Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[a_majoor]

Although it is the "Combat Team of Tomorrow", I am thinking of the "Combat Team of here and now" as well.

As for integral firepower, the old school German panzergrenadier (Gepanzert) companies in halftracks during the war had mortars and 75mm guns mounted on halftracks.  Pushing "fire support" assets to platoon level on a permanent basis might be going too low.  It may be easier to attach down using habitiual affiliation than it is to regroup from the bottom-up.

I suppose that could be argued either way, and indeed my concept can be done either way; Coyote "gunships" integrated in the Infantry unit, or habitually attached. Either way, the intent is to support the observations of LCol David Kilcullen that close combat is won by fire rather than manoeuvre (his experience indicated up to 3/4 of a company's assets were needed as a "firebase", while the US Marines used 2/3 of their company assets as "firebase" in OIF). True believers can substitute MGS for Coyote, but the known deficiencies of the MGS would make that problematic at best. American experience with the SBCT will give us some information to work with.

This is not a Cavalry organization per se (although it could be used as a Cavalry formation if mounted on LAV or similar vehicles).

Is anyone else out there aware that the MGS, ADATS and TUA are all eventually to be replaced by MMEV Version 3?  This MMEV will have a lot of plug and play weapon systems designed to be fitted to suit a particular mission or combat requirement.  While it is very conceptual still, I do not foresee a Combat Team having a TUA, MGS or ADATS element, it will have MMEV Version 3s kitted out for the specific mission and anticipated threat.  The term heavy, medium or light will reflect the weapons load on the MMEV Version 3 but the basic platform will stay the same.

Eventually the MMEV III will hit the units, but it only supplies one part of the firepower needed for the supression battle (i.e. long range heavy fire power directed against enemy fortifications and AFVs). LAV-TOW and ADATS can perform the task today, as long as everyone is aware they are essentially LOS weapons (Which would limit their utility in complex or urban terrain, since depth targets might not be visable to their gunners). Really MMEV III is the LAV-TOW firing the more advanced PGM missiles in the examples I posted previously (I simply wasn't aware of the MMEV III designation. I'm sure there is more in terms of advanced sights and targeting systems as well, but conceptually it serves the same purpose). Spike is only one of the several different FOG-M missiles and concepts available, although my understanding was Spike is man portable and has a range of 2500m, so it is one of the smaller ones availalbe.

The initial thrust of this thread was how a Combat Team would be able to operate without tanks and heavy armour protection. Simply trying to cherry pick weapons systems to subtitute for the tank wasn't sufficient (which is why the thread stalled for a long time), but the observations of LCol Kilcillen pointed the way to change organization and integrate situational awareness systems which allow the Combat Team of Tomorrow to be effective even when confronted with the need to conduct assaults under contact. This concept is not perfect, and is especially missing the engineer element to provide mobility. As well, the commander should be using the enhanced situational awareness to shape the battle in the time and place of his own choosing, reducing the need for direct assaults.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Our envisioned team will have excellent firepower and could decimate a Motor Rifle Regiment that is advancing across Centurion Field.  It will have problems, however, when it has to go to the offensive itself.  Even a good ISTAR process will have some enemy systems going undetected.  If our lead forces cannot take a hit we will have to rely on our ability to accept casualties. 

2B

 

[Infanteer]

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2003_W/AAJ_w_2003_05.pdf

Here is a good article about the "assault", probably the most crucial phase of military operations (its when the Infantry makes their paychecks).

 

[Zipper]

Great article Inf.

If there was ever a reason to keep the Leopard and armoured forces, then that paper was it.

One of the problems I see with a lot of our analysis here on Cavalry and LAV forces is that it seems to me that everyone is thinking of a fairly open environment (desert, plains, large open cities, etc...) where you can see and ID your enemy well before contact.

Maybe I'm wrong in this perception?

But after reading that article and his explanation of complex terrain (close jungle, forest, mountains, etc...), I do not believe we would have the luxury of this. The enemy will be right on top of us before we can "soften" him up with volume of fire from our MMEV's/MGS/TOW/etc. And that ISTAR and other fancy sensor systems will fine for the "open battle", but next to useless in complex terrain. Considering a great deal of Canada and other locals world wide are considered complex, I find our focus towards "lighter" forces rather short sighted as opposed to the Aussie examples.

As well with our current forces and their numbers (even with the supposed boost), we would not be able to engage in anything close to an assault, as we just do not have the tolerance (numbers or will) for casualties.

 

[plattypuss]

I have read the article from LCol Macillum and found it to be a good read.  Given his experience both in combat and trg he does not seem to have a strong concept of sense or ISTAR assets.  In his article, he depicts a battle during trg where it appears little effort was made to use sense assets, keeping in mind that even the individual soldier on the ground is a valuable sense platform.  It appears that the army went in almost blind with "little" valuable intel on enemy location or strength until hey came into contact although I would assume there was some.  Hopefully today, we would use the assets we have aval to gain the information to form a proper picture and then be capable of conducting the maneuverer that the LCol suggests is less valuable then the concept of suppression.  The enemy picture should be developed by sensor platforms (Coyote, UAV, ADATS) which although incapable of penetrating deep into the urban space should identify the recce gap in which to punch in further sensor platforms which in the future might be unmanned ground vehicles.  One of the most underrated sensor platforms in the urban battle is the sniper, who can infiltrate into the urban environment and provide excellent enemy intelligence.  Now what I have described could be used in his trg missions or where there is no artificial time limit imposed.
In terms of his real life situation which appears to have been a meeting engagement and the most likely form of engagement to be faced in combat where you do not have the time for a gradual build up of a sense picture, I don't have a ready answer. Ideally you could send the tanks in, which inevitably forces the enemy to reveal their hand but in this case we are talking of a combat team without tanks.  Once again UAVs would be an invaluable asset to act as your sense asset if aval (and have proved valuable in convoy ops in urban environments in Iraq).  In all cases it is always important to win the fire-fight and your intimate LAVs, ALAWS, CASW would help do that.

The concept of suppression as pointed out is not new, but there as in all options, a danger with sending in a smaller maneuver group and leaving most of the resources in a firebase, in the cases where the maneuver group itself comes into contact with another group of enemy and becomes pinned down and itself decimated by suppression.

Reference the Spike, I believe the type we were looking at was a Long range Spike with a range of much further, (I think out to 6K) but I can't find anything right now to back that up.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Infanteer,

Excellent article.  I've read three good ones in the last few months from that journal.  While the infantryman certainly earns his pay in the assault, so to speak, the tankers in the assault element and intimate support also face their most demanding tasks.  As a Troop Leader on Leopards one of my most demanding tasks was being in "intimate support", commanding hatches down with the enemy close up and friendly infantry right behind (and this was in peacetime).  Doing this took practice.

The lessons of tank/infantry cooperation were learned the hard way in WW II.  If tanks can take enemy fire then they can transform the assault force.  If they can't then the assault will only come with casualties.

Plattypuss,

Perhaps I am a skeptic, but I do not put too much faith in the ability of ISTAR to do away with finding the enemy the hard way.  In 2002/03 I was a tank sqn BC for several major exercises.  ISTAR was seen as a way to do away with advancing to contact.  It worked well if we were attacking enemy positions (target arrays) that were situated on forward slopes.  When we moved into more complex terrain against "live" opponents it became much harder.  I'm reading some Normandy book right now that show the same problems sixty years ago when an opponent is not obliging.

Recce Sqn and other ISTAR assets (UAVs, EW etc) can certainly find enemy positions, but it is somewhat unrealistic to count on them to find every system.  Use ISTAR to find the companies/platoons and then have the combat teams (with tanks) define the enemy by muckling on to them and destroying them.

My read of several OIF accounts tells me that the meeting engagement will be the norm.  Even with sophisticated ISTAR assets the coalition forces usually ended up attacking undefined enemies.

OEF also provides an example of the limitations of ISTAR.  I mentioned this in a thread on Thermal Imaging a couple of months ago.  The paper called "Afghanistan and the Future of Wafare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy" by Stephen Biddle is quite illuminating.  It was published in Nov 02 and is available online at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.  Two interesting quotes are as follows:

  "At Op ANACONDA an intensive pre-battle reconnaissance effort focused every available surveillance and target acquisiton system on a tiny, ten by ten kilometer battlefield.  Yet fewer than 50 percent of all the Al Queda positions ultimately identified in the course of the fighting were discovered prior to ground contact.  In fact, most fire received by US forces came from unseen, unanticipated al Qaeda fighting positions."

  "The answer is that the earth's surface remains an extremely complex environment with an abundance of natural and manmade cover and concealment available for those militaries capable of exploiting it."

ISTAR certainly has promise and gives our forces an advantage over others not similarilly equipped.  I do not think, however, that we can rely on it alone.

You mention artificial time limits.  Time is one of the things that is very short in battle (I think that Napolean had something to say about that). 

Our mounted forces can still participate across the spectrum of operations, but without tanks we will need to focus on different roles.

Cheers,

Iain

 

[Infanteer]

Plattypuss,

Give this a gander:

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/complex_warfighting.pdf

(yes, it is yet another Aussie document written by Col Kilcullen)

Specifically, page 6 regarding ISTAR Threshold.   I think he is quite right in identifying the fact that in complex warfighting, the enemy will often and successfully operate under our threshold - therefore, it is the assault and not the fancy-dancy stand-off MMEV battle we should be prepare for (sorry for the proselytizing).   2Bravo's post further substantiates this hunch (Steven Biddle is an excellent author, I reccomend his works), whether it is in the urban sprawl of Sadr City or in the mountains of Southern Afghanistan, trying to develop the battle picture is below any threshold we have now (and by the time we do develop it, the situation can be changed rapidly); thus fixing the enemy with close-battle suppression may be what is required to actually figure out what is going on (to tip the enemies hand, as you said).

My zwei pfennig
Infanteer

 

[Zipper]

Jeez, another great article Inf. Where do you get the time to find these things? ;D

You can be pretty darn sure that while ISTAR and other sensor systems are wonderful, that they are also being worked on to defeat as well. Much like computer anti-virus software, there is another stronger virus to beat it out there.

I agree that the previous article made it seem that they "blundered" into enemy contacts, and maybe sometime they did considering the jungle environment they were operating in. But more often then not, they had good ol' recce forces (snipers, recce squads, mud recce, etc) out front finding the bad guys in which to assault.

And that is where I think we are starting to make a bit of a blunder in staking our efforts on "technology" that can only go so far. Especially in complex terrain. It will always come down to an observant eye and feet on the ground to truly build a proper picture of what is ahead that can harm us.

The lessons hard won in the past should not be thrown away because of a new toy. Adapted in some way yes. Forgotten no.

 

[a_majoor]

Which kind of takes us full circle: ISTAR can't find everything, and the current suite of equipment isn't well suited to fight for information. For the forseeable future, CF Combat teams will attempt to find the enemy using ISTAR assets and techniques, but will certainly need organizational and TTP changes to come to grips with the enemy when they show up unexpectedly.

I forsee using ISTAR as a means of finding the broad outlines of the enemy, their nexus of activities, potential centres of gravity and so on, without being able to pinpoint thier exact locations. The combat team commander can use this information to plan his moves, and I would expect much of the future TTPs would resemble "reaction to enemy ambush". The combat team would have to move in a dispersed fashion to minimize enemy "effects", but each element would be able to follow Col Kilcullen's "move, observe, fire" dictate to pinpoint the enemy. The longer ranged elements and the "gunships" could move under the commander's direction to attack "depth" targets, while the small assault element prepares to attack.

The fear that the assault element will get "sucked in" and defeated is quite real, and the best defense I can think of is they have limited objectives, and once there, the rest of the team can "caterpiller" forward and prepare to either repeat the process (i.e. a series of limited assaults), or prepare for the follow up forces to pass through and exploit.

The use of dismounted troops and snipers is something that should be stressed more, one problem that I forsee with TUAVs and robotic vehicles is they will announce the presence of the combat team, and perhaps even allow a sophisticated enemy to deduce what the commander is planning (watching the pattern of the TUAVs doing sensor sweeps will alert the enemy to what the area of interest is, for example).

The logistical considerations that led to the demise of the tank and heavy AFVs in the CF will return under these conditions, we will need more soldiers on the ground and more surveillance assets in an attempt to substitute information for firepower. I already felt the "Combat team of Tomorrow" would be bigger than the present organization, and this simply confirms the manpower and equipment bill that will need to be paid to make the team effective. More manpower, more equipment, more resources. The "best" use for such a team that I can think of is to drive the enemy into isolated pockets within the AOR in an attempt to limit their actions, interactions and access to logistical support, and be prepared to support coalition heavy forces when they go in to reduce the pockets of enemy resistance. (It would be so much better if we could do it on our own, but for now...). Cities and urban areas are not "monolithic", and I can see wheeled/light forces finding areas where they can operate with some success, although their role will more closely resemble a mobile cordon to pin the enemy into defined areas.

If the "Combat Team of Tomorrow" resembles a Cavalry formation, then so be it. We have to work within the limits of our equipment, just think of ways to use it differently.

 

[plattypuss]

Infanteer - I am having some problems opening up the pdf document you linked to in your last post but hopefully it will fill in some of the holes once I get it to open. :blotto:

I think the point on the required increase in the number of boots on the ground is very true and I believe a look at the Stryker Brigade Combat Team validates this as they have increased significantly the number of infanteers.  The size of urban area that a CF organisation could realistically look at attacking and capturing would be surprisingly small.

I acknowledge that ISTAR will not find all enemy locations and positions but I think that the technology is new and as we use it more and more, we will naturally be able to use it more effectively which may not have been the case even in 02. 

I am not an expert on the matter nor do I have much time to read into the matter but my initial read of the LCols article sounded a lot like attrition warfare however I believe that the second article which I have yet to read will prove me wrong.  I agree that our forces will be niche and probably not well suited to the urban fight.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I wouldn't call LCol Kilkullen's article "The Essential Debate" attritionist.  I might call his proposal "methodical" in nature, with its focus on firepower.  This is not a criticism, per se, just an observation.  I like the basic notion of blasting the enemy from a number of directions as opposed to rushing in and trying to stab him.  "Move to shoot" is how I describe his philosophy (borrowing a phrase from someone else).

Going back to combined arms for a moment, are we now back to 1944 where dismounted infantry lead, supported by AFVs held back in firing positions?

I've talked this to death, but I'll return to my beloved Cavalry Team (version XXVIb):

  a.  SHQ (all arms in nature)
  b.  2 x Coyote Tps
  c.  2 x LAV Pls
  d.  1 x AT Tp (take your pick MGS/TUA/MMEV)
  e.  1 x Mortar Tp
  f.  1 x Sapper Tp
  g.  CSS Tp

Tps d. thru f. could be mission specific I suppose.  Mounted on wheeled AFVs and possessing a good number of dismounts this package can perform many tactical tasks across the spectrum of operations.  The one I do not want it to perform is assaults.  Against peer or neer-peer opponents (convetional warfighting) it will fight only to support its sense capability.  Its main role would be to provide security for other forces.

Cheers,

Iain

 

[Zipper]

That looks good Iain.

Are all those assets available in each squadron? Or as you said, would d thru f be regimental assets that plug and play into whichever squadron(s) needed those assets the most?

Now that I look at it a little longer, wouldn't the mortar trp be better at regimental level and only d and f be better as mission specific? Don't know if that means anything, but...

As well, why do you keep dedicated vehicles per trp as opposed to mixing and matching them so that all trp's within the squadron perform in a similar fashion? They seem rather mission specific.

Thanks

 

[George Wallace]

Since time immoral, armies have been using deception to confuse their enemies.  As weapons systems have evolved so has surveillance systems.  At the same time more sophisticated methods have been developed to defend against weapons systems, as well as surv systems.  In WW II whole manufacturing facilities were camouflaged to look like rural country side, inflatable tanks and other vehicles were deployed to confuse enemy reconnaissance.  As technology advances in one direction, it is also advancing in another.  ISTAR is a tool.  It is not the be all, end all that many hope it to be.  There are many effective means to defeat surv systems; some are natural, some are the ingenuity of the enemy.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Zipper,

While the various Tps/Pls could be force generated from different units, I would see them training together as a team before deployment.  The Sqn would be laid out as listed above.  A Regt or Task Force would have one or more such Cav Sqns/Teams.  Regt would focus on ISTAR and coordinating higher level assets (UAVs, EW et al).

I guess my Mortar Tp could be talked down in size.  I would like the Cav Sqn to have organic indirect firepower, and perhaps a small Tp of 4 tubes might work.  The Cav will be operating across a wide frontage, so I would like the mortars pushed down to Sqn level.  Centralized mortars would have a hard time supporting multiple Sqns.  Perhaps a gun battery could be included at Regt level, although again ranges might be a problem for a dispersed unit.  The Sappers are a bit of an indulgence, but their presence would be a huge benefit across the spectrum (and perhaps even more so at the" lower" end).

I've kept the Tps "pure" on paper, although they may well task organize.  I ee the Sqn/Coy as the focal point.  Within the Cav Team you could form Tp/Pl affiliations and practice smaller combined arms groupings.  A smaller grouping for a given task might have a Patrol of Coyotes, a Platoon of Infantry and a section of MGS.  Keeping them as Tps and Pls, however, allows them to be employed as "pure" organizations as well.  Sometimes it is easier to push down attachments than it is to draw them up.

I guess I'm hijacking this thread.  There are many possible combinations.  My main argument, however, is that the Combat Team without tanks is more suited to a Cavalry role than a general purpose combat role.  It can still fight, but as part of the security battle.  Call it a Cavalry Team and we can make an important and achievable contribution to coalition warfighting.

Cheers,

2B  

 

[a_majoor]

I guess much of the disagreement which remains is more concerned with roles rather than equipment or TTPs. 2Bravo's proposed Cavalry Squadron is a pretty close approximation to some of the "Combat Teams" I have scribbled on various napkins, and I certainly agree that the ideal is to avoid butting heads if at all possible, but rather to shape the battle before contact with manoeuvre and long range fire power if you can.

Maybe it is just the Infantry orientation in me, but a Combat or Cavalry Team without the means to "close with and destroy the enemy" seems to be a very poor niche player. Would the US Army or Marines really want an organization which cannot fight as part of their coallition? Hand waving about the security battle, "three block war", rear area security tasks and so on will not go over very well when the reality is enemies can and will operate in all these environments, popping out of holes or other places where he is concealed from our ISTAR assets (or even USING these assets against us; if it becomes routine to lead convoys or advancing troops with UAVs, how long before they "template" us and lay mines, IEDs and ambushes to be triggered after the overflight [for example]).

I will concede that the Combat Team of Tomorrow, even enriched with sensors, "gunships" and long range PGMs isn't the ideal means of fighting the close contact battle, but it had better be able to fight, and fight well, otherwise it is a waste of time for our coalition partners and a deadly game of Russian Roulette for the poor soldiers operating within the organization.

 

[Zipper]

Couldn't agree with you more Majoor.

2B - Ok I see where your coming from now with the mortars. Keeping them at squadron level makes alot of sense by allowing each to have the additional fire support. Do you see us actually picking up the required number of vehicles though? I hope so. And I agree with you on the sappers. A very valuable asset that doesn't seem to be fully recognized as much these days. To aggressive perhaps?

I've kept the Tps "pure" on paper, although they may well task organize.  I ee the Sqn/Coy as the focal point.  Within the Cav Team you could form Tp/Pl affiliations and practice smaller combined arms groupings.  A smaller grouping for a given task might have a Patrol of Coyotes, a Platoon of Infantry and a section of MGS.  Keeping them as Tps and Pls, however, allows them to be employed as "pure" organizations as well.  Sometimes it is easier to push down attachments than it is to draw them up.

I guess the part about this that I see as maybe causing problems is that by keeping everything so liquid, you have no real solid focus for training, and would have to get used to many different people/organizations. It would be very much like we have now with our ad hoc formations thrown together for each and every overseas mission. Is there any way of making up a trp/sqn to offer the best mix as possable and still keep the homogeneous nature of a unit together so that training and missions are keeping everyone together? That way less confusion and higher training standards.

As for the Cav role as opposed to GP role without actual tanks. I would agree. But as majoor said, they had better be able to fight if suddenly set upon.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Zipper,

Permanent all-arms groupings would have certain advantages, but I need to be somewhat realistic with my expectations.  As long as the Cavalry Sqn Team gets several months of workup training then we should be good to go.  All the pieces exist except for the AT Troop.  Whether its MGS, LAV TOW, MMEV 3 or some other beast, we do not yet have a wheeled AT vehicle.  Putting TOW on the LAVs and Coyotes would help, but that's another thread!

AMajoor,

This team would still be able to fight, although if they ever fix bayonets something has gone very wrong.

I put in infantry to give this Cav Team additional teeth.  This team is robust and can indeed engage in combat.  What it cannot do is march shoulder to shoulder with a US Unit equipped with M1s conducting assaults against prepared positions.  That being said it can offer many attractive capabilities to US or UK coalition partners.  A Cav Task Force (two or three Sqn Teams) would be a welcome addition to a USMC or Army Division.

This team or Task Force could operate up front, clearing enemy security elements and finding centres of resistance.  A Cavalry Sqn Team or Task Force could guard the flank of an advancing US division, finding and killing enemy forces trying to get at the CSS elements from the flanks.  A Cav Sqn Team could find and kill irregulars in Toyotas.  It could also provide warning of conventional counter-attacks.  Indeed, given its integral infantry, AT and indirect fire assets it could maul a conventional mechanized force attacking from a flank.  Coyotes, MMEVs, TOW, MGS and ALAWs are very well suited to this kind of engagement.  This team could also be a very robust Rear Area Security force.  It would also be very welcome during the stabilty phase of an operation when conventional fighting has stopped.  The integral infantry and sappers would enhance this team's abililty to operate in complex terrain, although the frontage that the team could cover would be reduced.

Again, I see this force performing classic Cavalry tasks along the lines of Stuart and Buford, not Lucan or Raglan.  Buford is my ideal Cavalryman.  Perhaps I am betraying my own regimental roots here as I've been reading some of my South Africa 1900 history books again. 

Cheers,

Iain

 

[Old Sweat]

Iain,

Your comments re the South African War struck a chord with me. I have long been a fan of that war, especially the mobile or guerilla phase following the capture of Pretoria. As you are probably aware, the British army transformed itself from an infantry-heavy force organized in divisions into a mobile force formed into mounted, all arms columns. By the end of the war half of the army was employed in these groupings, while the remainder garrisioned supply depots, protected the railways and manned the blockhouse lines.

 

[a_majoor]

Strangely enough, there was an article in the CAJ Vol 7 No 1: "The Urban Web; an operational concept for offensive operations in the urban sprawl of the 21rst century" by LCol W.D. Eyre, which advocated an updated version of the mobile phase of the South African War; with high tech "blockhouse lines" and mobile all arms columns dividing the city into bite sized pieces to separate enemy forces and isolate them in gradually contracting areas.

Perhaps the best compromise between the Armoured Cavalry Team and Combat Team of Tomorrow would be the swapping of two modular elements: A Cavalry Team would use Coyote based "Gunships" and ligh sapper sections in LAV carriers, while a Combat Team would need true Engineer support, and (hopefully) a developed version of the MGS which has at a minimum fire on the move capability and a large internal "magazine".

This leads to some interesting ideas as well: a mech Infantry BN or "Cavalry" Regiment would have the basic combined arms company/squadron as the "standard" for training and bonding, while Engineers and DFS regimental personnel would exist in separate sub units for training and admin, and do the "modular" plug and play depending on the situation. This is starting to edge into the "Future Regiments and Alternative Formations" thread, where we need to group enough assets together so they can live and work as a team, with the actual "plug and play" being chosen at a fairly low level (The Combat Team/Cavalry Team commander makes the request for heavy/light support). Bring on the modular Manoeuvre Battalion!

Just a quick foray into the CSS aspect; convoy protection in the Viet Nam war was often done by American MPs in Cadillac Gage "Commando" 4X4 LAVs. Bringing that concept on line would free up some combat arms assets and alow the CSS convoys/packets more freedom of action in an asymmetrical battlefield.

If anyone gets a chance, see if these ideas can be wargamed into J-CATS, Simnet, TACOPS or other simulations to see if we are on to something or just talking through our hats.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

For me, our Combat Team of tomorrow is the Cavalry Team.  Our allies can continue to field "Combat Teams" as we have known them with tanks, mech inf and breaching assets.  I think, however, that we need to re-adjust our sights a little.

The Cavalry Team as quickly laid out above has a decent mix of firepower assets.  I'm vague on the AT Tp, but perhaps MGS could fit the bill.  My bottom line is that it can fight and would actually be quite robust in certain theatres/situations.  When required it could fight to obtain information, or guard a friendly formation's flank.  It should be remembered, however, that it is vulnerable.

The composition of the HQ element will be a contentious issue.  It is a big organization, however, and perhaps it does need a large sub-unit HQ element.  There is precendence for having two "OCs".  I'm going to avoid this one for now.

Old Sweat,

Perhaps we (the royal We of the West) need to go back and look at the little wars of the British Empire.  Things have changed, but I think that there are some lessons to be gleaned.

Cheers,

Iain