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Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
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2Bravo said:
To me, the Cavalry role represents an inversion of sorts from our old method.  The tank/LAV battlegroup sensed in order to act.  The Cavalry will act in order to sense.  That act will also be limited in scope.

A bit of a philosophical point, but I would have thought the distinctions were reversed: a Combat team "acted" to "sense"; since advance to contact is simply that: advancing (act) to contact (sense) the enemy. The combat team commander simply had to be able to react at warp speed once contact was made. I always thought ti was the mark of a good combat team commander to be able to launch the attack in under 20 min from the lead troop's "Contact, wait out".

The cavalry team, however it is laid out, seems to be designed to follow the "Force Employment Concept for the Army" by "..lead with sensors, follow up with effects and exploit with soldiers" (pg 10). This would seem to put sense firmly in the driver's seat, with a greater or lesser amount of "act" available depending on the type and employment of issues kit. Cavalry team commanders will probably have to use their long range weapons to shape the battle while manoeuvreing to refuse contact.
 
When Gen Devlin had 2 CMBG, he made a point of the fact that his Bde would never ever advance to contact - and lets face it, why would you, if you didn't have to.  His statement was meant to focus attention on winning the infowar - act only once one has sensed.  That is where we are heading with the mech inf - and that is what we need to plan for.

Dave
 
PPCLI Guy said:
When Gen Devlin had 2 CMBG, he made a point of the fact that his Bde would never ever advance to contact - and lets face it, why would you, if you didn't have to.   His statement was meant to focus attention on winning the infowar - act only once one has sensed.   That is where we are heading with the mech inf - and that is what we need to plan for.

I think Mark C had some good comments on that whole pipe-dream.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/18535.0.html

A rough reading of most of the conflict going on today seems to point towards "sense" never surviving first contact - all it takes is one Hadji hiding with an RPG to throw off the entire estimation.

It seems that the advantage of the M1 in urban combat is that they can take a hit - implying that the US Army, the most adequately kiitted and supplied on the face of the Earth, still needs to "Advance to Contact" in order to get things done, so I'm unsure of how we in Canada are going to skip that part....

In Military Power, Stephen Biddle asserts that we've been fighting under the same "Force Employment" paradigm since WWI - that of cover and concealment, dispersion, small-unit action, and increasingly lethal firepower.   Because of this, all the RMA Theories (of which "No Act before 100% Sense" would be one of them) are bunk - until technology is developed which is capable of defeating modern system Force Employment, essentially sensors that negate the effects of terrain (which are far off from today), then we won't be leaving behind the paradigm, or Advance to Contact, anytime soon.

My Opinion,
Infanteer
 
AMajoor,

To me, the classic Combat Team or Battlegroup was focused on "Act", in that it was usually trying to seize an objective or clear an axis between boundaries.  Advancing to contact was the key method of defining the enemy but after (hopefully) recce had at least found the enemy positions (but not necessarily in detail).  The recce elements were there to enable the tanks/infantry to destroy the enemy.  It is in this aspect that I say that "We sensed to act."  Recce found the enemy platoon in order for the combat team to destroy it.

With a Cavalry unit, (in my opinion), the unit will usually only Act in order to enable the sense (such as winning the counter-reconnaissance battle).  The Cavalry unit might shoot up an isolated enemy security position in order to get the recce elements past but will not go looking for platoons or companies to attack.  In the bigger sense, the Cavalry unit will be "sensing" in order to enable the supported formation to "act." 

PPCLI Guy,

I agree that act should be preceeded by sense, but I also agree with Infanteer that we should not pin our hopes on complete enemy SA.  Each level of recce should attempt to find the enemy for its commander but there should not be an expectation of complete enemy SA.  The combat troops will still "advance to contact" but with at least some idea of where the enemy is.

I am still a believer in "advancing to contact" if only because it is a necessity.  When a tank sqn leads a combat team advance the lead troops will define the enemy in great detail while engaging it.  Tanks are well suited to this kind of engagement and few other systems are.  Recce and other ISTAR assets can find the enemy positions but leave the definition up to the combat systems.  I was on several exercises in 02/03 that tried to dispense with advancing to contact and I think that we were somewhat optimistic in our ability to gain the required SA on the enemy.  Advancing to contact with tanks means that we get a good grip on the enemy before attacking, and having heavy armour allows our plan to survice the odd enemy position that hides from the sensors.  Please note that I'm not saying that the Leopard C2 fit this bill!

The Canadian Army has placed great hopes on ISTAR but I do not think that ISTAR will allow us to conduct mounted assaults with LAV IIIs and long range missiles.  AARs from recent conflicts seem to indicate that many enemy positions will remain undisclosed to our sensors.  I believe that the advance to contact will still be required, while the mounted assaults without tanks will be a very dicey affair.

Our mounted forces do have strengths (particularily in the sense department).  They are fast on good going, have decent firepower and moderate protection.  I suggest that we focus on these strengths but leave the mounted "act" for our coalition allies' heavy forces.

Cheers,

2B
 
I said:
When Gen Devlin had 2 CMBG, he made a point of the fact that his Bde would never ever advance to contact - and lets face it, why would you, if you didn't have to.   His statement was meant to focus attention on winning the infowar - act only once one has sensed.   That is where we are heading with the mech inf - and that is what we need to plan for.

I think Mark C had some good comments on that whole pipe-dream.

Yep - pretty thorough routing of what I seem to have been saying above - I guess I just didn't say it right...

A rough reading of most of the conflict going on today seems to point towards "sense" never surviving first contact - all it takes is one Hadji hiding with an RPG to throw off the entire estimation.

Sense is relative - and nowhere did I say that we should rely on total SA, rather that we should sense before we acted.   I am speaking of the mindset, not the skillset.   In A to C, one acts in order to sense.   I'm not sure we should make that our bread and butter any more, specifically given the resounding lack of a ring of steel.

In Military Power, Stephen Biddle asserts that we've been fighting under the same "Force Employment" paradigm since WWI - that of cover and concealment, dispersion, small-unit action, and increasingly lethal firepower.

I wholeheartedly agree with that statement.

Because of this, all the RMA Theories (of which "No Act before 100% Sense" would be one of them) are bunk - until technology is developed which is capable of defeating modern system Force Employment, essentially sensors that negate the effects of terrain (which are far off from today), then we won't be leaving behind the paradigm, or Advance to Contact, anytime soon.

Not so sure that "no act before 100% sense" is an element of any part of the RMA that I have studied.   It isn't as cut and dry as that - as my favorite dead German would have said if he was posting here:   Don't forget about friction dumkopf!   Any theory that is based on 100% knowledge is bound to fail - as is any tactic predicated on that kind of certainty.

I agree that act should be preceeded by sense, but I also agree with Infanteer that we should not pin our hopes on complete enemy SA.   Each level of recce should attempt to find the enemy for its commander but there should not be an expectation of complete enemy SA.   The combat troops will still "advance to contact" but with at least some idea of where the enemy is.

Again - we will never have complete SA.   However, without a ring of steel, why would we still advance to contact?   And if we needed to act in order to sense, then surely there are better ways to do it, particulalry with the equipment and capabilties that we have?

I am still a believer in "advancing to contact" if only because it is a necessity.   When a tank sqn leads a combat team advance the lead troops will define the enemy in great detail while engaging it.   Tanks are well suited to this kind of engagement and few other systems are.

At the risk of sounding sarcastic..thats nice.   However, we don't have tanks.   Lets change our tactics to suit.   We used to have horses, and we eventually stopped doing cavalry charges, right?

The Canadian Army has placed great hopes on ISTAR but I do not think that ISTAR will allow us to conduct mounted assaults with LAV IIIs and long range missiles.   AARs from recent conflicts seem to indicate that many enemy positions will remain undisclosed to our sensors.

If that is the conclusion that will be drawn from this latest linear and conventional battle (veering to unconventional Infanteer), then we better start figuring out how we are going to close with and destroy the enemy - even if it means not doing mounted attacks.   We have to fight our way out of our own box, and throw down the shackles of history and corps identities ferchrissakes.

I believe that the advance to contact will still be required, while the mounted assaults without tanks will be a very dicey affair.

Ack.   See above.   No tanks.

Our mounted forces do have strengths (particularily in the sense department).   They are fast on good going, have decent firepower and moderate protection.   I suggest that we focus on these strengths but leave the mounted "act" for our coalition allies' heavy forces.

Agreed.   We have already given up on the charade that we were up for high-intensity combat with a near peer enemy (without MLRS, a capable tank, and attack aviation, we were just kidding ourselves - although one could argue whether there were any real near-peers).   Governmental policy and the Army strategy all speak of mid-intensity combat operations, so lets stop pretending, and get on with sorting out how we are going to do it.

A bit of a rant here, but as I see it, we have two options: get out, or get on with sorting out how to morph legacy equipment into a fighting force fit for employment in the Future Security Environment.

Dave
 
Alright. I have two questions then...

PPCLI Guy said:
Sense is relative - and nowhere did I say that we should rely on total SA, rather that we should sense before we acted.  I am speaking of the mindset, not the skillset.  In A to C, one acts in order to sense.  I'm not sure we should make that our bread and butter any more, specifically given the resounding lack of a ring of steel.

Again - we will never have complete SA.  However, without a ring of steel, why would we still advance to contact?  And if we needed to act in order to sense, then surely there are better ways to do it, particularly with the equipment and capabilities that we have?

At the risk of sounding sarcastic..thats nice.  However, we don't have tanks.  Lets change our tactics to suit.  We used to have horses, and we eventually stopped doing cavalry charges, right?

So if we are not going to attempt A to C, but we still need to act to to sense. What are our choices? As we all know, to recce a position sometimes requires sticking the branch in the hornets nest and seeing what comes out (Forced recce). Do we "sense" up to contact range and then throw a few missiles or 25mm rounds their way, run away and see how they react with with a few selectively placed ISTAR units?

PPCLI Guy said:
If that is the conclusion that will be drawn from this latest linear and conventional battle (veering to unconventional Infanteer), then we better start figuring out how we are going to close with and destroy the enemy - even if it means not doing mounted attacks.  We have to fight our way out of our own box, and throw down the shackles of history and corps identities ferchrissakes.

Agreed.  We have already given up on the charade that we were up for high-intensity combat with a near peer enemy (without MLRS, a capable tank, and attack aviation, we were just kidding ourselves - although one could argue whether there were any real near-peers).  Governmental policy and the Army strategy all speak of mid-intensity combat operations, so lets stop pretending, and get on with sorting out how we are going to do it.

A bit of a rant here, but as I see it, we have two options: get out, or get on with sorting out how to morph legacy equipment into a fighting force fit for employment in the Future Security Environment.

And since our choice of equipment and such is rather on the disorganized and "un-proven" side. Are we even pretending that could even participate in a mid-intensity combat operation? Hell even with Afghanistan, we were kept away from the more dangerous missions with our Allies. Whats to say with the new foreign/defense review that we will even BE tasked anywhere near mid-intensity situations? I guess time will tell.
 
Dave,

Perhaps I am violently agreeing with you.  I have made my peace with the tank issue  ;) and am quite happy in the reconnaissance world.  I agree wholeheartedly that we need to adapt to our new structure.  I became a believer in the LAV/Coyote overseas and these forces excell at security/stability operations.  I think that reconaissance and surveillance are also tasks that they can do very well even in a conventional warfighting scenario.  My only point (if I indeed have one) is that we need to accept that the loss of the tank means that the Mech Inf need to adapt as well for conventional operations.  Part of this adaptation should perhaps include a new role (closing with and destroying the enemy may have to modified somewhat) and not simply new tactics.  

I have been wondering about what a mid-intensity conflict is at the tactical level.  If what this really means is that we optimize our forces for the asymetric/unconventional fight somewhere between Kabul and Fallujah then I would say that that is a achievable and important goal.  If our enemy is insurgents/terrorists then we going in the right direction, and LAV-borne infantry can be "war-winners" in this conflict. We will have an army that is relevant to the security environment and the the missions that it will likely receive.    

I think that our LAV/Coyote force can operate across the spectrum of conflict if it is used the right way (focused on sense and not act at the higher end of the conflict spectrum).  If this means a bit of a "niche" role then so be it.  As an aside, I feel that even the Leopard C2 equipped army should also make this adaptation.

I am starting to beat this old horse to death, so please apologize my own little rant!

Cheers,

Iain
 
Looks like I was just spoiling for a fight or something.... ;D

[wandering rant mode]

I don't think we should get wrapped around the low/mid/high intensity axles because they do us no good.   For some reason, some here are assuming that high intensity means full-on mechanized warfare (against a near-peer foe; who is that these days anyways?).   To the Ranger in Mogadishu, the Special Forces soldier in the Pashtun Mountains or the Columbian Jungles or the Rifleman in Kandahar or Fallujah, once the two-way range lights up, it is nothing short of "high-intensity" for the grunt on the ground.

This is why I have always preferred (and encourage the use of) "density" instead of "intensity".   Missions today continue to exist along the "density spectrum" - from "Low Density" (rooting out Al Qaeda forces in Southern Afghanistan) to Mid-Density (the city battle in Fallujah) to High-Density (such as 1st MarDiv and 3rd InfDiv against the Republican Guard outside of Baghdad).   How does Canada fit into this spectrum?

With regards to "Low Density" missions, I feel we have the ability and the raw material to expand on this mission set.   Our Soldiers maintain an excellent level of individual skills and, in general, are extremely fit and agile, able to conduct operations over arduous and difficult terrain.   "Light Force" doctrine can evolve from simply "trackless Infantry" to a truly "niched" force (as in not being a "General Purpose" force).   I still think we are in the advance to contact game.   We are more then capable of launching an advance to contact to sweep insurgents and terrorists off of mountainsides and out of caves as we did in Op Apollo.   I believe with a dedicated Light Force (SOC-capable) doctrine we are able to maintain this capability in a "Step-Child of Chechnya" type of conflict.   This is not "getting out"; this is, as Dave pointed out, "sorting out how to morph legacy equipment into a fighting force fit for employment in the Future Security Environment."

As for the "Son of Iraq", the "High-Density" arena, we are not "getting out" - we are again morphing.   Canada will not (in the near future), and has never, conducted "High-Density", Modern System operations outside of a coalition context.   I've argued that it is silly to try and maintain this specific capability now, but I'd venture that we've been out of the "Heavy Force" game longer then we care to admit, with JaDex only managing to preserve a threadbare Armoured capability in the 1970's (1 battalion's worth of 50-ton tanks - c'mon, let's not kid ourselves).   Let us realistically assume that since at least the 1950's or '60's, we've never been a world class heavy force.   Just as we would have been paltry standing in with the British Army on the Rhine, we aren't going to be spearheading US 1st Armoured Division any time soon.

However, this doesn't mean that we are useless or have to "get out" of the High-Density game.   We have a real, combat-tested capability in the LAV III, and I feel that all the idea of LAV CAV that are being bounced around these threads are definitely on to something.   Again, the Marines have gained much out of their LAR's and the US Stryker Brigades are up to the challenge - they still must advance and fight, only they must be applied more dexterously in an operational setting to ensure the A-to-C is capable of effecting victory rather then smashing up on a "surface".   "High Density" operations are unique and complex affairs, and although we may not be on the tip of the spear in these sorts of operations, we aren't excluded from finding a very effective and realistic role along some other part of the weapon.

As for "Mid Density" conflict, I think this may prove to be the biggest challenge as the requirement can demand a bit from both Force Structures.   Some of the battles in Iraq are very good at pointing this out, while many more "loose" conflicts such as the Al-Aqsa Intifada or driving the Taliban from Afghanistan serve as other examples.   There is no "low-density" nature to these situations - the point of conflict and the opposing force are quite obvious to those going in and control of a specific area is usually integral to the mission.   These types of operations may demand a mix of skill sets from our forced that are "niched" towards "High" and "Low" density operations or they may not - the American AAR's from Fallujah are showing this to be the case.   In our theoretical case, it may be Light Forces moving throughout an urban environment with LAV CAV rolling up to provide immediate firepower to fix and destroy the bad guys.   Or the operations may involve LAV CAV rapidly shifting positions to serve as a blocking force (an anvil) for enemy C2 structures being pushed out of a surrounding complex environment by Air-Assaulting Light Forces.

In all three operational settings, there is no "getting out."   Tactically, we still fight the same way that our predecessors fought in the fields of Flanders and France - by getting close to the enemy, rooting him out, and killing him.   I'm not to sure where I'm going with this counter-rant, only that I feel that we are selling ourselves short if we feel we have to "drop out" of any specific type of conflict.   Regardless of kit, Canada's tough and well-trained soldiers should be able to squeeze into operations and offer unique or important capability sets along the spectrum of combat (as well as the spectrum of conflict).

Infanteer

[/wandering rant mode]
 
I agree with PPCLI guy on several issues.
(1) Tanks are getting the pink slip. For the fiftieth time, GET OVER IT !!!

(2) ISTAR is still in its infancy. We already have TWO types of UAV for the CF. In the near future, we may go with 4 classes of UAV as the yanks are planning.

(3) The MMEV may or may not work. We shall see.

(4) The TUA is a very effective and proven vehicle (I am a TOW Gunner with TUA M113 expirience), Beleive me getting new TOW missiles (especially 4 KM missiles) is going to greatly enhance our capability. I remember a few times on ex being tucked away in a well hidden overwatch position and our crew realizing we could take out several enemy vehicles and infantry (the TUA has a C6 co-axial). However the crew commander would comment that we are just providing overwatch let the tanks do their thing. Keep in mind the TOW 2B is 3,750m effective range. I have also seen video shots of Fallujah where the bradley was using the TOW missile in an OBUA scenario.

(5) A to C, if at all possible, there are better ways to avoid this scenario. I remember countless times of sending out Recce patrols and OPs on exercise to determine the enemy location ( yeah even on mech ex) and then sending in a deliberate attack vice a quick attack.

(6) Mid intensity conflict? I  have no doubt we could hop along with our allies and fight in a mid intensity conflict. The most important weapon is the highly trained and equiped Infantryman, not the tank, the IFV or anything else.

(7) If finally get the CASW and the ALAWS in, thats is going to level some of the playing field. So for the monkey tanks, don't worry about IF we get javelin.
 
ArmyRick said:
(4) The TUA is a very effective and proven vehicle (I am a TOW Gunner with TUA M113 expirience), Beleive me getting new TOW missiles (especially 4 KM missiles) is going to greatly enhance our capability. I remember a few times on ex being tucked away in a well hidden overwatch position and our crew realizing we could take out several enemy vehicles and infantry (the TUA has a C6 co-axial). However the crew commander would comment that we are just providing overwatch let the tanks do their thing. Keep in mind the TOW 2B is 3,750m effective range. I have also seen video shots of Fallujah where the bradley was using the TOW missile in an OBUA scenario.

(5) A to C, if at all possible, there are better ways to avoid this scenario. I remember countless times of sending out Recce patrols and OPs on exercise to determine the enemy location ( yeah even on mech ex) and then sending in a deliberate attack vice a quick attack.

ArmyRick has demonstrated we already have the elements of "Cavalry" TTPs and doctrine, all we need to do is apply it to the LAV kit that we have/are getting. LAV-TOW operating in overwatch, perhaps in conjunction with Coyotes and UAVs support the advance, while actual Cavalry operations will resemble point 5, with the big difference being everyone is mounted, and we will be doing recces and preps for deliberate attacks on the move to get inside a potential enemy OODA loop.
 
Infanteer,

I'm glad you picked up on my question regarding "mid-intensity."  While it can perhaps exist at the strategic level I do not see tactical conflict as definable by intensity.  I certainly agree that our light forces can conduct the normal infantry role and associated tasks, although they need to operate in the right kind of terrain.  It is our Mech Inf that need to adapt in my opinion.

Army Rick,

A LAV company or battalion could certainly deal with an armoured threat in a defensive setting, particularily once they get ALAWs.  Again, it is offensive operations about which I have concerns.  If the plan is to walk up on foot after an intensive ISTAR effort then perhaps we just go with light infantry.  I am over the tanks getting their "pink slips", but I am not sure that everybody has really absorbed what that meant.

All,

In a Cavalry role the infantry would still have LAV IIIs and LAV TOW and work in conjunction with the Coyotes and other dedicated ISTAR assets.  The "mounted" infantry would still be the dedicated "killers" in the hunter/killer concept.  All I am saying is that assaulting enemy positions would not be in the play book.  We could certainly snipe away at the armoured vehicles in an enemy position if they are obliging enough to give us long range opportunities.  We can provide the TA for fires. 

If any here were on the old CF board I posted a rather long-winded thread in Nov 03 about how the LAV/MGS battlegroup could conduct operations.  I figured that we could probably do a good job of finding the enemy.  We'd have to go slow and try to exploit sensors such as the Coyote mast (which is a big pain in mobile operations) and UAVs.  We would then bring up our TOW and MMEV to pick apart the enemy vehicles, most likely covering the move-in of the missile systems with artillery fire.  MGS could then establish the firebase to pound the enemy position with HESH etc to cover the assault.

The first big problem that I saw was that we had very limited breaching abilities.  Minefields, wire and ditches would pretty much have to cleared by hand. 

The next was that any enemy vehicles that remain undetected (which is possible, particularily if they are in reverse slopes or trying to get key-hole shots down wadis) etc would be able to do a lot of damage to the LAVs.  A T-55 that lay hidden would be a big problem once the assault force moves past where the firebase can see.  The assault force tanks were the ones who would normally deal with these opponents.  I know, get over the pink slips...

Another issue is the amount of time that this would take.  We can assume this one away here but perhaps not as easily in the real world if we have flanking forces or an advancing formation to our rear.

An interesting variation is that the LAV/MGS company team could "hustle" an enemy security element out of its position with a combination of fire and manouevre.  Of course, if the enemy consists of a platoon of BTRs in the open without an obstacle then perhaps we have found the right enemy.

Cheers,

2B

p.s. I was on a JCATs ex a couple of weeks ago where I had a LAV company with two Recce Sqns.  I used the Javelin/ALAWS (four in the company) as our AT resource.  We would basically walk up the Javelins to hit the T55s.  It can work but it is very slow and relies on the enemy not moving or having infantry protecting his tanks.
 
This all sounds awesome.

ArmyRick said:
(6) Mid intensity conflict? I have no doubt we could hop along with our allies and fight in a mid intensity conflict. The most important weapon is the highly trained and equipped Infantryman, not the tank, the IFV or anything else.

Couldn't agree more. Now the problem is getting the Government to agree. The chance of them being willing to send "our boys" into the line of fire that this may encompass is is some ways few and far between. Of course, the enemy may have other plans.

2B - Like above. What are the chances of our Government sending us into a "offensive" operation? LAV wise that is? I know we have to train for such things and be equipped to deal with such, but the chances of us actually using such skills? I don't know.

I liked the way you wrote that above scenario. However, wouldn't you want your Cav forces to be far more mobile? And not setting itself down for anything like a fire base mission? Especially if we're operating in conjunction with Allies who are probably better (and heavier) equipped to do so themselves.

I think your "hustle" idea probably works best. If best can describe any battle situation... ::)
 
Some US Army thoughts on how to do Cavalry with LAVs:

"Cavalry for the Interim Force. A Proposal for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment" by Col Kevin C.M. Benson, Armor, Jan-Feb 2002 pg15-18 http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/jf02/1benson02.pdf

The author is describing a formation about as big as a Canadian Brigade (CCBG?), which makes sense given the requirment for the unit to sometimes operate alone (economy of force), to cover a projected 100X100 km AOR and have the C4I capabilities to connect with higher formations or do "reachback" to national level assets.

"The Stryker Equipped Cavalry Squadron in an Urban Environment" by Sgt First Class Andrew L Barteky, Armour, July August 2003 pg 26-30, 36, http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/ja03/4barteky03web.pdf

This article is focused on Urban Ops. The author is well aware of the limitations of TUAVs and the surveillance system in complex terrain, and advocates using dismounted troops to fill in the gaps and exploit sensor "hits". The Stryker is not seen as a fighting vehicle, but rather a "mount" to give the troops a certain amount of tactical mobility, and better protection against small arms fire and light anti-tank weapons or IEDs than a troop equipped with armoured HMMVWs.

Some differences to the way we do business are the inclusion of organic EW and HUMINT assets, as well as a larger proportion of "heavy" weapons, ranging from Javelin Fire and Forget missiles for the dismounts to 120mm mortars (although the authour makes a case for adding 60mm mortars to the mix, given the 120 has issues with minimum range and safe distance. Perhaps vehicle mounted 81mm is a good compromise?)

The author also understands the limitations of the Stryker equipped Cavalry, the paradigm "See First, Understand First, Act First and Finish Decicisivly" often means manoeuvring out of contact to set up better conditions for engagement.

Interesting reads
 
Quote from: Infanteer on May 22, 2005, 04:58:59
Next, give this article a read - very good stuff ...

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2003_W/AAJ_w_2003_04.pdf

My overall impression is that the article does a great job of summing up the nuts-and-bolts of the tactical battle the Infantry will face.�  To sum it up:

1) Suppression is the key to winning the tactical battle.

2) Maneuver remains essential before and after the battle - it is required to "set up" a tactical victory by finding the right points and to secure the tactical victory by properly exploiting the gains of the battle.

I have circled back to this thread since it ties in some of the meandering I was doing in "Future Armour" and "Thinking about the Infantry attack"

In all cases, light , medium or heavy forces, we will need to equip the troops with a means of Manoeuvre. The model of close combat is a series of actions against local strong points and bunkers, using high volume of fire (or magic bullet PGMs) to suppress the enemy and break his will, allowing the unit to advance.

Light forces will need air or Helicopter mobility, or alternatively some sort of tactical vehicle with similar characteristics to the HMMVW. This gives them the ability to get in and out; setting up the tactical victory and allowing them to exploit the gains of the battle. This also provides a means to win the suppression battle, since vehicles can transport extra weapons and ammunition, and act as firing platforms as well.  HMMVW sized vehicles have been demonstrated with almost every IF and DF weapons station imaginable (missiles, machine guns, cannons and AGLs), and while we can argue about the relative virtues of each, whatever they carry should be versatile against a wide range of targets and be relatively easy to use. Resurrecting weapons like the 106mm RR should be considered, since it gives light troops and vehicles the means to deal with hard targets like bunkers and AFVs. A section of vehicles attached to each platoon could provide suppression fire with HMGs or AGL's, while DF fire could come from an organic "fire support company".

Medium forces like the proposed Armoured Cavalry or LAV based combat teams need to emphasise fire more, adding extra sections of LAV "gunships" which can manoeuvre independent of the Infantry company to provide fire from flanks or other positions is one suggestion I would push very strongly. Equipping the LAV-TOW with a more potent weapon like ground launched HELLFIRE, BRIMESTONE or FOG-M would help a lot, as well as upping the amount of LAV-mortars available. I will discount MGS in its present form since it doesn't carry a worthwhile amount of ammunition, and while the MMEV as conceived now may be able to use its long range to manoeuvre independently and take flank shots from outside the zone of engagement, improved LAV-TOW can do the same thing. This concept relies on "magic bullet" firepower to substitute for tank fire.

Heavy forces can be done in many ways, but the essential DF tasks will still rely on a vehicle resembling a tank. The tank itself will have to evolve to be more mobile, without sacrificing too much in the way of protection and lelethalityCovering fire should come from an artillery weapon with a high rate of fire, the FH-70 6X6 with a 155 howitzer feeding from a 24 round magazine and autoloader comes to mind. Infantry should rereceiveaximum protection, I would argue for a HAPC like the ACHZARIT for this task. A heavy "gunship" vehicle to provide extra fire support is also a must (as on the models above).

Organizationally, I think a section of vehicles (without dismounts) attached to each platoon is about right in providing extra firepower and some reserve mobility without making the platoon commander's job too difficult (A "weapons Sgt" position would be created for controlling the movement and fire of the vehicles). The primary job of these vehicles is to move to points of observation; place fire on the enemy until they either flee, are destroyed or are "cracked" and can be assaulted, and cover the move of the dismounted force as they caterpillar to the next point of observation. Since they are similar in size and layout to the other vehicles in the team, they can carry troops if the primary carriers have been damaged or destroyed.

Supplementing the extra vehicles and firepower is improved situational awareness. This starts from the bottom with PRR so the troops can communicate both within and between sections, vehicle mounted situational awareness suites and the ability of team leaders and vehicle commanders to get off board information, such as viewing the "next bound" though a TUAV before crossing. A company should also have an organic section of TUAVs attached as well.

The combat team of tomorrow will be a bigger organization, and bristling with more "teeth" and "eyes", but should also be able to move much faster and be able to fight more effectively as a result.

(Edited to correct the spell checking!)

 
Wow. Very nice.

I like it.

However Majoor. Do you see a realistic chance of Canada either affording this in either money or will? Even for the light side of things?

I hope so myself...

 
Zipper said:
Wow. Very nice.

I like it.

However Majoor. Do you see a realistic chance of Canada either affording this in either money or will? Even for the light side of things?

I hope so myself...

The "will" can be supplied with organizational change. The "light" and "heavy" were mostly illustrations to show this concept is independent of particular kit or "cult objects", although it would be nice to see the light units beefed up with light vehicles. I suppose in an emergency, they could acquire a fleet of Toyota Land Cruisers (the global standard for this sort of thing) and do some heavy duty welding to create a fleet of vehicles for the task.

The changes to a LAV equipped BG are not too difficult to achieve, dismasted Coyotes exist as DFSVs, and integrating them into an Infantry battalion should not be any more difficult than taking the 1 PPCLI AAP and bringing it into the LdSH (RC).The "gunship" option isn't even nessessary, if you are willing to take the risk, the LAV carriers can be agressively manoeuvred into fireing positions after the dismounting of the troops, but this option reduces the absolute size of the firebase and LAVs might have some difficulty getting to good positions in the face of opposition. The "gunship" option allows the LAV carriers to shoot in the gunships, and the gunships support the LAVs and dismounted infantry in their next bound.

LAV-TOW will have to be upgraded sooner or later, and these weapons systems (HELLFIRE, BRIMESTONE and FOG-M) already exist and are capable of being retrofitted into existing ATGM systems. The MGS as currently configured is a non starter, but if we are willing to bite  the bullet and replace the LPT with a new turret mounting a 90mm cannon, then we may have a viable support weapon. MMEV with ADATS exists already, and can be used in the way suggested, but from what I know of the ADATS system, if you do not have a line of sight to the target, then you cannot take a shot. HELLFIRE can be guided in by a forward observer using a laser designator, BRIMESTONE has a millimetre radar so it can find its own targets to a certain extent, and FOG-M uses a TV camera in the nose, so the gunner can look for a target in flight and guide the missile right to impact. In close or complex terrain, this is probably the most important aspect of "magic bullet" PGM technology.

Situational awareness is already being reserched at DRES, and the idea of section commanders tapping into TUAVs has been discussed in "Infantry of Tomorrow", the Israeli army issues this equipment already.

When you get down to it, the "Combat Team of Tomorrow" can be stood up tomorrow (right after coffee), and I hope some of our readers will start wargaming these ideas in J-CATS or other simulations to see how close in or far away they really are.
 
<a href=http://g2mil.com/efogm.htm>This EFOG-M sounds like the best thing since sliced bread.</a>
 
Pushing additional firepower assets and capabilities into a Cavalry unit would be beneficial as long as the unit was not then tasked to go fighting along the lines of a tank-equipped force.  Tanks are more than firepower.  Given our resources and missions, we might as well focus as an Army on producing Light Forces and Cavalry forces.  These will be forces with real missions in the here and now.  I think that we do have the people and equipment readily available to implement that. 

As for integral firepower, the old school German panzergrenadier (Gepanzert) companies in halftracks during the war had mortars and 75mm guns mounted on halftracks.  Pushing "fire support" assets to platoon level on a permanent basis might be going too low.  It may be easier to attach down using habitiual affiliation than it is to regroup from the bottom-up.

Cheers,

2B
 
Gents

Is anyone else out there aware that the MGS, ADATS and TUA are all eventually to be replaced by MMEV Version 3?   This MMEV will have a lot of plug and play weapon systems designed to be fitted to suit a particular mission or combat requirement.   While it is very conceptual still, I do not foresee a Combat Team having a TUA, MGS or ADATS element, it will have MMEV Version 3s kitted out for the specific mission and anticipated threat.   The term heavy, medium or light will reflect the weapons load on the MMEV Version 3 but the basic platform will stay the same.   I think the LdSH(RC)'s push to cross train all their crew commanders on all the DF systems is in recognition of the above fact and an attempt to prepare themselves for the eventual demise of all these systems which will be replaced by MMEV Version3.

Technically we no longer need a TUA system (if we were to buy off the shelf) as the LAHAT laser guided missile can accompish the same thing as TUA with a range of 8km and it can be fired from 105mm barrels.  The FOG-
M sounds good but the camera concept is also replicated in the Israeli "Spike" system which was considered for the ALAWS competition. I'm not sure if we decided on the SPIKE or the JAVELIN (I think the SPIKE was considered too much weapon for what we needed at one time).

 
Having less system types is not a bad idea.  I think that we've had the long range missile debate on some other threads.  8 km shots may well prove the exception rather than the rule and I wonder about our ability to identify friend from foe at that range.

Don't get me wrong, an 8km range missile on a mobile platform would certainly be a good thing, particularily if it could indeed fire a mixture of warheads.  It could certainly be of use in a Cav role where the longer range would work well in the greater dispersion of those units.  Just don't think, however, that because it can kill a tank that it can replace a tank.

2B
 
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