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Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

Colin P said:
It would allow you to keep your pilots that are leaving connected and fairly current, as well as doing CAS training with the army. I have argued for a lighter airframe for this role before, prefer something like the armed Hawk. Also means that your pilots can still get flying in when your main fleet gets grounded for some safety reason, which I can bet will happen with the F-35 as it seemed to have happened with pretty well all jet fighters introduced in the last 30+ years. Not to mention that even though availability will go up, the real number of air frames is going to go down. It's entirely possible that air frames will get significant flight hour restrictions to make them last. A cheaper to run air frame will allow your pilots to practice many of the skillsets without incurring those hours on the main air frame.

something cheap like the Textron Scorpion? a forecasted unit cost of less then $20 million each would make it a cheap buy to fill that roll, could even use it as a jet trainer at that price.
 
Colin P said:
It would allow you to keep your pilots that are leaving connected and fairly current,

Current on what? An aircraft that they will ride into battle? Some cheapy little putt-putt with limited range, limited weapons, limited speed, and limited survivability in a real conflict? What may work in an Afghan situation will not work as well when somebody like China gets uppity.

Or do you think that they could simply get dropped into the cockpit of a serious machine at short notice and be able to operate it effectively?

What you are suggesting, and what keeps being suggested, is akin to the Cougar being bought as a "tank trainer" in the seventies.

If there were no tanks without crews for the tank-trainer crews to occupy, then they would have been trained for nothing.

Why have one tank regiment and three tank-trainer regiments? What would those crews do in wartime? It is unlikely that a lot of tank crews would die in undamaged vehicles that could simply be taken over.

The tank-trainer crews would never be sent into battle in crappy little moving targets.

One fights with what one has. If what one has is not up to the real job, then one is rather screwed, nein?

Why keep these Pilots current, and what is expected of them?

How many such people would there be? How many would be interested in flying something with a non-existent operational role? Precious few ex-Reg Kiowa Pilots seemed interested in flying them as Reservists - as Res F Pilots could not fly enough to maintain tactical quals and there was no establishment for Observers (or any possibility of training Res F candidates to the required standard). Max has said that he would not be interested in flying anything less than what he has now.

Where would these machines be flown? There is not a lot of free airspace around the cities to which ex-Reg Pilots tend to gravitate, and few ranges into which they could shoot. Most guys who wish to continue flying go to airlines. To find a pool large enough that might generate enough Pilots, one would therefore have to look at Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver etcetera. Where are the ranges? Where are the hangars? Who will maintain these machines?

Colin P said:
as well as doing CAS training with the army.

You really, really, really do not want that.

Colin P said:
I have argued for a lighter airframe for this role before

And I have pointed out the weaknesses of such arguments before.

Colin P said:
something like the armed Hawk

Again, do you really think that this is a good machine in which to send somebody off to engage a credible enemy? They'd achieve nothing more than glorious deaths. Wire my feet to the rudder pedals and my hands to the stick and throttle, Goose! Banzai! Banzai! Banzai! VCs for All.

Colin P said:
Also means that your pilots can still get flying in when your main fleet gets grounded for some safety reason

How often does that happen? For how long do these groundings happen? Long enough to refresh guys on another machine with completely different performance and handling, systems, procedures, cockpit layout? I've never seen that since I started flying 3.5 decades ago.

Colin P said:
It's entirely possible that air frames will get significant flight hour restrictions to make them last.

Yup.

But,

Colin P said:
A cheaper to run air frame will allow your pilots to practice many of the skillsets without incurring those hours on the main air frame.

No.

We have simulators, which perform much more like the real thing than a completely different machine that has no real reason to exist, and no retraining on a different type is required.

If you want to have a military flying organization, then purchase the appropriate machines in the various categories - effective, capable aircraft, that will survive in the most demanding operational conditions imaginable. For anything with a ground attack role, that means a decent weapon load and the targeting systems to match, adequate speed and range, and the means to avoid detection and defend itself.

If you want a decent Infantry capability, buy enough proper rifles for all of them, and not a bunch of lever-action .22s.

Anything less is a waste of money at best, and a waste of lives and ultimate defeat at worst.
 
IF the GOC and CAF really want another bomb truck, we could do what others are doing.

Possible CAS/bomb truck solution #1    It can Be Done  P-3 Bomb Camp

There seems to be no political will to have anything like this in Canada; we have an airframe that has a bombbay AND wing pylons for external ordinance as well.  If you want to have something manned that can remain on station for decent times and deliver CAS, write your MP and have him press to kit out the CP-140. 

Everytime you think we need/should have one of these really small low level rinky-dink CAS platforms, the next thing you should think is MANPAD engagements/SAFIRES.  IMO.  Why?  Because the plane you buy for 'one type of war' is the one you are going to be stuck with for any type of war.

Honestly, I am not even sure why we talking about this "new CAS airframe".  Think of this CAS airframe we are talking about as the girl in this movie scene.  The RCAF is the guy with the hat on, the Cdn Army is the guy with no hat on, all dreamy eyed. 
 
How about the Army folks stop interjecting with what they think the Air Force needs to do the job.

You don't see Loachman try and tell someone what a proper section attack should look like so why do we continue to interject in to Air Force business.

Canada needs a credible multirole fighter force for a variety of reasons, more than just acting as the Army's bomb truck.

Instead of trying to discredit Air Force programs so we can fund our own pet projects, maybe we should be supporting their endeavours.  :2c:
 
Royal Drew,

I agree largely.  An exam came directly from a briefing by Gen Hillier I attended; I was in CSprings at the time.  He was just at the Boeing plant and asked some dude on the line how long to build a Chinook... a few months.  Wrong question... the right question is if you get in line right now when will you get one... he didn't understand how airplanes are built.

However, although I largely agree with your premise (aviation  is a specialty so let aviators do it), we have a problem in Canada... unlike almost every other country, we don't have proper Maritime and Tactical Aviation where it belongs... in the Navy and Army.  And that is causing us lots of problems.  The Air Force doesn't understand the Army's needs... Tactical Aviators like Loachman and trained JTACS do.  They don't run the Air Force...

As a complete outsider (I was infantry a very long time ago, but I was a private in the reserves... don't count for turds),  I would rather the discussion be about a proper rotary Wing force (and by the way, a ship to put them on if we needed), of LOH,  Attack, Utility, and heavy.  By the way, question: how useful is heavy going to be to us in contested airspace?

From experience, I don't trust the RCAF; fully admit my bias.
 
Baz said:
Tactical Aviators like Loachman and trained JTACS do.  They don't run the Air Force...

Nor would I want to.

I don't want anything to do with it.

It does not understand us, nor does it care to.

It drags upon us in far too many ways.

I do not care one whit what it does with its bombers and transport communities. I just want it to leave us alone and release us from its clutches. Everyone would benefit.

"Render unto Caesar" 'n' all.
 
Baz said:
Royal Drew,

I agree largely.  An exam came directly from a briefing by Gen Hillier I attended; I was in CSprings at the time.  He was just at the Boeing plant and asked some dude on the line how long to build a Chinook... a few months.  Wrong question... the right question is if you get in line right now when will you get one... he didn't understand how airplanes are built.

However, although I largely agree with your premise (aviation  is a specialty so let aviators do it), we have a problem in Canada... unlike almost every other country, we don't have proper Maritime and Tactical Aviation where it belongs... in the Navy and Army.  And that is causing us lots of problems.  The Air Force doesn't understand the Army's needs... Tactical Aviators like Loachman and trained JTACS do.  They don't run the Air Force...

As a complete outsider (I was infantry a very long time ago, but I was a private in the reserves... don't count for turds),  I would rather the discussion be about a proper rotary Wing force (and by the way, a ship to put them on if we needed), of LOH,  Attack, Utility, and heavy.  By the way, question: how useful is heavy going to be to us in contested airspace?

From experience, I don't trust the RCAF; fully admit my bias.

Crazy how something like this isn't followed along with the same vigor as the "buttons and bows" projects.  :whistle:
 
It seems to me that a "low tech" CAS aircraft only makes sense for a country that is prepared to actually use them.  If Canada had the political will to get heavily involved militarily in regional conflicts where AA risks are reduced and was willing to both potentially suffer losses and to be potentially be seen as an imperialistic aggressor, then we could probably get a lot of real use out of them. 

That's not the case however.  We're not France or Russia.  If our warplanes are realistically only going to be deployed regionally as part of a coalition where risk to our forces is limited as much as possible for political reasons...or are meant to fight a potential near-peer enemy in a major conflict, then they are not the right tool for the job. 

The Canadian public won't stand for seeing news clips of (hypothetical) RCAF AT-6's strafing and firing rockets & bombs at IS** positions and possibly being shot down with pilots captured in the same way as they will accept seeing "video game" footage of targets being "neutralized" from fighter-bombers at 10,000 feet.  The enemies are dead in both cases, but one method just "seems" so much more brutal and doesn't allow us to maintain the fantasy of being the clean, good-guys.

Similarly, if we are forced to face China, Russia, Iran or North Korea, etc. we risk having our "brush war" aircraft swatted from the sky by an enemy with "real" weapons.

So to my mind, while maybe you can make a strickly military case for having a low-tech CAS capability I don't think you can make a political case for it. 

 
GR66 said:
It seems to me that a "low tech" CAS aircraft only makes sense for a country that is prepared to actually use them.  If Canada had the political will to get heavily involved militarily in regional conflicts where AA risks are reduced and was willing to both potentially suffer losses and to be potentially be seen as an imperialistic aggressor, then we could probably get a lot of real use out of them. 

That's not the case however.  We're not France or Russia.  If our warplanes are realistically only going to be deployed regionally as part of a coalition where risk to our forces is limited as much as possible for political reasons...or are meant to fight a potential near-peer enemy in a major conflict, then they are not the right tool for the job. 

The Canadian public won't stand for seeing news clips of (hypothetical) RCAF AT-6's strafing and firing rockets & bombs at IS** positions and possibly being shot down with pilots captured in the same way as they will accept seeing "video game" footage of targets being "neutralized" from fighter-bombers at 10,000 feet.  The enemies are dead in both cases, but one method just "seems" so much more brutal and doesn't allow us to maintain the fantasy of being the clean, good-guys.

Similarly, if we are forced to face China, Russia, Iran or North Korea, etc. we risk having our "brush war" aircraft swatted from the sky by an enemy with "real" weapons.

So to my mind, while maybe you can make a strickly military case for having a low-tech CAS capability I don't think you can make a political case for it.

Why have low tech fixed wing? We need high tech helicopter gunships, you know, like others have had since the early 60s  ::)
 
daftandbarmy said:
Why have low tech fixed wing? We need high tech helicopter gunships, you know, like others have had since the early 60s  ::)


Simple answer:  $

I don't have any expertise to recommend one CAS platform over another.  The original suggestion to bring back something "CF-5 like" or "something with a prop" I'm assuming was based on the idea that it would be a cheaper alternative to the F-35 or other fast air CAS platforms.  If a cheap, low tech, fixed wing solution doesn't make political/economic sense for Canada then a more expensive, high tech, rotary wing solution is even less likely to happen in my opinion. 

Attack helicopters are one of the MANY things I'd love to see the CF have available, but in the current political and economic climate it's about as likely as getting Star Destroyers.

 
We could have bought fewer Chinooks - a nice but niche machine - and a few AH instead.

Griffon will not make such a great escort machine in cooler/wetter climates than Afghanistan. It can get a little breezy in the back without the doors.
 
Loachman said:
We could have bought fewer Chinooks - a nice but niche machine - and a few AH instead.

Griffon will not make such a great escort machine in cooler/wetter climates than Afghanistan. It can get a little breezy in the back without the doors.

And it's a big, fat, underpowered thing too, thus probably a lot easier to see and shoot down  ;D
 
GR66 said:
If our warplanes are realistically only going to be deployed regionally as part of a coalition where risk to our forces is limited as much as possible for political reasons...

Or, hey how about just so they don't get blotted from the sky for no real good military reason so they can fly and fight again the next day...aircraft and crews are not easily replaced.
 
GR66 said:
Simple answer:  $

I don't have any expertise to recommend one CAS platform over another.  The original suggestion to bring back something "CF-5 like" or "something with a prop" I'm assuming was based on the idea that it would be a cheaper alternative to the F-35 or other fast air CAS platforms.  If a cheap, low tech, fixed wing solution doesn't make political/economic sense for Canada then a more expensive, high tech, rotary wing solution is even less likely to happen in my opinion. 

Attack helicopters are one of the MANY things I'd love to see the CF have available, but in the current political and economic climate it's about as likely as getting Star Destroyers.

As the originator of the thread, the initial idea was to have something lower cost, requiring less infrastructure and the ability to operate off forward, austere air bases. Some of the suggestions I made in that long ago time included (as thought experiments) the CF-5, MiG 29 and SAAB JAS-39 Gripen. Real world experience shows Russia's SU-25 is also an excellent candidate, being both purpose built for the role and both smaller and faster than the A-10, giving it a few logistical and survival advantages as well.

While actually buying SU-25's would be problematic (unless we were to gather them up from third world air forces and do complete rebuilds including Western engines and avionics), the initial idea still stands. While the CF-35 would be an outstanding bomb truck, among other things, it also needs a lot of care and feeding, which would defeat the idea of low infrastructure and operating off austere airfields.
 
Thucydides said:
As the originator of the thread, the initial idea was to have something lower cost, requiring less infrastructure and the ability to operate off forward, austere air bases. Some of the suggestions I made in that long ago time included (as thought experiments) the CF-5, MiG 29 and SAAB JAS-39 Gripen. Real world experience shows Russia's SU-25 is also an excellent candidate, being both purpose built for the role and both smaller and faster than the A-10, giving it a few logistical and survival advantages as well.

While actually buying SU-25's would be problematic (unless we were to gather them up from third world air forces and do complete rebuilds including Western engines and avionics), the initial idea still stands. While the CF-35 would be an outstanding bomb truck, among other things, it also needs a lot of care and feeding, which would defeat the idea of low infrastructure and operating off austere airfields.

Another thing would be the increased cost of a mixed fleet
 
The navy is buying ships tailored to operating in the north.  They already own subs, frigates, a destroyer etc.  Each serves a particular combat function.  Why does the air force figure they can perform all the myriad tasks that they are assigned with a single combat type?  First define the mission, then define the equipment required.  If you can't supply the equipment, don't do the mission.  But compromise in war, kills.  From all the information available, it is evident that the F35 is a poor compromise for CAS.
 
YZT580 said:
From all the information available, it is evident that the F35 is a poor compromise for CAS.
What information proves this? 
 
YZT580 said:
The navy is buying ships tailored to operating in the north.  They already own subs, frigates, a destroyer etc.  Each serves a particular combat function.  Why does the air force figure they can perform all the myriad tasks that they are assigned with a single combat type?  First define the mission, then define the equipment required.  If you can't supply the equipment, don't do the mission.  But compromise in war, kills.  From all the information available, it is evident that the F35 is a poor compromise for CAS.

It's called a multi-role fighter for a reason.  The F35 is the best aircraft available to do the missions we use our combat aircraft for.  If the Army wants a dedicated CAS platform, they should
help the Air Force build a business case to procure a dedicated Attack Helicopter platform. 

The Air Force has quietly gone about building a pretty good capability with the deployable ATF based around a Six Pack of Fighter/Bombers, Air to Air Refuelers and dedicated ISR platform with the CP-140.  The next bound should be to procure an armed UAV that can do ISR but also work in tandem with the F35 to find, fix, strike. 

If we buy some shat second rate aircraft you can kiss this all goodbye.  Combined with our world class SOF forces, our Air Force is delivering some excellent service and is exactly the type of expeditionary force we need. Glad some folks here aren't involved in the decision-making process, some of the ideas floated here would set the military back years. 
 
RoyalDrew said:
It's called a multi-role fighter for a reason.  The F35 is the best aircraft available to do the missions we use our combat aircraft for.  If the Army wants a dedicated CAS platform, they should help the Air Force build a business case to procure a dedicated Attack Helicopter platform. 

The Air Force has quietly gone about building a pretty good capability with the deployable ATF based around a Six Pack of Fighter/Bombers, Air to Air Refuelers and dedicated ISR platform with the CP-140.  The next bound should be to procure an armed UAV that can do ISR but also work in tandem with the F35 to find, fix, strike. 

If we buy some shat second rate aircraft you can kiss this all goodbye.  Combined with our world class SOF forces, our Air Force is delivering some excellent service and is exactly the type of expeditionary force we need. Glad some folks here aren't involved in the decision-making process, some of the ideas floated here would set the military back years.


I agree ... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to aviation, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.

If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.
 
Loachman said:
Current on what? An aircraft that they will ride into battle? Some cheapy little putt-putt with limited range, limited weapons, limited speed, and limited survivability in a real conflict? What may work in an Afghan situation will not work as well when somebody like China gets uppity.

Or do you think that they could simply get dropped into the cockpit of a serious machine at short notice and be able to operate it effectively?

What you are suggesting, and what keeps being suggested, is akin to the Cougar being bought as a "tank trainer" in the seventies.

If there were no tanks without crews for the tank-trainer crews to occupy, then they would have been trained for nothing.

Why have one tank regiment and three tank-trainer regiments? What would those crews do in wartime? It is unlikely that a lot of tank crews would die in undamaged vehicles that could simply be taken over.

The tank-trainer crews would never be sent into battle in crappy little moving targets.

One fights with what one has. If what one has is not up to the real job, then one is rather screwed, nein?

Why keep these Pilots current, and what is expected of them?

How many such people would there be? How many would be interested in flying something with a non-existent operational role? Precious few ex-Reg Kiowa Pilots seemed interested in flying them as Reservists - as Res F Pilots could not fly enough to maintain tactical quals and there was no establishment for Observers (or any possibility of training Res F candidates to the required standard). Max has said that he would not be interested in flying anything less than what he has now.

Where would these machines be flown? There is not a lot of free airspace around the cities to which ex-Reg Pilots tend to gravitate, and few ranges into which they could shoot. Most guys who wish to continue flying go to airlines. To find a pool large enough that might generate enough Pilots, one would therefore have to look at Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver etcetera. Where are the ranges? Where are the hangars? Who will maintain these machines?

You really, really, really do not want that.

And I have pointed out the weaknesses of such arguments before.

Again, do you really think that this is a good machine in which to send somebody off to engage a credible enemy? They'd achieve nothing more than glorious deaths. Wire my feet to the rudder pedals and my hands to the stick and throttle, Goose! Banzai! Banzai! Banzai! VCs for All.

How often does that happen? For how long do these groundings happen? Long enough to refresh guys on another machine with completely different performance and handling, systems, procedures, cockpit layout? I've never seen that since I started flying 3.5 decades ago.

Yup.

But,

No.

We have simulators, which perform much more like the real thing than a completely different machine that has no real reason to exist, and no retraining on a different type is required.

If you want to have a military flying organization, then purchase the appropriate machines in the various categories - effective, capable aircraft, that will survive in the most demanding operational conditions imaginable. For anything with a ground attack role, that means a decent weapon load and the targeting systems to match, adequate speed and range, and the means to avoid detection and defend itself.

If you want a decent Infantry capability, buy enough proper rifles for all of them, and not a bunch of lever-action .22s.

Anything less is a waste of money at best, and a waste of lives and ultimate defeat at worst.

the F-22 is an example that quickly comes to mind for being grounded, not to mention the F-35 fleet has already been grounded once for engine issues, plus the F-15, F-16 (i know it's age related) .

A pilot flying the "cheaper aircraft" is practicing the other skillsets other than flying the top line machine. As I recall, lot's pilots flew in the older birds to keep their flight status up as there was not enough flying hours and CF-18's for them otherwise. When a fighter pilot leaves, we lose those skills, giving them a option to maintain those skills at a certain level, gives us some surge ability that we otherwise might have. Yes i would prefer to buy another 40 Super Hornets instead, but am aware there is only so much money, hence the lesser option. I think the RCAF is terrified of putting anything else on the table that might allow the politicians an excuse not to buy the F-35 or reduce the numbers even further.

and why would you not want the RCAF to train with the army in the use of CAS? 
 
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