Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

[aesop081]

Thats good to know. Now how are the comms? That is usually the single point of failure in most operations.

I wont comment on these means.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Isn't a 3D radar contained within FELEX? Coupled with the ripping out of the 70's era computer systems and the additional space opened we should be able to make the Frigates more C4IC capable.

upgrades to the SPS49 and the SG150, no plan in FELEX to make them 3D.

 

[Old Sweat]

Let's leave the subject of FACs for a while and get back to the question whether a relatively 'unsophisticated' aircraft is a suitable ground support aircraft.

Before I do, in my opinion to cite the example of the USMC is to ignore a fundamental difference between their doctrine and ours. The marines dedicate their aircraft to support of their own on the ground, and we do not. A marine division is supported by a complete marine air wing, which is a pretty formidable force in its own right. As the size of the force decreases, so does the air element. But it still supports ground marines.

We are unlikely to depart from the doctrine that drives most western air forces - the centralized control of air power at as high a level as possible. Thus any aircraft we deploy will go into the big pot. Thus our aircraft will be employed based on theatre priorities. Bascially I agree with this system, frustrating as it is.

What governs how many sorties we are apt to see in any given day, besides the tactical situation? Obviously major factors are the number of airframes serviceable which is usually far less than the actual number on paper, and the monthly flying rates, as well as the availability of things that go boom on the ground. The capability of the airframes is also really important and this is where I am at odds with many of you. Rusty as I am, I still feel that something as short legged and with as small a payload as the CF5 or any other the other birds proposed is a misuse of space on the tarmac. We might be able to provide a six pack of aircraft to the theatre, which (I am guesstimating) could allow four sorties a day, each of no more than two hours duration. For that eight hours of aircraft hours, which might translate into two two aircraft missions on station for perhaps ninety minutes each, we should want to get as large a return as possible.

Last, let me harp at one of my pet points. A fast, modern aircaft can fight and survive in more theatres than a less capable bird. Let's not limit our ability to participate because of the type of airframe we have in service.

Rant off, and I am headed to the fridge for a beer followed by some prime rib with the trimmings and some good red wine.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Isn't a 3D radar contained within FELEX? Coupled with the ripping out of the 70's era computer systems and the additional space opened we should be able to make the Frigates more C4IC capable. Not an ideal situation but at least a stop gap until we get (we hope) the 280/CPF replacements. Major lack of foresight when expansion was not designed into the Frigates. (Sorry about turning an AF thread into a Navy thread, but you know us Navy types always implying that a Navy opinion is always a valued one ;D).

The radar upgrade is a separate program. Probably not much upgrading to be done with the provided budget though.

What's wrong with tracking with the STIR? As long as nobody illuminates, people shouldn't get too antsy.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Last, let me harp at one of my pet points. A fast, modern aircaft can fight and survive in more theatres than a less capable bird. Let's not limit our ability to participate because of the type of airframe we have in service.

I think a Hawk, equipped with the ADEN 30mm, 2XAIM-9s on the wingtips plus A-G ordinances on the 4 wing pylons would be a decent CAS platform...  That's 8000 lbs for A/G Ordinances!

 

[McG]

... would make an excellent low intensity CAS aircraft.

Except as band-aid measures to meet urgent operational requirements for limited periods of time, I don't think we should be buying things with suitability limited to low intensity conflicts.  If the CF requires a specific CAS platform, then it must stand up to the AD beasting it may very well find itself exposed to in future theatres of operations. 

Consider that there has been a lot of political spin on the idea of intervention in Sudan (and under other governments we might have found ourselves leading a coalition there).  Despite being "low intensity" there is a real air threat in that theatre and there is a cooresponding real AD threat.  There have been articles posted on this site about MIGs being employed in CAS & being shot out of the sky in that theatre.  While we are not in Sudan in any large numbers today, we must be ready to go there or theatres like it in the future.

In the long run we are only likely to kill service personnel with half-measures such as buying "peace support" or "low-intensity" operational kit to save money.  In the case of budget CAS, we risk the lives of the pilots in the air & the soldiers on the ground depending on supporting fires.

 

[SupersonicMax]

MCG, there are many models of MiGs...  Which ones are being shot down?  There is a significant difference between the MiG 17 and MiG 29...

 

[McG]

It was a 29
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/77110.0.html

 

[Infanteer]

We are unlikely to depart from the doctrine that drives most western air forces - the centralized control of air power at as high a level as possible. Thus any aircraft we deploy will go into the big pot. Thus our aircraft will be employed based on theatre priorities. Bascially I agree with this system, frustrating as it is.

I guess I'm saying we should get away from this "Blue Sky" doctrine, or at least create a corresponding "Green Grass" one for it.

Last, let me harp at one of my pet points. A fast, modern aircaft can fight and survive in more theatres than a less capable bird. Let's not limit our ability to participate because of the type of airframe we have in service.

Except as band-aid measures to meet urgent operational requirements for limited periods of time, I don't think we should be buying things with suitability limited to low intensity conflicts.  If the CF requires a specific CAS platform, then it must stand up to the AD beasting it may very well find itself exposed to in future theatres of operations. 

Consider that there has been a lot of political spin on the idea of intervention in Sudan (and under other governments we might have found ourselves leading a coalition there).  Despite being "low intensity" there is a real air threat in that theatre and there is a cooresponding real AD threat.  There have been articles posted on this site about MIGs being employed in CAS & being shot out of the sky in that theatre.  While we are not in Sudan in any large numbers today, we must be ready to go there or theatres like it in the future.

In the long run we are only likely to kill service personnel with half-measures such as buying "peace support" or "low-intensity" operational kit to save money.  In the case of budget CAS, we risk the lives of the pilots in the air & the soldiers on the ground depending on supporting fires.

As I mentioned in my caveat above, I am basing my "preference" on the principle of USAF Air Superiority.  It is a reality, and I can't really see us being committed to a situation requiring CAS without it.  The second principle stems from the first.  For the foreseeable future, the US Military will simply crush any near-peer foe, full stop.  This is the environment the CF, and especially CF Airpower, will operate in - Coalition operations against a "low-intensity foe" because, for the next "generation" at least, anyone who steps away from this paradigm of fighting is going to end up like Saddam's Republican Guard.

By sticking to High + Fast CAS we are sticking to a game we can't really compete in and is so resource intensive that we can't really deploy it anyways (an Airbase in Italy doesn't count).  I want to see deployable CAS that is actually deployable as well as flexible enough to get away from the "Fortress Bases" to support good expeditionary warfighting.  The excerpts from the article I posted above are an example of how we could achieve this.

I'm happy to let the Blue CF stick to high altitude fighters with huge logistical tails for a peer-on-peer fight - it has its place and if we develop the capability enough perhaps it can be employed in a reasonable fashion (ie: F-35B from a LHD); but we have the "Green Grass" force for the myriad of situations that force our "Blue Sky" fleet to sit out of the fight.  As well, something needs to be said for the theory of what happens once 1-billion dollar planes start going down in AD buzzsaws.  How fast could we replace CF-18's once they start going down?  At least the "austere" planes are replaceable.  As for the cost in pers, well, maybe we should shift to an all-UAV force if we are afraid of losing pilots?

 

[Kirkhill]

But I think we end up coming around again to how much marginal advantage does a fixed wing CAS aircraft deliver over a force equipped with Rotary Wing assets, Hunter-Killer UAVs, Recce UAVs and Arty equipped with 155/Excalibur, MRLS/G-MRLS and NLOS systems?

Isn't it still just an issue of how quickly you can defeat your target of interest?  24 hour CAP is certainly one way of getting the job done but it is pretty pricey and I am going to guess that even the Marines occasionally have to wait their turn for available assets to bail them out.  6 AV-6Bs in DS of a MEU are not going to be available at Seconds to Move.

Having said that, and essentially agreeing with Old Sweat, there is another side to the premise that Infanteer posted.    And that is the general concept of integrating the Air and Ground forces better.

How about taking a leaf out of Herr Goering's book and offering the Air Generals their own Ground Troops to "play" with.  As I suggested to Infanteer in a PM, seeing as how the Navy doesn't want to play nice by supplying Big Honking Ships, and the Air Force has at least demonstrated a willingness to buy the kit necessary to move Ground Pounders around the countryside (C17/C130/C27(maybe)/CH-147/CH-146) maybe the way to get them into the Air Mobile game is to give them a direct, personal (need I say promotion enhancing) stake in supplying an Air Mobile Force.   

As the Iraqi article suggested - mass drops are not necessary but a Regimental/Brigade sized formation of independent Commandos (not all Para Qualified - some airlanded infantry, maybe even some LAV infantry) but all capable of operating with air logistics.  Useful at home here, or at least the training exercises would both bolster sovereignty and provide real world experience that would be of benefit overseas to allies of whichever Club of the Day.

 

[HItorMiss]

The Problem with the Commando moniker is what constitutes a Commando...currently Canada has two SOF Units in JTF2 and CSOR. If you want a Highly trained Airmobile Unit the Perhaps going back to the old Model of the Airborne minus the need to be Jumper. Have a Unit in-doc like the AIC only call it CIC or perhaps a small 2 month course/selection process. From there you integrate said unit into a Mobile force with integrated Airmobile assets and Logistics and perhaps this BG(ish) group could have a rotating Commander between the AF and the Army. With one element holding Command and the other 2IC and rotating that every 2-3 yrs.


I would like to add that said force would need some form of CAS for myself I am more a fan of Rotary CAS then Fast Air. Though prop driven might be a nice in between the two. I like AH's though  for escort of the UH's and for staying on station for intimate support with Fast Air and Arty on call.

 

[a_majoor]

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/mail/mail491.html

What Role is there for the USAF

The US Air Force has always been primarily interested in maintaining itself as a Strategic Force. If I were them I would give up the Ground Support entirely to the army and navy and concentrate on your own High Frontier suggestion.

With that in mind a US Aerospace Force is a viable structure, let the other forces have the bottom 40000 feet, let the USAF control everything above. This would include satellites, THOR weapons, Ben Bova Laser Battlestations, and a fleet of Aerospace Fighters. This is the role I could envisage for a future USAF. The control of these and other Strategic Tools would be best controlled by a arm dedicated to them.

Dave March
Military Interests Games Society Hamilton, ON

Become the Middle and possibly High Guard... USAF refused to give up the ground support mission even though it was clear they didn't want it and didn't want to do it. The miserable performance in close support is one reason USMC gets to keep its own air force. Marine Air works well with the ground forces. USAF hates the mission.

I'm bringing this back because I think it does illustrate the divide; USAF and their admirers want to be able to fly the biggest, baddest, most sophisticated aircraft, while most "grunts" (of whatever persuasion) are more concerned that something is overhead and available when they need it, and could care less if it is a Raptor or a cropduster with a guy hanging out the back with a C-6.

I suspect that many in the Airforce community are true believers in sophisticated, high tech solutions and see a B-2 filled with smart bombs as a great support platform. This may even be true under some circumstances, and I wouldn't say no if that was what was available. A bit farther in the future, airborne laser platforms will have moved from the pages of SF to working hardware (several different prototypes are flying around right now), so the Zoomies will have the biggest and best toys to bring to the game.

These tools are so sophisticated and so expensive (a single B-2 costs almost as much as an attack submarine, especially when you add in the special ground support it needs) that the centralized "pool" model of allocating resources does make sense. Using the arbitrary 40,000 ft line as the dividing point, then we can reasonably allocate decentralized resources for a "green" airforce, which the manoeuvre commander has in his own pocket. These aircraft can be as cheap and unsophisticated as desired (which seems to have been one of the reasons the USAF really hates the A-10, very low LCF for wannabe fighter jocks), and since they are flying under the USAF's air superiority umbrella, objections about flying into danger can be somewhat muted.

Perhaps this has been the real problem with this thread all along, not so much the type of airplane, but rather who controls the asset. IF it is an Airforce General or Theater Joint Forces commander, then high performance aircraft that can cover the entire AOR are the best possible asset. If it is a Brigade or Battalion commander, then something that can fly from unimproved airstrips and sections of road are in order.

 

[thunderchild]

maybe we can have things both ways, I took some advice from a previous posts, did some digging and got information from the Public Relations and Information office of the Swedish Airforce RE: the JAS-39c fully loaded it can take off from rough airstrips, airfields of parts there of and highways with a solid serface with in 600M.  It takes 1 C-130 load per day to support 3 aircraft (no mention of #of sorties per day) an can be maintained by 1 2.5 tone truck with a crew of 3.Is this someting close to what everybody is thinking?

 

[Old Sweat]

If it is a Brigade or Battalion commander, then something that can fly from unimproved airstrips and sections of road are in order.

I have lifted your last line because it all boils down to that. If we go that route, how many hours per day of air suport will we have? Not bloody many, I venture, and a lot less than under the present system.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Problem with the Commando moniker is what constitutes a Commando...currently Canada has to SOF Units in JTF2 and CSOR. If you want a Highly trained Airmobile Unit the Perhaps going back to the old Model of the Airborne minus the need to be Jumper. Have an Unit in-doc like the AIC only call it CIC or perhaps a small 2 month course/selection process. From there you integrate said unit into a Mobile force with integrated Airmobile assets and Logistics and perhaps this BG(ish) group could have a rotating Commander between the AF and the Army. With one element holding Command and the other 2IC and rotating that every 2-3 yrs.


I would like to add that said force would need some form of CAS for myself I am more a fan of Rotary CAS then Fast Air. Though prop driven might be a nice in between the two. I like AH's though  for escort of the UH's and for staying on station for intimate support with Fast Air and Arty on call.

Sorry for the lack of clarity.  I was referring to option 2 - the CAR Commando model - the reinforced company or the permanently formed combat team.

 

[aesop081]

maybe we can have things both ways, I took some advice from a previous posts, did some digging and got information from the Public Relations and Information office of the Swedish Airforce RE: the JAS-39c fully loaded it can take off from rough airstrips, airfields of parts there of and highways with a solid serface with in 600M.  It takes 1 C-130 load per day to support 3 aircraft (no mention of #of sorties per day) an can be maintained by 1 2.5 tone truck with a crew of 3.Is this someting close to what everybody is thinking?

Just so you know, the Sweedish highways and road network was designed to support this. Our system is not.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It really seems there are 3 types of fixed wing air support, 4 if you want to count air resupply,

!. Recce/overhead cover being mainly passive relaying information to the ground troops. This can be done by many differnet platforms, loiter times, surveillance packages are the most important issues.

2. Air support from medium altitude via dumb munitions or guided munitions, as the cost (and a lesser amount of air frames) of first line fighters go up, I see the Air forces preferring this type of engagement where the aircraft are protected from low level AA (and large rocks) From the air force command view, it does not make sense to risk a 70 million dollar aircraft to strafe a few guys on a hilltop. (The squad being pinned down by said guys might be in disagreement with this viewpoint)

3. In the weeds and eating dirt flying, using rockets, guns and bombs to take out enemy positions close in and dirty. Presently there are only 2 frontline aircraft specifically designed for this task and to take the damage normally expected, these are the A10 and the SU-25  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-25 Both give up airspeed for other desirable characteristics, mainly survivability and slower maneuvering speeds and weapon loadouts.

I guess the question to be asked of our Air force bosses is: Are you willing to send our new F-35 (assuming they buy such) into the weeds to support troops in close contact and risk serous damage or loss of theses aircraft?  I suspect I already know the answer, being an extremely long winded and roundabout way of saying NO while really saying we will support you as best we can as long as the risk of ground fire is nil. Therefore I believe we safely say the future of CAS in the Canadian Air force will be #2

So if we want and need #3 in the future we need another air frame. Based on our budget i don't think we can afford presently both fixed and rotary attack aircraft (never minding the political discussions about such) The USAF is upgrading the existing A-10 airframes, going by the internal politics of that organization, I wouldn't be surprised if a request to purchase some of those airframes might actually be entertained, the number that pops into my head is 20, for a squadron of 12 aircraft with spares. (out of 356 airframes to be upgraded)  I suspect most opposition to such would come from the Canadian Air Force command, who would see the budget and manning requirements of such a purchase as a threat to the plans to buy new fighters, followed by handwringing from Taliban jack and co. This is why I proposed the build up of a ground attack squadron based on similar platforms as our training aircraft. This squadron would be an virtual orphan, a threat to the established order of things and will have to survive on tight funding for some time before acceptance seeps in. The risk is that the squadron will be pressed into oversea service with 2nd line aircraft if we deploy into an operation with minimal airsupport. Mind you the army has had to deploy with 2nd rate equipment for years, it will be a matter of risks vs benefits and only those in the future will be able to decide that equation. What the main role of the squadron would be is to train dedicated CAS pilots with close ties to the ground forces and to change mindsets on the blue side of things. These pilots could also fly with our allies gaining experiance on other airframes and learning tactics.

Well I beaten this horse enough, now what else can I find in the back of the stable, hmmm MGS, no, Russian aircraft, no, SPG's, no, aircraft carrier, hmmm... nah to much typing, well off for a beer!  ;D 

The other option is rotary wing which we can leave for anther day.

 

[Infanteer]

If we go that route, how many hours per day of air suport will we have? Not bloody many, I venture, and a lot less than under the present system.

So, we are talking about the current system - how many hours of CAS has Air Command given TFA elements to date?

 

[Old Sweat]

As you well know, Air Command has not given any hours of air support to TFA because it has no aircraft deployed in theatre. However the combined air assets have provided a heck of a lot of air support. I have skimmed a couple of logs (unclassified) kept by FOO/FAC parties in theatre and they have often controlled several missions per day, even when not in TIC situations.

Whatever aircraft Air Command uses makes no difference to the argument. If they are not deployed, they can't fly missions. However given the NATO procedures for air support, our troops have not suffered all that much from a lack of support.

 

[Zoomie]

A few things that have peaked my interest in the past pages - everything else is chaff and useless diatribe.

The Airforce doesn't decide what aircraft it buys or where it deploys.  The Government of Canada makes these decisions.  Purchase of the CC-177, CH-47, J-model, etc wasn't done to appease the green folks - it is just a part of fleet renewal and rationalization.

People with Master's Degrees in Education are the ones who design and develop training for each OSS.  If they believed that we needed to take Phase 3 Infantry, we would all be loaded on it while waiting for Phase 3 AFT <period>

CAS is not something new or lacking in the CF - our CF-188s are designed as attack aircraft (F/A).  Fiscal responsibility prohibits this multi-role aircraft being used to 100% of its capability - if we stopped fuel payments to the Navy and Army for a couple years, we could achieve this.  Sound fair?