Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

[thunderchild]

Not expecting them to I used a bad example.  DND is buying some very expensive helicoplers and no escort for the helicopters or the troops they carry.

 

[thunderchild]

lets face reality,how long did it take to replace the seaking? the army was going to get the MGS instead of the leo 2's they needed we need to plan now expecting a 15-20 year wait for the kit we should have had 5 years ago. The AT-6C was an idea to get some capability and develop it.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Well until we actually have Cyclones on our flight decks then they have not been replaced.

 

[aesop081]

The AT-6C was an idea to get some capability and develop it.

The Sea King replacement disaster delay is a political problem. We could be flying the EH-101 already if the Lieberals had not cancelled it. What on earth makes you think that that a light strike aircraft will not encounter more political problems ? We are still waiting for a decision on FWSAR, the continuation of AIMP for the CP-140 came at the very last moment possible..........see a trend here ?

 

[CBH99]

Someone with more experience with politics or AF procurement than myself...feel free to correct me.

But the lack of helicopter-based CAS is more of a politican issue than a technical or economic issue.  There is a Bell plant right there in Quebec (Same factory that built our Griffons if I'm correct) - that could be used to build other Bell products.  A Bell plant building Bell aircraft - right here in Canada.  And Quebec, to top it off. 

Acquiring a small number of 'armed recce helicopters' shouldn't be all that challenging.  Order the aircraft, order the parts, train the flight crews & ground crews.  Its the political will to do so that is the hard part.  Am I correct, or am I missing something??

 

[thunderchild]

I'm all for 30-40 AH-1Z rather thanAH-64's, we just have to make sure that they will be able to fight where they are needed without having to mission adapt everything.

 

[aesop081]

I'm all for 30-40 AH-1Z rather thanAH-64's,

There you go again.......What are you basing this on ?

we just have to make sure that they will be able to fight where they are needed without having to mission adapt everything.

What ?

 

[Infanteer]

I am loathe to join the "let's buy this aircraft" discussion, but I really did like the slant of this article from the March 2008 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette.  I have a PDF copy if anyone wants the whole article, but the gist is Squadrons capable of deploying away from the large "KAF's" that are anathema to Counterinsurgency.  Why would Canada aim towards something like this?  First, it is cheap(er) yet effective.  Second, as someone said earlier, we will be operating in a Coalition environment.  We'll let the USAF fly the high-skies with F-22s while we get the most bang for our Airpower bucks.  Some highlights:

Counterinsurgency requires us to go 'back to the future'

We will be leaving Iraq soon. If there is going to be any sort of peace in Al Anbar Province we had better prepare the Iraqi Air Force with the tools and skills to continue this counterinsurgency fight. This article addresses the shortage of true counterinsurgency aircraft in the Marine Corps fight, which ones to use, how to use them and, most importantly, how to transition the fight over to the Iraqi Air Force. The Marine Corps should look at three types of fixed-wing turboprop aircraft to win and transition this fight-light attack/forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)), light, and medium cargo.

Light Attack/FAC(A) Aircraft

Older, proven turboprop aircraft are first to jump to mind as perfect light attack aircraft. Certainly one of the best examples is the OV-10. It was built expressly for the task. The problem with selecting the Bronco today has everything to do with availability. Unless the OV-10 line is reopened by Boeing (who bought Rockwell, the original Bronco manufacturer), I believe the way forward is to look at current turboprop aircraft in use today that have existing and tested ordnance mounting and delivery systems.1 In his 1986 article, "Air Power in a Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East," William Olsen summed up the problem and reason for a fixedwing turboprop solution very quickly:

The use of high-speed, high-performance aircraft and heavy ordnance, like the indiscriminant use of long-range artillery, is counterproductive. Targets are difficult to identify, distinguishing friend from foe is largely a matter of chance, and time on station is too ephemeral. What are needed are slow planes that can be directed discriminatingjly by ground observers who have an understanding of the situation. The air platform needs to be stable, tough, inexpensive, and easily maintained and operated in an austere environment . . . . Expense, time on station, and difficulty of maintenance are reasons why helicopters are not necessarily the best answer to the situations of low-intensity conflict. [Author's emphasis.]2

Tactics. The best way to employ a counterinsurgency light attack/FAC (A) squadron would be to have it forward deployed alongside the ground unit it is supporting. The FAC(A) would be intimately familiar with the geography of his assigned area of operations, the rules of engagement, the threat, and friendly units supported. In our current fight the fixed-wing aircraft are employed as close air support/nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in general support of the entire Multinational Force-West (MNF-W) area of operations (AO). Aircrew are sent anywhere within this enormous area on a daily basis. It is impossible to "know" the area as well as we should. The Marine Corps should relook at the way area FACs were used during the Vietnam War. FAC squadrons were assigned specific AOs to work. Aviators assigned to those units could generally expect to fight in that AO for their entire tour.

Light Cargo Aircraft

Light cargo aircraft also serve an important place in any air force fighting a counterinsurgency war. The movement of personnel and cargo within the AO is a time- and asset-consuming problem. The main advantages of a fixedwing light cargo aircraft over a rotary-wing aircraft lies in its speed, altitude, and ease of maintenance. Over the distances we are covering in our current fight, speed becomes critical in the timely delivery of needed people and equipment. Our CH-53s and 46s are maxed out flying every night in our current fight. The aircraft are absolutely full, and there are more people and equipment to be moved than actually get moved. The current surface-to-air threat has relegated most of our helicopters to flying their assault support requests at night. Fixed-wing aircraft could avoid flying through most of the threat envelopes and would give the ground combat element (GCE) what they need 24/7. These two factors-speed and altitude (read survivability)-are why the Marine Corps has pushed so hard for the MV-22. The Marine Corps is not leaving any of the MV-22s for the Iraqi Air Force, so we had better be prepared to leave them something they can use.

Air resupply. The Marine Corps should also revisit using airdrops for resupply. This ability would let the GCE stay out in the field longer-one of the key tenets in winning a counterinsurgency. It would also do away with (for a large part) the ground resupply convoys that have been hit so hard by improvised explosive devices through the years and coordinated attacks recently. The Marine Corps already has air delivery Marines in its table of organization (T/O). By using airdrops they could be employed as their military occupational specialty designates.

In the 1962 RAND Corporations Symposium on Counterinsurgency Report, COL John White, Royal Australian Army, "quarreled with the theory, taught by the special warfare schools, that air support is a bonus, and advocated air supply as a routine means of support wherever other vehicles are unusable." In the same paragraph, COL Charles Bohannan, AUS(Ret):

. . . was inclined to make an even stronger case for the logistic uses of aircraft. He felt that the potential of air drops, which are economical in manpower and money, had not been fully enough exploited. . . .11

Medium Cargo Aircraft

The Iraqi Army is not going to be fighting the counterinsurgency with large troop movements, mass airborne assaults, or with a requirement for large airdrops. Nor is it going to need an aerial refueling capability. What would be more useful is a larger number of medium-sized cargo aircraft able to move smaller units and reasonably sized cargo requirements around the country. The Iraqi Air Force does not need more large, complex aircraft to maintain on an austere budget and battlespace....

Tactics. At a minimum the Marine Corps should stand up one 12-plane, medium-lift VMR squadron and base it at Al Asad Airbase. This aircraft would coordinate with the GCE at the Marine expeditionary force level. For the Marine Corps fight, this would allow the Marine aerial refueler transport squadron to concentrate on fixed-wing aerial refueling and intertheater lift requirements. The intratheater lift would be handled by the medium-lift VMR squadron.

As the cargo is moved within the theater between the larger prepared fields, the light cargo aircraft would take the cargo out to unprepared fields or airdrop the cargo as required. This is not to say the medium-lift cargo aircraft is incapable of operations out of those fields or of airdropping supplies. It is just that it would not be economical to move the amount of cargo that would need to be distributed to remote communities or small units in the field with medium-lift aircraft.

Maintenance

One of the biggest factors in deciding which aircraft to use for the light attack and light cargo aircraft would be commonality of parts. The use of the Pratt & Whitney PT6A engine amongst the light attack and light cargo aircraft is a major bonus for the Marine Corps and the Iraqi Air Force. No matter what forward base the aircraft stop through, common consumables-petroleum, oil, and lubricants-and light maintenance requirements could be satisfied.

If we are going to have CAS, I would like to see Green CAS, with pilots who've trained with their Ground Combat Arms brethren (perhaps even doing Phase III infantry, as Marine Corps Aviators do).  Their aircraft are small, sturdy and capable of operating from austere fields that we spread out amongst our FOBs.

 

[Zoomie]

If we are going to have CAS, I would like to see Green CAS, with pilots who've trained with their Ground Combat Arms brethren

Giddy-up.  There's plenty of space on those courses, right?  Sign me up.  Wait - isn't that why we have FoxholeU?

The best thing about CAS is that at a minimum the aircraft can travel at around 4 miles/minute - that eats up the ground pretty fast and gives a large area of quick reaction.

IMO - AT-6 would make an excellent low intensity CAS aircraft.

 

[Infanteer]

Giddy-up.  There's plenty of space on those courses, right?  Sign me up.  Wait - isn't that why we have FoxholeU?

I've worked with other military forces who do it and it works.  It was awesome to do mission planning with aviators who actually spoke some "ground-tactics" language.  Same with their logistics officers.

Would it eliminate some fat plods who are in it for the shot at Air Canada?  Probably.  Make it Green aviation and let the Blue stick to what they're doing now and I think we'll all be happy.

 

[George Wallace]

Would it eliminate some fat plods who are in it for the shot at Air Canada?  Probably.  Make it Green aviation and let the Blue stick to what they're doing now and I think we'll all be happy.

Now you are talking sacrilege.  The Air Force won't even let the Tac Hel guys go "Green".  Now want them to let CAS go "Green". 

 

[thunderchild]

maybe going green is what is needed for any cas to work.  Why would the airforce mind giving up somthin that they don't want anyway ........

 

[SupersonicMax]

maybe going green is what is needed for any cas to work.  Why would the airforce mind giving up somthin that they don't want anyway ........

What do you mean?

 

[aesop081]

maybe going green is what is needed for any cas to work. 

How so ? Are you saying that all AF provided CAS is ineffective ?

 

[GAP]

Why are you guys feeding this troll?

 

[FSTO]

Just wondering here. When was the last time the army and AF had a training exercise where the CF-18 provided CAS to army units? Who is designated as the ground-air controller for calling in the strikes? How are the communications between the two? Is is direct or does it go thru several other steps before the airplane is on task?

know its been a few years since I've been in battlestar but if I remember right the Navy has AF air controllers posted to the command ship. They were responsible for the CAP, had direct communications with them and control their employment. 

 

[dimsum]

know its been a few years since I've been in battlestar but if I remember right the Navy has AF air controllers posted to the command ship. They were responsible for the CAP, had direct communications with them and control their employment. 

I thought it was the SAC specialty of NCIOPs or MARS who did that onboard?

 

[SupersonicMax]

FSTO, it happens all the time.  CAS is BIG right now in the fighter community.  There are FACs deployed in afghanistan (which are pilots by trade, 1 hornet driver deployed as FAC at all times).  

 

[aesop081]

When was the last time the army and AF had a training exercise where the CF-18 provided CAS to army units?

Almost every MAPLE GUARDIAN i have participated in had Hornets providing CAS and CP-140s providing ISR. Controlled by the guys on the ground.

 

[FSTO]

Almost every MAPLE GUARDIAN i have participated in had Hornets providing CAS and CP-140s providing ISR. Controlled by the guys on the ground.

Thats good to know. Now how are the comms? That is usually the single point of failure in most operations.