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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

The Economist worries about China's intentions:

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Why is Xi Jinping building secret commodity stockpiles?​

Vast new holdings of grain, natural gas and oil suggest trouble ahead​


Over the past two decades China has devoured enormous amounts of raw materials. Its population has grown bigger and richer, requiring more dairy, grain and meat. Its giant industries have been ravenous for energy and metals. In recent years, though, the economy has suffered from political mismanagement and a property crisis. Chinese officials are adamant that they want to shift away from resource-intensive industries. Logic dictates that the country’s appetite for commodities should be shrinking, and shrinking fast.

In reality, the opposite is happening. Last year China’s imports of many basic resources broke records, and imports of all types of commodities surged by 16% in volume terms. They are still rising, up by 6% in the first five months of this year. Given the country’s economic struggles, this does not reflect growing consumption. Instead, China appears to be stockpiling materials at a rapid pace—and at a time when commodities are expensive. Policymakers in Beijing seem to be worried about new geopolitical threats, not least that a new, hawkish American president could seek to choke crucial supply routes to China.

Trump trade​

The fear is warranted, for China is dependent on foreign resources. Although the country is the world’s refining centre for many metals, it imports much of the raw material required, ranging from 70% of bauxite to 97% of cobalt. China keeps the lights on thanks to imported energy. It has a lot of coal, but its deposits of other fuels do not match its needs, forcing it to bring in 40% of its natural gas and 70% of its crude oil. China’s dependence is most acute for food. In 2000 almost everything citizens ate was produced at home; today less than two-thirds is. The country imports 85% of the 125m tonnes a year of soyabean it uses to feed its 400m pigs. Its reliance on foreign farmers is near total for coffee, palm oil and some dairy products.

Aware of this, China started building up “strategic” stockpiles of grain and defence-related minerals at the end of the cold war, which it then added to at the peak of its economic boom with stocks of petroleum and industrial metals. Three recent events have prompted more stockpiling. In 2018 President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on $60bn-worth of Chinese exports to America, forcing China to retaliate by slapping duties on American soyabeans. Next came covid-19, which disrupted supply chains and raised the cost of materials. The war in Ukraine then inflamed prices and showed America’s will to use embargoes against even large foes.

Now Mr Trump, who makes no secret of his desire to hobble China, has a decent chance of returning to power. America could start by restricting its own food exports to China, which have rebounded since Mr Trump’s departure from the White House, and lean on other big suppliers such as Argentina and Brazil to do likewise. It could try to influence countries that sell metals to China, including Australia and Chile. And most of China’s commodity imports are shipped through a few straits and canals that America could seek to block for Chinese vessels by, say, posting military ships nearby.

China seems to be readying itself for a more hostile environment. Its preparations start with scaling up infrastructure required to stash supplies. By contrast with America, where strategic reserves are government-controlled, in China stockpiles also take the form of private tanks, silos and warehouses, which officials in Beijing have access to in times of crisis.

Since 2020 China’s crude-storage capacity has increased from 1.7bn to 2bn barrels. The location of many such sites is secret, but satellite imagery suggests that known ones have grown fast since 2022, says Emma Li of Vortexa, a data firm. Similarly, the capacity of underground gas caves grew six-fold between 2010 and 2020, to 15bn cubic metres (bcm); the target is to reach 55bcm by next year. China is also building a dozen or so tanks to hold liquefied gas along its coast. JPMorgan Chase, a bank, forecasts that total gas-storage capacity will hit 85bcm by 2030.

China is now filling these facilities. In another sign of increasing caginess, state statisticians have stopped releasing data for stocks of many commodities. Yet there are ways to approximate the degree of concern. America’s Department of Agriculture forecasts that, by the end of the current growing season, China’s stocks of wheat and maize will represent 51% and 67% of the world’s, up five to ten percentage points from 2018. These are thought to be enough to cover at least a year’s demand. Stocks of soyabeans, China’s biggest agricultural import, have doubled since 2018, to 39m tonnes, and are projected to hit 42m tonnes by the end of the season.

Copper-bottomed​

More striking still has been China’s effort to stash away metals and fuel. By estimating the amounts of copper, nickel and various other metals that China could have credibly consumed and comparing it with total supply, Tom Price of Panmure Liberum, a bank, finds that the country’s inventory build-up since 2018 has been sufficient to cover at least 35% to 133% of its annual demand, depending on the commodity. By the end of spring China also had 25bcm of gas in storage, enough to meet 23 days of consumption, and up from 15 days’ worth five years ago. Parlsey Ong of JPMorgan Chase expects that this cover will reach 28 days by 2030.

Crude stocks, meanwhile, have risen by an average of 900,000 barrels a day (b/d) since the start of the year, estimates Rapidan Energy, a consultancy. At 1.5m b/d, the filling rate was fastest in June, suggesting acceleration. This has helped China’s inventory near 1.3bn barrels, enough to cover 115 days of imports (America, by comparison, holds 800m barrels). The stash will continue to grow. China has told oil firms to add 60m to stockpiles by the end of March. Rapidan reckons reserves will grow even faster, with China adding as much as 700m barrels by the end of 2025.

This stockpiling is worrying Americans, and not just because it could fuel inflation by raising commodity prices. The supplies China is after are exactly those it would need to survive a protracted conflict, perhaps as it blockades Taiwan. “When you juxtapose that against China’s military build-up, it starts to be very concerning,” says Gabriel Collins, a former analyst at America’s defence department. For now, the evidence suggests that Xi Jinping’s hoarding is more likely to be a defensive measure, since it is not yet on a scale required for him to be secure in a hot conflict. American officials must hope that does not change in the years to come. ■

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The last para is the worrying part.

The smart money forecasts a two phased approach to China's global domination, beginning with regional hegemony, kind of the the US' journey to Super Power status....

China Has Two Paths To Global Domination​

The conventional wisdom was that China would seek an expanded regional role but would defer to the distant future any global ambitions.

The emerging conventional wisdom holds that China will try to establish global influence by first establishing regional hegemony. This does not mean physically occupying neighboring countries (with the potential exception of Taiwan), as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. But it does mean that Beijing must make itself the dominant player in the Western Pacific, out to the first island chain (which runs from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines) and beyond; it must gain an effective veto over the security and economic choices of its neighbors; it must rupture America’s alliances in the region and push U.S. military forces farther and farther away from China’s shores. If China cannot do this, it will never have a secure regional base from which to project power globally. It will be confronted by persistent security challenges along its vulnerable maritime periphery; it will have to focus its energies and military assets on defense rather than offense. And so long as Washington retains a strong military position along the first island chain, regional powers—from Vietnam to Taiwan to Japan—will try to resist China’s rise rather than accommodate it. Put simply, China cannot be a true global power if it remains surrounded by U.S. allies and security partners, military bases, and other outposts of a hostile superpower.

 
Things that might make you wonder about the government's "communications" policy from today's Globe and Mail:

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Canadian warship shadowed ‘dual-purpose’ Chinese vessel in Bering Strait​


A Canadian warship travelled to the Bering Strait in July to shadow China’s most advanced polar icebreaker as the Xue Long 2 transited the passageway between Russia and Alaska as part of Beijing’s effort to reinforce its Arctic ambitions.

The Canadian government did not make public this part of HMCS Regina’s trip to the Arctic Ocean until it faced media requests about the frigate’s itinerary this week. The Department of National Defence did not explain why it omitted this monitoring of the Chinese ship from its news release accounts of the trip, which it had described as an “Arctic awareness and sovereignty mission.”

HMCS Regina’s tracking of China’s Xue Long 2 (Snow Dragon 2) research vessel came at a potentially fragile moment in Canada-China relations. Open-source vessel tracking websites suggest this took place July 13 to 17. The same ship-tracking websites show HMCS Regina turned off its transponder July 13 in the Bering Sea. Four days later the Canadian vessel reappeared in Arctic waters.

This monitoring of China’s transit occurred just as Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly was preparing for a historic visit to Beijing to reopen communication channels with the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) amid a deep freeze in Canada-China relations brought on by the 2018 imprisonment of two Canadian citizens. Ms. Joly’s visit on July 19 was the first time a Canadian foreign minister had visited China in nearly seven years.

Department of National Defence spokesperson Frédérica Dupuis said in a statement that as climate change warms the Arctic, Canada is seeing more foreign actors with regional military ambitions in the area who seek natural resources, energy and transportation routes. China does not possess territory in the Arctic but has taken to calling itself a “near-Arctic state” with hopes of legitimizing its presence in the region.

Ms. Dupuis said China’s Snow Dragon 2 vessel has dual purposes when it enters Arctic waters. Competitor nations “are exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence,” she said. On July 24, North American Aerospace Defense Command said it monitored two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian TU-95 strategic bombers flying in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone, a defined band of international airspace that requires the ready identification of all aircraft in the interest of national security.

“We are seeing more Russian activity in our air approaches, and a growing number of Chinese dual-purpose research vessels and surveillance platforms collecting data about the Canadian North that is, by Chinese law, made available to China’s military,” Ms. Dupuis said.

She said HMCS Regina and its helicopter “interacted safely and professionally with the Chinese research vessel Xue Long 2 throughout its transit through the Bering Strait.”

The Canadian frigate’s trip also coincided with a visit to the Bering Sea by four Chinese military ships including a destroyer, two guided-missile destroyers and a replenishment ship. The government of Japan identified these vessels through postings on X and the U.S Coast Guard reported encountering the Chinese warships.

Ms. Dupuis said HMCS Regina did not interact with the Chinese naval flotilla.

“The Canadian Armed Forces was also aware of the presence of a Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval task group, which remained in international waters at all times. The Chinese naval task group had no encounters with HMCS Regina,” she said.

“To maintain the security of our missions and personnel, we will not disclose further specific operational details.”

Steffan Watkins, an Ottawa-based consultant who tracks aircraft and ships, said he’s still confused why the Canadian military took steps to reduce its visibility during the Bering Strait passage.

“Why did they turn off their transponder, specifically hiding their location, for the transit of the strait and until they had broken off from monitoring the research vessel?,” he said.

“If this is just an innocent friendly passage, why turn off the transponder?”

Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, said he’s proud of how far north HMCS Regina ventured. “It’s extremely rare for a frigate to operate at such high latitudes and it is definitely the record for a Halifax-class north of the Bering Strait.”

The Xue Long 2 is an improvement on China’s original Xue Long research vessel, one that Arctic defence experts say has been used to legitimatize China’s growing interest in region, despite holding no territory there.

“Over the last decade, in addition to its overt scientific goals, Xue Long was, and is, intentionally employed under the cover of science and scientific collaboration to intentionally normalize, for skittish Arctic nations, China’s presence in the region and the CCP’s revisionist self-assertion as a near-Arctic nation,” authors Bryan J.R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer wrote in a 2021 paper for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

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Maybe she’s going over to get the instruction package for running the Canadian October 2025 election? 🤷🏻‍♂️
Maybe. Here’s who is behind our latest mission in kowtowing diplomacy. Anyone who has been paying attention won’t be surprised. It would explain Jolys’ failing up in Cabinet.

 
Maybe. Here’s who is behind our latest mission in kowtowing diplomacy. Anyone who has been paying attention won’t be surprised. It would explain Jolys’ failing up in Cabinet.

Is traitorous scoundrel too strong?
 
PLAN has a 50,000 ton amphibious assault carrier under construction now with an EMALS rail appearing to be 130 meters long. It would seem this Type 076 LHA will be the largest in the world so far, with an ability to launch and trap dozens of fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and drones. There may eventually be 4 ships in this class, and the PLAN will displace the USN as the largest gator navy by the end of the decade.

 

"We warn Canada that it should abide by the One-China Principle, be cautious in its words and deeds on the Taiwan issue," ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said.
How about a response like "go fuck yourselves. You're responsible for millions of deaths so fuck off"

A good diplomat I would not be....


You Must Star Wars GIF by Regal
 
Things that might make you wonder about the government's "communications" policy from today's Globe and Mail:

----------

Canadian warship shadowed ‘dual-purpose’ Chinese vessel in Bering Strait​


A Canadian warship travelled to the Bering Strait in July to shadow China’s most advanced polar icebreaker as the Xue Long 2 transited the passageway between Russia and Alaska as part of Beijing’s effort to reinforce its Arctic ambitions.

The Canadian government did not make public this part of HMCS Regina’s trip to the Arctic Ocean until it faced media requests about the frigate’s itinerary this week. The Department of National Defence did not explain why it omitted this monitoring of the Chinese ship from its news release accounts of the trip, which it had described as an “Arctic awareness and sovereignty mission.”

HMCS Regina’s tracking of China’s Xue Long 2 (Snow Dragon 2) research vessel came at a potentially fragile moment in Canada-China relations. Open-source vessel tracking websites suggest this took place July 13 to 17. The same ship-tracking websites show HMCS Regina turned off its transponder July 13 in the Bering Sea. Four days later the Canadian vessel reappeared in Arctic waters.

This monitoring of China’s transit occurred just as Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly was preparing for a historic visit to Beijing to reopen communication channels with the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) amid a deep freeze in Canada-China relations brought on by the 2018 imprisonment of two Canadian citizens. Ms. Joly’s visit on July 19 was the first time a Canadian foreign minister had visited China in nearly seven years.

Department of National Defence spokesperson Frédérica Dupuis said in a statement that as climate change warms the Arctic, Canada is seeing more foreign actors with regional military ambitions in the area who seek natural resources, energy and transportation routes. China does not possess territory in the Arctic but has taken to calling itself a “near-Arctic state” with hopes of legitimizing its presence in the region.

Ms. Dupuis said China’s Snow Dragon 2 vessel has dual purposes when it enters Arctic waters. Competitor nations “are exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence,” she said. On July 24, North American Aerospace Defense Command said it monitored two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian TU-95 strategic bombers flying in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone, a defined band of international airspace that requires the ready identification of all aircraft in the interest of national security.

“We are seeing more Russian activity in our air approaches, and a growing number of Chinese dual-purpose research vessels and surveillance platforms collecting data about the Canadian North that is, by Chinese law, made available to China’s military,” Ms. Dupuis said.

She said HMCS Regina and its helicopter “interacted safely and professionally with the Chinese research vessel Xue Long 2 throughout its transit through the Bering Strait.”

The Canadian frigate’s trip also coincided with a visit to the Bering Sea by four Chinese military ships including a destroyer, two guided-missile destroyers and a replenishment ship. The government of Japan identified these vessels through postings on X and the U.S Coast Guard reported encountering the Chinese warships.

Ms. Dupuis said HMCS Regina did not interact with the Chinese naval flotilla.

“The Canadian Armed Forces was also aware of the presence of a Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval task group, which remained in international waters at all times. The Chinese naval task group had no encounters with HMCS Regina,” she said.

“To maintain the security of our missions and personnel, we will not disclose further specific operational details.”

Steffan Watkins, an Ottawa-based consultant who tracks aircraft and ships, said he’s still confused why the Canadian military took steps to reduce its visibility during the Bering Strait passage.

“Why did they turn off their transponder, specifically hiding their location, for the transit of the strait and until they had broken off from monitoring the research vessel?,” he said.

“If this is just an innocent friendly passage, why turn off the transponder?”

Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, said he’s proud of how far north HMCS Regina ventured. “It’s extremely rare for a frigate to operate at such high latitudes and it is definitely the record for a Halifax-class north of the Bering Strait.”

The Xue Long 2 is an improvement on China’s original Xue Long research vessel, one that Arctic defence experts say has been used to legitimatize China’s growing interest in region, despite holding no territory there.

“Over the last decade, in addition to its overt scientific goals, Xue Long was, and is, intentionally employed under the cover of science and scientific collaboration to intentionally normalize, for skittish Arctic nations, China’s presence in the region and the CCP’s revisionist self-assertion as a near-Arctic nation,” authors Bryan J.R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer wrote in a 2021 paper for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
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Its interesting that a frigate was sent that far north to shadow a non-military vessel. I assume that none of our AOPS's were available or would have been able to make the distance travelled in the time necessary due to their much slower speed than a frigate. Also, I'd assume that since the AOPS's are still not certified to carry a CH-148 that would have been another strike against sending one of them up there. The CH-148 gave the Regina the ability to get in alot closer to the Chinese vessel without putting Regina within visuals.

The US had a Coastie following the naval task force, not a naval vessel. I assume that the US was stretched a bit thin and asked us to help out.

The only way to really know who's potentially on their way into our backyard in that area is to sit on the edge of the US exclusive economic zone and wait and see who might come along, though I'm sure that the US Air National Guard is tracking all shipping coming into the area. Have to wonder if it would make any sense to station 1 or 2 AOPS's at Kodiak from June-Oct in order to substantially shorten the respond time to be on station - a savings of 3.5 days from Esquimalt to Kodiak.
 
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Zongyuan Zoe Liu, writing in Foreign Affairs, says that China is making bad, even fatal economic choices due to party orthodoxy:

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China’s Real Economic Crisis​

Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model​

The Chinese economy is stuck. Following Beijing’s decision, in late 2022, to abruptly end its draconian “zero COVID” policy, many observers assumed that China’s growth engine would rapidly reignite. After years of pandemic lockdowns that brought some economic sectors to a virtual halt, reopening the country was supposed to spark a major comeback. Instead, the recovery has faltered, with sluggish GDP performance, sagging consumer confidence, growing clashes with the West, and a collapse in property prices that has caused some of China’s largest companies to default. In July 2024, Chinese official data revealed that GDP growth was falling behind the government’s target of about five percent. The government has finally let the Chinese people leave their homes, but it cannot command the economy to return to its former strength.

To account for this bleak picture, Western observers have put forward a variety of explanations. Among them are China’s sustained real estate crisis, its rapidly aging population, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s tightening grip on the economy and extreme response to the pandemic. But there is a more enduring driver of the present stasis, one that runs deeper than Xi’s growing authoritarianism or the effects of a crashing property market: a decades-old economic strategy that privileges industrial production over all else, an approach that, over time, has resulted in enormous structural overcapacity. For years, Beijing’s industrial policies have led to overinvestment in production facilities in sectors from raw materials to emerging technologies such as batteries and robots, often saddling Chinese cities and firms with huge debt burdens in the process.

Simply put, in many crucial economic sectors, China is producing far more output than it, or foreign markets, can sustainably absorb. As a result, the Chinese economy runs the risk of getting caught in a doom loop of falling prices, insolvency, factory closures, and, ultimately, job losses. Shrinking profits have forced producers to further increase output and more heavily discount their wares in order to generate cash to service their debts. Moreover, as factories are forced to close and industries consolidate, the firms left standing are not necessarily the most efficient or most profitable. Rather, the survivors tend to be those with the best access to government subsidies and cheap financing.

Since the mid-2010s, the problem has become a destabilizing force in international trade, as well. By creating a glut of supply in the global market for many goods, Chinese firms are pushing prices below the break-even point for producers in other countries. In December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that excess Chinese production was causing “unsustainable” trade imbalances and accused Beijing of engaging in unfair trade practices by offloading ever-greater quantities of Chinese products onto the European market at cutthroat prices. In April, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned that China’s overinvestment in steel, electric vehicles, and many other goods was threatening to cause “economic dislocation” around the globe. “China is now simply too large for the rest of the world to absorb this enormous capacity,” Yellen said.

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity. At home, factories in government-designated priority sectors of the economy routinely sell products below cost in order to satisfy local and national political goals. And Beijing has regularly raised production targets for many goods, even when current levels already exceed demand. Partly, this stems from a long tradition of economic planning that has given enormous emphasis to industrial production and infrastructure development while virtually ignoring household consumption. This oversight does not stem from ignorance or miscalculation; rather, it reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing economic vision.


As the party sees it, consumption is an individualistic distraction that threatens to divert resources away from China’s core economic strength: its industrial base. According to party orthodoxy, China’s economic advantage derives from its low consumption and high savings rates, which generate capital that the state-controlled banking system can funnel into industrial enterprises. This system also reinforces political stability by embedding the party hierarchy into every economic sector. Because China’s bloated industrial base is dependent on cheap financing to survive—financing that the Chinese leadership can restrict at any time—the business elite is tightly bound, and even subservient, to the interests of the party. In the West, money influences politics, but in China it is the opposite: politics influences money. The Chinese economy clearly needs to strike a new balance between investment and consumption, but Beijing is unlikely to make this shift because it depends on the political control it gets from production-intensive economic policy.

For the West, China’s overcapacity problem presents a long-term challenge that can’t be solved simply by erecting new trade barriers. For one thing, even if the United States and Europe were able to significantly limit the amount of Chinese goods reaching Western markets, it would not unravel the structural inefficiencies that have accumulated in China over decades of privileging industrial investment and production goals. Any course correction could take years of sustained Chinese policy to be successful. For another, Xi’s growing emphasis on making China economically self-sufficient—a strategy that is itself a response to perceived efforts by the West to isolate the country economically—has increased, rather than decreased, the pressures leading to overproduction. Moreover, efforts by Washington to prevent Beijing from flooding the United States with cheap goods in key sectors are only likely to create new inefficiencies within the U.S. economy, even as they shift China’s overproduction problem to other international markets.

To craft a better approach, Western leaders and policymakers would do well to understand the deeper forces driving China’s overcapacity and make sure that their own policies are not making it worse. Rather than seeking to further isolate China, the West should take steps to keep Beijing firmly within the global trading system, using the incentives of the global market to steer China toward more balanced growth and less heavy-handed industrial policies. In the absence of such a strategy, the West could face a China that is increasingly unrestrained by international economic ties and prepared to double down on its state-led production strategy, even at the risk of harming the global economy and stunting its own prosperity.

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There's plenty more but she concludes that:

"So far, the Biden administration has taken a compartmentalized approach to China, addressing issues one at a time and focusing negotiations on single topics. In contrast, the Chinese government prefers a different approach in which no issues are off the table and concessions in one area might be traded for gains in another, even if the issues are unrelated. Consequently, although Beijing may seem recalcitrant in isolated talks, it might be receptive to a more comprehensive deal that addresses multiple aspects of U.S.-Chinese relations simultaneously. Washington should remain open to the possibility of such a grand bargain and recognize that if incentives change, China’s leadership might shift tactics abruptly, just as it did when it suddenly ended the zero-COVID policy.

Washington should also consider leveraging multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization to facilitate negotiations with Beijing. For example, China might agree to voluntarily drop its developing country status at the WTO, which gives designated countries preferential treatment in some trade disputes. It may also be persuaded to support a revised WTO framework to determine a country’s nonmarket economy status—a designation used by the United States and the EU to impose higher antidumping tariffs on China—on an industry-by-industry basis rather than for an entire economy. Such steps would acknowledge China’s economic success, even as it held it to the higher trade standards of advanced industrialized countries.

Xi views himself as a transformational leader, inviting comparisons to Chairman Mao. This was evident when he formally hosted former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—among the few widely respected American figures in Xi’s China—in July 2023, just four months before Kissinger’s death. Xi believes that as a great power, his country should not be constrained by negotiations or external pressures, but he might be open to voluntary adjustments on trade issues as part of a broader agreement. Many members of China’s professional and business elite feel despair about the state of relations with the United States. They know that China benefits more by being integrated into the Western-led global system than by being excluded from it. But if Washington sticks to its current path and continues to head toward a trade war, it may inadvertently cause Beijing to double down on the industrial policies that are causing overcapacity in the first place. In the long run, this would be as bad for the West as it would be for China."
 
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