Notes from underground
Don't look now, but Moscow's squaring off with the wrong 'enemy,' says Russian analyst ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY
By ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY
Tuesday, February 20, 2007 – Page A19
......Indeed, my fear is that, there, it will meet its end, defending those borders from the advance of Islamic radicals. When to the ululating of those fighting against "a unipolar world" NATO finally departs from Afghanistan and from history, the front of the Islamic revolution will cut through the countries of Central Asia. If we look a little further to the East, there too significant events are afoot.
As Izvestia recently reported, in September, the Chinese People's Liberation Army conducted a 10-day military training exercise on an unprecedented scale in the Shenyang and Beijing Military Regions, the two most powerful of the seven Chinese MRs. These border Russia -- Shenyang confronting the Russian Federation's Far East Military District, and Beijing the Siberian Military District. In the course of the exercise, units of the Shenyang MR performed a 1,000 kilometre advance into the territory of the Beijing MR and engaged in a training battle with units of that region.
The nature of the exercise tells us that it is in preparation for war with Russia and, moreover, that what is being planned is not defence but attack. Against Taiwan this scenario makes no sense. Deep invasive operations are being worked out on dry land, in a region of steppes and mountains. The lie of the land in the region where the exercises were held is similar to that of the Transbaikal region, and 1,000 kilometres is precisely the distance from the Russo-Chinese border along the river Argun to Lake Baikal. ......
http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com//servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20070220/CORUSSIA20/Comment/comment/comment/somnia/
Interesting take on this situation.
I am one of those that find Russia and China to be too friendly by half. They regularly seem to be working towards a common goal of crippling the west, at least sufficiently to allow them to catch up and not enough to inflict fatal wounds.
On the other hand Molotov and von Ribbentrop were sufficiently friendly in Aug of 1939 to sign a Non-Aggression Pact. That didn't last 2 years. Nor did antipathy to the UK and the US prevent Stalin finding common cause for two or three years. Things in that part of the world have a longstanding tradition of rapid and unanticipated, if not unpredictable, change. Something like 6000 years or men on horseback with no fixed address.
So how long is China's long game? If they were to move into Siberia is it enough to sideline the Stans as compliant neutrals - accepting both Western and Chinese investment? Or do they need a firmer commitment on their left flank? Do they need to dominate them and have them support a Siberian takeover militarily?
Do they need more man-power than they have? Do they need to wait for the Russians to become older and more decrepit and pickled in Vodka?
Is the purchase of Russian hardware merely a case of using Lenin's dictum that the capitalist will sell you the rope to hang himself against the Russians?
While everybody is focusing on the Straits of Taiwan, Czech radars and Afghanistan what would be the effect if the Chinese were to launch an Army, or even a Corps in the direction of Lake Baikal and the Altai? How about the Urals as a forward line of exploitation?
I think it might be possible for the Chinese to exploit along the northern border of the Stans as far as the Urals, keeping to the Steppes and have it accepted as a net benefit by the minor neighbours as a security enhancing move. Better a strong state and order than a weak state and disorder.
If they stay away from the tree line then militarily they can seize ground quickly - while still staying close to oil reserves - then wait another 10-20 years before considering infiltrating north and following up with an "invitation" to invade from the locals.
Russia wouldn't be pleased, needless to say. But could it do anything effective beyond nuclear strikes? India might not be pleased but would it be any worse off than it is now? Especially if the Stans maintain a buffer zone of "neutral" states and India maintains friendly relations with the west and commercial ties with Beijing. As for the US - might it not serve the US to make loud noises and do little if it buys China a resource base and the US control over a hinterland with a demonstrated history of unpredictability?
Does China need to wait for the US to deploy a working ABM capability in Europe to counter the Russian missile threat to China?
With respect to the latter point I note that the US is likely to have had the technology available for a number of years to kill tanks in large numbers with low cost munitions. It continued to maintain large tank forces and apparently to suppress the deployment of technologies like the Fibre Optic Guided missiles and Kinetic Energy Missiles. (Before this goes off on tanget re tanks they still have their uses and we should but the Leo2A6s). However it would certainly be a winning strategy to keep your enemy investing billions of dollars and man-hours, not to mention investing your entire tactical, operational and strategic structure on a technology that you know you can defeat - easily and quickly. If you were the only person with a gun would you let everyone know or would you waot to show up at the next sword fight armed like everyone else but with the gun as well?
China's moves against the Satellite may not be so much directed against the US who has many more satellites operating in much higher orbits but against Russian capabilities.
A Russia-China confrontation would be more in keeping with some of the scenarios that Edward has posited and it is also in keeping with what I consider a flaw in Barnett's Gap. He considers China and Russia to be functioning states. I disagree. Neither state can control their people (the number of rebellious acts in China's hinterland appears to be growing) and Russia almost certainly can't control its territory. Even there China's ability to control its borders seems suspect - It couldn't stop people moving to Hong Kong and it can't stop people being smuggled out of Fujian. Even if we allow for the fact that both of those emigrations may be state-sanctioned because they offer benefits to the state - how are we to explain the fact the China can't stop North Koreans claiming refugee status in China? And apparently one of China's major concerns in propping up North Korea is that the last thing they need is a sudden influx of more people.
I think the Chinese might be able to pull off a Sudetenland adventure in the near future:
A relatively small but well trained and motivated force with great reserves
Opposed by a small, demoralized, poorly equipped and led Russian force
Limited, non-threatening objectives
An international community with populations that are already war-weary and frightened
And "the British and French, in an effort to appease Hitler, gave into his demands rather than go to war over, in the (in)famous words of British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing” " http://www.mala.bc.ca/~Johnstoi/praguepage/introlecture.htm
Add the US to the British and French, especially if the US is tied up in Iraq and Iran, and swap Czechoslovakia and Germany for Russia and China - but with less foreign empathy for Russia than Czechoslovakia could garner.
An interesting window of opportunity in the spring of 2009? After the election of Hilary or Obama and when Canada is due to withraw from Afghanistan?
I hope the US and the West hold on to command of the seas as a counter and to be able to support our friends with secure external lines of communication. Ceding "control" over billions of people is one thing. History shows that nobody can control 3 people for very long. Ceding control over lines of communication in uninhabited space is another matter entirely.