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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

What about, say, our extremely intimate collaboration with US in NORAD if this government allows Huawei into Canada's 5G networks (further links at original):

U.S. Mulls Pulling Spy Planes From Britain, Not Basing F-35s There Over Huawei 5G Plans: Report
The United States says the Chinese firm's work on the United Kingdom's national 5G network is a major security risk.

Members of the U.S. Senate are reportedly looking to block the future forward-deployment of two U.S. Air Force F-35A Joint Strike Fighter squadrons to the United Kingdom. This follows reports that the White House is considering withdrawing RC-135 spy planes and other intelligence assets, as well as other U.S. military personnel, from the country. At issue are security concerns over the U.K. government's decision to allow Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei to be among those working on the country's national 5G mobile phone and WiFi networks.

The Telegraph newspaper in Britain first reported the effort to prevent the F-35As from going to the United Kingdom, which is a proposed addition to the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2021 Fiscal Year, on May 5, 2020. This same paper had reported that the White House was conducting its larger military and intelligence security review the day before.

The summary of the proposed addition to the NDAA, which is only now starting to take shape in Congress, would "prohibit the stationing of new aircraft at bases in host countries with at-risk vendors in their 5G or 6G networks." This could also upend any other forward-deployments of U.S. military aircraft to the United Kingdom or any other country that employs a telecommunications contractor, such as Huawei, that the United States deems to be a national security risk.

If this provision were to become law, it's not clear how this might impact plans to deploy U.S. Marine F-35Bs on the U.K. Royal Navy's aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth during that ship's first operational cruise, which is set to occur in 2021. How this prohibition might apply to rotational deployments, such routine visits by Air Force heavy bombers, is unclear, too.

With regards to the broader White House review, forward-deployed RC-135 spy planes at RAF Mildenhall in southeast England are high on the list to be withdrawn if the U.K. government goes ahead with its 5G plans involving Huawei. The U.K. Royal Air Force is also an RC-135 operator, with its variants known as Airseekers, a program that is heavily tied together with its American counterparts. It's unclear if that cooperation could also be put in jeopardy should the U.K.'s 5G plans go forward.

Beyond that, the United Kingdom is part of the so-called "Five Eyes" intelligence network with the United States, along with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This arrangement allows these five countries to rapidly share very sensitive information back and forth with each other and means that the United Kingdom hosts a wide variety of other permanent and rotating American intelligence assets.

This includes, but is certainly not limited to, deployments of U-2S Dragon Lady spy planes to RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford and the large U.S. Intelligence Community presence at RAF Menwith Hill. The Telegraph also said that the White House review was exploring withdrawing up to 10,000 U.S. military personnel in total, including non-intelligence related elements, as well. The U.S. military has a large precense in the United Kingdom, in general, which includes other Air Force units, including a fighter wing equipped with F-15C/D Eagles and F-15E Strike Eagles, an aerial refueling wing with KC-135R tankers, and a special operations wing.

It's not news, of course, that the U.S. government has concerns about potential security risks posed by allowing a Chinese firm to have a significant role in establishing mobile data networks across the United Kingdom. The fear is that the Chinese government could leverage Huawei's involvement to either build in backdoors or otherwise gain access to these networks in the future and use them as a vector to penetrate into more sensitive systems. The Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly accused the company of having direct ties to the Chinese government, which is also well-known for using cyber attacks, as well as traditional espionage, to steal both commercial and government information.

The U.S. military, as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community, have only become ever-more reliant on computer networks over the years. The F-35, specifically, which the United Kingdom also operates, is heavily network-dependent, with its cloud-based Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) responsible for a host of mission planning, maintenance, and logistics functions. There have long been concerns about ALIS' vulnerability to cyber attacks.

"Our governments share a tremendous amount of security information," Mick Mulvaney, then Acting White House Chief of Staff, said at a gathering for students Oxford’s debating society in February. "We are very much concerned that integrity of that information is hardwired into your computer systems, and if you folks go forward with the decision to include Huawei, it will have a direct and dramatic impact on our ability to share information with you. Period, end of story."

That same month U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly harangued U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson over Huawei.

Of course, there is no indication that the United Kingdom would ever allow Huawei to be involved in work relating to any sensitive portions of its national 5G network. At the same time, in an ever-connected world, even general access to commercial networks can still present real security risks to military and other government personnel.

Beyond all that, the U.S. government has been in its own protracted spat with the Chinese firm, which has also been tied to an ongoing trade war between Washington and Beijing, since 2018. In May of that year, the Pentagon banned the sale of Huawei cell phones, as well as those from Chinese firm ZTE, on its bases, citing security risks. Seven months later, Canadian authorities then arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou at the request of the U.S. government.

In January 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice hit the company with a total of 23 separate indictments, including the theft of trade secrets and fraud. Then, in May 2019, President Trump essentially banned Huawei from operating in the United States entirely via executive order. The U.S. government has now also indicted Meng Wanzhou personally over stealing trade secrets and other charges, as well, which she denies.

The U.S. has sought to pressure other allies to drop Huawei from their own 5G network rollouts, too. Australia, another Five Eyes member, ultimately blocked the Chinese firm from its own national network plans. Members of the U.K. parliament from Boris Johnson's own Conservative Party have also been pushing him to terminate the deal with the telecommunications company.

Relations between Washington and Beijing, as well as the Chinese government and those of other countries, have also cooled significantly in the past few months amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Key issues are evidence that authorities in China covered up the initial outbreak and that they are still withholding important information that could help global efforts to combat the spread of the virus.

The White House security review and the push in the Senate to block the deployment of F-35s and other aircraft to the United Kingdom are only likely to add to the already mounting pressure on U.K. authorities to drop Huawei from its 5G plans.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33316/u-s-mulls-pulling-spy-planes-from-britain-not-basing-f-35s-there-over-huawei-5g-plans-report

And a related earlier post:

Huawei, 5G, Canada and…COVID-19 and our Comprador Class
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2020/04/23/huawei-5g-canada-and-covid-19-and-our-comprador-class/

Mark
Ottawa

 
And the start of a post today (also notes at end a piece by Matthew Fisher):

The Cringe-Worthy PM Justin Trudeau vs Comrade Xi Jinping

Further to this post and “Comments” (very relevant to Terry Glavin’s article below),

COVID-19: The Chicoms and Canada, Australia and Sweden

Mr Glavin (tweets here) does a very nice number on our prime minister and his Liberal government...
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2020/05/06/the-cringe-worthy-pm-justin-trudeau-vs-comrade-xi-jinping/

Mark
Ottawa


 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52606774?at_custom3=BBC+News&at_custom1=%5Bpost+type%5D&at_custom4=1E5D347C-92B4-11EA-BE7C-9EF439982C1E&at_campaign=64&at_custom2=facebook_page&at_medium=custom7

Indian and Chinese troops 'clash on border' in Sikkim

Seems like tension on the Border in this particular area is increasingly turning violent from sources I have read.
 
Two other Canadians sentenced to Chinese jail.

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-immigrant-couple-who-sought-a-better-life-in-canada-now-jailed-in/
 
dapaterson said:
Two other Canadians sentenced to Chinese jail.

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-immigrant-couple-who-sought-a-better-life-in-canada-now-jailed-in/

Anything from Ottawa? You know the statement like "we are concerned that Chinese authorities are arresting and detaining Canadian citizens and this is not the behavior we expect from a civilized nation".

No?
 
Start of a post based on stories today from Globe and Mail and Global News (latter getting better all the time):

Pernicious Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in Canada (including United Front Work Dept.) and Our Government’s Limp Response

Further to this post,

The Cringe-Worthy PM Justin Trudeau vs Comrade Xi Jinping

the Chicoms are certainly engaging in a whole lot of that old-time subversion in our country, about which our government remains effectively mute. The start of two major news stories that both appeared May 12...
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2020/05/12/pernicious-diplomacy-with-chinese-characteristics-in-canada-including-united-front-work-dept-and-our-governments-limp-response/

Mark
Ottawa


 
Start of a post:

Red China vs Justin Trudeau’s Canada: “We’re all hostages now”

Further to this post which deals with many similar matters,

Pernicious Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in Canada (including United Front Work Dept.) and Our Government’s Limp Response

Terry Glavin, for his part, enters the lists once more...
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2020/05/13/red-china-vs-justin-trudeaus-canada-were-all-hostages-now/

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
A post based on recent Report to Congress by Congressional Research Service:

Mark Collins

Concluding scary item in May 14 "D-Brief" from Defense One (further links at original):

And finally today: The U.S. would be toast in a war with China, the Washington Post’s David Ignatius writes off a new book from Christian Brose, former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

How that would happen: “[U.S.] spy and communications satellites would immediately be disabled; our forward bases in Guam and Japan would be ‘inundated’ by precise missiles; our aircraft carriers would have to sail away from China to escape attack; our F-35 fighter jets couldn’t reach their targets because the refueling tankers they need would be shot down.”

Why so vulnerable out there in the Pacific? In part, because of “bureaucratic inertia compounded by entrenched interests. The Pentagon is good at doing what it did yesterday, and Congress insists on precisely that. We have been so busy buffing our legacy systems that, as Brose writes, ‘the United States got ambushed by the future.’”

As for responses less likely to lead to a large loss of U.S. life, “These smart systems exist,” Ignatius writes. “The Air Force’s unmanned XQ-58A, known as the ‘Valkyrie,’ is nearly as capable as a fighter but costs about 45 times less than an F-35; the Navy’s Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, known as the ‘Orca,’ is 300 times less costly than a $3.2 billion Virginia-class attack submarine.”

The problem: “[T]hese robots don’t have a lobby to rival the giant defense contractors.” Continue reading, here.
https://www.defenseone.com/news/2020/05/the-d-brief-may-14-2020/165393/

And the conclusion of a 2016 post:

US Navy: Carriers or Subs, with the Dragon in Mind
...
So to “win” in a serious war a need to end up nuclear? Help.
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2016/10/21/mark-collins-us-navy-carriers-or-subs-with-the-dragon-in-mind/

Mark
Ottawa
 
From Oz think tank:

Nuclear-armed submarines and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific

The maritime strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific is changing rapidly. The future of undersea nuclear deterrent forces has strategic, operational and force structure aspects for all major powers in the region. Strategic competition in an increasingly competitive environment has a significant maritime element, which itself is profoundly influenced by the continuing importance—and progressive expansion—of the region’s underwater nuclear deterrent forces.

To a greater extent than during the Cold War, both threatening and protecting such assets will be difficult to separate from other maritime campaigns. This particularly applies to potential anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations in the East and South China Seas, as well as to India and Pakistan and to North Korea, creating uncertainty over the possibility of unplanned escalations and outright accidents.

Maintaining any kind of regional balance will, therefore, call for cool judgements on the part of all the players, judgements that will need to be continually revised in the light of technological innovation and force development.

The US Navy’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force is central to the country’s nuclear arsenal. While the navy can’t be complacent about threats to the survivability of its submarines, until there are revolutionary developments in sensor technology, the combination of geography, oceanography, and platform and missile capabilities means that its at-sea deterrent will remain the most secure element of America’s nuclear force and thus receive high priority in funding.

The problem for the US Navy is that it will need to start replacing the Ohio class within the next decade, but the cost of 12 new Columbia-class submarines will severely limit its ability to regenerate all the other force elements that will be required to meet the combined challenges of China and Russia.

The navy’s efforts represent just one part of a strategy to push the US’s competitors off balance and regain the strategic initiative. An important maritime element is likely to be undermining China’s efforts to create an underwater ‘bastion’. Here, the Americans must weigh the benefits of actively threatening the security of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s SSBN force against the resource commitments that that would entail, as well as the complications that it could represent for alliance arrangements, notably with Japan and Australia.

In seeking to become the predominant maritime power in the western Pacific, China has its own problems of resources and technology. However attractive the concept of an at-sea deterrent force within its nuclear inventory may be, China must first extend the range of its submarine-launched missiles and considerably improve the stealth qualities of its missile submarines if it is to create a capability sufficient to pose a credible threat to the continental United States.

Russia’s challenges are in some ways parallel to those of the US, particularly its need to sustain an SSBN force while modernising the remainder of its navy. Maintaining an at-sea nuclear deterrent remains the highest priority. However, replacement of the older SSBN with the new Borey class must be consuming a very large share of the Russian navy’s resources. To the SSBN program must be added the need to renew the nuclear-powered attack submarine force and continue development of the ASW capabilities necessary to secure the bastions against potential attackers. The limited money available means that Russia’s maritime power-projection assets don’t enjoy the same level of attention.

Japan’s defence expansion, despite the tensions with China and the rise of the PLA Navy, has been relatively limited. Its most significant new elements are focused on developing amphibious forces capable of responding rapidly to any threat to the Ryukyu Islands, including the contested Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Japan’s ASW efforts are much less visible in, but perhaps more significant for, its maritime strategy. Japan’s submarine force is slowly expanding, and the modernisation of its surface and air ASW forces continues.

Australia faces equivalent challenges. Because it is one of the few regional players with substantial high-technology capabilities, particularly in the ASW domain, Australia’s assistance will be eagerly sought by the Americans, just as they have long looked to Japan. While its defence expansion remains relatively constrained—and slow—Australia’s emerging force structure will provide both independent national capabilities and strategic weight in alliance terms in ways that are relatively new. Australia has been a regular presence in the South China Sea over many years, but the latest Indo-Pacific Endeavour task group deployments have been on a larger scale than the individual ship deployments of the recent past.

North Korea remains a wild card. Its efforts to develop an underwater nuclear deterrent are only a small part of the increasingly complex problem its future presents for neighbouring countries and the region as a whole.

India must balance its apparently unresolvable tensions with Pakistan against a developing strategic rivalry with China that has important maritime dimensions. The growing Chinese economic and military presence in the Indian Ocean threatens India’s self-image as the dominant power in the region. India’s interest in the South China Sea represents something of a riposte and a deliberate effort to complicate China’s maritime strategy.

On the other hand, the entry of the first Indian SSBN into operational service and the start of its deterrent patrols may have added to India’s nuclear capabilities, but they also create a hostage to fortune that the Indian Navy must factor into its dispositions. Whether Pakistan will add to India’s problems by embarking nuclear weapons in its submarine force is uncertain, as is the priority that the Pakistan Navy will give to locating and tracking Indian SSBNs.

In sum, strategic competition in the increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific has a significant maritime element. Distinguishing threatening and protecting nuclear assets from routine maritime campaigns is increasingly difficult. As SSBN capabilities proliferate, and ASW technology advances, maintaining a regional maritime balance will increase in complexity.

This piece was produced as part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Undersea Deterrence Project, undertaken by the ANU National Security College. This article is a shortened version of chapter 2, ‘Maritime and naval power in the Indo-Pacific’, as published in the 2020 edited volume: The future of the undersea deterrent: a global survey. Support for this project was provided by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Author


James Goldrick served as a rear admiral in the Royal Australian Navy, has published widely on naval issues and now has appointments at UNSW Canberra, the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and ANCORS (Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security). Image: US Strategic Command.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-armed-submarines-and-the-balance-of-power-in-the-indo-pacific/

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of a post:

Engaging with the Chicoms’ PRC–Time to Wake Up and Smell the Maotai

A Republican former congressman and then senator has now seen the light; how long will Justin Trudeau and his government remain, at least publicly, largely in the dark?

I’ve Changed My Mind About China. America Should Too...
https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2020/05/16/engaging-with-the-chicoms-prc-time-to-wake-up-and-smell-the-maotai/

180412083403-president-xi-jinping-naval-parade-0412-full-169.jpg

Mark
Ottawa
 
And what about continuing Chinese efforts to buy up Canadian assets (oil sands firms coming?):

Ottawa urged to consider Beijing’s growing control over strategic minerals when weighing Chinese state firm’s bid for gold miner

China’s growing control over strategic minerals could be a threat to Canada’s national security, a former head of CSIS says, and Ottawa should recognize this when it reviews a proposed takeover of an Arctic gold mine by a Chinese state-owned conglomerate.

Shandong Gold Mining Co. Ltd., one of the world’s largest gold producers, is paying $207.4-million to buy TMAC Resources Inc., the latest struggling Canadian junior miner to be swept up by a larger and better-capitalized company.

The deal will be among the first pored over by Ottawa after it announced in April that it would bring “enhanced scrutiny” to bear on acquisitions by foreign state-owned investors in a period where the COVID-19 pandemic has driven down the value of companies. China is the largest producer and consumer of gold in the world [emphasis added].

Richard Fadden, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service director from 2009 to 2013, said Ottawa should examine the proposed TMAC takeover within the larger picture of Canada’s national interests and Beijing’s strategy of gaining control over critical metals and minerals.

Chinese companies have not only been active buying up gold mines around the world but Shandong Gold Group, the state-owned parent company, signed up in 2015 to back a national Beijing effort to stockpile the precious metal, which is considered one of the best hedges against economic volatility.

China is also active in the Canadian North in zinc, a key rare-earth ingredient in making galvanized computers, cellphones and batteries.

MMG Ltd., whose major shareholder is the Chinese government, owns zinc and copper assets in the Izok and High Lake deposits in Nunavut. Those deposits could be worth billions of dollars to China if Ottawa goes ahead with a plan to build a road and a deep-water port to ship the zinc and copper out through the Northwest Passage.

China’s designs on Northern Canadian minerals in part prompted a recent joint U.S.-Canada strategy to reshape global metallic supply chains to reduce reliance on China, which has moved aggressively to control rare-earth minerals that are critical to high-tech and military products [emphasis added].

Key minerals, such as zinc, lithium, cesium and cobalt, are used in an wide variety of products ranging from lasers, computer chips, electric vehicles, solar panels, smartphones and military equipment.

Mr. Fadden said that while gold is not part of the Canada-U.S. critical-mineral strategy, the precious metal should be added to the list.

Gold is not only viewed as a safe-haven investment in turbulent economic times, but it is widely used in the control systems of nuclear-power plants and nuclear-weapons facilities, he noted.

“I think gold is pretty important for the world economy. China has enough of a grip on the world economy as it is, given its capital assets, so I would include gold," Mr. Fadden said. “Governments should sit down, convene a bunch of experts and talk to our allies about it.”

Mr. Fadden, who was also national security adviser to Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, said there had been growing concerns within Canadian national-security agencies about how China was carefully investing in Canadian companies “so as to be beneath regulatory thresholds.”

“There was a worry that the Chinese seemed to be very knowledgeable about regulatory thresholds and were coming just underneath them and, as is well known, Chinese corporations abroad are required to comply with Chinese government directives,” he said. “If you had enough of these, either beneath regulatory thresholds or small investments, they would eventually be consolidated and there would not be very much anyone could do about it,”

Pierre Gratton, president of the Mining Association of Canada, said the TMAC takeover has “raised eyebrows” within the industry because Shandong Gold Group is a Chinese state-owned enterprise. It’s prompting discussion about how this takeover would fit into the Canada-U.S. strategy to limit China’s involvement in rare-earth minerals, he said.

“I think the action plan is pretty serious and I think the commitment by Canada and the U.S. to lessen their dependence on the Chinese for these materials is pretty serious,” Mr. Gratton said.

If Ottawa were to reject the takeover, Mr. Gratton said it would “send a pretty strong message” that Canada has serious concerns about Chinese state-owned companies buying up resource industries in Canada [emphasis added].

Toronto-based TMAC’s sole gold mine is in Hope Bay in western Nunavut, 160 kilometres above the Arctic Circle. The mine is situated near tidewater in the Northwest Passage emphasis added] a highly strategic shipping route connecting the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific.

While a sale to Shandong could stave off financial ruin for TMAC, which has struggled to mine gold for a profit, it also raises questions about sovereignty in the Far North, national security, and whether Canada should allow China to scoop up a domestic resource company at a fire-sale price.

“China as a very large powerful authoritarian state acquiring assets in the Canadian Arctic, that concern is legitimate,” said Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia.

“It's not a reason for saying no to all investments. It's just a reason for being vigilant and that's what the Canadian government needs to do here.”

Arctic expert Rob Huebert, who teaches at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, said Canada should assume every Chinese state-owned investment in Canada is in part a strategic purchase for Beijing.

“You can’t separate it. It’s all part and parcel of the Silk Road initiative, which is ultimately the Chinese effort to become a global power,” Prof. Huebert said, referring to Beijing’s worldwide Belt and Road investment strategy.

However, he said Canada should probably approve the TMAC transaction because increased obligations imposed on resource development by the Trudeau government in recent years are making it harder to attract investors to Canada’s North.

“I think we have no choice – given the fact that almost everything else is being blocked in terms of development,” Prof. Huebert said. “It’s hard to see us being able to say no.”

The deal is subject to a review under the Investment Canada Act (ICA). Ottawa will assess whether the acquisition will be a “net benefit” to Canada and will look at factors such as jobs, revenue and the impact on the local Indigenous community.

The government will also conduct an initial screening that will look at the deal from a national-security viewpoint. If Ottawa suspects the deal could be damaging to national security, the transaction could undergo a more thorough review under section 25.3 of the ICA.

Canada has rejected deals on security grounds in the past, including the proposed $1.5-billion acquisition of Canadian construction giant Aecon Group by China’s CCCC International Holding Ltd. nearly two years ago.

While the local Inuit community near the Hope Bay mine doesn’t have veto power over the deal, it’s an important stakeholder. The Inuit own the land on which the mine was built, the Kitikmeot Inuit Association (KIA) has a royalty on it, and it also owns about 1 per cent of the common shares in TMAC.

Although the gold is high grade, the company’s mill has not done well. Shandong has the money to keep the operation going, invest in upgrades and guarantee employment.

But even if an acquisition looks good on paper, there are no guarantees it will be approved.

Since 2012, 22 foreign takeover deals have been reviewed under section 25.3 of the ICA. Fourteen of those were by Chinese investors, with the vast majority subsequently either blocked by the government, subject to divestitures, or withdrawn proactively by the Chinese buyer.

“Part of the challenge in dealing with these cases is you don’t know what you don’t know, and the government will always have a better understanding in their mind of what might be important to them," said Peter Glossop, Toronto-based foreign-investment lawyer with Osler.

One aspect of the deal likely to be examined is TMAC’s mine location in the Arctic and its proximity to the Northwest Passage.

“What we call proximity analysis is something that’s taken into account in a national-security context," Mr. Glossop said.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-urged-to-scrutinize-chinas-mining-activities-in-the-arctic-in/

Mark
Ottawa
 
And here's a major piece, based largely on Chinese documents, on CCP's plans for PRC in the world:

China’s Plans to Win Control of the Global Order
The Chinese Communist Party leadership believe they are in the midst of an ‘intense, ideological struggle’ for survival and that to win they must defeat the West
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/china-plans-global-order

Mark
Ottawa
 
Mark, since you seem to be following China very closes, how do you think the near to medium term outlook will play out?
 
Re: Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread
« Reply #3732 on: Today at 15:20:44 »

    Quote

Mark, since you seem to be following China very closes, how do you think the near to medium term outlook will play out?

With great difficulty as many countries (including Japan) try to disentangle from PRC. Canada better choose where it really stands if it wants to keep any self-respect--and avoid probably some harsh responses from US (not just Trump, Democrats have really seen the light on CCP and also want to hit back).

Armed clashes with Taiwan, US, Japan  are, I fear, a real possibility (could be started by subordinate Chinese commander) leading to...?

Mark
Ottaw
 
Basically your predicting a new Taiwam Strait crisis and potential armed conflict in the region especially if countries flock to support Taiwan given how they handled covid 19 vs how the PRC did.
 
Not quite but something to be afraid of:

PLA drills put Taiwan in crosshairs
Two Chinese military exercises are aimed at preparing for an invasion of the self-governing island territory
https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/pla-drills-put-taiwan-in-crosshairs/

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
Not quite but something to be afraid of:

Mark
Ottawa

China may be emboldened by a weakened western military by covid 19. They could make a power play for the smaller islands, Taiwan does have decent anti air, missile and ship defense systems, however the Dragon has a lot of teeth.

In other news, pro democracy lawmakers removed from Hong Kong legislative assembly before vote on who becomes next  chair person

https://thepostmillennial.com/chaos-ensues-as-hong-kong-pro-democracy-lawmakers-removed-from-heated-parliament-debate
 
Fears of global trade war with China after Beijing slaps 80 per cent tariff on Australian exports starting TODAY as brutal payback over country's call for coronavirus inquiry backed by 100 nations including the UK
- Chinese government imposed a brutal and extraordinary 80 per cent tariff on Australian exports from today 
- Diplomatic relations between nations deteriorated as Australia called for probe into the spread of coronavirus
- Britain and 100 other countries also demanded inquiry, leading to fears UK could be dragged into trade war
- Chinese president Xi Jinping said today China acted 'with openness and transparency' in tackling outbreak

By DANYAL HUSSAIN FOR MAILONLINE and BRITTANY CHAIN FOR DAILY MAIL AUSTRALIA

PUBLISHED: 14:58 EDT, 18 May 2020 | UPDATED: 18:00 EDT, 18 May 2020

There are fears Britain could be dragged into a global trade war with China after Beijing slapped an 80 per cent tariff on Australian exports as punishment for demanding an independent coronavirus inquiry - which 100 nations including the UK supported.   

On Monday, the World Health Organization bowed to calls from most of its member states to launch an independent probe into how it managed the international response to coronavirus, which has been clouded by finger-pointing between the US and China.

The 'comprehensive evaluation', sought by a coalition of African, European and other countries, is intended to review 'lessons learned' from WHO's coordination of the global response to the virus outbreak.

The UK has also supported the call for an inquiry, though the one announced by the WHO is expected to stop short of looking into contentious issues such as the origins of the virus.

EU spokeswoman Virginie Battu-Henriksson said several key questions needed to be answered as part of a review: 'How did this pandemic spread? What is the epidemiology behind it? All this is absolutely crucial for us going forward to avoid another pandemic of this kind.'

Last month, Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said China faces 'hard questions' about the source of the coronavirus pandemic, adding there would have to be a 'deep dive' into the facts around the outbreak.

He also said it wouldn't go back to 'business as usual' between the UK and China after the pandemic eases.

A Foreign Office spokesman said yesterday: 'There will need to be a review into the pandemic, not least so that we can ensure we are better prepared for future global pandemics. The resolution at the World Health Assembly is an important step towards this.'

In April, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison demanded an independent probe into the deadly virus and the World Health Organisation's handling of the crisis.

In response, Chinese state media and leaders warned of trade retribution that could wipe $135billion from the Australian economy.

After weeks of threatening to boycott the meat and barley industries and restrict travel and foreign education opportunities, China on Monday announced an 80.5 per cent levy on barley exports starting on Tuesday.

Beijing claims Australia subsidised its farmers and dumped barley in China. The tax will remain in place for five years, China's Ministry of Commerce said.

...

See rest of article here: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8332719/Fears-global-trade-war-China-Beijing-slaps-80-cent-tariff-Australian-exports.html

:cheers:
 
So, presumably over a billion Chinese still gotta eat.

Ultimately, the cost of any tariff is paid by the consumer. In this case, the Chinese consumer.

What happens when the Chinese hit everyone with a tariff? There is a finite list of countries willing and capable of selling grain to China. Is their plan to hit them all with a tariff?

Sounds like they have a social cohesion problem brewing, at that the point where food starts to get real expensive or unobtainable.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
So, presumably over a billion Chinese still gotta eat.

Ultimately, the cost of any tariff is paid by the consumer. In this case, the Chinese consumer.

What happens when the Chinese hit everyone with a tariff? There is a finite list of countries willing and capable of selling grain to China. Is their plan to hit them all with a tariff?

Sounds like they have a social cohesion problem brewing, at that the point where food starts to get real expensive or unobtainable.

Perhaps that is the plan, if people can't eat, the country will destroy it self. If China broke apart we would see atleast half a dozen countries form out of it.
 
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