Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[quadrapiper]

Although they never said this publicly, they probably didn’t want to buy any F35’s at all.
We can whine and b*tch about the current clown and fruit loops show, but the government before this was much darker and dangerous when it came to military funding. Just my 2 cents, of course.

And IIRC rather more ideologically inclined to using the military.

New ships are being built, new fighters and MPA purchased, assorted green wheeled kit brought into service (if the particular 21st C armoured car isn't fit for purpose, that sounds more like an Army mistake than a Cabinet one), and I'm sure I'm missing a few other projects... there's certainly more that needs doing, but the can-kicking seems to have stopped on some enormous needs.

 

[Maxman1]

We can whine and b*tch about the current clown and fruit loops show, but the government before this was much darker and dangerous when it came to military funding. Just my 2 cents, of course.

Yeah, no. They might not have been great, but they were a damn sight better than the current, or their predecessors.

 

[Maxman1]

And IIRC rather more ideologically inclined to using the military.

New ships are being built, new fighters and MPA purchased, assorted green wheeled kit brought into service (if the particular 21st C armoured car isn't fit for purpose, that sounds more like an Army mistake than a Cabinet one), and I'm sure I'm missing a few other projects... there's certainly more that needs doing, but the can-kicking seems to have stopped on some enormous needs.

And most if not all was put in place by the Harper government. About the only thing they didn't do was pick the Type 26 as the CSC.

 

[DBNSG]

Yeah, no. They might not have been great, but they were a damn sight better than the current, or their predecessors.

My Son was in the reserves in Mid February 2006 at the rifle range in Aldershot N.S. when the Regimental RSM of the PLF drove up and started unloading ammo. They stayed on the range until everyone qualified as opposed to the planned allocation of 3 mags and you are done. He said it was a long fun day at the range. Harper took Office Feb 6 2006.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Then the RCAF would not have enough fighters to fill the roles it is required to fill.

The CAF can't "do more with less" the CAF needs to do more with more. We have cut the fat, and the muscle, and now we are cutting bone. Any suggestion that involves the CAF getting less than is planned is a suggestion to make the CAF nothing more than a parade force.

We can do that with new build Spitfires and Enfields for far les than 65 F-35s.

Hey leave the Enfield's out of this. Anyone who uses anything else are simply unwashed savages.

#303britforlife

 

[dapaterson]

And most if not all was put in place by the Harper government. About the only thing they didn't do was pick the Type 26 as the CSC.

New fighters, AAR, growth in AAR fleet, MPA are all current government.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Do you need AEGIS for CEC? And how many AEGIS systems are necessary? Could the cost have been reduced to allow funds to cover not only ships at sea but airfields ashore as well?

As far as I am aware, CEC has been separated from AEGIS for quite sometime so it is not required if you want that capability. The Navy wouldn't just be able to have its funds arbitrarily taken and handed to the Airforce between projects, this would be something the Airforce itself would need to look to undertake. AEGIS must have been judged to be necessary/a major boon considering how seemingly heavy and power/crew intensive the overall system is. While AEGIS is effectively a blackbox (like every CMS), the fact that it is one of the most widely operated systems which sees continual support and development by the reigning world superpower (which we are majorly aligned with) points towards it being a valuable addition to CSC.

You know, it occurs to me that there is some overlap among the CSC, BMD, IAMD, GBAD, CUAS and F35 programmes.

Harper's Air Force only wanted 65 F35s. Trudeau called for 88 to be purchased sometime in the future.

What happens if the Air Force reverts to the 65 and takes the money from those extra 23 and invested it into something based on CEC that integrated IAMD and GBAD-NASAMs?

A Joint programme.

Ironically F-35A can interface with CEC present aboard CSC, which likely makes them a far more useful asset to have around in comparison to ground based air defense systems. I would not wish to cut the F-35A program in the slightest considering its total importance to continental defense and Canadian missions abroad.

 

[DBNSG]

New fighters, AAR, growth in AAR fleet, MPA are all current government.

True, but how close was the hand of the White House to those signatures?

 

[dapaterson]

True, but how close was the hand of the White House to those signatures?

How close was their hand when the investments into the Army and RCAF during the deployment to Afghanistan?

 

[DBNSG]

How close was their hand when the investments into the Army and RCAF during the deployment to Afghanistan?

Those were signalled loud and clear from Hillier.

 

[Kirkhill]

As far as I am aware, CEC has been separated from AEGIS for quite sometime so it is not required if you want that capability. The Navy wouldn't just be able to have its funds arbitrarily taken and handed to the Airforce between projects, this would be something the Airforce itself would need to look to undertake. AEGIS must have been judged to be necessary/a major boon considering how seemingly heavy and power/crew intensive the overall system is. While AEGIS is effectively a blackbox (like every CMS), the fact that it is one of the most widely operated systems which sees continual support and development by the reigning world superpower (which we are majorly aligned with) points towards it being a valuable addition to CSC.


Ironically F-35A can interface with CEC present aboard CSC, which likely makes them a far more useful asset to have around in comparison to ground based air defense systems. I would not wish to cut the F-35A program in the slightest considering its total importance to continental defense and Canadian missions abroad.

Points taken - but if the F35As and the CSCs are going to be able to collaborate then it only makes sense to me that the RRCA's Ground Based systems, both Air Defence and LRPF, should also be netted in. And sacrificing a single AEGIS ship and 12 F35As would buy a lot of GB assets.

 

[Good2Golf]

True, but how close was the hand of the White House to those signatures?

F-35, P-8 - White House: “alright, make the announcement now!”

A330 - White House: “sure Canada, do your own thing. KC-46 is kind of screwed up anyway at the moment.”

 

[Navy_Pete]

We tend to hold Australia up as a model for defence procurement, but they have their own issues in that regards.

News that the Hunter class is being reviewed: Surface fleet review carries Hunter Class changes in February release, say industry insiders

Criticism of the competition that resulted in the GCS winning the RFP: Hunter-class Frigate Procurement Flawed: Review - Naval News

Other paywall sites are reporting everything from cuts to possible cancellation: Frigates in firing line as government plans naval overhaul

It will be very interesting to see what the outcome of all of this is, and any potential impact it might have on our program.

It's a model for Canada in terms of being close for context in how the governments and armed forces are structured, so one of the closest ones for doing apples to apples comparisons.

They have their own struggles, which happens on massively complex projects, but they do some pretty innovative things on procurement, and are way further ahead on us on things like relational contracting and having a standard bible to you can pick and choose contract templates and terms (vice everyone having their own templates internally and randmonly applying SACCs).

We (GoC) tend to do a lot of fact finding missions, look at best practices etc then the GoC just ignores it and makes something else up. We do the same in the CAF as well. The other thing we do, which is my personal favourite, is take something that works in a different context, ignore how we do things, bolt in on then realize it doesn't work for our context. DRMIS is probably a good example, where it has now become a giant, user unfriendly tail wagging the dog and we continue to break our routine business to try and shoehorn in SAP workflows designed for totally different customers that do very different things.

 

[Good2Golf]

Points taken - but if the F35As and the CSCs are going to be able to collaborate then it only makes sense to me that the RRCA's Ground Based systems, both Air Defence and LRPF, should also be netted in. And sacrificing a single AEGIS ship and 12 F35As would buy a lot of GB assets.

Why would you cut a frigate and several fighters?

That’s not how procurement in Canada works. It’s not like a “get 87 F-35 instead of 88 and buy new rifles and more combat clothing for the troops” kind of thing. A service-vs-service capability trade off as you suggest isn’t an appropriate way of managing capital resourcing.

 

[Halifax Tar]

It's a model for Canada in terms of being close for context in how the governments and armed forces are structured, so one of the closest ones for doing apples to apples comparisons.

They have their own struggles, which happens on massively complex projects, but they do some pretty innovative things on procurement, and are way further ahead on us on things like relational contracting and having a standard bible to you can pick and choose contract templates and terms (vice everyone having their own templates internally and randmonly applying SACCs).

We (GoC) tend to do a lot of fact finding missions, look at best practices etc then the GoC just ignores it and makes something else up. We do the same in the CAF as well. The other thing we do, which is my personal favourite, is take something that works in a different context, ignore how we do things, bolt in on then realize it doesn't work for our context. DRMIS is probably a good example, where it has now become a giant, user unfriendly tail wagging the dog and we continue to break our routine business to try and shoehorn in SAP workflows designed for totally different customers that do very different things.

Lets not forget DRMIS was foistered on the CAF by RCN engineering folks.

In 2006-8 when we first started to trial it (MASIS) on TOR we were briefed it came from the FMFs.

 

[Good2Golf]

Lets not forget DRMIS was foistered on the CAF by RCN engineering folks.

In 2006-8 when we first started to trial it (MASIS) on TOR we were briefed it came from the FMFs.

 

[Kirkhill]

Why would you cut a frigate and several fighters?

That’s not how procurement in Canada works. It’s not like a “get 87 F-35 instead of 88 and buy new rifles and more combat clothing for the troops” kind of thing. A service-vs-service capability trade off as you suggest isn’t an appropriate way of managing capital resourcing.

So it isn't appropriate when managing a cross-service capability like Air Space Management, Air Defence and Long Range Fires? Something where, hopefully, all three traditional services will be co-operating on delivery?

Besides, a good chunk of the project life-cycle cost is munitions, which we seem to short on a regular basis.

If the Army buys some "relatively" cheap launchers, like the NASAMS Multi Missile Launchers and Lockheed Payload Delivery System then the Army, Navy and Air Force can share the costs of SMs, ESSMs, AIM-120s, AIM-9s, CAMMs, Tomahawks, NSMs and JAGMs.

The management system is sussed if you go with the CEC system. The Army has its own sensors already. Next you need FCS.

Does it really matter to the target if the NSM that hits it is launched from a CSC, an F35 or a truck?

....

If you had all three services capable of loading the same munitions wouldn't you have less inter-service rivalry and everybody arguing for more munitions for everybody?

 

[Good2Golf]

I would caution against conflating interoperability standards with procurement funding.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I would caution against conflating interoperability standards with procurement funding.

We actually tried that with JSS and AOPVs; we were told we couldn't specify much common equipment and had to limit it to performance requirements because they were independent contracts so other vendors should have opportunties to supply, fairness and transparency blah blah blah. A few were allowed but much smaller than the original intent, which was to have things like common pumps, valves etc where it made sense. That was a PSPC/TBS thing, not a DND restriction.

That massively cut the list of common equipment for build, but included it in AJISS as part of obsolescence management to convert to common equipment in service, with performance incentives if it saves money in parts or maintenance (and management).

The business case bits is pretty dubious anyway, and usually means someone is compromising somewhere. And what usually happens is even if you start with common interoperability, the elements don't maintain it, so you end up with things like a 'land support radio' on a ship, that uses frequencies the army hasn't used in a decade, but don't find it out until an actual mission, and then revert to BBs and pay as you go local cell phones.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Lets not forget DRMIS was foistered on the CAF by RCN engineering folks.

In 2006-8 when we first started to trial it (MASIS) on TOR we were briefed it came from the FMFs.

MASIS was only a small part of SAP, but from what I remember that was more of a pilot of the production management modules at the FMFs while the great big project was underway.

There are easier tools the shipyards use for production planning and management, but they also set up things like BoMs (bills of materials) on the equivalent to preventative maintenance, which we haven't done in DRMIS and no plans to do. I don't think anyone on the engineering side would have picked DRMIS after trying the SAP interface for about 10 minutes compared to other tools, as it's counter intuitive and not user friendly with an absolutely enormous learning curve. It's like using a scanning electron microscope; really powerful, but can be difficult to get it to do what you want without a lot of practice and constant use.

We end up with all the ass pain and miss a lot of the benefits. It's like using the min/max supply function, which is a lot of work to maintain, but disconnecting the background resupply function so it's all manual anyway (and we normally now order about 3 years worth of the 'annual' usage because of the HR limitations delaying the next buy).

And to make things fun, ships have independent deployed servers that don't show up in normal searches (except when portions sometimes do), so for material management there is another layer for the RCN.

I hate DRMIS, and all the processes that we know have in DRMIS that are so cumbersome we still manage things on spreadsheets and emails in addition to DRMIS, with things like project schedule milestones having zero connection to the actual work notifications and those schedules. Huge amount of garbage data.