Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
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Sea Harrier Emergency Landing on Cargo Ship
Remarkable news footage on the recovery of Sea Harrier ZA176 and Sub-Lt Ian Watson after the Alraigo docked in Santa Cruz, Tenerife, June 1983.
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A couple of ancillary tales.
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I'm telling you right now there is no way in hell that modern pilots take that sort of risk. The RCAF won't take a non-operational risk like that (outside of test flying), It is just not in their DNA.
Can't even get a helicopter to land on a ship without a proper flight deck management system now. The cyclones are not as bouncy as the Sea Kings apparently.
*in no way was this intended as disparaging to my airforce brethren. I save the good stuff for the mess.
It's kind of funny though. The reason the Harrier was invented and adopted by the RAF/RNAS and the USMC was because of its ability to operate without infrastructure, like a helicopter. Yes, it can certainly demonstrate improved efficiencies with infrastructure, like the ski-jump to reduce fuel consumption on take-off and thus increase range and payload, but it doesn't "need" it.
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Realistically, it’s a non starter.
The shipyards are full with NSS orders, and will be for several years.
The Navy wouldn’t be able to crew the ship with our current numbers without having to tie up a CPF alongside.
Nor will the government want to pay that kind of money to operate and maintain such a niche, yet powerful capability.
F-35’s aren’t cheap, amphibious assault ship’s are definitely not cheap (especially if they are built here in Canada), and we have to streamline recruiting before crewing anything else that floats.
Respectfully, I would take that money and crew, and put it towards a submarine replacement instead.
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I'm telling you right now there is no way in hell that modern pilots take that sort of risk. The RCAF won't take a non-operational risk like that (outside of test flying), It is just not in their DNA.
Can't even get a helicopter to land on a ship without a proper flight deck management system now. The cyclones are not as bouncy as the Sea Kings apparently.
*in no way was this intended as disparaging to my airforce brethren. I save the good stuff for the mess.
I see your broad brush would stop at grey helicopters. Even with MH, I assume there is a risk assessment & management process (RAMP), so I take your ‘risk isn’t in their DNA’ as tongue-in-cheek, as I would expect a sailor to take a pigeon’s assertion that the Navy is risk-averse, over-bearing and under-appreciative of its personnel and severely constrained by an attitude based on ‘hundreds of years of tradition, unimpeded by social or technological progress.’
There certainly are established risk assessment & management processes for other air operators consistent with RCAF or other Commands’ procedures. You sound as though you might even be surprised that some non-grey helos know what MPP-02 Vol 1(H) is and what it means to RCN, RCAF and others…
Point being, that modern day analogues of the RN/RAF use of MV Atlantic Conveyor back in 1982, are used today, including appropriate use of RAMPs to get on with the business, particularly when limited capital assets aren’t available to support all the demands being placed in them.
Regards
G2G
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I had a more expansive, "outside of operational imperatives, they are very safe" type post with all the wording to soothe potential hurt feelings taken into account, examples of risk taken by MH I have seen in some crazy situations, and even more, examples taken by the green helos in Afghanistan. But I cut it for the cheeky footnote, partially to elicit a response from someone like yourself and partially because I talk too much about my experiences and it starts to sound like bragging.
I see your broad brush would stop at grey helicopters. Even with MH, I assume there is a risk assessment & management process (RAMP), so I take your ‘risk isn’t in their DNA’ as tongue-in-cheek, as I would expect a sailor to take a pigeon’s assertion that the Navy is risk-averse, over-bearing and under-appreciative of its personnel and severely constrained by an attitude based on ‘hundreds of years of tradition, unimpeded by social or technological progress.’
There certainly are established risk assessment & management processes for other air operators consistent with RCAF or other Commands’ procedures. You sound as though you might even be surprised that some non-grey helos know what MPP-02 Vol 1(H) is and what it means to RCN, RCAF and others…
Point being, that modern day analogues of the RN/RAF use of MV Atlantic Conveyor back in 1982, are used today, including appropriate use of RAMPs to get on with the business, particularly when limited capital assets aren’t available to support all the demands being placed in them.
Regards
G2G
Any misinterpretation or insult, real or imagined is on me.
Of note, the Altantic Conveyor was considered a necessary operational risk by the standards of the day.
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No offence taken, but I would note that, having lived through more than my fair quota of shipboard fires and other scary shit, the RCN could stand to have a risk assessment culture and actual follow its own rules on seaworthiness…I'm telling you right now there is no way in hell that modern pilots take that sort of risk. The RCAF won't take a non-operational risk like that (outside of test flying), It is just not in their DNA.
Can't even get a helicopter to land on a ship without a proper flight deck management system now. The cyclones are not as bouncy as the Sea Kings apparently.
*in no way was this intended as disparaging to my airforce brethren. I save the good stuff for the mess.
Maxman1
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Building one or two in Canada is a pipe dream at this point, but ordering it from France is always an option. And the Mistrals have a shockingly low core crew requirement for the capability they provide, only 160 (Wikipedia breaks it down as "20 officers, 80 petty officers, 60 quartermasters").
But the ships themselves can't accommodate the F-35, and besides, we don't have F-35s currently and the government's official stance is we will never buy F-35s.
All true. The Mistrals are extremely favourable in terms of crew requirements - ideal for a country like us.
I wouldn’t put a ton of weight behind our government’s official stance on anything.
Things can change pretty dramatically depending on what month it is on the astrology calendar.
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How do we crew 3 JSS that we really need....
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I had a rant about that somewhere else so you'll get no argument from me! Switching to engineering from Operations has been a real eye opener for me. That being said sometimes we are way over safe. Ammo, Radhaz, and Laser policies are way too restrictive based on the current science.
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The maximum crew of 239. The actual crew is in the 190's somewhere. Positions are still being locked down. Those extra bunks are for when two Air Det's are embarked.
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I'm always amazing at the way the CF (and not just the CF) implements certain "Safety" measures - and often overlooks the platform that is often the biggest issue.
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Not sure RADHAZ is too restrictive, Underway…I’ve operated in and around RCN vessels that swore on a stack of bibles that they were [insert pusser term for not transmitting], and my RWR went ballistic every time the SR swept me. A follow-up hail “Are you sure you’re not transmitting? I’m getting a periodic hit in E/F-band that looks suspiciously timed to that big antenna on your bridge…” Silence, followed by the E/F-band UNK disappearing…
Maxman1
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As a guy who was fairly well trained in the RADHAZ area, I'll observe that the RCN has had a learning curve on this...over the life of our Halifax Class ships anyhow.Not sure RADHAZ is too restrictive, Underway…I’ve operated in and around RCN vessels that swore on a stack of bibles that they were [insert pusser term for not transmitting], and my RWR went ballistic every time the SR swept me. A follow-up hail “Are you sure you’re not transmitting? I’m getting a periodic hit in E/F-band that looks suspiciously timed to that big antenna on your bridge…” Silence, followed by the E/F-band UNK disappearing…
When I was on the Gatineau, I was once standing on the bridge-top, manning a pair of binoculars that were linked to the gunnery system for manual fire control direction and firing. I was told in no uncertain terms "Do not press the red button" and myself and the other lookout were up there standing with the OOW about 15 -20 feet ahead of the fire control director that was linked to the gun - ever hear of side-lobe radiation? Yeah...I've been radiated.
Working on the bridge of a Halifax class ship and you hear the buzz of the VHF radios every time the SPS-49 swept...good times...keep those bridge wing doors open because it's 'safe'...right?
Watching the operators lock up a seagull and turn on the CWI....birdie went "splash" very quickly.
The new rules had a 50X safety factor built into them. So effectively, if there was dangerous radiation being emitted at a distance of 2 cm, you had to be 1m away from that transmitter.
The out of bounds areas are now to be clearly marked, and it's surprising just how much of the ships is placed out of bounds when you're transmitting on an active jammer system. Or on a 1000W HF transmit system.
Things may seem hard-over on RADHAZ safety, but having buried several friends to Cancer...including a buddy who 'coincidentally' spent a 6 month deployment building a model ship on a work-bench while at sea during a deployment...that was within a matter of feet of the Cobalt-60 source in the SPS-49...well...yeah....that big brain tumor that killed him was purely a coincidence...
My personal thoughts are that because of the lack of training, and lack of a visual 'danger' cue, there needs to be more care taken. Add some automated lights to the danger/hazard areas indicating no-go zones.
