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Canada's tanks

Ajax is a hilarious replacement for CVRT
fewer and fatter
Speaking of- which is the bigger drawback for a 21st century CVRT- doctrinal/modern relevance, or techinal constraints?

With advances in tech could you get a ~14 tonne version with a stabilized 35mm and higher protection level into the same size of platform?
 
I think the answer is more about budget issues than an actual intent.
Could be. The original intent was to buy Boxer for some battalions while upgrading Warrior for others (presumably those in armoured brigades). Budget cuts led to the Warrior upgrade cancelled and Boxers now becoming the standard MIC for the reduced number of heavier battalions.

Somewhere there had to be some folks who said, "That's good enough." I have yet to see a discussion about how it effects armoured brigade tactics.

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I'm a little confused about the UK Boxer. In looking at the videos etc for the UK Boxer, it describes it as an MIC (mechanized infantry carrier) and shows it without a turret, just a RWS MG that looks to be in the nature of a .50. It's replacing Warrior in the mech inf battalions (which was equipped with a 30 mm Rarden turret.)

I may be jumping to a conclusion here, but it seems like the Brits are going to something in the nature of a slightly up-armoured Stryker rather than an IFV. Rheinmetall does offer an IFV version of the Boxer but that doesn't seem to be what the UK is buying. That raises a question for me insofar as Strykers are designed to transport infantry close to the battle area but support a dismounted fight while Warrior was meant to fight through with the tanks dismounting when required.

I've seen a lot of articles about Boxer's "state of the art" and an emphasis which seems to be on driving 1,000 miles to the fight. There is nothing that I could find that discusses the ability to fight once there and if it will be a change of tactics from Warrior. Am I missing something?

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thats why I say it is a Bulldog replacement and not a Warrior one
 
Could be. The original intent was to buy Boxer for some battalions while upgrading Warrior for others (presumably those in armoured brigades). Budget cuts led to the Warrior upgrade cancelled and Boxers now becoming the standard MIC for the reduced number of heavier battalions.

Somewhere there had to be some folks who said, "That's good enough." I have yet to see a discussion about how it effects armoured brigade tactics.

🍻
I think the British Army is about a decade behind in incorporating lessons learned. Keep in mind they were planning on axing the majority of their MBT fleet prior to Russia conducting the invasion on Ukraine.

The Boxer acquisition seems to have been based the requirements from Southern Iraq. Conflating the difference between a PSO and actual LSCO needs.

Which is why I think Nicholas Drummond is attempting to beat the Tracked Boxer drum / as he’s financially invested in Boxer, but also knows that it isn’t the all singing and dancing system that the UK needs.

TBH I’m of the opinion that if one can’t afford to have three different types of Division’s one should probably axe the Medium before the Heavy or Light, and should not make a Light Force a ‘shmedium’ just due to previous inappropriate use in PSO’s.
 
I think the British Army is about a decade behind in incorporating lessons learned. Keep in mind they were planning on axing the majority of their MBT fleet prior to Russia conducting the invasion on Ukraine.

The Boxer acquisition seems to have been based the requirements from Southern Iraq. Conflating the difference between a PSO and actual LSCO needs.

Which is why I think Nicholas Drummond is attempting to beat the Tracked Boxer drum / as he’s financially invested in Boxer, but also knows that it isn’t the all singing and dancing system that the UK needs.

TBH I’m of the opinion that if one can’t afford to have three different types of Division’s one should probably axe the Medium before the Heavy or Light, and should not make a Light Force a ‘shmedium’ just due to previous inappropriate use in PSO’s.

TBF, it seems that Boxer is a replacement for the FV432 and not the Warrior, although a wheeled platform is obviously more limited in various ways...

What does Boxer do?​

The purpose of Boxer is to rapidly transport soldiers, to and around the battlefield, enabling them to conduct their special-to-arm roles.

Initially, the Army will buy a troop-carrying variant, an ambulance, a command vehicle and a specialist carrier.

 
TBF, it seems that Boxer is a replacement for the FV432 and not the Warrior, although a wheeled platform is obviously more limited in various ways...
Yeah it does seem to be quite a leap from Warrior IFV to Boxer

Whereas the 432 was an APC and while tracked had a lot more in common with the Boxer that the Warrior to the Boxer.
 
If the past is anything to go by I suspect that sometime in the future we see the British announcement on the impending retirement of the Boxer .
Followed by an almost hidden tiny article on a possible replacement programme for FV 432.
I'm not sure but I think this might be the third attempt at replacing them .
 
My understanding is that functionally the FV432s have been sidelined by the foxhounds and mastiffs with protected mobility largely replacing mechanized. I could of course be wrong.

I think the ‘British M113’ is still in service in some roles. Why they felt the need to over complicate the replacement process for what is essentially an armored box is quite bizarre.
 
I think the ‘British M113’ is still in service in some roles. Why they felt the need to over complicate the replacement process for what is essentially an armored box is quite bizarre.
Right I just meant as an APC specifically but seems to have been replaced by the various MRAPs procured for Afghanistan. I don’t think the right way to see it is FV432 being replaced but rather the various wheeled systems in use are being replaced.
 
“Tanks aren’t as effective as they once were,” a tanker with the first name Victor told Kirichenko. But that doesn’t mean they aren’t still useful. “Tanks will still be around in the future, but FPV drones have changed tank warfare forever,” Victor added.

Don’t expect hundreds of tanks to mass for swift attacks across open ground like they did as recently as 2003. Swarms of drones have rendered that tactic obsolete.

Instead, tanks will fight in small numbers and from under cover where possible – their crews more cautious than ever.




Armoured warfare will never be the same​

The era of the ‘cautious tank’ is here. But can a tank be cautious and still be a tank?
David Axe

15 October 2024 1:13pm BST


Russia’s wider war on Ukraine didn’t make the tank obsolete – but it did make the men and women who operate tanks much more careful.

Small drones are everywhere all the time over the 700-mile front line in the 31-month wider war. The threat from these all-seeing drones, many of them carrying grenades or rigged with explosives, forces the tankers to hide and sneak around if they’re going to have any chance of surviving.

“Enemy and friendly drones criss-cross the air space, hunting for valuable targets like heavy armour and artillery,” David Kirichenko wrote for the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington DC. “This aerial cat-and-mouse game has fundamentally altered tank tactics.”

It’s a new “era of the cautious tank,” according to CEPA.

There was a time, in the early decades of armoured warfare, where tanks could roll across the battlefield in broad daylight – and their crews could expect to survive. Yes, rough terrain, mines, artillery, handheld anti-tank weapons and other tanks posed a threat. But not an existential one.

It was this expectation that tanks could survive – especially when supported by engineers, infantry, artillery and air power – that underpinned the tank doctrine that the biggest armies championed through the Cold War and into the 2020s. Tanks would spearhead powerful attacks on enemy lines, aiming to break through the outermost defences in order to run amuck in the enemy’s vulnerable rear area. The essence of tank warfare was aggressive attack, not caution: and many advocates of armoured warfare would say that it still is.

Massive, tank-led attacks were common as recently as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. But in the 20 years that followed, drone technology developed faster than anti-drone defences developed.

When the Russian army launched powerful tank assaults deep into Ukraine in February 2022, it ran straight into the drone revolution in armoured warfare. Russian tank columns, stretched out along the highways leading to Kyiv, were under constant surveillance by Ukrainian drones. Ukrainian artillery and anti-tank missile teams lay in wait to ambush the Russian vehicles where they were most vulnerable: at the end of the Russians’ fragile supply lines.

It got worse for the tankers. The first few explosive first-person-view drones appeared in the sky over Ukraine as the Russians fell back later in 2022. By 2023, the tiny hovering drones – some equipped strictly for surveillance, others built to explode on contact – were everywhere. Today, Ukraine builds two-pound, $500 FPV drones at a rate of three million per year. Russia at least matches that production rate, although its poorly-managed drone operators may be less skilled.

Most tanks were designed in eras when attacks from the sides and front were most common. To protect tanks from the likeliest attacks, engineers thinned out the tanks’ top and back armour and reinforced the armour on the turret face and along the hull’s frontal arc.

But FPV drones can strike at angles that exploit this thinner protection along a tank’s top and back. The sheer number of FPV drones over a given length of the front line – sometimes dozens at a time in a single spot – compounded the problem. “In 2024, you can have a $500 FPV drone take out a tank worth millions,” a tanker with the last name Bohdan told Kirichenko.

FPVs are now among the biggest killers of Russian and Ukrainian tanks. In 31 months of hard fighting, the Russians have lost around 3,300 tanks, according to the analysts at the Oryx intelligence collective. That’s as many tanks as the Russian military had in active service before the wider war. (The Kremlin has made good its losses by building new tanks and reactivating old Cold War tanks.) The Ukrainians have lost nearly 900 tanks. That’s also nearly 100 percent of their pre-war inventory.

To put into perspective the scale of the tank losses, consider that the British Army possesses slightly more than 200 tanks. The Russian army loses that many tanks in two months.

Russian and Ukrainian tankers are scrambling to adapt. To survive, tanks hide – and fire their guns from under the cover of camouflaged, stationary positions. When tanks must venture out into the open for attacks, their crews count on anti-drone radio jammers and layers of add-on armour – outward-exploding reactive blocks, metal grills and shed-like metal shells – to mitigate the risk from drone strikes.

“Tanks aren’t as effective as they once were,” a tanker with the first name Victor told Kirichenko. But that doesn’t mean they aren’t still useful. “Tanks will still be around in the future, but FPV drones have changed tank warfare forever,” Victor added.

Don’t expect hundreds of tanks to mass for swift attacks across open ground like they did as recently as 2003. Swarms of drones have rendered that tactic obsolete.

Instead, tanks will fight in small numbers and from under cover where possible – their crews more cautious than ever.

 
I’m unsure that is a good take. One will simply see more counters added to tanks or tank formations.
 
I’m unsure that is a good take. One will simply see more counters added to tanks or tank formations.
With the right combination of EW, GBAD, counter air, route clearance and suppression fire I can still see tank formations being able to largely survive an assault. I do however wonder about the ability of the tanks to concentrate in the first place and avoid being disrupted before the assault by enemy artillery and drones.
 
With the right combination of EW, GBAD, counter air, route clearance and suppression fire I can still see tank formations being able to largely survive an assault. I do however wonder about the ability of the tanks to concentrate in the first place and avoid being disrupted before the assault by enemy artillery and drones.
How realistic was that in reality? Did we ever plan on concentrated forces without air superiority? You'd have to go back to the chaos of Korea
 
I’m unsure that is a good take. One will simply see more counters added to tanks or tank formations.

But more counters add more cost, more weight and more electro-mechanical complexity.
Modifying TTPs runs the risk of complicating the already complicated task of Combined Arms Operations.

Taken together you are increasing the time it would take to get a force into the field and making it harder to sustain.
 
How realistic was that in reality? Did we ever plan on concentrated forces without air superiority? You'd have to go back to the chaos of Korea
Is the shift not so much air superiority or not, but that the "air" filter now needs a much finer mesh, as there's now things that act like an "air" threat (real-time operation, manoeuvring non-LoS to the operator, and flying a course rather than launching on a target) that are basically the size of artillery projectiles, and don't have the good grace to come from a battery of launchers/guns?
 
But more counters add more cost, more weight and more electro-mechanical complexity.
Modifying TTPs runs the risk of complicating the already complicated task of Combined Arms Operations.

Taken together you are increasing the time it would take to get a force into the field and making it harder to sustain.
Not really.
Having a C-UAS ‘tank’ attached to a Platoon or a few for a Company of tanks isn't dramatically changing their makeup or the complexity. Given we have “AD Det’s”
in Inf Platoons already down here, it doesn’t take much to add a dedicated C-UAS vehicle.

Part of the idea behind the Bradley type IFV’s was to fight with the tanks. So now you are just adding an additional capability to either IFV or a number of AD Gun tanks to the mix.

Considering what you need to conduct a breaching operation already that add is such an insignificantly small aspect that it shouldn’t be an issue whatsoever.

Lockheed, Northrop and Rtx all had AMPV and Stryker based systems displayed at AUSA designed to do directly that, including some in GDLS and BAE’s areas too.
 
Not really.
Having a C-UAS ‘tank’ attached to a Platoon or a few for a Company of tanks isn't dramatically changing their makeup or the complexity. Given we have “AD Det’s”
in Inf Platoons already down here, it doesn’t take much to add a dedicated C-UAS vehicle.

Part of the idea behind the Bradley type IFV’s was to fight with the tanks. So now you are just adding an additional capability to either IFV or a number of AD Gun tanks to the mix.

Considering what you need to conduct a breaching operation already that add is such an insignificantly small aspect that it shouldn’t be an issue whatsoever.

Lockheed, Northrop and Rtx all had AMPV and Stryker based systems displayed at AUSA designed to do directly that, including some in GDLS and BAE’s areas too.


That's not what I take away from the RUSI article posted by @FJAG yesterday


....

The new battle impacts every vehicle and every echelon, every VP and every formation and demands new C2 relations between existing organizations and the creation of some new organizations.
 
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