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CAN Enhanced (Permanent?) Fwd Presence in Latvia

milnews.ca said:
</paulharveygeek>  ;D

Yes, you got me there.  I realized after I posted and didn't bother to edit it.  I always liked hearing his radio broadcasts. 
 
The latest from Latvian public media, shared under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42) - highlights mine ...
The Canadian-led multinational battalion earmarked for deployment to Latvia will include heavy weaponry, and the first soldiers are expected to arrive in Latvia at the beginning of next year, Defense Minister Raimonds Bergmanis told the LETA news agency September 7.

Overall there will be a large contingent of allied forces deployed to Latvia, as there will also be soldiers stationed here which are not a part of this battalion,

He said that the work taking place within the Latvian defense sector is very active at the moment in anticipation of the arrival, as infrastructure projects are being developed and other important matters are being solved.

''Visits and consultations are ongoing. The commander of the Canadian armed forces will arrive in Latvia next week. Cooperation is very active at the moment, but there are still some complicated matters which must be dealt with. Our discussions are open and the Canadian side is very understanding,'' the minister explained.

He said that infrastructure at the Adazi military base (FB link) and the Lielvarde air base (Wikipedia link) are being constructed and modernized at at a fast pace - barracks are being constructed, as well as warehouses and other infrastructure.

Asked whether Latvia will be able to complete these infrastructure project by the spring, when the battalion is expected to arrive in Latvia, the minister replied that Latvia's allies are very understanding and are prepared to live in tents for a period until everything is complete. He said that not only Latvian funds are being invested in these infrastructure funds, but also financing from allies as well.

The minister confirmed that the battalion will also include heavy weaponry. It has not yet been decided what kind of heavy weaponry will be stationed in Latvia, but added that this weaponry will be an excellent opportunity for Latvian soldiers to increase their capabilities.

He also said that the battalion will be made up of over 1,000 soldiers. ''The battalion will be made up of over 1,000 soldiers, as they will also have service crews with them,'' Bergmanis pointed out, adding that the total number of soldiers will be greater taking into account the deployment of U.S. troops already on the ground here.

''The NATO battalion and the rotating contingent of U.S. soldiers in Latvia are completely separate from one another. Furthermore, a contingent of soldiers from one of the Visegrad countries will be in Latvia on a rotational basis as well from next year. The overall number of allied soldiers will be quite large,'' Bergmanis said.

Bergmanis hopes that Spain, Slovenia, Italy and Poland will be sending its soldiers to Latvia, as representatives from these countries had recently arrived in Latvia for consultations. ''It is also possible that other allied members will send their soldiers to be a part of this battalion,'' the minister emphasized.

Bergmanis believes that the first soldiers will arrive at the beginning of next year to carry out preparatory work, while the rest of the battalion's soldiers will gradually begin to arrive in the coming weeks.

The Defense Ministry previously stated that the specific countries which will be a part of the Canada-led battalion in Latvia will be known after a meeting of NATO defense ministers in October.

The significant strengthening of the NATO presence in the Baltic states comes as a direct result of Russia's overt and covert military and hybrid actions in Ukraine.
 
Maybe they'll add an LRP Det.  A much nicer location for sustained ops.  We're tired of dust and sand.  :nod:
 
A couple of updates courtesy of Latvian public media ...
The Canadian-led multinational battalion in Latvia will receive 455 Canadian troops who'll start arriving around spring 2017, Canada's Chief of Defense General Jonathan Vance told the press Thursday.

Other countries forming the battalion will be able to decide on the number of troops to be sent to Latvia.

"We do not have any set numbers of troops for each country. I can tell that there will be about 1,000 troops in total," said Vance.

He said it's still being discussed which countries will form the battle group and confirmed the estimated time of arrivals.

(...)

As previously reported, Canada will lead a NATO reinforcement battalion in Latvia next year but other nations, possibly including Italy, are also expected to contribute smaller numbers of troops.
(source)
During a meeting September 14 with Italian President Sergio Mattarella, Latvian President Raimonds Vejonis expressed hope that Italy will join the Canadian-led multinational NATO battalion which will be deployed to Latvia, reported LETA.

During the meeting, which took place at a conference in Bulgaria, the two sides praised their cooperation on security matters, which is important in implementing the decisions made during the recent NATO Summit in Warsaw.

''We are happy at the decision made during the NATO Summit in Warsaw on strengthening the alliance's presence in the Baltic region and Poland, which foresees the deployment of a Canadian-led multinational battalion in Latvia,'' Vejonis said.

(...)

As previously reported, Canada will lead a NATO reinforcement battalion in Latvia next year but other nations, possibly including Italy, are also expected to contribute smaller numbers of troops.

Italian military officers have already inspected facilities in Latvia.
(source)
 
Rand's best guess:  no more than 60 hours for Force Putin to reach "the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga" ...
Research Questions

--  What might the consequences be if Russia decided to reclaim the territory of the three Baltic republics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — which are NATO members?
--  What might be done to prevent or mitigate such a scenario?

Russia's recent aggression against Ukraine has disrupted nearly a generation of relative peace and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors and raised concerns about its larger intentions. From the perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the threat to the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — former Soviet republics, now member states that border Russian territory — may be the most problematic of these. In a series of war games conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, RAND Arroyo Center examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games' findings are unambiguous: As presently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Fortunately, it will not require Herculean effort to avoid such a failure. Further gaming indicates that a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades — adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities — could suffice to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states.

Key Findings

As Presently Postured, NATO Cannot Successfully Defend the Territory of its Most Exposed Members

    Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours.

    Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad.

It Is Possible to Avoid Such Consequences

    A force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades — adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities — could suffice to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states.
    While not sufficient to mount a sustained defense of the region or to achieve NATO's ultimate end state of restoring its members' territorial integrity, such a posture would fundamentally change the strategic picture as seen from Moscow.

The Expense Needs to Be Balanced Against the Consequences of Not Rethinking the Current Posture

    While this deterrent posture would not be inexpensive in absolute terms, it is not unaffordable, especially in comparison with the potential costs of failing to defend NATO's most exposed and vulnerable allies.
You can download the whole paper (16 page PDF) here.
 
milnews.ca said:
Rand's best guess:  no more than 60 hours for Force Putin to reach "the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga" ...You can download the whole paper (16 page PDF) here.
How difficult would it be to take back the Baltics from a entrenched Russian military is probably the better question to be asking.

I don't think anyone expecting the Baltics to hold if Russia decides to play nasty.
 
Altair said:
How difficult would it be to take back the Baltics from a entrenched Russian military is probably the better question to be asking.
I wish I could say something different, but if the Russians made it to the 'burbs of the Baltic capitals, unless the Baltic militaries are pressing a hard, continued fight, I'm guessing the West won't have the moral fibre/political will to blow the shit out of occupied territory as it faces a nuclear-armed Russia.  Best to keep them out of the house than to have to evict them.
 
Altair said:
How difficult would it be to take back the Baltics from a entrenched Russian military is probably the better question to be asking.

I don't think anyone expecting the Baltics to hold if Russia decides to play nasty.

Extremely difficult last time, but we didn't have the moral fibre to even drop weapons and ammo to insurgents who fought the Soviets from 1945 to 1959 while hoping we would come.  Personally, if I was an Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian I wouldn't smoke the shit that NATO is serving unless they stationed troops in my country.  As for NATO stationing troops there is like being cut off, the land bridge from Poland to Lithuania is narrow and easily interdicted unless you are willing to spend a lot of pilots to keep it open. 
 
In Latvia and Estonia in particular I'd be more concerned with unconventional support for the significant Russian populations in those countries (26-28% Russian in each from what I can see).  Internal ethnic strife would be a much more difficult thing for NATO to intervene in than a full-fledged military invasion.  Any heavy handed responses to ethnic Russian activities (supported by "little green men") could give Russia a political excuse to intervene with military forces to defend the ethnic minority.

From their point of view I'd think that little bites from the Baltic states and sewing political disunity would be a much smarter approach than a very risky direct invasion.
 
GR66 said:
In Latvia and Estonia in particular I'd be more concerned with unconventional support for the significant Russian populations in those countries (26-28% Russian in each from what I can see).  Internal ethnic strife would be a much more difficult thing for NATO to intervene in than a full-fledged military invasion.  Any heavy handed responses to ethnic Russian activities (supported by "little green men") could give Russia a political excuse to intervene with military forces to defend the ethnic minority.

From their point of view I'd think that little bites from the Baltic states and seowing political disunity would be a much smarter approach than a very risky direct invasion.
Although we may be less likely to see "the polite ones" in the Baltics (given that the Russians don't have bases on Baltic soil - which made the appearance of "local defence militias" easy & quick in Crimea)*, I agree with you about the bits in yellow.

* - Unless, of course, Putin & Co. funds/uniformly equips Baltic Local Defence Militias within the Russophone communities.
 
GR66 said:
In Latvia and Estonia in particular I'd be more concerned with unconventional support for the significant Russian populations in those countries (26-28% Russian in each from what I can see).  Internal ethnic strife would be a much more difficult thing for NATO to intervene in than a full-fledged military invasion.  Any heavy handed responses to ethnic Russian activities (supported by "little green men") could give Russia a political excuse to intervene with military forces to defend the ethnic minority.

From their point of view I'd think that little bites from the Baltic states and sewing political disunity would be a much smarter approach than a very risky direct invasion.
Isn't that the point of the trip wire forces?

Any heavy handed response to our heavy handed response would end up killing NATO soldiers, Americans, Canadians, Germans, etc.

That's a slow building situation with very little in terms of tactical surprise. I would imagine that would be easier to plan for and handle.

A sudden Russian push through the Baltics that would have them occupied in 60 hours would be a far more devastating because like Crimea, NATO would be presented with a fair accompli. How many alliance members are going to want to try to push a dug in Russia out of the Baltics?

How long would NATO survive if it didn't?
 
Are any of NATO's eastern members making attempts at fostering or creating "stay behind" and guerilla/militia forces, as a low-cost deterrent to Russian occupation?
 
quadrapiper said:
Are any of NATO's eastern members making attempts at fostering or creating "stay behind" and guerilla/militia forces, as a low-cost deterrent to Russian occupation?

Yes. It's called 'Poland'. :)
 
quadrapiper said:
Are any of NATO's eastern members making attempts at fostering or creating "stay behind" and guerilla/militia forces, as a low-cost deterrent to Russian occupation?

Poland is:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_Defence_Force_(Poland)

Of course, Poland is in a better position geographically than Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Poland has time and space (and rivers) on its side on the defence, the Baltic states are in a much more difficult position. In addition, Poland has a very small ethnic Russian population -- the Baltic states have significant numbers of ethnic Russians.

A worst case scenario for NATO in the Baltics would probably be some kind of attempted coup in one of the Baltic countries -- a coup attempt in a member nation isn't supposed to trigger NATO involvement (see our allies in Turkey) and by time the dust settles a pro-Russian regime could be in power. The other option being that NATO intervenes, prevents the coup, and is then painted by the Russian propaganda machine as interfering in a member state's internal politics without any legal backing.

Interesting times ahead for the new Cold War. I hope everyone's brushing up on their conversational Latvian.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_Defence_League
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Defence_troops_(Finland)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Sweden)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Norway)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Denmark)
 
Ostrozac said:
A worst case scenario for NATO in the Baltics would probably be some kind of attempted coup in one of the Baltic countries -- a coup attempt in a member nation isn't supposed to trigger NATO involvement (see our allies in Turkey) and by time the dust settles a pro-Russian regime could be in power. The other option being that NATO intervenes, prevents the coup, and is then painted by the Russian propaganda machine as interfering in a member state's internal politics without any legal backing.
Or, as mentioned in "Yes, Prime Minister", "salami tactics" at the borders - since the YouTube video's no longer available, here's the script - even though they talk about nukes, same with intervention:
... Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA):  if they try anything, it will be salami tactics.

Prime Minister (PM - Salami tactics?

CSA - Slice by slice.  One small piece at a time.  So will you press the button if they invade West Berlin?

PM - It all depends.
CSA - On what?  Scenario one.  Riots in West Berlin, buildings in flames.  East German fire brigade crosses the border to help. Would you press the button...?

CSA - The East German police come with them.  The button...?

CSA - Then some troops, more troops just for riot control, they say.  And then the East German troops are replaced by Russian troops. Button...?

CSA - Then the Russian troops don't go.  They are invited to stay to support civilian administration.

CSA - The civilian administration closes roads and Tempelhof Airport.  Now you press the button?

PM - I need time to think about it ...
 
Chris Pook said:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_Defence_League
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Defence_troops_(Finland)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Sweden)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Norway)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Guard_(Denmark)

Many Estonian gun clubs have a stock of AKs and offer training and shooting practice to club members with government provided ammo.
 
Lightguns said:
Many Estonian gun clubs have a stock of AKs and offer training and shooting practice to club members with government provided ammo.

And all that without the 2nd amendment? Amazing.... :)
 
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