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C3 Howitzer Replacement

I would like to offer a few comments. First, the Basic Load is an estimate of usage in static periods, and not of rounds to be fired in active operations. There was, in the Second World War, a pool of ammunition that was expended in active operations such as Totalize and Tractable. A long while back I checked the 21st Army Group holdings for 25-pounder ammunition between July and the end of the Normandy Campaign in late August. The holdings, expressed in Rounds per Gun, decreased from 700-odd RPGs to around 250.

For example, "higher" might allot 400 RPG for a specific operations, and this would be further broken down for preparatory fire, phases, CB, and a commander's reserve. Again this was over and above the basic and maintenance loads, although conservation of basic loads did end up in the "other pile". This ammunition was delivered by what was known as a dumping programme, delivering ammunition to the gun positions.

Example from Korea. E Troop, 216 Battery, 81st Field Regiment RCA (later E Troop, M Battery, 4 RCHA) engaged attacking Chinese Forces attacking 3 RCR one night in early June 1953, firing roughly 400 RPG during the night. (I later served in E Troop in Petawawa 1958-1960 and it still was discussed by the troops, who were justifiably proud of their part in the battle, and The Royals who held the position against heavy odds).
 
If anything, the vehicle fleet for artillery has been schizophrenic since the M109/M548 and the MLVW/C3 fleets. Both those vehicles worked adequately as limbers. After that there were no trucks designed for guns. The mod for the M777 is basically just a data connector to allow some of the gun's data system to be read in the cab while travelling.

In Bosnia we used Bisons as gun tractors for LG1s. When we went into Afghanistan we went back to MLVWs for the LG1s and then started dancing around for Kandahar flirting with Bisons and RG1s in combination with HLVWs before finally settling on the following for each for each roughly 33-35 person troop:

1) an M777s as CP vehicle

2) 2 x TLAV - one for the Tp Comd/recce veh and 1 for the Tp SM

3) 2 x TLAV and 2 x HLVW with armoured cab - one of each for each gun det

4) 1 x TLAV for the Met det (generally two per bty and not necessarily 1 for each tp)

Note that the two HLVWs carried about 100 rds 155mm, 300+ rds 81mm, 1,000s of rounds of small arms ammunition as well as all the food, water, fuel, defensive stores, for the entire troop and towed the M777.

Much of the time in the first few years the troops deployed in AMAs without any additional security details in the middle of butt-hole nowhere. They preferred wide open spaces so that you could see strangers from far away. A troop of 33 looking after their own security while doing their primary job of fire support and usually being 4 or 5 men short on HTLA was problematic. Problematic as well was the total absence of a battery level echelon and the battery ammo vehicles, especially in the early years when helicopter resupply and NSE CLPs were few and far between.

All that to say, I see problems with automated systems. While a gun with an autoloader needing only a crew of two and capable of producing its own firing data supplied by an autonomous ammo limber sounds really quite intriguing, I don't see it lasting long.

Leaving aside local defence for the time being (and believe me you can not leave it aside) you need to at least double the crew to provide for 24/7 operation and routine running maintenance.

Then there is the issue of ammunition. A 155mm round weighs in at just short of 100 lbs. Assuming the gun has an autoloader, it probably won't handle more than 25 to 40 rounds on board assuming multi-function fuzes and modular charges. There will need to be a mix of projectiles however - generally HE, Smk, Illum, and some precision. Those do not get fired at standard ratios so more probably then not you will run out of the popular stuff before you are 2/3rds of the way through an autoloader's magazine. That means a constant need to draw off the limber - perhaps every second mission or so. I don't see any system on the horizon that automates ammo transfer from the limber to the gun. You need extra people here. Probably 3 to 4 per gun. So since you have those you really do not need an autonomous limber.

So how does the limber get refilled? There are numerous methods, but generally a regiment has to keep a basic load on hand. A basic load is the expected expenditure for three days while the brigade still holds a one day's maintenance load. Generally speaking then, every day you can expect that you have to transfer a days worth of ammo through to the regiment's ammo vehicles which then top up the battery ammo limbers. Pallets and cranes help with that. Why a basic load? Because artillery is not a just-in-time delivery logistics system. You have surges where there is no option but to double and triple expenditures and you better have the ammo near at hand.

The other thing that heavily automated systems bring are maintenance woes. To keep my 6-gun M109 battery on the road I had a 14-man maint sect with providing light and heavy tracked and wheeled and electronics and weapons maintenance. The more complex the equipment becomes the more maintainers you will need - don't forget medics and cooks, quartermasters, POL crews. - And then there's local defence. Oh, yes and manual backups for communications and data processing breakdowns. They happen and will continue to happen. 24/7 and redundant systems are an artillery characteristic

I guess what I'm trying to convey is that, yes, automation will help but it won't save the manpower that you think. Russian SP batteries (with autoloaders) are notoriously made up of 50 all ranks but are essentially devoid of any any logistic or maintenance support - that, and ammo reloads come from the battalion and brigade. (The 152 mm carried one unit of fire i.e 60 rds. The brigade in total carries 6 units of fire or 360 rds per gun) This is why the Ukraine was littered with broken down and abandoned Russian equipment.

In contrast, a Paladin battery has 90 all ranks, an M992 ammo limber per gun (each gun and limber together together carry 134-137 rds per set) and three M1074 pallet trucks and trailers with a total 32 ton capacity per set with more at battalion and many more in the brigades distribution company. The Americans too keep the bulk of their maintainers, medics, kitchen etc at battalion. My battery gun line was a bit fatter at around a hundred together with its echelon but without its BC and FOOs. Out of those 90-100 all ranks in a Cdn or US bty, roughly 40 are ammo handlers. Remember that on an M109 there are only two people who actually operate the gun and one who supervises their work; everyone else lugs ammo.

If you are looking for a problem to solve for the artillery then try to figure out how to create a more efficient system for bringing large amount of diverse ammunition constantly flowing to guns that have limited on-board magazines and that must move frequently.

Cherrio.

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What I am looking at is:

Guns attracting incoming fire.
Is it necessary to put a crew on the firing position at all?
Or can the gun be loaded up with the ammunition necessary for the shoot then remotely manoeuvered into battery. Immediately after the last shot can that gun be manoeuvered to a different location for replenishing?
That seems to be analogous to the manner in which the SPGs are being used except the gun crew is exposed along with the gun.
I am suggesting that a 120mm mortar, or 105mm gun or a 155mm howitzer could look more like a gun in an anti-aircraft battery.

As to the size of the crew - I can see the need for more numbers to manage 24 hour ops and local defence. But do all those numbers have to be on the gun all the time? Can you not organize 3 2-gunner shifts?

How many skilled gunners do you need for a shoot? Even HIMARS notes that the launchers can be centrally fired.
Could 2 gunners man 3 or 4 automated guns while the other 6 to 8 gunners get some rest?

As to ammunition - large dumps seem to be attracting attention. One of the advantages of the HIMARS/MLRS system is the podded insensitive rounds and the ability of the launch vehicle to "change mags" permitting the wide dispersal of the ammunition in small caches.

Maintenance - agreed you are never going to have enough techs - so I might want to keep the few I have out of the firing line to the greatest extent possible and move the guns to the techs to the greatest extent possible.

Security - do you need to employ scarce qualified gunners and techs or can they be augmented by reservists with 5 to 8 weeks of SQL/BMQ type training?




We know that UGVs are sufficiently advanced to play follow the leader. Even with Canada's new 8x8s some portion of that fleet could be converted to optionally manned vehicles. Trailers could be given APUs to permit the trailer to be remotely manoeuvered in the same way the Rogue Fires JLTV is manoeuvered.

Heck, you could have a lightly armoured tracked SPH(G)(M) carried on a trailer behind an 8x8 with the crew and mechanics with one of the crew dozing off in the cab of the ammunition resupply trucks playing follow the leader.

This isn't tomorrow stuff but nor is it next decade stuff.





 
As to the size of the crew - I can see the need for more numbers to manage 24 hour ops and local defence. But do all those numbers have to be on the gun all the time? Can you not organize 3 2-gunner shifts?
You may not need all the gunners all of the time, but there will be times you more than you have... Intentionally understaffing the battery/troop to a minimum leave no room injury, HLTA, etc...

Security - do you need to employ scarce qualified gunners and techs or can they be augmented by reservists with 5 to 8 weeks of SQL/BMQ type training?
The problem with that idea is that it won't be respected as soon as someone up the food chain decides those extra bodies can be better used somewhere else. If they are gunners it's much easier to argue that they are required with the guns. Remember, a gunner that's just off sentry can help with the guns, whereas a non-qualified Pte fresh off BMQ/BMQ(L) can essentially hold a rifle and not kill themselves or those around them.

My Met Det deployed to Afghanistan with two drivers from 4 AD, they never sat in the driver's seat of our Bison once. They were tasked away to another job, leaving one of us Cpls to drive a vehicle we weren't qualified on, while the MCpl or Sgt crew commanded.

We know that UGVs are sufficiently advanced to play follow the leader. Even with Canada's new 8x8s some portion of that fleet could be converted to optionally manned vehicles. Trailers could be given APUs to permit the trailer to be remotely manoeuvered in the same way the Rogue Fires JLTV is manoeuvered.

Heck, you could have a lightly armoured tracked SPH(G)(M) carried on a trailer behind an 8x8 with the crew and mechanics with one of the crew dozing off in the cab of the ammunition resupply trucks playing follow the leader.

This isn't tomorrow stuff but nor is it next decade stuff.

Follow the leader is fun right up until it goes haywire in the mud/dust and now half your ammo is dead on the road, and you don't have enough drivers to get it all moving again.
 
We issued demolition kits to gun troops so that they could BIP ammo they couldn't pack up and move in time.
That is a viable option in some cases, at least for what would be carried in a gun tractor type vehicle.
I have seen denial of arty ammo in a hostile environment and it was a two day op to destroy a trucks worth of arty ammo after the truck rolled down a wadi. Decent packaging means everything has to be unpacked to ensure no kickouts. Intermittent small arms fire slowed everything down. Good show at the end though.
 
I learned on my demo course in Wainwright how sturdy a unfuzed 105 HE is , when the charge failed to detonate it and instead flung it a distance and into a gopher hole, took us awhile to find it.....
 
What I am looking at is:

Guns attracting incoming fire.
Is it necessary to put a crew on the firing position at all?
Or can the gun be loaded up with the ammunition necessary for the shoot then remotely manoeuvered into battery. Immediately after the last shot can that gun be manoeuvered to a different location for replenishing?
I can't see why it couldn't. I do have a concern about all autonomous or remotely controlled systems which is that EW can make it non functional albeit with the degree of computerization in ordinary engines one can carry that argument to quite a degree. Obviously it needs an autoloader type system. Something like Caesar needs crews.
That seems to be analogous to the manner in which the SPGs are being used except the gun crew is exposed along with the gun.
I am suggesting that a 120mm mortar, or 105mm gun or a 155mm howitzer could look more like a gun in an anti-aircraft battery.
I'm not getting the visual but I do see the point.
As to the size of the crew - I can see the need for more numbers to manage 24 hour ops and local defence. But do all those numbers have to be on the gun all the time? Can you not organize 3 2-gunner shifts?

How many skilled gunners do you need for a shoot? Even HIMARS notes that the launchers can be centrally fired.
Could 2 gunners man 3 or 4 automated guns while the other 6 to 8 gunners get some rest?
M777s had digital gun management systems. Those went down from time to time. When they did, crews went to manual backups and kept firing. I have much less faith in how well these automated systems will work than you do. Maybe some day. It's not on my visible horizon. That doesn't mean one shouldn't try to keep developing these systems.
As to ammunition - large dumps seem to be attracting attention. One of the advantages of the HIMARS/MLRS system is the podded insensitive rounds and the ability of the launch vehicle to "change mags" permitting the wide dispersal of the ammunition in small caches.
Decentralization is a risk assessment balanced against handling and managing resources available
Maintenance - agreed you are never going to have enough techs - so I might want to keep the few I have out of the firing line to the greatest extent possible and move the guns to the techs to the greatest extent possible.
Bty echelons do not sit cheek to jowl with gun lines. Distances as between gun lines and echelons is a balancing act based on the tactical situation.
Security - do you need to employ scarce qualified gunners and techs or can they be augmented by reservists with 5 to 8 weeks of SQL/BMQ type training?
Our reservists come trained to function on the gun line. There's no benefit in having a separate security detail. Our system doesn't do it now but in 5 weeks I can take a civilian and make him a decent gun number.
We know that UGVs are sufficiently advanced to play follow the leader. Even with Canada's new 8x8s some portion of that fleet could be converted to optionally manned vehicles. Trailers could be given APUs to permit the trailer to be remotely manoeuvered in the same way the Rogue Fires JLTV is manoeuvered.

Heck, you could have a lightly armoured tracked SPH(G)(M) carried on a trailer behind an 8x8 with the crew and mechanics with one of the crew dozing off in the cab of the ammunition resupply trucks playing follow the leader.

This isn't tomorrow stuff but nor is it next decade stuff.





I'll get back to the key element here. It's not the driving, that could be done through UGVs. It's the handling through unloading pallets, unpackaging and distribution. It's the break bulk function that machines can't do efficiently.

Small example. We used to provide fuel to tank laagers and gun lines by having a 2 1/2 truck loaded with jerry cans drive down the line, drop x number of cans at each vehicle and come back later to pick up empties. In ten minutes you could drop cans for a whole battery and have each crew fuel their own vehicles. We got rid of the cans and got bowsers. Now the bowser has to go vehicle to vehicle and gas each up sequentially. That can take an hour or two for a battery. Cans were inefficient for the logistics system but super convenient and fast for the gun line or tank squadron.

Ammo is like that. You have to convert pallets to useable rounds. Find a way to do that efficiently without people and you'll get a medal.
Follow the leader is fun right up until it goes haywire in the mud/dust and now half your ammo is dead on the road, and you don't have enough drivers to get it all moving again.
That's a really good point. Convoys get screwed. You haven't lived until you've had to unstick a gun troop from a muddy farmer's field. Simple things like a flat tire need muscle power. Recovery was a problem in Afghanistan because - ta da - there were no company or battery echelons. It had to come from the NSE in KAF - sometimes a hundred or more kilometres. And the recovery vehicles weren't well suited to LAVs. There was a lot of self recovery by way of A frames too. Hard to do when there's only two guys looking after a troop of guns. Feb 06 was wet and muddy in Afghanistan. Gun troops got stuck and had to be pulled out through bunches of guys working together with sets of winches.

How would a UGV handle this - and yes, that's an M777:

2007 May 19 Gun damage ditch2.JPG

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Rheinmetall's Canadian Autonomy solution - derived from their mission master work but applied to any vehicle - the Aussies applied it to the Wiesel and to heavy military vehicles.

Multiple modes of operations including tethers and optical comms.

I think there is a lot of redundancy built in here










What I'm getting at, with my continuing fascination with everything light, is building weapons that trade space for arrmoured weight.

If I can put a couple hundred meters of optical fibre or coax and a hill between my position (under my SKOP kit) and the weapon I would be happy. And the absence of armour means that it is more likely that the weapon will be able to accompany me regardless of the theatre of operations and the means of transport.

Not to mention making it harder for the enemy to template fire solutions and easier for the log and maintenance types to work away from the gun line.
 

Simple, direct... and understandable ;)


The Marine Littoral Regiment concept is part of Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 plan, which is meant to make the Corps lighter and expeditionary enough to win a war against China.

However, Berger’s plan has run into criticism from prominent retired Marine general officers, including retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, who completely upended the U.S. military’s assumptions about its adversaries in the 2002 Millennium Challenge wargame.

On Friday, Van Riper told Task & Purpose that the idea of Marine Littoral Regiments using NMESIS to attack Chinese ships from Western Pacific islands was “dumber than dirt.”
 
Rheinmetall's Canadian Autonomy solution - derived from their mission master work but applied to any vehicle - the Aussies applied it to the Wiesel and to heavy military vehicles.

Multiple modes of operations including tethers and optical comms.

I think there is a lot of redundancy built in here










What I'm getting at, with my continuing fascination with everything light, is building weapons that trade space for arrmoured weight.

If I can put a couple hundred meters of optical fibre or coax and a hill between my position (under my SKOP kit) and the weapon I would be happy. And the absence of armour means that it is more likely that the weapon will be able to accompany me regardless of the theatre of operations and the means of transport.

Not to mention making it harder for the enemy to template fire solutions and easier for the log and maintenance types to work away from the gun line.
I don't really see these solutions going quite as far as you envision but I do think there are several areas where these technologies are definitely useful.

The Mission Master series would be a great option for Light units both for re-supply as well as recce and as a support weapon carrier.

Something like the autonomous Wiesel would be great for manned-unmanned teaming for a Recce Squadron. A troop of 3-4 vehicles with one of them being unmanned that can take point in terrain where there is increased risk of detection.

For the convoy-type systems I don't see them replacing the operators but possibly being an aid to the human operators to allow for a portion of the team to get crew rest, etc. A remote-control system could also be useful if there are crew casualties but the vehicle is still operable. The vehicle could be operated remotely or put into "follow" mode to move out of the line of fire, etc.
 
I don't foresee UGV on ops for a long time, outside of mine clearing, UXO and perhaps breeching. I do foresee powered exoskeletons in the Logistical branch to help with the transferring of goods from one platform to the next.
 
Simple, direct... and understandable ;)


The Marine Littoral Regiment concept is part of Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 plan, which is meant to make the Corps lighter and expeditionary enough to win a war against China.

However, Berger’s plan has run into criticism from prominent retired Marine general officers, including retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, who completely upended the U.S. military’s assumptions about its adversaries in the 2002 Millennium Challenge wargame.

On Friday, Van Riper told Task & Purpose that the idea of Marine Littoral Regiments using NMESIS to attack Chinese ships from Western Pacific islands was “dumber than dirt.”

Van Riper's Red Force efforts during 2002 Millenium Challenge bear reviewing


 
I don't foresee UGV on ops for a long time, outside of mine clearing, UXO and perhaps breeching. I do foresee powered exoskeletons in the Logistical branch to help with

I see UGVs initially in the light force logistics, in convoy application (make the lead and trail vehicles MRAPs and removee the drivers from the trucks themselves) and in "garrison artillery" - GBADs and Coastals that are designed to defend fixed installations.

I'm not thinking of making a Gepard an unmanned vehicle to accompany a Brigade Group.

I'm thinking of taking this array with its two duty operators (10 operators total for 3 shifts plus command and support)

Skyshield_AA.jpg


and then sticking TheMIS type UGVs under each of the sensor and effector pallets so that they can be relocated around the airfield.

images


With the NASAMS system those pallets can be up to 20 km from the FDC.

Goose Green 1982, the paras got a rough handling by a pair of 35mm Oerlikons AA Guns - and those were stationary.

Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns, manned by air force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion. Both the 20mm and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon could also be used in a direct fire ground support role,

35MM_GDF_007_AA_GUN%28A%29.jpg


Similar to the Goose Green guns, the Canadian guns held for the defence of Lahr and very similar to the guns mounted on the Leopard chassis as the Gepard.

It is going to take 10 to 20 years for even optionally manned systems to make their way into the mechanized forces.
 
Van Riper's Red Force efforts during 2002 Millenium Challenge bear reviewing


I'd love to know more about exactly why Van Riper considers Berger's plan "dumber than dirt".

In his (in)famous Red Team win in Millennium Challenge 2002 he overwhelmed the Blue Team fleet with a barrage of missiles followed up by small boat attacks. In some ways isn't the goal of the Marine Littoral Regiments somewhat similar? Use asymmetrical tactics to overcome the strengths of the enemy force?

  • Expand the early detection capabilities of Allied forces through multiple dispersed land-based nodes in addition to naval and air sensors. In naval warfare it's often he who fires first wins.
  • Allow for attack on enemy aircraft and ships from multiple directions (land, sea and air) to hopefully overwhelm their sensors/defences with multiple vectors of attack (or at least expend much of their defensive ammunition before they reach the main mass of Allied naval forces).
  • Potentially force China to expend important recon and strike forces to find and attack the Marine locations rather than focusing on the major threat which is the US naval forces.
 
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