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C3 Howitzer Replacement

Probably per gun, as most batteries were getting 30-50 HEMTT loads/day in some places.
That's a good log trail. 4 HEMTT per gun. Less if the HMETTs are configured for MLRS pods as they have (had?) brackets on the bed that messed with normal pallets.
 
That's a good log trail. 4 HEMTT per gun. Less if the HMETTs are configured for MLRS pods as they have (had?) brackets on the bed that messed with normal pallets.
I probably should not have said HEMMT, I always default to that for trucks these days. I’m pretty sure that the HEMTT’s aren’t supporting the M1’s and other non 777 tower guns. So whatever standard (if there is one) tactical/logistics truck in the Ukraine would be used.
 
1673562682236.jpeg

This is called a Drop Deck Trailer - an alternative to Spades for Fire Support?

Makes me wonder about a TheMis UGV crossover

Titan-THeMIS-w-soldiers-IMG_6152-696x464.jpg
 

Definitely not for an Armoured Battle Group. - But a viable infantry mule.


Country of origin​
Estonia​
Entered service​
2019 (?)​
Dimensions, weight and performance
Weight (curb)​
750 - 850 kg​
Payload capacity​
750 kg​
Length​
2 m​
Width​
0.9 - 2.1 m​
Height​
0.9 m​
Maximum road speed​
25 - 35 km/h​
Nominal working hours​
8 - 10 h​
Distance between UGV and operator​
up to 1.5 km​
 

How Ukraine became a laboratory for Western weapons and battlefield innovation​

By Katie Bo Lillis and Oren Liebermann, CNN
Updated 7:08 AM EST, Sun January 15, 2023


CNN —
Last fall, as Ukraine won back large swaths of territory in a series of counterattacks, it pounded Russian forces with American-made artillery and rockets. Guiding some of that artillery was a homemade targeting system that Ukraine developed on the battlefield.
A piece of Ukrainian-made software has turned readily available tablet computers and smartphones into sophisticated targeting tools that are now used widely across the Ukrainian military.
The result is a mobile app that feeds satellite and other intelligence imagery into a real-time targeting algorithm that helps units near the front direct fire onto specific targets. And because it’s an app, not a piece of hardware, it’s easy to quickly update and upgrade, and available to a wide range of personnel.
US officials familiar with the tool say it has been highly effective at directing Ukrainian artillery fire onto Russian targets.
The targeting app is among dozens of examples of battlefield innovations that Ukraine has come up with over nearly a year of war, often finding cheap fixes to expensive problems.
Small, plastic drones, buzzing quietly overhead, drop grenades and other ordinance on Russian troops. 3D printers now make spare parts so soldiers can repair heavy equipment in the field. Technicians have converted ordinary pickup trucks into mobile missile launchers. Engineers have figured out how to strap sophisticated US missiles onto older Soviet fighter jets such as the MiG-29, helping keep the Ukrainian air force flying after nine months of war.
Ukraine has even developed its own anti-ship weapon, the Neptune, based off Soviet rocket designs that can target the Russian fleet from almost 200 miles away.
This kind of Ukrainian ingenuity has impressed US officials, who have praised Kyiv’s ability to “MacGyver” solutions to its battlefield needs that fill in important tactical gaps left by the larger, more sophisticated Western weaponry.
Ukrainian servicemen of National Guard operate with a homemade anti-aircraft machine gun to destroy drones in Mykolaiv, Ukraine.

Ukrainian servicemen of National Guard operate with a homemade anti-aircraft machine gun to destroy drones in Mykolaiv, Ukraine.
STR/NurPhoto/Getty Images
While US and other Western officials don’t always have perfect insight into exactly how Ukraine’s custom-made systems work – in large part because they are not on the ground – both officials and open-source analysts say Ukraine has become a veritable battle lab for cheap but effective solutions.
“Their innovation is just incredibly impressive,” said Seth Jones, director of the international security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

‘Real world battle testing’​

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has also offered the United States and its allies a rare opportunity to study how their own weapons systems perform under intense use – and what munitions both sides are using to score wins in this hotly fought modern war. US operations officers and other military officials have also tracked how successfully Russia has used cheap, expendable drones that explode on impact, provided by Iran, to decimate the Ukrainian power grid.
Ukraine is “absolutely a weapons lab in every sense because none of this equipment has ever actually been used in a war between two industrially developed nations,” said one source familiar with Western intelligence. “This is real-world battle testing.”
For the US military, the war in Ukraine has been an incredible source of data on the utility of its own systems.
Some high-profile systems given to the Ukrainians – such as the Switchblade 300 drone and a missile designed to target enemy radar systems – have turned out to be less effective on the battlefield than anticipated, according to a US military operations officer with knowledge of the battlefield, as well as a recent British think tank study.
But the lightweight American-made M142 multiple rocket launcher, or HIMARS, has been critical to Ukraine’s success – even as officials have learned valuable lessons about the rate of maintenance repair those systems have required under such heavy use.

How Ukraine has used its limited supply of HIMARS missiles to wreak havoc on Russian command and control, striking command posts, headquarters and supply depots, has been eye-opening, a defense official said, adding that military leaders would be studying this for years.
Ukrainian service members fire a shell from an M777 Howitzer at a front line, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues.

Ukrainian service members fire a shell from an M777 Howitzer at a front line, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues.
Gleb Garanich/Reuters
Another crucial piece of insight has been about the M777 howitzer, the powerful artillery that has been a critical part of Ukraine’s battlefield power. But the barrels of the howitzers lose their rifling if too many shells are fired in a short time frame, another defense official said, making the artillery less accurate and less effective.
The Ukrainians have also made tactical innovations that have impressed Western officials. During the early weeks of the war, Ukrainian commanders adapted their operations to employ small teams of dismounted infantry during the Russian advance on Kyiv. Armed with shoulder-mounted Stinger and Javelin rockets, Ukrainian troops were able to sneak up on Russian tanks without infantry on their flanks.
The US has also closely studied the conflict for larger lessons on how a war between two modern nations might be waged in the 21st century.
A High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) during military exercises at Spilve Airport in Riga, Latvia.

A High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) during military exercises at Spilve Airport in Riga, Latvia.
Roman Koksarov/AP
The operations officer said that one lesson the US may take from this conflict is that towed artillery – like the M777 howitzer system – may be a thing of the past. Those systems are harder to move quickly to avoid return fire – and in a world of ubiquitous drones and overhead surveillance, “it’s very hard to hide nowadays,” this person said.
When it comes to lessons learned, “there’s a book to be written about this,” said Democratic Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut, a member of the House Intelligence Committee.

‘A $10,000 one-way attack drone’​

US defense contractors have also taken note of the novel opportunity to study – and market – their systems.
BAE Systems has already announced that the Russian success with their kamikaze drones has influenced how it is designing a new armored fighting vehicle for the Army, adding more armor to protect soldiers from attacks from above.
And different parts of the US government and industry have sought to test novel systems and solutions in a fight for which Ukraine needed all the help it could get.
Ukrainian soldiers are on standby with a US made Stinger MANPAD (man-portable air-defense system) on the frontline in Bakhmut, Ukraine

Ukrainian soldiers are on standby with a US made Stinger MANPAD (man-portable air-defense system) on the frontline in Bakhmut, Ukraine
Pierre Crom/Getty Images
In the early days of the conflict, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency sent five lightweight, high-resolution surveillance drones to US Special Operations Command in Europe – just in case they might come in handy in Ukraine. The drones, made by a company called Hexagon, weren’t part of a so-called program of record at the Defense Department, hinting at the experimental nature of the conflict.
Navy Vice Adm. Robert Sharp, the head of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency at the time, even boasted publicly that the US had trained a “military partner” in Europe on the system.
“What this allows you to do is to go out underneath cloud cover and collect your own [geointelligence] data,” Sharp told CNN on the sidelines of a satellite conference in Denver last spring.
Ghost, 24, a soldier with the 58th Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Army, catches a drone while testing it so it can be used nearby.

"Ghost", 24, a soldier with the 58th Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Army, catches a drone while testing it so it can be used nearby.
Leah Millis/Reuters
Despite intense effort by a small group of US officials and outside industry, it remains unclear whether these drones ever made it into the fight.
Meanwhile, multiple intelligence and military officials told CNN they hoped that creating what the US military terms “attritable” drones – cheap, single-use weapons – has become a top priority for defense contractors.
“I wish we could make a $10,000 one-way attack drone,” one of these officials said, wistfully.
Hopefully the M777 lesson gets through to our chain of command. I still see it as having a continuing role for airmobile ops and low intensity conflicts, but it has no place on the mechanized combined arms battlefield. It's simply not a multi-purpose gun

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Back to the 120mm system

Half an AMOS = NEMO @ 1900 kg - LAV mountable and container mountable - mobile and fixed.

8 for every LAV Battalion and Cavalry Regiment but arty trades. Just like MSHORAD.

81s for the companies.



AMOS and NEMO



And the Swedes went with a simplified version of AMOS, but still twin barrelled, called Mjolner. They have 8 Mjolners backing 2 small Leo Coys of 11 tanks and 2 CV90 infantry coys. Effectively as small Canadian Battle Group. They also have 4 40mm AD vehicles for each Battle Group.

 
“I wish we could make a $10,000 one-way attack drone,” one of these officials said, wistfully.

If I were a canny manufacturer I would make a $10,000 solution and start shipping it. Don't let the military committees get anywhere near it.

Part of the Ukrainian's success is that so much of its army are poorly equipped civilians unwilling to wait for the system to solve their problems. It is an army of McGyvers. They are working with what is on hand.

I remember reading early in the war that one of the first instances of a civilian drone being employed was a teenage hobbyist taking his drone out an offering to his neighbours who were patrolling the local streets and wanted to peek over walls and hedges. He got a full time job.
 
Rheimetall again - this time the autonomous vehicle



640px-IWM-H-8241-Morris-C8-19410320.jpg


This got me thinking - The three elements of the field gun - The Tractor, The Limber and The Gun.

Suppose you look at this as three separate vehicles with the limber and the gun being self propelled and playing follow the leader.

The Tractor carries the crew - does it need to be tracked? Can it be light enough to port by air?

The Limber carries the ammunition - does it need to be tracked?

The Gun - I would argue that it needs to be tracked.


The tractor and the limber can be located remotely from the gun and from each other.

The gun can be manoeuvered remotely into, and out of a firing position. The gun and the limber can be moved to an RV for reloading. The limber can be replaced by another limber. The crew can be separate from the firing position (up to 1.5 km) and only marry up with the limber when the gun is to be reloaded.

How much armour does the gun, the limber (beyond blast control) and the tractor (a JLTV?) need? How big a crew is required? 2? Not more than 4. Definitely not 7.

The crew vehicle, in fact, could be any vehicle that can manage the local terrain.
 
The Rangers looking for the Light Infantry mortar solution - Polaris Ranger 6x6 or similar, 81 or 120mm, fully automated laying and loading.


I am going to guess that all these artillery systems, going forward, are going to have the ability to launch their own UAVs for direct spotting.
 
Rheimetall again - this time the autonomous vehicle



640px-IWM-H-8241-Morris-C8-19410320.jpg


This got me thinking - The three elements of the field gun - The Tractor, The Limber and The Gun.

Suppose you look at this as three separate vehicles with the limber and the gun being self propelled and playing follow the leader.

The Tractor carries the crew - does it need to be tracked? Can it be light enough to port by air?

The Limber carries the ammunition - does it need to be tracked?

The Gun - I would argue that it needs to be tracked.


The tractor and the limber can be located remotely from the gun and from each other.

The gun can be manoeuvered remotely into, and out of a firing position. The gun and the limber can be moved to an RV for reloading. The limber can be replaced by another limber. The crew can be separate from the firing position (up to 1.5 km) and only marry up with the limber when the gun is to be reloaded.

How much armour does the gun, the limber (beyond blast control) and the tractor (a JLTV?) need? How big a crew is required? 2? Not more than 4. Definitely not 7.

The crew vehicle, in fact, could be any vehicle that can manage the local terrain.
If anything, the vehicle fleet for artillery has been schizophrenic since the M109/M548 and the MLVW/C3 fleets. Both those vehicles worked adequately as limbers. After that there were no trucks designed for guns. The mod for the M777 is basically just a data connector to allow some of the gun's data system to be read in the cab while travelling.

In Bosnia we used Bisons as gun tractors for LG1s. When we went into Afghanistan we went back to MLVWs for the LG1s and then started dancing around for Kandahar flirting with Bisons and RG1s in combination with HLVWs before finally settling on the following for each for each roughly 33-35 person troop:

1) an M777s as CP vehicle

2) 2 x TLAV - one for the Tp Comd/recce veh and 1 for the Tp SM

3) 2 x TLAV and 2 x HLVW with armoured cab - one of each for each gun det

4) 1 x TLAV for the Met det (generally two per bty and not necessarily 1 for each tp)

Note that the two HLVWs carried about 100 rds 155mm, 300+ rds 81mm, 1,000s of rounds of small arms ammunition as well as all the food, water, fuel, defensive stores, for the entire troop and towed the M777.

Much of the time in the first few years the troops deployed in AMAs without any additional security details in the middle of butt-hole nowhere. They preferred wide open spaces so that you could see strangers from far away. A troop of 33 looking after their own security while doing their primary job of fire support and usually being 4 or 5 men short on HTLA was problematic. Problematic as well was the total absence of a battery level echelon and the battery ammo vehicles, especially in the early years when helicopter resupply and NSE CLPs were few and far between.

All that to say, I see problems with automated systems. While a gun with an autoloader needing only a crew of two and capable of producing its own firing data supplied by an autonomous ammo limber sounds really quite intriguing, I don't see it lasting long.

Leaving aside local defence for the time being (and believe me you can not leave it aside) you need to at least double the crew to provide for 24/7 operation and routine running maintenance.

Then there is the issue of ammunition. A 155mm round weighs in at just short of 100 lbs. Assuming the gun has an autoloader, it probably won't handle more than 25 to 40 rounds on board assuming multi-function fuzes and modular charges. There will need to be a mix of projectiles however - generally HE, Smk, Illum, and some precision. Those do not get fired at standard ratios so more probably then not you will run out of the popular stuff before you are 2/3rds of the way through an autoloader's magazine. That means a constant need to draw off the limber - perhaps every second mission or so. I don't see any system on the horizon that automates ammo transfer from the limber to the gun. You need extra people here. Probably 3 to 4 per gun. So since you have those you really do not need an autonomous limber.

So how does the limber get refilled? There are numerous methods, but generally a regiment has to keep a basic load on hand. A basic load is the expected expenditure for three days while the brigade still holds a one day's maintenance load. Generally speaking then, every day you can expect that you have to transfer a days worth of ammo through to the regiment's ammo vehicles which then top up the battery ammo limbers. Pallets and cranes help with that. Why a basic load? Because artillery is not a just-in-time delivery logistics system. You have surges where there is no option but to double and triple expenditures and you better have the ammo near at hand.

The other thing that heavily automated systems bring are maintenance woes. To keep my 6-gun M109 battery on the road I had a 14-man maint sect with providing light and heavy tracked and wheeled and electronics and weapons maintenance. The more complex the equipment becomes the more maintainers you will need - don't forget medics and cooks, quartermasters, POL crews. - And then there's local defence. Oh, yes and manual backups for communications and data processing breakdowns. They happen and will continue to happen. 24/7 and redundant systems are an artillery characteristic

I guess what I'm trying to convey is that, yes, automation will help but it won't save the manpower that you think. Russian SP batteries (with autoloaders) are notoriously made up of 50 all ranks but are essentially devoid of any any logistic or maintenance support - that, and ammo reloads come from the battalion and brigade. (The 152 mm carried one unit of fire i.e 60 rds. The brigade in total carries 6 units of fire or 360 rds per gun) This is why the Ukraine was littered with broken down and abandoned Russian equipment.

In contrast, a Paladin battery has 90 all ranks, an M992 ammo limber per gun (each gun and limber together together carry 134-137 rds per set) and three M1074 pallet trucks and trailers with a total 32 ton capacity per set with more at battalion and many more in the brigades distribution company. The Americans too keep the bulk of their maintainers, medics, kitchen etc at battalion. My battery gun line was a bit fatter at around a hundred together with its echelon but without its BC and FOOs. Out of those 90-100 all ranks in a Cdn or US bty, roughly 40 are ammo handlers. Remember that on an M109 there are only two people who actually operate the gun and one who supervises their work; everyone else lugs ammo.

If you are looking for a problem to solve for the artillery then try to figure out how to create a more efficient system for bringing large amount of diverse ammunition constantly flowing to guns that have limited on-board magazines and that must move frequently.

Cherrio.

🍻
 
The Rangers looking for the Light Infantry mortar solution - Polaris Ranger 6x6 or similar, 81 or 120mm, fully automated laying and loading.


I am going to guess that all these artillery systems, going forward, are going to have the ability to launch their own UAVs for direct spotting.

I think the Dagor would be a better option. Still air drop capable, with more payload.
 
As FJAG mentions, ammunition handling is a huge issue. More attention to logistical details from the Production line to the gun position is needed. Is ammunition packaging optimal (keeping in mind that ammunition packaging might have excellent secondary uses after being emptied) The packaging size seems to settled onto the pallet which is generally a international standard. Does the military have enough material handling equipment to manage large scale shipments of ammunition quickly, safely and efficiently, where are the chokepoints? At the gunline in the PRes I would say the total lack of ammunition handling facilitates is a problem. We experianced this while supporting the German Black Bear shoots, which introduced us to the concept of each gun position having 3 pallets worth dumped on each gun. If we had to bug out quickly, it would have been at the cost of much of our ammunition. if you keep it on your vehicles and bring up ammunition trucks constantly, you risk exposing your dug in and concealed towed battery, so likley ammunition stores on the gun line need to last till dark. Track discipline needs to be enforced. Ammunition trucks need Hiabs to expedite ammunition handling. There should be a minimum of two ammunition trucks with crane and trailer for each battery. Every towed battery needs a means to dig in and out it guns. Since it's a wheeled battery you need something like this attached.

unimog_001-jpg.56542
 
If Canada could define a day of supply on ops, then Unit Load Containers could be used that contain projectiles, and charges in mixed natures on the same footprint as a pallet and these could be preloaded in the rear and shipped out. As it is two or more full pallet footprints are needed if you want 16 rounds and 16 charge bags.

If course we would need to procure ULCs in the first place. Yes Colin, all trucks need HIABs. The nice thing about a ULC is it can be built to be lifted from above with a crane or with forks, easing loading and unloading.

I have seen what happens with a troop without much ammo lift redeploys from one position to another. Thousands of 105 left behind in a FOB and and urgent dumping program needed in the new FOB. Then a significant log surge to refurbish and repack the abandoned ammo.
 
I have seen what happens with a troop without much ammo lift redeploys from one position to another. Thousands of 105 left behind in a FOB and and urgent dumping program needed in the new FOB. Then a significant log surge to refurbish and repack the abandoned ammo.

Based on what we see from Ukraine, thousands of rounds seem to make for a juicy target.
 
I bet Basic Load has been increased now based on recent experience.
Basic and Maintenance loads vary based on theatre and campaign. During all my years it was based on what was calculated for 4 CMBG and which was then incorporated into our training in Canada. It was in all our staff handbooks back then. The important thing is that it is derived from doctrine which also ends up defining the organization and equipment needed within the brigade to handle those loads. Since we left Germany, I'm not so sure we really have done much work in refining it.

When TF1-06 deployed, the battery commander went over in a recce some five months before deployment and talked to the battery commander on the ground from TF Gun Devils as to their expenditure rates and then submitted a requisition for ammo accordingly. When he arrived in theatre he found that not only wasn't the ammo there yet but the loggies had switched the amounts and forgot to include the fuzes (a 155mm projectile is generally fuzeless.) and not told him about it beforehand. The "basic" load there (if you could call it that) was not based on estimated expenditure rates but the capacity of the ammo dump at KAF at the time. (Don't get me started with the guns having the task to do counterbattery work against mortars and rockets at KAF and then not being allowed to have any ammo on hand near the guns but having to keep it at the ammo dump about a thirty minute round trip away.)

Much of determining a theatre's basic and maintenance loads is educated guesswork based on a variety of factors. But it's one of those things that works backwards i.e. you need to figure out how much you're going to be firing daily and then all the calculations as to rounds and trucks and storage capability is derived from that. Our peacetime log system (much less vehicle procurement system) doesn't think that way anymore.

If Canada could define a day of supply on ops, then Unit Load Containers could be used that contain projectiles, and charges in mixed natures on the same footprint as a pallet and these could be preloaded in the rear and shipped out. As it is two or more full pallet footprints are needed if you want 16 rounds and 16 charge bags.
We really need models for different types of peacetime and wartime missions. Establishments and sustainment operations need to be built around that as opposed to arbitrary manpower ceilings and ad hoc equipment allocations at mission standup. IMHO, the NSE is the biggest enemy of modern artillery logistics support. It's an "efficiency" that we can't afford.

If course we would need to procure ULCs in the first place. Yes Colin, all trucks need HIABs. The nice thing about a ULC is it can be built to be lifted from above with a crane or with forks, easing loading and unloading.

I have seen what happens with a troop without much ammo lift redeploys from one position to another. Thousands of 105 left behind in a FOB and and urgent dumping program needed in the new FOB. Then a significant log surge to refurbish and repack the abandoned ammo.
We issued demolition kits to gun troops so that they could BIP ammo they couldn't pack up and move in time. It was never necessary to use it but you are right - ammo dumping into preselected AMAs is a viable strategy but there also needs to be a contingency for guarding it and dealing with it when no longer needed.

I think what Ukraine does, is that it should make us think about worst case scenarios. We need a strategy for ammo handling from manufacturer to gun position, including war stocks, ramped up manufacturing, transport and establishments. And - with my usual $0.02 worth - since we only need that in extreme cases, much of it should be set up via a reserve system.

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