FJAG
Army.ca Legend
- Reaction score
- 13,791
- Points
- 1,160
Let me throw in my :2c: worth on all initiatives to "replace" tanks and "heavy infantry".
Fact 1. The potential enemy (whether Russia or China or Iran or the Fantasians) have tanks and will have for the foreseeable future;
Fact 2. There are very capable anti-armour systems in existence and even more under development (even though Canada seems to mostly ignore them)
Fact 3. Anti-armour weapons while good defensively, have only limited capabilities in the offence.
Accordingly any army that gives up it's tanks without viable replacements that can take the fight in the offence, is immediately relegating itself to a defensive war (including abandoning the ability to conduct the local counter attack)
Aviation has many uses. Gaining and holding ground isn't one of those.
Generally speaking, tanks have gotten very expensive but not so much because the basic steel in them is more expensive or that the automotives are substantially more complex; it's because the electronics, weapon systems and defensive components (Chobham, reactive armour, Trophy etc) are very expensive due to R&D costs and low volume sales.
Note that on an annual personnel cost side, tanks can be fairly cheap. The US armored company has only 62 all ranks led by a captain for fourteen tanks while the mech inf coy has 135 all ranks led by a captain for fourteen Bradleys. It's the Combined arms battalion's forward support company with 179 all ranks (again led by a captain) and 60 vehicles and the headquarters company at 239 all ranks and another 55 vehicles that bulk up the organization.
A Russian tank battalion (31 tanks) has 151 all ranks (at a crew of three per tank that leaves just 56 people to provide command, control and logistics). A motorized rifle battalion with 37 BMPs has 461 personnel (with 27 rifle sections of 8 each [or 216], that leaves 245 providing all command, control, support weapons and logistics)
I'm not throwing this out there to say we should organize like the Russians. What I'm suggesting is that perhaps we aren't pursuing the right mix of equipment and personnel. If the C&C and logistics component of an US Combined Arms battalion is almost as big as a whole motorized rifle battalion and bigger than a tank battalion then maybe we're doing something wrong. That recurring annual paycheck for a western style battalion is at least twice that of the Russian counterpart (probably more considering Russian pay scales). The question we need to really ask is: how much do their combat effectiveness differ? And if they do, is the difference an acceptable one? Can we accept potential losses in equipment and people resulting from using the last generation of tanks rather than moving on to the next (Let's face it even the Russians aren't turning out the Armada T-14 series on an industrial scale)
Long story short (too late?) we need armour and heavy infantry, but do we need the heavy HQ and logistics establishment within the companies and battalions that we presently have? or can we lighten that up considerably thus saving significant annual costs? That doesn't even address the issue that heavy forces, because of they are only needed in times of extreme emergencies, could be better provided by part-time salaried reservists.
I'm all for new innovations such as autonomous vehicles, precision guided munitions and cyber warfare BUT until those are proven and deployed or unless our putative opponents divest themselves of heavy armour, we need to stay with the tried and proven systems that we already have.
:cheers:
Fact 1. The potential enemy (whether Russia or China or Iran or the Fantasians) have tanks and will have for the foreseeable future;
Fact 2. There are very capable anti-armour systems in existence and even more under development (even though Canada seems to mostly ignore them)
Fact 3. Anti-armour weapons while good defensively, have only limited capabilities in the offence.
Accordingly any army that gives up it's tanks without viable replacements that can take the fight in the offence, is immediately relegating itself to a defensive war (including abandoning the ability to conduct the local counter attack)
Aviation has many uses. Gaining and holding ground isn't one of those.
Generally speaking, tanks have gotten very expensive but not so much because the basic steel in them is more expensive or that the automotives are substantially more complex; it's because the electronics, weapon systems and defensive components (Chobham, reactive armour, Trophy etc) are very expensive due to R&D costs and low volume sales.
Note that on an annual personnel cost side, tanks can be fairly cheap. The US armored company has only 62 all ranks led by a captain for fourteen tanks while the mech inf coy has 135 all ranks led by a captain for fourteen Bradleys. It's the Combined arms battalion's forward support company with 179 all ranks (again led by a captain) and 60 vehicles and the headquarters company at 239 all ranks and another 55 vehicles that bulk up the organization.
A Russian tank battalion (31 tanks) has 151 all ranks (at a crew of three per tank that leaves just 56 people to provide command, control and logistics). A motorized rifle battalion with 37 BMPs has 461 personnel (with 27 rifle sections of 8 each [or 216], that leaves 245 providing all command, control, support weapons and logistics)
I'm not throwing this out there to say we should organize like the Russians. What I'm suggesting is that perhaps we aren't pursuing the right mix of equipment and personnel. If the C&C and logistics component of an US Combined Arms battalion is almost as big as a whole motorized rifle battalion and bigger than a tank battalion then maybe we're doing something wrong. That recurring annual paycheck for a western style battalion is at least twice that of the Russian counterpart (probably more considering Russian pay scales). The question we need to really ask is: how much do their combat effectiveness differ? And if they do, is the difference an acceptable one? Can we accept potential losses in equipment and people resulting from using the last generation of tanks rather than moving on to the next (Let's face it even the Russians aren't turning out the Armada T-14 series on an industrial scale)
Long story short (too late?) we need armour and heavy infantry, but do we need the heavy HQ and logistics establishment within the companies and battalions that we presently have? or can we lighten that up considerably thus saving significant annual costs? That doesn't even address the issue that heavy forces, because of they are only needed in times of extreme emergencies, could be better provided by part-time salaried reservists.
I'm all for new innovations such as autonomous vehicles, precision guided munitions and cyber warfare BUT until those are proven and deployed or unless our putative opponents divest themselves of heavy armour, we need to stay with the tried and proven systems that we already have.
:cheers:
