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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Time  has passed, and here is my reply:

“it was as a man apart, as a prophet. Frail and aging, he poured into that single speech his whole molten hatred of war, of its utter senselessness and uselessness, of his personal determination to oppose it to the end”

It is also true that at that moment Woodsworth was utterly wrong, as his party and caucus regretfully concluded.

Social democrats in Parliament applauded him, thanked him, and then broke with him, voting correctly to join Britain's increasingly lonely fight against Nazism -- two years before the United States could bring itself to do so.

The author starts off on the wrong foot in my opinion.  He quotes Woodsworth, virtually saying that he is prophetic in his desire for peace.  The desire of peace is noble; however, it must not ever be “at all cost”.  The exact example used is the benchmark against which the futility of peace at any cost really is.  Woodsworth was utterly wrong then, and his statements are utterly wrong now, and always will be.  War may make no sense to some, but sometimes it is necessary.  The second world war ended tyranny in Europe and Africa, not to mention in eastern Asia.  In my mind, that was the sensefulness and usefulness of the war.

As an aside, on 10 September, 1939, Great Britain was not fighting “increasingly alone” against Nazism.  France, Poland and the UK were joined in the fight, soon to be joined by other nations.

2309 The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. The gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time:
The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
there must be serious prospects of success;
the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.
The power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.

This is the heart of the matter -- a brief, clear summary of what is and is not a "just war".

This is not what makes a just war, this is what makes going to war just (Jus ad Bellum).  The conduct of war (Jus in Bello) is a separate, though closely linked matter.


All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective

But the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a national government.

It provided al-Qaeda with its principal base of operations as well as moral and practical support that was condition-precedent for the September, 2001, atrocity. That regime could be destroyed through conventional warfare.

I submit that as direct party to an undeniable act of war, the Taliban government in Afghanistan provided the United States and its allies with just cause for a focused, limited and promptly-ended war. Given the history and state-of-play of Afghanistan at the time, it is hard to see how the Taliban regime could otherwise have been destroyed (for example through an embargo, or through sustained bombing) without unacceptable harm to the people of that country.

The author talks of the fight against Al Qaeda.  I will not comment on that, as this article is primarily about the war in Afghanistan.  It this part, the author is partially correct; however, he fails to note that the line between “conventional” and “non-conventional” war is rather blurry, and often useless.  I do agree that the war, as such be focused and limited, and that the war should be ended as soon as practicable. 
There must be serious prospects of success

Here we get to the nub of the matter as it stands today.

There were "serious prospects of success" for what was appropriate to do in the fall of 2001 -- which was to destroy the Taliban government in Afghanistan, to install an alternative government with some reasonable level of support, and then to promptly get out -- in, say, 12 months (toward the end of 2002).

This would not have supplied schooling and health care to the children of Afghanistan -- also lacking in many neighbourhoods in the United States, Canada and numerous other countries.
Here the author loses me totally.  Destroying the government, the national infrastructure, and then leaving Afghanistan to its own means would have produced a much worse state of affairs than was the case on 10 September 2001.  Such a state of affairs is exactly what allowed Al Qaeda to set up shop in Afghanistan.  The example of “lack of schooling and health care” in Canada and other nations is a specious argument that makes no sense in the level of comparison.  All Canadians and Americans can get “some” level of healthcare and schooling if they so desire.  In Afghanistan, this simply is not the case, and certainly would not have been the case had the west left on 11 September 2002.  China Shop rules are in effect: if you break it, you bought it. 
The author must note that once we finished destroying the society known as Germany in 1945, we stayed and ensured that they built back up again; however, it was on our terms, more or less.  That is the exact model to be employed in any war: build the nation back up.

The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated

Forces in Afghanistan who oppose the use of that country as a base for terrorist attacks in other countries should be plentifully and indefinitely supplied and supported.

And the United States and its allies should make clear -- and mean it (i.e. through new agreements and an appropriate permanent base structure) -- that a future Afghan government that provides sanctuary to al-Qaeda will again be destroyed.

Is the author suggesting that we keep going back, playing “whack-a-mole” with nations?  In order to ensure that we no produce evils and disorders, it is necessary for us to rebuild that nation, and destroy those who would hamper such redevelopment.  This key tenet of the catechism states exactly why we should remain in Afghanistan using the model that is currently employed in Kandahar, and has been for some time.  Our Provincial Reconstruction Team, a blend of military and civilians, is our main effort, or at least it should be.  We have destroyed the Taliban government though the use of arms.  Now is, and has been, the time to build that nation back up. 

2313 Non-combatants, wounded soldiers, and prisoners must be respected and treated humanely. Actions deliberately contrary to the law of nations and to its universal principles are crimes, as are the orders that command such actions. Blind obedience does not suffice to excuse those who carry them out. ...

In other words, war criminals must be brought to justice.
No argument here.  I’m not sure of its relevance, however.

In conclusion, the author unwittingly outlines exactly why we should stay in Afghanistan.  Though disgusting and full of evils, war is sometimes a necessity.  And one thing worse than war is waging a war, and then leaving in place the exact reason why the war was necessary in the first place.  In the case of Afghanistan, the reasons include poverty and illiteracy.  We are making steps in the right direction, and there are those who oppose such progress, because it undermines their own power.  And because there are those who oppose progress for all, they must be destroyed.
 
At the risk of getting into a philosophical debate with Midnight Rambler, which I am bound to lose, in my view there is a problem with rationalizing strategic decisions like going to or ending a war. The “just war” theories (just cause for going to war, just conduct in war, and just conduct after war) are just that: rationalization of realist conduct that is, almost always, at odds with the popular belief system.

Augustine lived in a particularly difficult era: civilization, as it was known, was contracting, being driven into the cities as powerful, innovative ”barbarians” advanced (migrated) from the North and East. The people Augustine served, the Western Romans, were being overrun by a variety of peoples (whose names still resonate in our language: Vandals, Goths and Huns, for example) and the necessities of military and political survival were very much different from the doctrine of the fast growing, increasingly powerful Christian religion. It rather reminds me of an old staff college joke which goes:  “That’s great in practice; but can you make it work in theory?” Augustine squared the circle for his masters; he reconciled the heavenly hopes of the believing Christians with the hellish realities of 5th century Europe.

--------------------​

War is failure.

All wars represent a failure to accomplish one’s ends by less difficult and expensive and destructive means.

Osama bin laden and al Qaeda failed, over and over again, throughout the ‘90s to persuade the West to withdraw from Arabia and to stop supporting Israel and, and, and, ad infinitum. So he/they went to war. He/they attacked America, in particular, at every weak point they could find – in Arabia, in the Africa, in the Middle East and in America. His attacks produced precisely the wrong responses: the Americans did not give in to his demands; they counter attacked; he lost his base in Afghanistan (and must now rebuild in Somalia); he lost his popular support amongst the knee-jerk anti-Americans in East and West; he frightened China and India; and on and on goes the list. He failed because he could not find a useful, sensible, successful way to accomplish his crusade.

Hitler failed in 1939. He actually had the West on the run; he might have parlayed Western fear of another destructive war and Western anti-communism to a “free hand” to get his lebensraum and accomplish his dastardly political goals. But he went to war instead and the results were not what he wished.

-------------------​

With specific regard to Woodsworth: we can, even should admire him for the strength of his beliefs and, even more, for the grace and dignity with which he advanced them. But, in 1939, his pacifism was morally unacceptable. A Western, civilized response to the attack by Hitler’s barbarians was not only justified, it was mandatory. We, the civilized West, knew, before 1939, that the Germans had gone off the moral rails and were hell bent on a morally unacceptable course of conquest and destruction. We know this because, in 2000, the Globe and Mail published a year long series of historic front pages. In November 2000 they published a front page from a November 1938edition of the Toronto Globe and Mail, as it was then. There, “above the fold,” with a large photo, was a boldly headlined “lead” story on Kristallnacht that, clearly, told us where the Germans were headed. Yes, the full depth and breadth of German barbarism wasn’t evident to the whole world until 1945 but the “broad strokes” were on the canvas long before September 1939. Woodsworth’s plea for peace was moving but wrong.

Finally, comparing  McNamara’s ( and Kennedy’s) series of failures in/about Vietnam with Obama/Gates/McChrystal is asinine. The Americans are in a morally legitimate responsive mode – this war is just because it is a strategically defensive “response” to an unjustified attack. It may not be being prosecuted correctly, we may not “win” it in any conventional sense, but political lessons from the ‘60s do not apply.
 
Here, reproduced under the fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s National Post web site, is a report on another call for a revised “plan” for Afghanistan:

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2044587
NATO chief calls for new Afghan strategy
New Afghanistan strategy needed, says Rasmussen

Viola Gienger, Bloomberg

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said nations fighting the war in Afghanistan must change their tactics and tout successes or risk losing public support there and at home.

"Reaching our goal in Afghanistan is not guaranteed," Mr. Rasmussen told an audience at the Atlantic Council policy group in Washington yesterday.

More troops will be needed at least to train the Afghan National Security Forces, Mr. Rasmussen said, while cautioning that a revised strategy must be agreed upon before decisions are made about the additional resources.

"We cannot continue to do exactly what we're doing now," Mr. Rasmussen said. "Things are going to have to change."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization leads the 41-nation military campaign in Afghanistan, where the Tal iban-led government shielded al-Qaeda before being ousted by the U. S. after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The U. S. has 65,000 troops in the country, Canada has 2,200, with the remainder of the 100,000-strong foreign force contributed by NATO members and other allies.


Does anyone in NATO/ISAF capitals or HQs really want to carry on doing "exactly what we're doing now"? If not then why are we still doing "it," whatever "it" is?
 
I am no expert in this area of counter insurgency, I fully admit that.
However, while the brunt of the casualties seem to be US, Brit and Canadian, including my son, I'd like to tell our NATO "allies" that maybe if they got on the wagon with us, maybe the ride would be more successful.

Or am I preaching to the choir?
 
To be honest, I'm getting a little sick of the "we need to change our strategy or risk losing the war" broken record that has been going on for a year or two now....
 
Infanteer said:
To be honest, I'm getting a little sick of the "we need to change our strategy or risk losing the war" broken record that has been going on for a year or two now....
AMEN!!!!!!!  (to keep the theme of Augustine and the Papists going!) ;D


For any strategy to work, it must be given time.  I just wonder if the Secretary General really knows what "we" are doing "over there"?

For any future officers out there, THIS is exactly why we do estimates.  We problem solve, which in many cases involves finding out exactly what the problem is.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
At the risk of getting into a philosophical debate with Midnight Rambler, which I am bound to lose, in my view there is a problem with rationalizing strategic decisions like going to or ending a war. The “just war” theories (just cause for going to war, just conduct in war, and just conduct after war) are just that: rationalization of realist conduct that is, almost always, at odds with the popular belief system.
No argument here, and if nothing else, I believe that part of the problem with Woodsworth is that in theory, he may have been correct; however, what he said had no application in the real world.  So, perhaps I agree with the author that parliamentarians should read his September 1939 speech, as an example of what can happen when you fail to consider the real world when attempting to practice philosophy.

As for Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, I see those more as legal concepts vice philosophical.  And you raise very VERY interesting points that I had never before considered: OBL and AH both failed, and therefore had to resort to war to get their ends desired. 
 
Two excellent posts by BruceR at Flit (first has great graphics, note "security sponges" in second):

Afghanistats, 2009 version
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_09_29.html#006545

Associated strategery musings
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_09_29.html#006546

Mark
Ottawa
 
This from CBC.ca (highlights mine):
The government .... is considering many options for continuing to help the Afghan population — including security, which would undoubtedly involve an unspecified number of soldiers, said Defence Minister Peter MacKay.

"It involves securing, but working to develop the countryside, working to invest in infrastructure," said MacKay.

"Working to help build capacity, immunizing children, educating children, building democratic institutions — all of which Canada is involved in now."

Much of that development, medical aid and reconstruction work falls to Canada's provincial reconstruction team, or PRT, based in Kandahar.

When specifically asked Tuesday whether Canada's PRT would remain in the volatile region, MacKay would not rule it out.

"We're considering a number of options,"
MacKay said after being questioned by reporters about the PRT.

Question for anyone who knows the organization better than I do:  could Canada keep the PRT going without any Canadian troops?  I ask because if the March 2008 motion of the House is to be followed, there should be no Canadian troops left in Kandahar by the end of 2011.

Also, this from Jack Granatstien, via the Globe & Mail, about considering another Manley-esque commission to consider Canada's future in AFG:
.... Now the clock is ticking toward the inevitable Canadian withdrawal. Can we not replicate the Manley commission to help us prepare the plan for the post-2011 years? This could not happen if the country had been plunged into a general election this fall, but, with some luck, we may avoid this until after the Vancouver Olympics.

A commission set up now could hear witnesses, including Canadian diplomats and aid officials, senior officers from the Canadian Forces, academics, representatives of non-governmental organizations and others. It could talk to foreign diplomats and politicians and visit Afghanistan and Pakistan ....

- edited to add Granatstein idea -
 
All our efforts may end up being for nothing if the Obama administration walks away from Afghanistan, and there are indications here they intend to do exactly that. Not surprising really, when they tossed their European allies to the Russians without a second thought:

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/09/obama-afghanistan-copenhagen.html

What Obama won't say about the Afghan war today, at least publicly
September 30, 2009 |  2:04 am

This is a messy time for the nation's politics. And this seemingly serene autumn day is quietly crucial.

Despite all the excitement and promise of a fresh Barack Obama administration cleaning house from eight years of Republican rule and with a Congress in the lopsided control of his own Democratic party, the nation's capitol is mired in partisan pushing over healthcare, among numerous fractious issues. And likely about to enter a bitter war over war.

Despite the largest single spending bill in history, a whopping $787 billion, despite VP Joe Biden's best talking and a $9.5 million refurbished recovery.org website, the nation still sees the economy in a recession with high unemployment and perhaps worse to come, rampant fears and uncertainty and awful consumer confidence.

Biden has been reduced to arguing not that anything is getting better, but that things are not going bad now as quickly as they were last winter, a challenging pitch to make convincingly entering a congressional midterm election year, when White House parties historically lose seats on the Hill anyway.

A new ABC News study finds that with three-quarters of 2009 complete, the country is on....


...track to have the worst year's consumer confidence in nearly a quarter-century. Neither party is popular in polls. But will voters still buy the eight years of failed Bush policies argument in 2010 or take that festering lack of confidence out on the Democrats who, after all, have controlled Congress since the 2006 elections?

As one minor but revealing measure of the country's desire for escapism, the most popular current movie these days is about meatballs falling from the sky. Hiding in the weeds too is a possible flu pandemic.

Tomorrow night the president will fly off to Copenhagen in his 747 with the one-man shower, the double-bed and the motorized window blinds to help the Chicago Chamber of Commerce stave off the Rio de Janeiro challenge and sell the International Olympic Committee on the Windy (Humid) City for the 2016 summer games. Having First Lady Michelle Obama head the U.S. delegation wasn't good enough for Mayor Richard M. Daley, to whom all municipal Democrats owe obeisance out there.

But today out of the public eye in a very secure White House room the president will meet with top advisers to debate what to do about the good war, the one that Obama spent the last two-plus years arguing was the real one against terrorism, not the concocted conflict in Iraq.

Obama calls the Afghan conflict "a war of necessity" and has already approved one troop surge there. Now the new allied commander appointed by the Obama administration says he needs more boots on the ground or failure is virtually certain.

As more U.S. troops undertook more aggressive action this summer, August turned into the worst month for American casualties in the eight-year war, with one American dying every 14 hours. That's likely to worsen.

Obama spent the entire summer almost exclusively selling healthcare reform. And as memories of 9/11 and the attackers' training sites in Taliban Afghanistan fade, polls show American support for the war there melting, especially within Obama's own party.

Only about a quarter support sending more troops -- and many of that party of Yes are Republicans. They agree with Obama that it's esssential to deny Afghanistan to terrorists and keep Pakistan's nukes out of their hands.

So what's to do?

White House officials say privately no final decisions will be made today. But the thinking will be greatly shaped and the stakes are huge, making healthcare look like a sideshow.

Signs are growing that Obama will seek to change the war goals, to redefine what is success and divert the discussion away from the more-troops measure. It's not defeat in Afghanistan; it's victory of a different kind. The president used a similar strategic argument recently when abandoning the Bush administration's missile defense shield in Europe: it's not less defense, it's defense done smarter and cheaper.

Biden reportedly opposes additional forces. He was a senator when Obama was a sixth grader, and recalls too vividly the last Democratic administration to pour U.S. soldiers into a distant guerrilla war -- and lose. That savagely split his party -- and nation -- and lead to 20 years of Republican presidents in the next 24.

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed earlier this week, Sen. John Kerry, who succeeded Biden as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, began the Afghan redefinition.

Kerry, who was in the Vietnam war before he was against it, said that 1) things have changed in Afghanistan since last spring, 2) perhaps what we need is not more troops but a "well-honed counter-terrorism strategy," 3) the recent Afghan election was deeply flawed and maybe it's the fault of a weak, untrusted Afghan government if we can't win militarily and 4) we need to plan how to get out.

Other than argue that American security is tied to defeating the terrorists in Afghanistan, Obama has not shown his hand on this decision. Here's what he said Tuesday after a meeting with NATO's secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen:

It is absolutely critical that we are successful in dismantling, disrupting, destroying the Al Qaeda network, and that we are effectively working with the Afghan government to provide the security necessary for that country. 

Here's the entire Obama transcript. But notice anything missing here? No more mention of the original 9/11 bad guys, the Taliban. No mention either of defeating them. And no more mention of making it safe for democracy to flourish in Afghanistan.

Through such overlooked omissions are the political goals and measures of American victory in Afghanistan being subtly shifted without any notice or announcement by the Obama administration.

-- Andrew Malcolm
 
Terry Glavin
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/

gives a crucial Afghan viewpoint in the National Post:

What we must promise Afghanistan
http://www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/story.html?id=2048394

It is heartening to see that the consensus of silence that has united Canada's political leaders on the Afghanistan question is at long last receiving some public notice. The sound of crickets is pretty well all we've been hearing ever since the January 2008 release of John Manley's sobering, no-nonsense report about Canada's purposes in that faraway country.

The report should have provided the basis for a proper public debate about what Canada's role might be at the 2011 end-date of the 52-nation Afghanistan Compact. Instead, the Conservatives, Liberals and New Democrats have used the opportunity as an excuse to keep schtum about the whole thing...

The problem isn't the resolve of the Afghan people. For Afghans, the big fear isn't the spectre of Taliban militias rolling across the landscape and recapturing Kabul. It's the stink of a looming betrayal that emanates from the language of defeatism abroad in rich countries like Canada. It paralyzes the bravest Afghans --if it's all coming to an end, there's no point in sticking one's neck out. It also fuels the "corruption" that plagues the country -- if this isn't going to last, then you might as well get it while the getting's good.

The language we speak is at least as important to the Afghan cause as bread or roses, or guns or butter. More than all else, what the Afghan people need to hear from us is plain words spoken in clear language:We will not betray you. We will not abandon you. We will not surrender. We will not retreat.

Until Canada's politicians can find it in themselves to speak that kind of language, perhaps they should do us all a favour and just keep their mouths shut. - Terry Glavin is an author, journalist and adjunct professor at the University of British Columbia.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Thucydides said:
All our efforts may end up being for nothing if the Obama administration walks away from Afghanistan, and there are indications here they intend to do exactly that. Not surprising really, when they tossed their European allies to the Russians without a second thought:

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/09/obama-afghanistan-copenhagen.html


American political "great" Tip O'Neil said (or, rather, his father said), "all politics is local."

o000098.jpg

Oil on canvas, Robert Vickery, 1986, Collection of U.S. House of Representatives


The "local" politics in the USA is health care and the economy. These pocket book issues will always take precedence over far away strategic matters.

And make no mistake: strategy and politics are inextricably linked and have been for, at least, 2,500 years, according to Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles had to fight simultaneous (domestic) political and military battles.
 
Interesting Michael Yon interview on the situation in Afghanistan and his view that the coalition is on the verge of collapse.I think that he overstates the condition of ISAF but I have to say its the most ineffective wartime coalition that I can remember. Every member of the coalition should have the same ROE and be at the complete direction of the theater commander.

http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/2254637
 
Further to milnews.ca's comment,
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/49908/post-879250.html#msg879250

here's one constraint on our government's being very clear about the future of Canada's military mission:

Afstan mission planning--"Gotcha!"?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/afstan-mission-planning-gotcha.html

And, of course, if President Obama effectively downgrades the American commitment it will, to my mind, be politically impossible for any Canadian military mission to continue after 2011.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of a Torch post, note the end:

ANSF realities
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/ansf-realities.html

Two more from BruceR at Flit; the first should be a must-read for those concerned about the issue...
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Military+investigation+abuse+doesn+ring+true/2013285/story.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
.... from the House of Commons (Hansard, QP, 30 Sept 09) - highlights mine:
Hon. Bob Rae (Toronto Centre, Lib.):  Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Foreign Affairs about Afghanistan.  The motion that we passed in the House was very unambiguous and very clear with respect to Canadian troops being redeployed out of Kandahar by December 2011. Certain comments have been made by other ministers and by other candidates for the Conservative Party with respect to the intentions of the Conservative Party post-2011. 

    My question for the Minister of Foreign Affairs is about Canada's presence in Afghanistan. Is he sticking to the motion that was passed by the House in March 2008?

Hon. Lawrence Cannon (Minister of Foreign Affairs, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, I will say this clearly and succinctly so that the member will understand. Yes, we are sticking to that motion. Yes, the Minister of National Defence answered that question previously with the same response that we always give. We are putting an end to our military combat mission by 2011, and that is clear.

Hon. Bob Rae (Toronto Centre, Lib.):  Mr. Speaker, the problem is that yesterday outside the House the minister said something else. The other problem is—

    An hon. member: No, he didn't.

    Hon. Bob Rae: The record will stand. The record will stand.

    Mr. Speaker, what I would like to ask the minister is very clearly it states that Canadian forces will be redeployed out of Kandahar by December 2011. It is unambiguous and clear.

    I would like to ask the minister, how is that compatible with the statements by the minister, as well as the statements of the candidate who is running in Ajax? The two statements are incompatible.

Hon. Lawrence Cannon (Minister of Foreign Affairs, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, the answer to his question is yes. I would strongly recommend that the hon. colleague read the transcript so that it will be clear. He might not understand what is written, but we all understand that is what it means.

*  *  *
 
Further to milnews.ca's comment, conclusion of a Torch post:

Afstan: What the Commons' resolution says and what the government says
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/afstan-what-commons-resolutions-says.html

...
It's simple. "Combat" or not, and what constitutes combat, are irrelevant at this point. The resolution is clear. The CF will be out of Kandahar by the end of 2011. If there is to be some continuing military mission in Afstan it will have to be somewhere else. Which, to my mind, is practically impossible for a mission of any size, especially one involving the PRT or trainers in the field with the ANSF (it would be madness to move given the local expertise and experience we have), or the Air Force (too much invested at KAF to make a move sensible in any way).
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/02/keep-that-air-wing-at-kandahar-plus.html

The government is dancing madly to avoid the clear meaning of the resolution. Any ongoing CF mission at Kandahar will require a new Commons' vote. The last thing the government wants before an election. So the dancing will continue, regardless of the facts.

Predate:

Skill Testing Question on Canada's Afghan Mission
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/skill-testing-question-on-canadas.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
....from Hansard (1 Oct 09):
Hon. Jack Layton (Toronto—Danforth, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, the House of Commons voted last year to have all troops out of Kandahar by 2011, but now we hear hints from the Minister of National Defence that the troops may stay in Afghanistan longer.  It is now the established practice in the House that there be a vote in the House of Commons on the deployment of Canadian troops. Does the Prime Minister believe that he can keep troops in Afghanistan beyond 2011 without a vote in the House authorizing such a deployment?

Right Hon. Stephen Harper (Prime Minister, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, let us be clear that it was this government that brought in the practice that military deployments have to be approved by the House of Commons.  The position of the government is clear. The military mission in Afghanistan will end in 2011. I have said it here and I have said it across the country. In fact, I think I said it recently in the White House.
 
Two at The Torch:

Afstan: Dutch really seem like going in 2010/Effect on our government//Brit Update
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/afstan-dutch-really-seem-like-going-in.html

Afstan: The McChrystal watch (video at 2)) and the president/Update: "War, D.C.-style"
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/afstan-mcchrystal-watch-video-at-2-and.html

And from Terry Glavin:

The Taliban doesn't want to talk to you, it wants to kill you
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/10/01/terry-glavin-the-taliban-doesn-t-wants-talks-it-wants-death.aspx

Mark
Ottawa
 
And more good thinking from BruceR at Flit:

Deciding or dithering
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_10_02.html#006551

Mark
Ottawa
 
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