Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[TCBF]

- I can't get too excited about people claiming their KIA sons and daughters did not believe in the mission.  The dead served honourably and did their duty - that is what counts.  We all know of people serving in Afghanistan now who don't like the mission, but they do their jobs and do them well.

- Now, as for the people serving who try to skate out of a deployment because they don't believe in it - release is the best solution, and off the merit list and back on it below all of the people who went is the next best solution.  We want to promote deployers, not avoiders.  The avoiders can sweep the floors.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail, is a report on Gen. McChrystal’s demand (not too strong a word, I think) for both more troops and a change in tactics:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-commander-warns-of-failure-in-afghanistan/article1295096/

U.S. commander warns of 'failure' in Afghanistan

Army General Stanley McChrystal calls for a ‘dramatically' and even ‘uncomfortably' different approach to fighting the war

Washington and Kabul — Reuters
Monday, Sep. 21, 2009

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan says in a confidential assessment of the war that without additional forces the mission “will likely result in failure.”

A request for more troops faces resistance from within U.S. President Barack Obama's Democratic Party, which controls Congress, and opinion polls show Americans are turning against the nearly eight-year-old war.

Army General Stanley McChrystal wrote: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) – while Afghan security capacity matures – risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

The assessment is contained in a copy of the 66-page document obtained by the Washington Post. Gen. McChrystal's spokesman in Kabul confirmed that the document is genuine.

Gen. McChrystal is expected to ask for a troop increase in the coming weeks to stem gains by a resurgent Taliban.

The Post said the McChrystal assessment makes clear that his call for more forces would be part of a new strategy that emphasizes protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents.

“Inadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced,” Gen. McChrystal is quoted as saying.

Gen. McChrystal has finished preparing his request, which some officials expected would include roughly 30,000 new combat troops and trainers, but he has yet to submit it to Washington for consideration.

Defence Secretary Robert Gates has said the Pentagon was working with Gen. McChrystal on how that request should be made.

In the assessment, Gen. McChrystal paints a grim picture of how the war is progressing and writes “the overall situation is deteriorating.”

He calls for a “dramatically” and even “uncomfortably” different approach to fighting a war which requires a cultural change in the way the military fights.

“The objective is the will of the people, our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem, the Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency.”

The war in Afghanistan is now at its deadliest in eight years. Gen. McChrystal's assessment says fighters have control over entire sections of the country, although it is difficult to say how much because of the limited presence of NATO troops.

He also strongly criticizes the Afghan government as having lost the faith of the country's people.

“The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government,” Gen. McChrystal says, referring to the International Security Assistance Force.

The number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan has almost doubled this year from 32,000 to 62,000 and is expected to grow by another 6,000 by the year's end. There are also some 40,000 troops from other nations, mainly NATO allies.

Fifty-eight per cent of Americans now oppose the Afghan war while 39 per cent support it, according to a recent CNN/Opinion Research poll.

Mr. Obama said in interviews aired on Sunday he wants to wait to determine the proper strategy for U.S. forces in Afghanistan before considering whether more troops should be sent there.

“I just want to make sure that everybody understands that you don't make decisions about resources before you have the strategy ready,” he told ABC.

Congressional critics, including his 2008 Republican presidential opponent Senator John McCain, have urged the administration to approve the deployment of more troops immediately, saying any delay puts the lives of troops already in Afghanistan at greater risk.

Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell told CNN on Sunday his party would be supportive of a U.S. troop increase for Afghanistan if it was needed as part of a new strategy but he said he was troubled by the delay in the decision-making.

“We think the time for decision is now,” Mr. McConnell said.

A few points, as I read this:

• More troops, alone, will not help. McChrystal is asking for troops will not hide behind the wire. He does not need more Euro-tourists in the North. He needs combat troops, trained in and willing/able to use (risky) COIN techniques, in the South;

• There are only a handful of countries likely/politically able to send those kinds of troops. That little list includes Australia, Britain, Canada and, of course, America;

• Most countries, including Australia, Britain, Canada and America are growing more and more tired of this war. Their populations do not understand the nature of COIN and they are not inclined to learn. Who can blame them, in the middle of a financial meltdown? Europe has never liked this operation and it is, across the board, casualty averse; and

• This appears to mirror what several Canadians generals and diplomats have been saying – just as Canada hardens its own “cut and run” position for 2011.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

"America's top commander in Afghanistan warns that more troops are needed there within the next year or the nearly 8-year-old war "will likely result in failure," according to a copy of a 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.


Gen. Stanley McChrystal, right, arrives at a U.S. base in Logar Province, Afghanistan, last month.

"Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible," U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal said in the document, according to the Post.

Bob Woodward of the Post -- who wrote the article -- called it "a striking thing for a general to say to the secretary of defense and the commander-in-chief."

McChrystal "really takes his finger and puts it in their eye, 'Deliver or this won't work,'" Woodward told CNN's "American Morning" on Monday. "He says if they don't endorse this full counterinsurgency strategy, don't even give me the troops because it won't work."

More on link http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/21/afghanistan.mcchrystal/index.html

With the call for more troops, particularly from NATO, it'll be interesting to see if the 2011 pull out date turns out to be like the 2009 one....

 

[Edward Campbell]

Also discussed here.

Unlike Woodward, I don't think it is especially "striking" thing for a general to his political masters. It is frank, to be sure, but maybe it is time to speak truth to power.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Kudos to the Washington Post for sharing the document itself (66pg 1.6MB PDF):
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews

 

[MarkOttawa]

Conclusion of a Torch post:

Afstan: McChrystal report hits the fan/Obama changing position?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/afstan-mcchryal-report-hits-fanobama.html

...
So now it's effectively [for President Obabam} just about al Qaeda, and basically forget about Afstan itself, its people, and what the Taliban resurgent might do there. Forget about any moral obligation to the country that might result from having been instrumental in forcing out the Taliban regime in 2001. And forget about "common security"; note that there is no mention of NATO or Allies in the answers to David Gregory.

What a scaling down of goals and reasons. And what an excuse to limit any force increases.

And from Paul at Celestial Junk:

Decision Time Afghanistan
http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2009/09/decision-time-afghanistan.html

When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse. ~ OBL

Now is the time that Obama shows whether or not he can earn the title, Commander-in-Chief. The leak of McChrystal's report is high stakes politics in which Afghanistan is now made Obama's baby ... if he doesn't comply with military requests, a loss in Afghanistan will be on his shoulders. Whether or not this the reality is irrelevant, it will be the perception...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Excerpts from a Torch post:

Afstan: Sen. Kenny defends his defeatism
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/sen-kenny-defends-his-defeatism.html

I think the Senator's criticism of our politicians is bang-on.
http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/697977
I also think he has over-reacted out of personal frustration and gone overboard...

Regarding failing. With the arrival of large US Army forces
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/kandahar-province-endless-us-army-orbat.html
the position in Kandahar province's most populated areas should stabilize significantly. And if President Obama agrees considerably more should be deployed.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/us-focus-on-kandaharorbat-fun.html
Indeed I have it from someone well-informed that the US military are seriously considering three more battalions for Kandahar/Zabul to operate in peripheral/Pak border areas that remain under-resourced. Moreover the US has already doubled the size of ISAF forces at Helmand with US Marines (list of units here),
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/06/us-marine-expeditionary-brigade.html
http://www.marineparents.com/deployment/units-deployed.asp
and the US military is also considering more battalions for areas other than Kandahar.

The Senator also fails seriously to consider the Afghans (which now seems to be President Obama's position, see last link); even now many Afghans feel betrayed by our intention to withdraw in 2011.

It's important to note that Gen. McChrystal says the US/NATO only risk failure if greater efforts are not made. Sen. Kenny seems to me rather to have given up the ghost while the way ahead is still very misty, essentially depending on President Obama's decisions...
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/afstan-mcchryal-report-hits-fanobama.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

The start and conclusion of a very helpful riposte by BruceR at Flit; if only our major media had pieces like this--please read the whole thing for the great detail and excellent analysis:

On that Wente column
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_09_21.html#006537

The Torch is an amazing resource, and a great Canadian milblog. But it can get a little defensive about the military at times (as indeed, can I). Case in point today, reacting to a Margaret Wente Globe and Mail column that was critical of the military last week:

"Ms Wente might wish to read this..."

Unfortunately, a careful read of the article linked, however, actually reinforces Wente's argument, that Canadian troops are not outside of the wire enough, engaging with the Afghans.

Wente's article was eminently attackable on one point, that the Canadians were mostly inside the wire back at Kandahar Air Field (KAF). That's not true, as many commentators have since pointed out. The majority of combat troops are forward of KAF, in suitably named Forward Operating Bases. KAF is a soul-destroying place: the food alone makes you weep for humanity. No one who has an excuse to get outside the wire doesn't jump at the chance. I was luckier in some respects in that regard. But Wente's larger, hidden point, that we're not having the effects we should have for all our outlay, is still valid despite her error in that regard. Goes the article:

"There's a thin line of defence between this area of the sparesly (sic) populated Panjwaii district and the wild, wild west where the Taliban are pretty much free to roam at will..."

All that to say, look, yes, Wente's piece was somewhat over the top, but we shouldn't knee-jerk too far in the other direction. Above all, we shouldn't pretend that there's some secret asterisk implied, one that says, "psst, not you, Canadians" in Gen. McChrystal's report this week:

"McChrystal is equally critical of the command he has led since June 15. The key weakness of ISAF, he says, is that it is not aggressively defending the Afghan population. "Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves."

We're far from the worst offender in ISAF in this regard. But to a degree the Commander is talking about Canadians, too. The senior general in theatre is actually agreeing with Wente when he says he wants to see us, and the rest of our allies, taking even more risks with our soldiers than we are now. As a country, we need to hoist that in.

Let the dialectic continue.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

The Torch:

What Afstan is all about
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/

And the basis from Terry Glavin:

Guns, butter, words, deeds and Afghanistan: Talk sense or shut up, go deep or go home.
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/09/words-and-deeds-in-afstan-talk-sense-or.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail, are some details of Canadian reactions to Gen McChrystal’s report:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/us-debate-doesnt-change-canadas-afghan-plans/article1296427/

U.S. debate doesn't change Canada's Afghan plans
In spite of a call for a troop surge, Ottawa intends to focus its effort in the war zone on a ‘humanitarian, development mission'

Campbell Clark

Ottawa
Tuesday, Sep. 22, 2009 06:00AM EDT

The call for a troop surge from the U.S. commander in Afghanistan probably won't radically alter the Canadian mission there now. But whether the surge strategy is accepted by U.S. President Barack Obama, and works, is key to any Canadian commitment to Afghanistan after 2011.

Government figures in Ottawa insist that Canadian combat troops will withdraw as of July, 2011. But Canada's contribution in 2012 could still include a sizable military mission in Kandahar if General Stanley McChrystal has the strategy right.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government has not yet decided what the scope of Canada's post-2011 mission will be, and officials said they expect his decision will depend on whether there is progress a year from now.

New Conservative Senator Pamela Wallin, a member of the Manley Task Force that helped chart the future of Canada's Afghan mission early last year, put it more bluntly: “To try and predict where we're going to be in the summer of 2011 is foolhardy,” she said. “We have no idea.”

Monday, the Canadian government blandly welcomed Gen. McChrystal's leaked report while insisting Canada won't get involved in a U.S. political debate on a surge.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay has read the report and spoke to U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates Monday morning, according to spokesman Dan Dugas.

“We welcome any additional troops in Afghanistan, and have been pushing NATO partners for years for additional troops,” Mr. Dugas said. “We welcome the additional American troops that have already been committed to Afghanistan – particularly in the south.”

Privately, some Canadian officials said that Gen. McChrystal's strategy reflects much of what Ottawa has long wanted, ideas on which Mr. Manley's task force focused. He calls for a commitment of more troops, but not unless other strategic conditions are met, and focuses on a massive build-up of the Afghan army and police.

He also calls for a strategy that protects Afghan civilians, rather than seeking out insurgents on the battlefield and then pulling back to base. Canadian troops, since a boost in U.S. troop levels earlier this year, have shifted from remote battlegrounds to primarily patrolling Kandahar City. Training Afghan troops is increasingly the priority.

After meeting with Mr. Obama last week, Mr. Harper said that Canada's mission “will be transitioning from a predominantly military mission to a mission that will be a civilian humanitarian, development mission after 2011.”

But officials point out that in Afghanistan, doing development work, such the Canadian signature project of rebuilding the Dahla Dam, requires troops for security, sometimes in large numbers.

The commitment to training Afghan National Army troops might continue after 2011, but that currently means deploying Canadian troops to serve alongside for some time after initial training ends.

Roland Paris, the University of Ottawa research chair in international security, said Canadian political leaders of any stripe will have two chief political goals: first, not disrupting the consensus that the combat mission ends in 2011, but second, ensuring allies don't view Canada as the first to withdraw.

“I think it's very unlikely that we'll have the 1,000-member battle group, which is kind of the core of our military contribution,” he said. “But the question is, if the battle group goes away, does everybody go away in the Canadian Forces?”

First: kudos to Sen. Wallin for telling the truth: “To try and predict where we're going to be in the summer of 2011 is foolhardy,” she said. “We have no idea.”

Second: Prof Paris’ question, “I think it's very unlikely that we'll have the 1,000-member battle group, which is kind of the core of our military contribution,” he said. “But the question is, if the battle group goes away, does everybody go away in the Canadian Forces?” is pertinent.

My “answer” to Prof. Paris is:

1. Withdraw the battle group, per se, from Kandahar province; and

2. Add more than one, maybe enlarged, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs or omlettes) – perhaps in Kandahar, which allows us to use our existing (but hopefully reduced) logistics base, or, perhaps in another province, which probably would involve moving a (reduced) Canadian logistics support base (Tim Horton’s and all!) and the PRT, too. The omlettes are a key component of what Gen McChrystal is talking about, as I read it; we can raise our profile even as we draw down our numbers. 

Unfortunately the “bill” for the OMLTs is paid in the “currency” of experienced officers and NCOs – who are in short supply, especially since Prime Minister Harper’s government/DND has not (yet) recruited the tens of thousands of new people that were promised.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Washington Post editorial sees the Obama shift too:

Wavering on Afghanistan?
President Obama seems to have forgotten his own arguments for a counterinsurgency campaign.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092103086.html

...it was a little startling to hear Mr. Obama suggest in several televised interviews on Sunday that he had second thoughts. "We are in the process of working through that strategy," said on CNN." The first question is . . . are we pursuing the right strategy?" On NBC he said, "if supporting the Afghan national government and building capacity for their army and securing certain provinces advances that strategy" of defeating al-Qaeda, "then we'll move forward. But if it doesn't, then I'm not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan."

...Some in and outside the administration have argued for a more limited strategy centered on striking al-Qaeda's leaders, giving up the more ambitious political and economic tasks built into the counterinsurgency doctrine.

It's hard to see, however, how Mr. Obama can refute the analysis he offered last March. "If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows al-Qaeda to go unchallenged," he said then, "that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." Afghanistan, he continued, "is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan," where al-Qaeda and the Taliban now aim at seizing control of a state that possesses nuclear weapons. Moreover, Mr. Obama said, "a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance . . . and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people -- especially women and girls."

"To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government," Mr. Obama concluded. As Gen. McChrystal's report makes very clear, keeping faith with that goal will require more troops, more resources and years of patience. Yet to break with it would both dishonor and endanger this country. As the president put it, "the world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos."

Meanwhile Gen. McCrystal is, er, muzzled:

Pentagon Delays Troop Call
Request for Additional Forces on Hold as White House Seeks Review of Afghan Strategy
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125350906414427191.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Torch post:

Afstan: CF going to the people/Similar US approach? More or fewer Brits?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/09/afstan-cf-going-to-peoplemore-of-fewer.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Edward Campbell]

The Good Grey Globe’s resident expert in Canadian domestic politics, Jeffrey Simpson, feels a periodic compulsion to demonstrate that his (acknowledged) expertise does not extend very far out of his regular lanes. Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail, is his latest demonstration of his own failure to comprehend grand strategy, foreign policy, military matters or Afghanistan:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/what-did-nato-expect-in-afghanistan-anyway/article1296303/

What did NATO expect in Afghanistan, anyway?
Make a new plan, Stan – it will take more than a couple of years to turn this war around

Jeffrey Simpson

Tuesday, Sep. 22, 2009

Almost eight years after the United Nations first authorized an international military force for Afghanistan, the “overall situation is deteriorating,” reports the top commander of those forces, U.S. General Stanley McChrystal. Without momentum against the insurgency in the next year, there could be an outcome “where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” Still more troops, and a different political and military strategy, will be required to avert “failure.”

If so, it will be for the United States alone to increase troops and implement a new strategy. Canada will end its military effort in 2011. Italians are already clamouring for their mission to end, after losing six soldiers. Germany certainly isn't going to up its ante. The Dutch, Danes and British have been doing a lot of fighting, along with the Canadians and Americans. They certainly won't be doing more. Nor will the Australians, who valiantly agreed to come to Afghanistan despite not being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Americans alone must implement Gen. McChrystal's strategy, the outcome of a hard-nosed analysis of the challenge of winning in Afghanistan. However, executing even this refined strategy will be next to impossible.

What is winning? NATO has never been very clear about this, in part because all sorts of high-minded goals were advanced to sell deployment politically in the alliance's member countries: improve the lot of women, educate more young girls, root out corruption, implant democracy, raise living standards.

Afghanistan remains a postmedieval country, at least many parts of it do, including rural Kandahar province, where the Canadians have been fighting a slowly losing battle, in the sense that the Taliban now control more territory than three or four years ago. Canada's casualties now number 131, with many others wounded.

Afghanistan was, and remains, one of the world's poorest countries. As such, it has absorbed the largest amount of Canada's foreign aid, without much of a dent being noticed. Attitudes toward women in the south and other rural areas are so deeply entrenched that no amount of Western liberalism will change them.

Corruption? The recent elections were marred by all manner of electoral fraud, according to just about every observer. The only issues were how much fraud and whether the outcome should be reversed.

What did NATO expect in a country with no tradition of electoral democracy but a long history of warlords, intimidation, bribery and decentralization? Of course President Hamid Karzai's regime and its allies stuffed ballot boxes and bribed voters. That's the way things get done in Afghanistan – through what we would call corruption, but what many Afghans would say is the way things have always been, with tribal strongmen extorting money and power for themselves in exchange for distributing crumbs of it to those dependent upon them. It ain't pretty, but it's the Afghan way.

Gen. McChrystal and President Barack Obama (in his five weekend television interviews) now define the mission as preventing al-Qaeda from re-establishing footholds in Afghanistan. This important goal is long removed from the early and persistent ones that were based on hopes and myths rather than realizable objectives. If keeping al-Qaeda out is the goal, Gen. McChrystal argues that more troops are needed. Becoming much closer to the people should animate policy.

This is easier said than done. One reason that soldiers patrol in convoys and governments place caveats on where and when their forces go is because they don't want troops killed. That's why the Americans used drones to fire missiles at suspected insurgent targets rather than sending ground troops, killing many civilians in the process.

As for cutting off the insurgents' supplies of money, how does this get done when the sources are in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and the poppy fields of the south? How do you patrol a Pakistan-Afghanistan border that is almost completely porous?

Gen. McChrystal's diagnosis is compelling: a weak state, a corrupt government, Pakistani support for the insurgents, money from the drug trade, extortion and intimidation, no working system of justice, endemic poverty, a police force no one trusts and an Afghan army that must grow to 240,000 from a targeted level of 134,000 by next fall.

Many years, not one or two, would be required to turn around any of these factors, let alone all of them.

Simpson starts off on the right foot. He recognized, as most Canadians do not, that we, Canadians and NATO and ISAF (which is NATO ++) are all there, in Afghanistan, to do what the United Nations asked told us to do in UNSC Res. 1386 (2001) when it said:

---------------------------
The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1378 (2001) of 14 November 2001 and 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001,

1. Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;

2. Calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the International Security Assistance Force, and invites those Member States to inform the leadership of the Force and the Secretary-General;


3. Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate; and (down near the bottom of a list of 10 authorizes, calls upons and decides)

8. Stresses that the expenses of the International Security Assistance Force will be borne by the participating Member States concerned.
---------------------

Then he goes right off track by saying, “The Americans alone must implement Gen. McChrystal's strategy.” Now it may (or may not) be true that, as he says:

• ”Canada will end its military effort in 2011.”
    That’s a maybe because it is not at all certain;

• ”Italians are already clamouring for their mission to end, after losing six soldiers.”
    That’s true, but what McChrystal is seeking is unlikely to be provided by most Europeans so it’s probably a red herring;

• ”Germany certainly isn't going to up its ante.”
    Also true but it’s another red herring.

• ”The Dutch, Danes and British ... won't be doing more. Nor will the Australians.”
    This is not, necessarily, true if, Big IF the US does decide to adopt, at least, Gen McChrystal’s operational proposals which are very, very similar to what Canadian (and other) combat leaders have been recommending.

What is undeniably true is that America cannot and will not go it alone. The international community will come, partially, on side.

”What is winning?” Simpson asks and then goes on to raise issues that have little to do with winning. Canada has, pretty consistently, set out three aims for “winning:”

1. To enhance our own security by preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base by al Qaeda (which means “base,” by the way). We have probably accomplished that – even though it is not, yet, a sure thing. Sometimes the aim has been expressed as something like ‘telling other failing states that they must not welcome al Qaeda or like groups because we will punish them as we have punished the Taliban.’ Given the goings on in Somalia, we have probably failed at that.

2. To enhance our own reputation by playing a meaningful, even leading role in the “war on terror” which was also “authorized” by the UNSC in Res. 1368 which said, ”The Security Council ... 3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable; [and]  4. Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 of 19 October 1999.” We have accomplished part a small part of that task but our reputation as a reliable “partner” in global security matters was so badly damaged in the 1970s that we will have to do much, much more before we ever regain anything like the stature we enjoyed – and used to our economic advantage – in the 1950s and ‘60s.

3. To help the Afghans. We have done a lot to help. Simpson says that Afghanistan ” has absorbed the largest amount of Canada's foreign aid, without much of a dent being noticed.” That is unmitigated crap as almost everyone who has ever been to Afghanistan (Simpson has not) says, over and over again, and is the clearest indicator yet that Simpson is uninformed, out of his lanes and, probably, blowing smoke in an effort to provide partisan political support for the anti-Harper parties. There is more to do, to help, but we have accomplished and are accomplishing a lot.

One final point: Simpson says, ”As for cutting off the insurgents' supplies of money, how does this get done when the sources are in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and the poppy fields of the south?” Once again, he demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge of how things are done. We need to and we can and we should find and then steal the Jihadists money while it is in banks in Berlin, London, New York, Paris, Toronto, Singapore, Sydney and Zurich and while it is in electronic transit between Muslim Muslim money transfer companies. This is not quite a legal tactic but it can be done and it would be effective.

 

[Edward Campbell]

See here, please, for another issue (W2I) that is loosely related to Afghanistan.

Some of the W2I members are skeptical, at least, about Afghanistan where we have taken R2P to its logical conclusion by intervening with the aim of rescuing Afghanistan from failure.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Ottawa Citizen is an excellent piece that illustrates that Canadians are out front, doing, already, what Gen McChrystal is recommending:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/life/Dying+battle/2018399/story.html

Dying in battle
 
By Bruce Ward, The Ottawa Citizen

September 22, 2009


Lt.-Col. Joe Paul "leads from the front," his Vandoos troops say with admiration. He also has a philosophic cast of mind that comes out when he talks about the battlefield, survival, fate and destiny.

Paul's statements to reporters following the ramp ceremony for Pte. Jonathan Couturier last Friday felt as real as a wound. He spoke of how Couturier's death had left the troops broken-hearted. He told them that nothing they might have done would have prevented the roadside bomb from claiming Couturier's life. And he urged them to get together to share their grief and rage that night, because the next morning they had to go outside the wire once again to do their job.

Eleven soldiers who were near Couturier when the IED exploded escaped with minor wounds, and were back on the job immediately after being treated at hospital. Paul, commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion Royal 22nd Regiment, also suggested that fate plays a role on the battlefield.

"Sometimes there are things that are difficult to understand. In some instances, someone can lose his life and the man or woman next to him walks away.

"Sometimes that makes you wonder and think about destiny."

What happened next was highly unusual -- Paul began to discuss tactics and to explain what the troops were doing when the bomb went off.

"Basically, his company was supporting an operation in Panjawii district. The intent was to protect the right flank of Bravo company. That company moved into a little town called Saladat. It's a town from where the insurgents have been operating freely over the last few years.

"The intent of the operation was to have a Canadian company living in the town on a permanent basis. Not simply a patrol done once a week or once a month but to live there in permanence, and Bravo company is going to do it ..."

So instead of clearing an area and moving on, Canadian troops in complements of about 100 are now setting up in "platoon houses" and living in the villages. The goal is "to really interact with the local population," said Paul.

The change in tactics seems to have boosted morale among the troops, who enjoy being around the Afghan children and helping them however they can.

It was the second time in a week that high-ranking officers took pains to explain to reporters how Canadian troops are here to provide security and protect the population by eliminating insurgent command and control networks in Panjwaii district.

Brig.-Gen. Jonathan Vance, commander of Task Force Kandahar, lashed out at Sen. Colin Kenny -- without naming him directly -- after Kenny wrote, in a Citizen op-ed article, that Afghanistan is morphing into Canada's Vietnam.

Vance said that such "uninformed" opinions were detrimental to the troops here and their families.

Public support for the war is eroding in Canada, the U.S. and Britain, which may be why Canadian commanders are now speaking out. General Sir David Richards, head of the British army, said recently that NATO must find the right formula to prevail in Afghanistan, and find it soon. The chance to win the war may be gone within the next year. NATO's defeat would have "a hugely intoxicating effect on extremists worldwide" Richards said. He pointed out that the situation in Iraq looked dire 18 months ago but has now improved greatly.

The Taliban has no tanks and no aircraft, but they do have the initiative. They use cheap explosives and circuitry to deadly effect, fighting the war in a more cost-effective fashion than the massive NATO expenditures.

The ramp ceremony for Couturier had a special poignancy because a few of the honour guard that carried his casket had been wounded in the explosion. The burn ointment on their faces glistened in the glare of the TV lights.

Another moving moment happened late the previous night, after reporters had filed their initial stories on Couturier's death.

At about 1:30 a.m., reporters heading to their sleeping quarters noticed that the flag at Old Canada House, a meeting place for off-duty troops to relax and watch TV, had been lowered to half staff.

This gesture was carried out by a middle-aged man who declined to give his name. He rode his bicycle across the base in darkness and lowered the flag for one simple reason, he said. "We lost one of our boys today."

Bruce Ward's column appears weekly.
He is currently on assignment in Afghanistan.

© Copyright (c) The Ottawa Citizen​

And to think that a majority of Canadians wants to bring the battle group, at least, home – just as they are showing NATO how to fight and win this war. For shame!

 

[observor 69]

Let me note that General Petraeus was a major advocate of the "new" American COIN tactic of "protect the people" which was used successfully in Iraq. And of course Gen. McCrystal reflects the strategy of his boss. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

Excerpts from some very astute observations by BruceR at Flit, plus text of McChrystal report (via Bruce's post):

About Deh-e Bagh
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_09_22.html#006540

The Star, today:
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/699002

He may not have mentioned it, but McChrystal appears to have had Canada in mind when he spelled out his winning conditions. Just a few months into his job and in deep contemplation about the state of the war, McChrystal travelled in July to Deh-e-Bagh, a tiny village south of Kandahar city that the Canadian military has made the centre of its counter-insurgency effort.

There McChrystal saw a mini-surge of security forces, economic development, medical care and education. Foreign troops were supporting the local population and the locals were supporting the Afghan government.

"That is more powerful than any round we can shoot," McChrystal declared.

Look, if COMISAF's beliefs were reinforced by spending time with the Canadians, good on us. This kind of write-up does tend to put the cart before the horse on the whole Canadian "model village" approach, though.

I'm a fan of the concept, to be sure. It's ink-spotting in the Afghan context, and it's learning from a lot of our and other's past mistakes, true. But it is also only possible now because of the massive influx of American troops that began in the early part of this year, which has formed an outer ring of steel around Kandahar City, one that was never there before, ensconcing the Canadians and Afghan security forces within it [more here].

Brig. Gen. Jon Vance and his staff's "model village" approach was a forward-leaning answer to the question, "okay, with all these new troops pouring in, what is the best way we can respond to this influx? With the Americans taking over much of the 'clear/hold' task in the outer districts, how could we best refocus the Canadian battle group and PRT specifically on the 'hold/build' closer to the city?" It is to Canadian planners' credit that they were thinking that far ahead, with the first model village in place even as the Americans were really starting to pour in, and not coping on the fly with changing circumstances after the fact...

...a battalion-sized FOB in the middle of a well-populated, relatively secure area IS a waste. No question. Those troops should be getting out, like the Canadians are in Panjwaii, into small platoon houses, and fighting the insurgents for the control of the night. That is the best "hold/build" template anyone's come up with so far. In the surrounding less-populated, or less-secure, or openly contested areas, the ideal template is probably a company-sized FOB, (less than 300 men total, Afghan and Western), with some surrounding smaller, more temporary outposts, similar to what Canadians had in Zhari district when I was there. In that environment, being able to assemble a sizable strike force on call is a requirement, and using all your force in defending too many small outposts means force protection replaces force projection...

All that to say protecting the population is the agreed goal here, but it will take different forms on different terrain, often in the form of concentric areas out from a major population centre. And saying simply we should "just get off the FOB" doesn't encompass some of the other adjustments to a still-fluid military situation that are also going to be required if the McChrystal plan is to succeed.

Redacted McChrystal report:
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews

Mark
Ottawa

 

[dapaterson]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail, are some details of Canadian reactions to Gen McChrystal’s report:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/us-debate-doesnt-change-canadas-afghan-plans/article1296427/

First: kudos to Sen. Wallin for telling the truth: “To try and predict where we're going to be in the summer of 2011 is foolhardy,” she said. “We have no idea.”

Second: Prof Paris’ question, “I think it's very unlikely that we'll have the 1,000-member battle group, which is kind of the core of our military contribution,” he said. “But the question is, if the battle group goes away, does everybody go away in the Canadian Forces?” is pertinent.

My “answer” to Prof. Paris is:

1. Withdraw the battle group, per se, from Kandahar province; and

2. Add more than one, maybe enlarged, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs or omlettes) – perhaps in Kandahar, which allows us to use our existing (but hopefully reduced) logistics base, or, perhaps in another province, which probably would involve moving a (reduced) Canadian logistics support base (Tim Horton’s and all!) and the PRT, too. The omlettes are a key component of what Gen McChrystal is talking about, as I read it; we can raise our profile even as we draw down our numbers. 

Unfortunately the “bill” for the OMLTs is paid in the “currency” of experienced officers and NCOs – who are in short supply, especially since Prime Minister Harper’s government/DND has not (yet) recruited the tens of thousands of new people that were promised.

(1) Correct.  OMLTs are expensive - in many ways, more so than a BG.  Finding the skillsets is difficult - and those skillsets are also in demand in other parts of the CF.  Since the CF is not on a war footing, it can be a challenge to prioritize personnel for such taskings (with over 100 Infantry LCols in the Regular Force, it should not be difficult, yet it is).

(2) Growth promised was in the thousands, nto the tens of thousands.  Timelines ahve been extended, and the CF itself has been to blame for some delays, not defining what it wants to grow in a timely manner.  Insetad, good, cautios staff proceeded slowly, providing commanders with a reserve of positions to decide upon later, and avoided hard choices until the end - and avoided identifyign the more training intensive requiremetns unti tlhe end.  Even such expansion would not address shortfalls for OMLTs and toher such initiatives, as growth is bey definition new intake; to grow a Sgt will take a decade at least - so, we accel;erate promotions for some and hope that the training and experiential deltas that ensue will not have too harsh an impact.

Unfortunately, much of our senior military leadership does not consider the personnel system or impacts on it when they make decisions - as adjudant-general postings tend to be career limiting, we do not always get the best and brightest posted into the N/G/A1 worlds.

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
(2) Growth promised was in the thousands, nto the tens of thousands ...

I admit to being a wee, tiny bit hyperbolic, for effect, but, in 2006, the Conservatives did promise 75,000 regulars and 35,000 reserves and that's more than just "thousands" that's at least one "ten thousand," closer to two in 2006.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Rrom Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal:

McChrystal to resign if not given resources for Afghanistan
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/mcchrystal_to_resign_if_not_gi.php
 

Within 24 hours of the leak of the Afghanistan assessment to The Washington Post, General Stanley McChrystal's team fired its second shot across the bow of the Obama administration. According to McClatchy, military officers close to General McChrystal said he is prepared to resign if he isn't given sufficient resources (read "troops") to implement a change of direction in Afghanistan:

"Adding to the frustration, according to officials in Kabul and Washington, are White House and Pentagon directives made over the last six weeks that Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, not submit his request for as many as 45,000 additional troops because the administration isn't ready for it.

In the last two weeks, top administration leaders have suggested that more American troops will be sent to Afghanistan, and then called that suggestion "premature." Earlier this month, Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that "time is not on our side"; on Thursday, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates urged the public "to take a deep breath."

...

In Kabul, some members of McChrystal's staff said they don't understand why Obama called Afghanistan a "war of necessity" but still hasn't given them the resources they need to turn things around quickly.

Three officers at the Pentagon and in Kabul told McClatchy that the McChrystal they know would resign before he'd stand behind a faltering policy that he thought would endanger his forces or the strategy.

"Yes, he'll be a good soldier, but he will only go so far," a senior official in Kabul said. "He'll hold his ground. He's not going to bend to political pressure."

On Thursday, Gates danced around the question of when the administration would be ready to receive McChrystal's request, which was completed in late August. "We're working through the process by which we want that submitted," he said."

...Today, the military is perceiving that the administration is punting the question of a troop increase in Afghanistan, and the military is even questioning the administration's commitment to succeed in Afghanistan. The leaking of the assessment and the report that McChrystal would resign if he is not given what is needed to succeed constitute some very public pushback against the administration's waffling on Afghanistan.

Mark
Ottawa