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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

A rather lengthy Torch post (note US Army brigade combat team coming to Kandahar and Herat as trainers):

Afstan: New US Marines, Army aviation, start arriving; US command structure changes?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/05/afstan-new-us-marines-army-aviation.html

End of post:
...
Lt.-Gen. McKiernan is now double-hatted as ISAF commander (reporting to NATO HQ) and commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan (reporting to Centcom commander, Gen. Petraeus).
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/03/more-unity-of-command-for-us-forces-in.html
That provides a bit of command unity, though hardly ideal.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2008/11/unity-of-command-in-afghanistan.html
Heaven knows how two American three-stars would affect the situation. If the second Lt.-Gen. is "day-to-day, committed to the fight -- an operational commander", would he be de facto in charge of both ISAF and USFOR-A? Would McKiernan keep ISAF with Rodriguez taking USFOR-A? In which case what about unity of command?

Moreover, would "a second commanding general with a large staff of officers", presumably as part of USFOR-A, in effect supplant ISAF as the real HQ for forces formally under NATO? All a bit confusin', must be a lot of buzzing going on at Brussels.

Update thought: Is there a corps headquarters under a three-star, in the Kabul area, of some sort in mind with charge of operations (cf. the Multi-National Corps - Iraq)? In Iraq the broader picture is the job of the four-star in command of the Multi-National Force - Iraq. But international operations in Iraq have one chain of command; those in Afstan have two, so the Iraqi model cannot be applied holus-bolus. Round holes and square pegs.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Torch post:

Losing the infowar in Afstan
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/05/losing-infowar-in-afstan.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afghan-Canadians torn Former residents support military effort but decry casualties
Colin Perkel, CP
The Edmonton Sun
11 May 09

Canada's role in Afghanistan is creating increasingly conflicted emotions among Afghan-Canadians, with strong support for the military effort tempered by both sadness and anger at escalating civilian casualties.  They also fret that reconstruction aims have taken a permanent back seat to brute and bloody force despite government contentions to the contrary.

"When the military mission shifted from reconstruction to combat, a lot of people were disappointed because that would create agony in the country," said Jamal Kakar, executive director of the Afghan Association of Ontario.  "As an Afghan, I prefer our troops stay there but the mission should be reconstruction, rebuilding Afghanistan."

During a visit to Kandahar last week, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said the infusion of thousands of American soldiers in the coming months would help Canada refocus on more defined "civilian objectives."

"We are in the process of transforming our mission to focus on reconstruction and development," Harper said.

In the interim, the bloodshed continued.  The International Committee of the Red Cross in Kabul last week reported the deaths of dozens of civilians in U.S. air strikes against suspected Taliban insurgents in western Afghanistan.  It's that kind of "collateral damage" that darkly colours otherwise strong support among Afghan-Canadians for Canada's role that has cost 118 Canadian military lives - the highest casualty rate among all foreign forces in the war-torn country.

"We are 100% behind our troops; we express our sympathies to the families who lose their loved ones ... it's very sad," Kakar said. "But when it comes to the (civilian) casualties in Afghanistan, we are equally sad."

Sanga Achakzai, a Toronto settlement worker from Kandahar, where Canada has focused its military effort since 2006, said Afghan-Canadians are most concerned about the spiral of violence created by civilian deaths.  "One innocent person who dies in a bombardment or from a Canadian or American soldier creates 10 more Taliban," she said.

Canada's Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk acknowledged the dilemma as American troops prepare to flood Afghanistan's south.  "When you bring in a lot more forces with the purpose of interdicting the Taliban," Natynczyk said, "there will be violence in those areas."

Estimates vary on the number of Afghan-Canadians, most of whom live in the Toronto area.  Statistics Canada figures based on place of birth put the number at close to 40,000 - with about half of them coming since the U.S.-led invasion.
 
It wasn't an invasion. Let's get that straight.

Another thing the government/military have to tell the public is the terrorist habit of holding civilians in an area of combat against their will.
Another habit of terrorists is to disarm the bodies of the dead and then claim they were "innocent civilians"
It's an age old tactic
 
A Torch post:

KAF: US Army combat aviation brigade formally in place/Apache hysteria
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/05/kaf-us-army-combat-aviation-brigade.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
...courtesy of the Globe & Mail (highlights mine):
.... As U.S.-led forces and the Taliban brace for what may prove the deadliest summer yet, Mr. MacKay said Canada's role is changing to delivering aid to city dwellers “rather than simply focusing on holding swaths of land.”

“I believe there are a number of roles Canada can play well into the future,” the minister said, capping off a three-day visit, but added that's subject to the will of the people. “We've said time and time we're going to respect Parliament's voice on this,” he said. “We can't come to Afghanistan and help them develop their democracy and not respect our own.”

Public documents tendered this month on a government website indicates Defence Construction Canada wants to buy 400 more beds at the Kandahar Air Field by next year, at a cost of $5-million, with an option to build 400 more. The documents don't state who the beds are for ....

More on MERX listing for KAF accommodation expansion here - .pdf attached if link not working.
 
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/changing-generals-midstream-45248902.html


Changing generals midstreamGwynne Dyer

17/05/2009
There is always a high turnover of generals in wartime. Some get replaced because they turn out to be no good at the job, but many others are changed because they have failed at a task that was beyond anybody's ability to accomplish.
They are fired, in other words, because the alternative would be to blame the person who gave them that impossible task. That certainly seems to be the case with Gen. David McKiernan, the American commander in Afghanistan, who was appointed by U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates less than a year ago, when then-president George W. Bush was still in power. What's needed is "fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem," said Secretary Gates, explaining why he was appointing Gen. Stanley McChrystal to the job instead. So what should Gen. McChrystal's fresh eyes see?

He could start by understanding that the United States is not fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is fighting the entire Pashtun nation, some 30 million people, two-thirds of whom live across the border in Pakistan. That border has never really existed for the Pashtuns, who move freely across it in peace and in war.

The Taliban are entirely Pashtun in membership and always were.

When they ruled southern and central Afghanistan between 1996-2001, they were hated by the other ethnic groups (who never lost control of the north), and even by many Pashtuns. But the U.S. invasion effectively drove not just the Taliban but also the Pashtuns in general from power, in a country that Pashtuns have dominated for several centuries.

To minimize U.S. casualties, the United States made an alliance with all the non-Pashtun ethnic groups of Afghanistan (the Northern Alliance) in 2001. There really was no American land invasion; it was the Northern Alliance that defeated the Taliban, with considerable assistance from American B-52 bombers. It was a clever strategy, but it perpetuated what was effectively an Afghan civil war between the Pashtuns (40 per cent of the population) and all the other ethnic groups ---- Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek.

It is warlords from those other groups who have controlled the Afghan government ever since. "The political, religious and economic mafia are all Northern Alliance people," says Daoud Sultanzoy, a member of parliament from Ghazni province, exaggerating only slightly. "Nobody outside the Northern Alliance is in the government." Except, of course, President Hamid Karzai, the token Pashtun, who is mockingly known as "the mayor of Kabul."

This is not a war about ideology, even if all the American and Taliban commanders insist that it is. The Pashtuns are fighting to regain at least a major share of power in Afghanistan, while the American and other foreign troops are, for all practical purposes, allied to the other ethnic groups. That is why all the fighting is in the Pashtun-majority provinces.

There is no point in trying to win over Pashtun "hearts and minds."

The war will only end when the Pashtuns regain a big share of the power at the centre (and the loot that comes with it). And no matter how fresh Gen. McChrystal's eyes are, it's unlikely that he can deliver that.

On top of everything else, the U.S. still insists on eradicating the poppy-growing that provides over half of the country's national income.

Opium use is obviously a problem in Afghanistan -- as one observer said, "If you applied a drug test to the Afghan army, three-quarters of them would be kicked out" -- but burning farmers' fields leaves them no alternative source of cash income except fighting for the Taliban, who pay $200 a month.

The final thing McChrystal should understand is that "winning" or "losing" in Afghanistan makes almost no difference to U.S. security. The Taliban are not "outriders for al-Qaida," in the lazy formula used by State Department special envoy Richard Holbrooke.

The Taliban are an Afghan phenomenon with almost exclusively Afghan goals, and even if they should win absolute power after the U.S. leaves (which is unlikely), there is no reason to believe that they would send terrorists to attack the United States. Indeed, Osama bin Laden probably didn't even let them know in advance about the 9/11 attacks.

This war is not only unwinnable but unnecessary, and if David McChrystal understood all these things he wouldn't have taken the job. But he did take it, so he doesn't understand. Afghanistan is Vietnam for slow learners.


Gwynne Dyer's latest book, Climate Wars, was published recently in Canada by Random House.
 
A couple of very helpful posts by BruceR at Flit:

Let's go to the map (Kandahar province realities)
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_05_11.html#006414

Remember, we're the main effort [embedded trainers]
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_05_15.html#006418

And one at The Torch:

Afstan: US forces increase under Obama quite a bit more that 17,000
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/05/afstan-us-forces-increase-under-obama.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
Let's go to the map (Kandahar province realities)
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_05_11.html#006414

Wow thanks for sharing that Link.I was just wondering today if Mushan was "withdrawn" from.Very surprised that it was posted up.I thought we were gonna end up doing it before the next roto came in.That's three COP's built and three retreated from in the matter of two tours.

Going on the topic you guys have hear.
How about when we come up with a plan lets think it through.That's three pieces of ground we have lost in a very volatile area.We went down that river twice to for a lack of a better term to retreat (i.e withdraw) out of Zangabad and Hadji.
Now Mushan.

Maybe if we do not have enough forces to effectively hold ground in Zhari Panjwaii we should tell someone that we can cover from here to here, and we need x amount of troops to take over what we cannot hold.

That's over 20km in a very taliban heavy district that has zero ISAF presence.

What do you think the people in that region think of ISAF as three of their bases have been leveled to dirt.

If I was a local  I would be seriously siding with the taliban as they are certainly pushing US back.Or so it would appear.I know there is a plan for doing so at a higher level.But lets look at what these people see.That whole area west of Panjwaii is 100% taliban.
 
X-mo-1979 said:
Wow thanks for sharing that Link.I was just wondering today if Mushan was "withdrawn" from.Very surprised that it was posted up.I thought we were gonna end up doing it before the next roto came in.That's three COP's built and three retreated from in the matter of two tours.

Going on the topic you guys have hear.
How about when we come up with a plan lets think it through.That's three pieces of ground we have lost in a very volatile area.We went down that river twice to for a lack of a better term to retreat (i.e withdraw) out of Zangabad and Hadji.
Now Mushan.

Maybe if we do not have enough forces to effectively hold ground in Zhari Panjwaii we should tell someone that we can cover from here to here, and we need x amount of troops to take over what we cannot hold.

That's over 20km in a very taliban heavy district that has zero ISAF presence.

What do you think the people in that region think of ISAF as three of their bases have been leveled to dirt.

If I was a local  I would be seriously siding with the taliban as they are certainly pushing US back.Or so it would appear.I know there is a plan for doing so at a higher level.But lets look at what these people see.That whole area west of Panjwaii is 100% taliban.
Dude, think about it. And read the open source press about what's going on and what went on in Mushan, Zangabad, etc.  Zero ISAF presence?  I don't think so.  Read  these:
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=1414406
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=5114

Those are just two stories.  There are more out there.
 
Midnight Rambler said:
Dude, think about it. And read the open source press about what's going on and what went on in Mushan, Zangabad, etc.   Zero ISAF presence?  I don't think so.  Read  these:
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=1414406
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=5114

Those are just two stories.  There are more out there.

Funny. I was out in that area on those two operations.Killed a few there.However IIRC we left and went back to the FOB.And left whom there?

Point being their freedom of movement is even more open in that area now that those COP's are gone.

Sure we found a few IED's and grabbed a few people in that area.We also withdrew out of the area as a whole.

Instead of spending so much money on setting COP's up to tear them down in a few months,plus the amount of money required to get even water to them (I.E combat team) we should start doing combat estimates on this crap prior to throwing it out there,then retreating.The insurgents depend on an effective IO campaign and we gave it to them.

Do you not think they have more power in that area now?When they come to locals and say we have rid the area of the kaffar,next time they come here help us push them further.Of course the civilians will comply as the IO campaign is easily viewed as the taliban pushing us out of their homeland.

As well if you want to win there,night patrolling in villages.For a sophisticated army with all the thermal and night vision and air superiority we sure didn't use it effectively.IMHO.

Edited:two points that are valid but I cannot prove removed.

 
Slight Tangent
"IO" is not about messaging the locals.  That's Psyops, which admittedly is a sub-set of IO.
Information Operations is all about command and control: enabling your own and hampering the other, such that your commander has a relative advantage over the enemy.  There are, as alluded to above, things that collectively make up IO.  That includes Communication and Information Systems (Computers, radios, the like), Psyops and even public affairs.  But let us not forget that when push comes to shove, "IO" is best done as either offensive or defensive.  That includes electronic warfare, physical destruction of enemy commanders, etc.


[/rant]  Sorry, it's just that our army doesn't read its own doctrine, and says "IO" when it means "Psyops" or "Propaganda".
 
Midnight Rambler said:
Slight Tangent
"IO" is not about messaging the locals.  That's Psyops, which admittedly is a sub-set of IO.
Information Operations is all about command and control: enabling your own and hampering the other, such that your commander has a relative advantage over the enemy.  There are, as alluded to above, things that collectively make up IO.  That includes Communication and Information Systems (Computers, radios, the like), Psyops and even public affairs.  But let us not forget that when push comes to shove, "IO" is best done as either offensive or defensive.  That includes electronic warfare, physical destruction of enemy commanders, etc.


[/rant]  Sorry, it's just that our army doesn't read its own doctrine, and says "IO" when it means "Psyops" or "Propaganda".

Gotcha!
Apologize.Everyone I worked for referred to it as that.I'm sure that's why its a tangent as the people who said it around you were the people telling us about it out there.
Thanks for the info.Now I have another to add to the list. :nod:
 
No apology required.  I used to think that's what IO was all about (glad handing locals, etc), but then I read the CF manual on it.  Talk about a surprise to me!

Anyway, to be back on topic here:
Did Gwyn Dyer actuälly say that we are fighting the entire Pashtun Nation?  Funny, once I met an ANA officer who was a Pashtun and he seemed to be on our side!  ::)  [sarcasm] Too bad I didn't read Dyer then, so that I could have homogenised the entire Pashtun race as one big bad entity and shot him on the spot!  [/sarcasm]
 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/06/afghanistan.pakistan/

I expect he meant something along these lines:

"The meetings are a continuation of a trilateral process started by Clinton in February, when she invited the foreign ministers of both countries to discuss Obama's strategy for stabilizing the region."

But then you already knew that didn't you.  :-\
 
I think Dwyer was referring to the idea of "Pashtunistan" and some (most) Pashtuns' view that the Durand Line is no line at all...not that that makes the issue of Pashtunistan (or Pakhunistan, or Pakhunkhwa) any easier to understand to those not intimately read in to the history of the region.
 
Some interesting oposites on the view for the way forward between nations;

Battle for hearts, minds
Our Afghan mission enters new phase

The Toronto Sun
20 May 2009

Canada's reconstruction mission in treacherous southern Afghanistan is poised to embark on a new phase in the coming weeks with efforts focused on normalizing small population centres on the five main approaches to Kandahar, the country's second-largest city.

The aim is to create "model villages" where normal daily and economic activity can flourish in a secure environment and the reach of the central Afghan government is felt. "We can't be everywhere at once," said Lt.-Col. Carl Turenne, who commands more than 400 soldiers at Camp Nathan Smith, the compound at the edge of Kandahar city that houses Canada's civilian-led reconstruction team.

If successful, Turenne said, the approach would render the insurgency "irrelevant."

The idea is simple: Identify suitable villages on the main thoroughfares in and out of the city where coalition support is strong, establish a secure perimeter and then embark on a concerted information campaign to win over the hearts and minds of villagers.

"This is a recognition that population centres are more pivotal," said Cory Anderson, currently in charge of the 60 civilians working with the reconstruction team.

In his visit earlier this week, Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Canadian forces no longer wanted to take and end up "holding swaths of land."

The new initiative is very much in line with that thinking, Anderson said.

RCMP and other forces across Canada have been mentoring their counterparts here.

The effort is paying off, with an "off-the-chart" improvement, said Anderson, whose stint ends this week.

In some parts of the city, Afghan officers are now doing real police work, he said.

The cost to Afghan police, however, continues to be high. Late yesterday, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the city's northern Arghandab district near the local police detachment, killing three officers and injuring nine others, the district chief said. The area's chief of police was among the injured.
compared to:
'Black ops' key to revamped Afghan strategy; Promotion signals dramatic change in military tactics
Peter Goodspeed
National Post
20 May 2009

He has been described as the Darth Vader of the War on Terror, a commander of elite special forces troops who has constantly fought in the shadows as head of one of the U. S. Army's most secretive commands.

Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal, a 53-year-old West Point graduate who last week was appointed the new U. S. commander in Afghanistan, made his career in the U. S. Special Forces.

Gen. McChrystal's promotion may signal a dramatic shift in U. S. tactics in Afghanistan. His background suggests a determination to rely more heavily on special operations forces and a willingness to use new intelligence procedures and unconventional tactics.

His reliance on "fusion cells" --a combination of special forces, science and technology -- has been credited with helping to win the war in Iraq.

His promotion also suggests a subtle shift from long-term counter-insurgency operations to short-term counter-terrorism actions.

Desperate to see a quick turn around in Taliban fortunes, Washington appears determined to rely on its special forces to help give it breathing room to regroup and reorganize its counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.

"With the new strategy, and with some changes and adjustments in our military approach, my hope would be that by the end of this year we will begin to see a change in momentum," Robert Gates, the U. S. Defence Secretary, told a House of Representatives committee last week, as he explained Gen. Mc-Chrystal's new assignment.

Ranked by some as one of the best generals in the U. S. Army, Gen McChrystal has spent time as the commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment and served tours of duty in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and as the U. S. Army's chief of staff in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. But it was the five years he spent, in 2003-08, as head of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the most secretive force in the U. S. military, that sealed his reputation and left him shrouded in mystery.

JSOC oversees such elite units as the U. S. Army's Delta Force and the U. S. Navy's SEALs. It has a reputation for "snake-eating, slit-their throats, black ops."

Gen. McChrystal, with a reputation as a warrior-scholar, who lives the life of an ascetic, eating one meal a day to avoid feeling sluggish, working on just a few hours of sleep and running nearly 20 kilometres each day, fits right in.

Yet JSOC is so secretive that while he was its commander Gen. McChrystal was never photographed and his name and phone number were deleted from most Pentagon directories.

As head of JSOC, he led Special Operations Task Force 121 in Iraq which hunted down and captured Saddam Hussein and killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

His forces worked out of one of Saddam's former military bases in Baghdad known as Camp Nama, which U. S. officials said was an acronym for "Nasty Ass Military Area."

The base had a reputation for detainee abuse and, according to Human Rights Watch, was the source of repeated allegations of beatings, exposure to extreme cold, threats of death, humiliation and various forms of psychological abuse.

But it was Gen. McChrystal's success in hunting down and exterminating al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders that captured the attention of his superiors.

He refined a new style of special operations called "collaborative warfare" which integrated a wide range of tools -- from signals intercepts, to human intelligence, spy planes and forensic science -- in one co-ordinated attack unit known as a fusion cell.

Most of the new techniques remain top secret, but the essence of the program is to send rapid strike teams of U. S. special forces into the field under the co-ordination of a joint task force that can include a wide array of experts, from map specialists to forensic experts, political analysts, computer specialists and intelligence officials. The aim is to blend all available military and intelligence assets into a single operations unit that can track and kill terrorist targets in lightning-quick raids.

Gen. McChrystal's fusion cells were so successful in Iraq they are credited with contributing to the success of the 2007 "surge" by eliminating virtually all al-Qaeda in Iraq's leaders.

Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward has compared JSOC's new counterterrorism techniques to the top-secret Manhattan Project in the Second World War which built the atomic bomb.

"This is very sensitive and very top secret, but there are secret operational capabilities that have been developed by the military to locate, target and kill leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq, insurgent leaders, renegade militia leaders. That is one of the true breakthroughs," Mr. Woodward said while promoting his book, The War Within.

Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh describes JSOC as an "executive assassination wing." He insists JSOC units do "high-value targeting of men that we believe are known to be involved in anti-American activities, or are believed to be planning such activities."

Gen. McChrystal's appearance on the scene in Afghanistan shouldn't do anything to alter the role Canada's armed forces are now playing in Khandahar, but it could see the secret redeployment of some members of Canada's own special forces, JTF2.

The general and other senior U. S. officials had nothing but high praise for Canada's special forces during in the initial invasion of Afghanistan.
 
Torch post, with material from BruceR at Flit:

The strategy for Afstan/Update: Lt.-Gen. McChrystal
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/05/strategy-for-afstan.html

The start of a piece by David Kilcullen (via Moby Media Updates):

    If we lose hearts and minds, we will lose the war...

Mark
Ottawa
 
So how do we win hearts and minds when every time we intrude into their defined area we are under contact and shooting and killing their brothers and family?

Hearts and minds is an awesome concept in a neutral area,but Canadians are dealing with areas where the Taliban has been the norm for a very long time.
Where we are viewed as the insurgents.
 
For a great many of them being "Taliban" is akin to working for a temp agency.  They could care less about the cause, they just need jobs. 
Nice to see the idea of sustainable support in key urban areas.  Cripes, it almost feels like there is a plan.  With a commanders intent.  And everything! 
Almost as though the support to the area was like a drop of something on a paper or such.  And the drop started to spread... jeez, that just sounds so familiar... 
Nah.  That will never work.  Going to random villages and shovelling obscene amounts of money down range to unproven contractors with questionable ties with no eye towards results is way better.  And coordinating projects?  That's just crazy talkin'! 
 
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