- Reaction score
- 3
- Points
- 430
Since Obama came into office the Yanks have put their A team, military and diplomatic, into play.
Now this is getting interesting! :nod:
Now this is getting interesting! :nod:
Exum
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/05/fallen-on-field-of-honor.html
and Foust
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/05/25/defending-mckiernan/
both take exception in their own way to the recent downgrading of Gen. McKiernan's reputation.
I link-hinted previously
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_05_12.html#006415
the general's sudden relief seemed more political than anything else. Yes, the stalemate had continued or worsened during his shortened watch, and stimulating accountability through "pour encourager les autres" tactics is not an idea without merit. But it's also true that what little I heard of the previous Afghan commander, many steps removed obviously, during my tour, had been positive. Nor do I recall anyone ever even suggesting in KAF in 2008-09 that a big part of Afghanistan's problem was the U.S. commander. YMMV.
zipperhead_cop said:For a great many of them being "Taliban" is akin to working for a temp agency. They could care less about the cause, they just need jobs.
Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Mr. Speaker, after the Minister of National Defence stated last week that the Canadian mission in Afghanistan might be extended beyond 2011, Afghan sources indicated that President Obama would require NATO members, including Canada, to provide more ground resources. Will the government again say no to President Obama and remind him that this House has decided that the Canadian mission in Afghanistan will end in 2011?
Hon. Lawrence Cannon (Minister of Foreign Affairs, CPC): Mr. Speaker, there has been no change in the Canadian government's position. Its position is unchanged and reflects the will of the members of the House of Commons expressed in a motion that was passed, establishing six priorities and the end to our combat mission in 2011.
Ms. Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Mr. Speaker, the Conservative government, with the support of the Liberals, voted to end the current mission in July 2011. That is the truth. Therefore, is the government committed to withdrawing Canadian soldiers from all combat zones at that time? Yes or no?
Hon. Lawrence Cannon (Minister of Foreign Affairs, CPC): Mr. Speaker, the Government of Canada shall respect the will expressed by the majority of MPs in this House.
Fulfilling the Manley commission's conditions to extend Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan to 2011 will cost more than $1.1 billion, say federal budget documents.
The Conservative government is asking for an extra $822 million in the current budget year to pay for "basic infrastructure to support air enhancements" and "mission close out costs."
That request is in addition to the $292 million set aside last year for six used Chinook CH-47D helicopters from the U.S. Army.
The final price tag for the two-year extension, which would include troops and armoured vehicles, is still being worked out by National Defence.
The latest request before Parliament refers to the operational expenses of deploying helicopters and unmanned surveillance aircraft [more here on Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) Air Wing]
http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/site/opdocs/JTF-Afg_e.asp
to support ground forces, said a spokesman for the Canadian Forces Expeditionary Force Command, the headquarters that oversees the war...
...
The independent commission – headed by former Liberal deputy prime minister John Manley – also recommended that the country's NATO partners deliver an extra battalion of ground troops to reinforce Canadian operations.
The Americans last year provided 650 soldiers, belonging to the famed 1st Infantry Division, who deployed to western Kandahar under Canadian command [in August 2008, though the MND seemed unaware of their presence in November last year].
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2008/11/afstan-mnd-mackays-miserable-failure-to.html
Canadian taxpayers are not on the hook for the U.S. reinforcements.
X-mo-1979 said:Really?It seemed to us they were all taliban and didn't mind taking our money during the work day then trying to shoot us up later that day.Do you have a quote somewhere? I would love to read it.
Seeing you are saying you were cimic on our tour, you must have been the guy down begging us not to hurt their crops I assume?Seems our views of that tour we were both on vary quite a bit,I wonder why?zipperhead_cop said:For a great many of them being "Taliban" is akin to working for a temp agency. They could care less about the cause, they just need jobs.
Nice to see the idea of sustainable support in key urban areas. Cripes, it almost feels like there is a plan. With a commanders intent. And everything!
Almost as though the support to the area was like a drop of something on a paper or such. And the drop started to spread... jeez, that just sounds so familiar...
Nah. That will never work. Going to random villages and shovelling obscene amounts of money down range to unproven contractors with questionable ties with no eye towards results is way better. And coordinating projects? That's just crazy talkin'!
That Afghan civilian deaths are "mainly caused by allied warplanes dropping bombs," is not supported by the evidence or broader opinion (Afghan Casualties To Rise, New U.S. Commander Says - June 2). According to UN figures, only 39 per cent of 2,119 civilian casualties in 2008 were attributed to pro-government forces, while 55 per cent were attributed to anti-government forces.
As well, bombing casualties makes up only a portion of that 39 per cent, and are the occasional result of accident or errors in planning.
Alain Pellerin
Executive director,
Conference Of Defence Associations
...
6. Air-strikes remain responsible for the largest percentage of civilian deaths attributed to progovernment forces. UNAMA recorded 552 civilian casualties of this nature in 2008. This constitutes 64% of the 828 non-combatant deaths attributed to actions by pro-government forces in 2008, and 26% of all civilians killed, as a result of armed conflict in 2008...
...
The United Nations report found that the Taliban and other insurgents caused the majority of the civilian deaths, primarily through suicide bombers and roadside bombs, many aimed at killing as many civilians as possible.
Taliban fighters routinely attacked American and other pro-government forces in densely populated areas, the report said, apparently in the hope of provoking a response that would kill even more civilians.
But the report also found that Afghan government forces and those of the American-led coalition killed 828 people last year, up sharply from the previous year. Most of those were killed in airstrikes and raids on villages, which are often conducted at night...
Further to this post, a Canadian view on future conduct of the campaign...
... if you read anything on the issue this week you must read Andrew Exum's new AfPak report, Triage,
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/06/triage-next-12-months-afghanistan-and-pakistan.html
written with the advice and support of Kilcullen, Nathaniel Fick, Registan's Josh Foust,
http://www.registan.net/
Ghosts of Alex's Christian Bleuer,
http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/
and Josh Schmidle...
Eight years into the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the situation is as perilous as ever and continuing to worsen. The campaign has been further complicated by a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, where the center of gravity of the insurgency has now shifted. In counterinsurgency campaigns, momentum matters. Over the next 12 months, the United States and its allies must demonstrate they have seized back the initiative from the Taliban and other hostile actors.
This paper makes four operational recommendations – two on each side of the Durand line – which allow the new strategy articulated by the White House a better chance of success. In Afghanistan, we recommend that protecting the population take precedence over all other considerations for the time being. At the same time, however, any “civilian surge” must be used to increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan population. In Pakistan, meanwhile, the U.S. government should place a moratorium on drone strikes on non-al Qaeda targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province until such strikes can be incorporated into a coherent strategy for separating the population of these areas from al Qaeda. And the United States should refocus its train and equip mission in Pakistan to place a greater emphasis on the police – the only Pakistani security service focused entirely on domestic security. Especial emphasis should be placed on the security services in those areas where Pakistani authority is strongest, such as in Punjab and Sindh.
In his speech in March, President Obama promised metrics and benchmarks to track his new strategy. This paper provides what we consider to be useful metrics of gauging U.S. and allied successes and failures. More specifically, this paper recommends focusing on metrics which measure outputs rather than inputs. In Afghanistan, for example, less important than how many troops we commit is how many civilians we manage to protect.
To be sure, the road ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan is long, and we predict violence in both countries to rise over the next 12 months. But with a renewed focus on protecting the population and the strengthening government agencies and security forces, the United States and its allies will be better positioned to seize the opportunities to reverse the deteriorating condition in both countries.
...
More important to watch than the numbers, however, is the kind of units arriving in the south. Most are special forces of one kind or another. In other words, soldiers extensively trained for counter-insurgency operations.
The first 10,000 Americans are highly mobile Marines, including many Iraq veterans who are well supplied with helicopters and have been hard training for months for this mission.
Less noticed has been the arrival from other countries of some of the toughest fighting units on Earth.
The targets
The British are sending in a mini-surge of elite special forces, including 800 more SAS (Special Air Service) soldiers along with a similar number of Royal Navy commandos. They'll form part of a counter-insurgency special forces support group.
Australians, operating just to the north of the Canadian force in Kandahar, are also bringing in their own formidable SAS teams, which will increase their overall fighting force in the region to 1,500.
Add in close to 500 commandos from New Zealand [Oops! Mr Stewart, an extra zero there],
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10328524
as well as Canada's own elite and super-secret JTF-2 commandos, many with long experience tracking Taliban units...
MarkOttawa said:Major clanging from the CBC's Brian Stewart:
Bringing in the special forces
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/06/11/f-vp-stewart.html
The Marines are not "special forces"; nor are the Stryker brigade combat team coming to Kandahar, the other major US ground combat unit coming to the south. In fact "soldiers extensively trained for counter-insurgency operations" are not in any sense special forces; otherwise the whole Canadian Task Force Kandahar would be special forces, which they definitely are not.
As for the Aussies, Mr Stewart has it ***-backwards. Their Special Operations Task Group of some 300 personnel has been in Afstan for some time
http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opslipper/index.htm
and their strength increase (some only temporary) is not made up of special forces.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/04/afstan-aussies-to-increase-troop.html
Mr Stewart is generally considered one of our better journalists. Only in Canada, pity (see Damian Brooks on Mr Stewart).
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2008/06/its-never-as-simple-as-331-piece-on.html
Mark
Ottawa