USS John S. McCain Collision 20 Aug 17

[MarkOttawa]

Oh dear:

Exclusive: US Navy ships in deadly collisions had dismal training records

The two US Navy destroyers involved in deadly collisions in the Pacific this summer both had lengthy records of failure to fulfill key training requirements, according to Government Accountability Office data provided to Congress and obtained by CNN.

The USS Fitzgerald had expired training certification for 10 out of 10 key warfare mission areas in June, and the USS John S. McCain had let its certifications lapse in six out of the 10 mission areas, the data show.
The dismal training record for the two ships sheds new light on one factor that may have contributed to the two collisions with commercial ships in June and August, which killed 17 sailors.

The training records of the McCain and Fitzgerald were worse than the average warship in the Pacific, but they weren't the only ones with training problems. GAO testimony released last week revealed that expired training certifications for the Navy's 11 cruisers and destroyers based in Japan had skyrocketed five-fold from 7% in January 2015 to 37% in June. Two-thirds of the certifications had been expired for at least five months...
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/11/politics/navy-ships-training-expired/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[tomahawk6]

You have to have time to study for certification and the sailors due to OPTEMPO had no time. Its not uncommon for sailors to work 100 hour weeks while at sea.

 

[daftandbarmy]

You have to have time to study for certification and the sailors due to OPTEMPO had no time. Its not uncommon for sailors to work 100 hour weeks while at sea.

In the Navy, to what extent does a formal certification determine whether you can do your job properly or not? I have no idea, of course, hence the newbie type question...

 

[FJAG]

I've never been a believer in having certification processes for units (whether ship or battalion). I've always had the view that all these processes do is have the unit spend time in preparing for the certification, not to mention that you have to develop an organization and system to administer the certifications in a timely manner.

For me the role of Commanding Officer is paramount. The CO is both responsible and accountable for his unit's effectiveness/efficiency and should be given the power to train his unit and report to his superiors the unit's state of training on a regular basis.

If an individual CO can't be trusted to do that he should be relieved.

If, systemically, the organization doesn't trust it's COs to do that then the system's methodology of developing COs must be modified until they are appropriately capable and reliable.

:2c:

:cheers:

 

[Navy_Pete]

In the Navy, to what extent does a formal certification determine whether you can do your job properly or not? I have no idea, of course, hence the newbie type question...

It depends; there are a number of trade specific certifications you need to do certain jobs.  For example, the old stoker trades had their Cert 1- cert 4s, all of which involve shore based training in the schools, OJTs which consist of practical 'show me you can do x' tasks, and a series of write ups and drawings that culminated with an oral board that ran from 1 hour- 90 mins for the juniour guys to 3 hours + for the final cert 4 board. Once you get the qual there is still regular training to maintain, so it can be pretty intense.

A number of other trades had similar requirements but nothing as formal or intense.  Generally though there is the same pattern of school training plus OJT signed off by a number of people with a final senior review to grant the formal certification.

Then there are the non-trade specific duty watch packages, all of which have their own OJT pacakages with informal/formal boards for the various positions.

And that's just the individual training certifications; there are a lot of group certifications where Sea Training comes onboard and makes the sections, departments, functional organizations etc demonstrate they can do their normal jobs plus all their emergency responses.

Then it all gets tracked on some kind of monthly tracker with big dashboards that the CRCN can pull up (assuming that's voice powered) and see at a glance if you aren't meeting any of your certifications, and in what area it's in, and when it was last signed off...

So yeah, there are a lot of certifications. And trackers.  And visibility from the stratosphere.

I guess on the plus side it means training is always a priority, even while deployed.  We were cycling trainees in and out of theatre to get sea time, which was a huge fight with CJOC and predecessors for the first few years after CEFCOM stood up.  The downside it means when you are running out of fibreglass wrap, duct tape and belzone while trying to keep the ship together, you will get emails asking why your training report is two days late, even if you've had 1980s level bandwidth for weeks due to connectivity issues and the upload won't go through.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It depends; there are a number of trade specific certifications you need to do certain jobs.  For example, the old stoker trades had their Cert 1- cert 4s, all of which involve shore based training in the schools, OJTs which consist of practical 'show me you can do x' tasks, and a series of write ups and drawings that culminated with an oral board that ran from 1 hour- 90 mins for the juniour guys to 3 hours + for the final cert 4 board. Once you get the qual there is still regular training to maintain, so it can be pretty intense.

A number of other trades had similar requirements but nothing as formal or intense.  Generally though there is the same pattern of school training plus OJT signed off by a number of people with a final senior review to grant the formal certification.

Then there are the non-trade specific duty watch packages, all of which have their own OJT pacakages with informal/formal boards for the various positions.

And that's just the individual training certifications; there are a lot of group certifications where Sea Training comes onboard and makes the sections, departments, functional organizations etc demonstrate they can do their normal jobs plus all their emergency responses.

Then it all gets tracked on some kind of monthly tracker with big dashboards that the CRCN can pull up (assuming that's voice powered) and see at a glance if you aren't meeting any of your certifications, and in what area it's in, and when it was last signed off...

So yeah, there are a lot of certifications. And trackers.  And visibility from the stratosphere.

I guess on the plus side it means training is always a priority, even while deployed.  We were cycling trainees in and out of theatre to get sea time, which was a huge fight with CJOC and predecessors for the first few years after CEFCOM stood up.  The downside it means when you are running out of fibreglass wrap, duct tape and belzone while trying to keep the ship together, you will get emails asking why your training report is two days late, even if you've had 1980s level bandwidth for weeks due to connectivity issues and the upload won't go through.

Wow.

So, I guess what we're seeing with these ships is related to leadership failures at the highest levels?

 

[Navy_Pete]

Wow.

So, I guess what we're seeing with these ships is related to leadership failures at the highest levels?

Maybe management and leadership? I can't say I've done any time at sea with other navies, so not sure if they have the same extent of oversight and tracking.
It's also dependent on your readiness level; a ship that just came out of the ditch starts at zero, will be able to get the basics done, but won't be able to do the majority of the warfare related ones until you are done the tiered readiness program. Some are also mission/equipmet specific so you may go a whole cycle without completing the related readiness/training. So I guess it depends where they are tracking them, but the basic seafaring/damage control ones should stay current from when you get the thumbs up to leave the harbour until the ship goes into the dock 4 years later.

We have a lot, so the management is using the tools and planning it around the limited hours in the day (with scarce resources). The leadership does come into play when it's the really terrible training no one wants to do or people are half assing planned training sessions, or not showing up.  You make a lot of friends when you stop the daily duty watch exercise and restart it to get it right, but better than being unprepared when stuff goes wrong at 2 in the morning on a Friday of a long weeked (statistically the most likely time for things to happen).  You really make friends when you do it to an alongside duty watch in a foreign port somewhere warm while everyone else is on shore leave heading to the beach. But leadership is hard, otherwise everyone could do it.

It might be because we try and do so much with so little that it's a forcing function to make sure things you can control (like training) are up to date. Also everyone has multiple secondaries and responsibilities with lots of cross training, so unless you are organized it goes to pot. (Fun fact, stewards, clerks and cooks make up the bulk of our first aid organization.)

On the plus side, the checklists etc are all there in the CFCD with the requirements, and it's all tracked by someone, so nothing is a surprise, it's more of a matter of making a priority amongst all the other top priority items while jamming everything else into the overflowing 2.27 kg bag. It can be a huge pain in the ass, and some of the training requirements are unachievable without very specific circumstances that you only hit once every five years but you can find a balance between keeping all the critical ones up to date, progressing training, and doing maintenance. Not easy, and sometimes you let some items lapse for a bit until you can hit them (particularly the 30 day ones that you have to be at sea for that lapsed every time you go alongside for normal work periods), but it's a constant triage that's part of business.

 

[tomahawk6]

The investigation has now turned to the possibility of the McCain network being hacked however remote that might be. I would think it more likely that the merchant ship might have been hacked.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

The investigation has now turned to the possibility of the McCain network being hacked however remote that might be. I would think it more likely that the merchant ship might have been hacked.

Sure, maybe, but really unlikely given the reports of how the collision occurred.

A simple mechanical failure or driving error is much more likely.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Worth verifying but to have the hack work, you'd have to be watching the two ships and time it precisely so that they would collide.  I guess it could be done but if you had the capability I would think you'd want to not reveal that and keep it as a back pocket thing for when you are at war.

Human error or mechanical failure at a bad time happen all the time, and given all the information that has come out about the op tempo, training, crew experience and other issues probably more likely.

 

[The Bread Guy]

... I would think it more likely that the merchant ship might have been hacked.

You're not alone in thinking that ...

The Navy is making cyber investigations automatic after any mishap, starting with the at-sea collision that killed 10 sailors aboard the USS McCain. They don’t expect to find any evidence of a cyber attack this time, admirals emphasize, but they’re using the McCain as a test case.

If there was a cyber attack, however, it’s quite possible that there’s no evidence aboard the McCain to find. It would have been much easier for an adversary to hack the merchant ship involved in the accident, the Alnic MC, causing it to turn unexpectedly across the destroyer’s path. That’s the hypothesis — admittedly speculation — of a Navy IT expert we’ve featured previously in these pages, recently retired Capt. John Zimmerman. He commanded the submarine USS Jefferson City, served as deputy chief information officer at Navy Sea Systems Command, and now is vice-president at contractor SubSystems ...

 

[Navy_Pete]

The container ships have turning radiuses measured in miles.  Even if someone had hacked them and deliberately steered them towards the USN ship, they have the speed and maneuverability to stay out of their way.  That would be like a Zamboni changing course and taking out a Lamborghini.  Most likely someone just f'd up.

 

[tomahawk6]

Two more commanders have been relieved they are Radm Williams Task Force 70 commander and Destroyer Squadron 15 commander Captain Bennett.

https://www.stripes.com/navy-relieves-two-more-commanders-in-7th-fleet-after-deadly-collisions-1.488250#.Wb_fS1e0m70

YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, Japan — The Navy relieved two more commanders in 7th Fleet on Monday amid fallout from two deadly collisions involving the destroyers USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain.

Task Force 70 commander Rear Adm. Charles Williams and Destroyer Squadron 15 commander Capt. Jeffrey Bennett were both relieved of command by 7th Fleet commander Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer “due to a loss of confidence in their ability to command,” the Navy announced in a Monday statement.

As both the CTF 70 and Carrier Strike Group 5 commander, Williams had tactical control of 7th Fleet’s cruisers and destroyers, as well as Carrier Air Wing 5 and the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan.

Williams assumed command of CTF 70 in July 2016 from Rear Adm. John Alexander, who has since been promoted to vice admiral and took command of the U.S. 3rd Fleet on Friday.

As DESRON 15 commander, Bennett oversaw all destroyers assigned to 7th Fleet. He assumed command of DESRON 15 last year in September.

 

[tomahawk6]

When in doubt create a new headquarters to do something an existing one could do. The USN is standing up a group of 30 personnel to oversee ship readiness. Based on the guidelines this new unit would be commanded by either a Captain or Read Admiral.

https://www.stripes.com/news/new-navy-unit-will-keep-tabs-on-warship-readiness-in-western-pacific-1.488549#.WcJfdFe0m70

YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, Japan — The Navy is standing up a new unit to look at warship readiness in the Western Pacific following a string of serious accidents.

Naval Surface Group Western Pacific will focus on ships assigned to the 7th Fleet, Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, Naval Surface Forces commander, told Stars and Stripes on Wednesday. Rowden is in Japan this week visiting 7th Fleet ships at naval bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo.

Some have suggested lack of time for training, maintenance and certification is at least partly to blame for collisions involving 7th Fleet ships that have killed 17 sailors in recent months.

California-based Rowden, who oversees the manning, training and equipping of Navy ships, said he has talked to Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Scott Swift about the need for “eyes and ears on the waterfront.”

 

[Rifleman62]

http://video.foxnews.com/v/5581315796001/?#sp=show-clips

Senate lawmakers grill Navy

Sep. 19, 2017 - 2:44 - Angry lawmakers directed tough questions at the Navy's top officer Admiral John Richardson; national security correspondent Jennifer Griffin reports from the Pentagon

At 0:46 the Admiral explains how Watch Officers are trained.


https://www.c-span.org/video/?434151-1/naval-leadership-scolded-warship-collisions

You could watch the questions and answers all of 2.25 hrs:

SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
Navy Incidents at Sea Navy Secretary Richard Spencer and Admiral John Richardson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the recent ship incidents at sea. In August 2017, the USS John S. McCain collided with an oil tanker of the coast of Singapore, killing 10 sailors. In addition, seven sailors died in June when the USS Fitzgerald collided with a cargo ship in the Sea of Japan. Admiral Richardson, chief of naval operations, said the Navy had taken steps to evaluate safety standards, ship certifications, and force readiness. Committee Chair John McCain (R-AZ) called the incidents unacceptable and alarming and urged the Navy to take immediate actions.

Extracts:

...100 hour workweeks...."

......make no mistake we are not waiting sixty days or ninety days to make adjustments the scieno addressed a list of actions the seventh fleet is taking immediately to address the situation at hand ranging from ship to ship materiel inspections to the activation of A I S radar identifications while we're trafficking specific areas ........

 

[The Bread Guy]

When in doubt create a new headquarters to do something an existing one could do ...

A.k.a the "Canadian solution"?  >

 

[quadrapiper]

Navy Leaders Pledge to Solve Problems Stretching Limits of Sailors
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/us/politics/navy-hearing-armed-services-committee.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20170920&_r=0

With a proviso that context (what's being counted as work) for e.g. 100 hour work weeks isn't provided, I'm not sure where the USN hopes to find its "in case of war" buffer as far as crew performance, especially with the comment regarding less than four hours of sleep for weeks at a time.

 

[Ping Monkey]

After Deadly Collisions Navy will Broadcast Warship Locations in High Traffic Areas

https://news.usni.org/2017/09/19/deadly-collisions-navy-will-broadcast-warship-locations-high-traffic-areas

By: Ben Werner
September 19, 2017 6:32 PM


Following this year’s pair of deadly collisions between U.S. guided missile destroyers and merchant ships, the Navy is now considering whether it’s surface fleet is often too stealthy.

Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson were peppered with questions Tuesday about their efforts to prevent further collisions while appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

One of the immediate changes to fleet operations, according to Spencer and Richardson, is the Navy’s surface fleet ships will now announce their presence in heavily trafficked shipping lanes.

“Every boat on the Gulf of Maine has a radar on it. When there’s another boat within a mile, or two miles, or five miles and an alarm goes off and shows up on your GPS. How in the world does a billion-dollar destroyer not know there’s a freighter closing in on it? I don’t understand how this could possibly happen,” said Sen. Angus King (I-Maine). “I’ve talked to Maine lobstermen and they’re scratching their heads. They can tell when there’s a flock of seagulls of their bow.”

“Sir, I have the same questions,” Richardson responded. “It’s very hard to understand with the sophisticated systems onboard these warships that we let a ship get in that close to the point of collision.”

“Don’t we have sailors on the bridge with binoculars anymore?” King asked.

“We do,” Richardson said. “It’s required to have lookouts and we have lookouts on the bridge.”

Part of the problem isn’t the Navy’s ability to see who else is out there, Richardson said, but everyone else’s ability to spot Navy ships.

“Is there some technology that they couldn’t see us?” King asked. “Are we using a stealth technology?”

The quick answer was yes. The Navy is very good at disguising itself at sea, Richardson said. Navy ships are designed to appear as something much smaller when detected on the radar screens of other ships. Even in daylight, Navy ships are painted Haze Grey to make it very difficult for crews on enemy ships to make visual contact.

“We design our warships to have a lower radar cross-section. Some are designed to be very low,” Richardson said. “That degree of stealth makes us more effective from a warfighting standpoint.”

But this stealth also imposes a burden on Navy crews to understand non-threatening marine traffic will have difficulty recognizing the size, location, and speed of Navy ships, Richardson added. Crews need to be more like a “defensive driver.”

A quick fix, Richardson said, is now the surface fleet is supposed to use its automatic identification system – AIS – when in high traffic areas.

“AIS is primarily and foremost a navigation tool for collision avoidance,” according to Coast Guard instructions. “The AIS corroborates and provides identification and position of vessels not always possible through voice radio communication or radar alone.”

The U.S. Coast Guard requires most maritime traffic to use AIS in U.S. waters. U.S. Navy ships, and other government vessels, are not required to use AIS, the maritime navigation safety communications system, standardized by the International Telecommunication Union and adopted by the International Maritime Organization.

According to the Coast Guard, AIS sends out vessel information including identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status, and other safety-related information. The system also receives such safety-related information from other ships.

While the Navy has for years had AIS onboard, Richardson said the system was rarely used.

“We had, I think, a distorted perception of operational security that we kept that system secure – off – on our warships,” Richardson said. “One of the immediate actions following these incidents – particularly in heavily trafficked areas we’re just going to turn it on.”

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

As St-Paul said on the road to Damascus:

"I have seen the light"

Or ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lX5tfRdkoY0

 

[dimsum]

Crew rest coming down the pipe for the ships? 

Navy issues new sleep and watch schedule rules for the surface fleet

...While the guidance does not mandate any specific schedule, it will likely mean the end of grueling 5-hours on, 10-hours off watch schedules, known as “five and dimes,” because that does not align with circadian rhythms and a 24-hour daily cycle.

“You’re going to have to form some level of watch bill that protects sailors’ sleep,” Naval Surface Force spokesman Cmdr. John Perkins said.

Commanders will also take into account a ship’s manning level, deployment status and current missions for such watch calculations, he said.

More at link

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/09/20/navy-issues-new-sleep-and-watch-schedule-rules-for-the-surface-fleet/