I got my hands on that American Cavalry Operations PAM, and was suprised at just how "Canadian" it really was. There are sections in it that I swear are lifted right out of "The Recce Squadron in Battle" and "The Recce Troop Leader's Manual". A lot of the doctrine just really isn't that different.
The one big difference though is that US Cavalry formations are expected to be able to conduct attacks within their combat power, where Canadian doctrine for the last 20 years or so has de-emphasized that. Here's a telling passage:
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
Actions on contact are a series of combat actions taken on contact with the enemy to develop the situation. Obstacles are treated like enemy contact since they are assumed to be covered by fire. The element making contact initiates these actions and they occur at each level of command, often simultaneously. Units perform these actions whether or not the enemy has detected the presence of the scout. Actions on contact are as follows:
* Deploy and report.
* Develop the situation.
* Choose a course of action.
* Recommend or execute a course of action.
Deploy and Report
Upon encountering an obstacle or enemy force, the element of the troop making contact deploys to a covered position affording observation and fields of fire. If necessary, the element uses direct fire to suppress the enemy, allowing freedom to maneuver. An immediate contact report is submitted with whatever information is available. This report alerts the commander and allows him to begin necessary actions.
Develop the Situation
The leader of the element in contact develops the situation to define the threat being faced, using various reconnaissance techniques as appropriate. These techniques range from stealthy dismounted reconnaissance, mounted reconnaissance, and reconnaissance by fire-both direct and indirect. The troop or squadron commander continues the mission with other elements to a designated limit of advance. Doing so helps to develop the situation across the front and provides more maneuver space to execute subsequent action. Once a clearer picture of the situation is developed, detailed spot reports are forwarded.
Choose a Course of Action
Once the leader in contact has gathered enough information to make a decision, he selects a course of action. The course of action should adhere to the intent of the commander, be within the capability of the unit, and allow the unit to resume the mission as soon as possible. For an obstacle, these courses of action are a hasty breach or bypass. For enemy contact, courses of action consist of the following:
* Hasty attack. A hasty attack is executed if sufficient combat power is available, and it will not detract from mission accomplishment. A hasty attack is executed by at least a troop, which can mass adequate combat power.
* Bypass. The enemy may be bypassed if sufficient combat power is not available, or if an attack will jeopardize mission accomplishment. The unit requests permission to bypass unless stated in orders. The commander must keep a minimum force in contact with the bypassed enemy.
* Hasty defense. If a hasty attack is not possible or a bypass is not feasible, the leader establishes a hasty defense or screen. The unit will conduct a hasty defense if it can defend against an enemy force. If the enemy contact exceeds the unit's capability to defend, it may elect to establish a screen and maintain contact through observation. The unit concentrates on maintaining contact with the enemy and fixing it in place with indirect or possibly direct fire until additional combat power can be brought to bear from supporting units.
Recommend a Course of Action
Once the leader has selected a course of action, he reports it to his commander. The commander approves or disapproves the course of action based upon its impact on the overall mission. The SOP may provide automatic approval of certain actions to avoid unnecessary delay. If the higher commander assumes responsibility to continue developing the situation, the leader in contact supports his actions as ordered.
I *love* this sequence! I think it very effectively encapsulates the choices availible to any recce commander on contact. It's a great little bit of writing.
Canadian recce doctrine fits this model too - it has just assumed though that the combat power of the troop to be so small, and the offensive power of the enemy (Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment supported by Divisional artillery) so large, that effectively the "hasty attack" option on contact is de facto suicidal, and so is doctrinally taken off the table.
But with the additional combat power of Coyote, and the reduced (although not eliminated) combat power of our typical near-future opponents, it seems to me that the "hasty attack" option is now feasible, and if the situation permits, even desirable. Am I really going to force the brigade advance off the preferred MSR just to bypass a guy with an RPG? Am I going to commit the brigade's combat powerto clearing that guy out, when I am capable of dealing with him myself without overly delaying my advance? (Part of the combat estimate before committing myself to an attack is: Does attacking get me back to my recce task faster than bypassing?)
Scale this up, with a very large follow-on formation, and the American combined-arms Cavalry Regiment starts to make a lot of sense. Large formations have a lot of inertia. It takes time - sometimes, a lot of time - for a large formation to deploy from the march, do battle procedure, etc. Sometimes it is better to have a smaller, more nimble force take on smaller forces and just get them out of the way. If you are a recce force screening a Division (or 2 or 3...) having a lot of integral combat power makes a lot of sense, because you can clear out forces that would be wasteful in time and space to use a Division on.
The Soviets were big on that too. That whole progression of forces starting with the CRP etc was designed to push small, combat capable subunits forward so they could handle small forces on their own without involving the bigger forces behind - and if they were *too* small to handle whatever they encountered, successively larger friendly units were on their way to help.
Biggest problem with this in a Canadian context? No big formations to screen for. We aren't likely to be fielding the First Canadian Army any time soon, so it won't need the First Canadian Cavalry Regiment to screen for it. The combat capacity of an American cavalry unit isn't necessarily necessary if we aren't going to be expected to take out small-ish enemy formations in order to prevent forcing the deployment of a large formation from march order to a fighting stance.
Now what I *CAN* see Canadian Cavalry doing is advancing into an new AOR to recce out the area in advance of it being occupied by a Canadian contingent. I can see a Canadian Cavalry mission used to extend the influence of a base camp by conducting patrols of larger radius and longer duration, covering more ground and staying away from base longer than those typically performed by the infantry. I can see Canadian Cavalry acting as a long distance rapid reaction force, moving rapidly to counter a threat and fixing it in place (or screening it in retrograde if it is too big to fix) for subsequent follow-on attack by heavier and slower forces. I can see Canadian Cavalry doing convoy escorts and zone surveilliance.
And really... three Recce troops with Coyote, plus an Assault Troop with LAV-III... that fits the bill. It certainly wouldn't hurt to have some direct fire punch (ideally a troop or two of tanks, but something like Rookiat is probably acceptable too) I don't see the need for organic artillery or engineers - if we really need them for the mission, they can be attached from a higher formation.
Oddly, this is almost exactly what current doctrine calls for now. It's almost like it isn't broken.....
DG
That's what discussion and debate is all about.
