"Trading Saber for Stealth" or "Are We a One Trick Pony?"

[TangoTwoBravo]

Not to get too far down the the vehicle design road here, but I wonder about having the crew commander up front with a 25mm weapon firing over his head.  Call me old-fashioned, but I don't like the idea of forcing the commander to be hatches down, even if he has episcopes and other optics. 

Other than that the specs for the vehicle look good.  What is the level of protection envioned?  I'd like it to be small arms and fragment proof.  I'd also like to offer protection against RPGs, IEDs and mines.  By protection I mean that the crew survives, although the vehicle may not be able to continue.

2B

 

[a_majoor]

Since the vehicle is going to be small, it was a bit challenging deciding where to put everything. Anyway, if the gunner has to"light up" a target, I expect everyone else will be dropping inside the vehicle pretty quickly! For extra protection I will go with a Leopard C 2 or Urdan style hatch system which can provide overhead cover. If we postulate a DFS version, there could be a two man turret with a 40mm+ cannon, so the commander will be able to operate "normally".

I think with modern composite materials and some clever shaping of the hull, you can have protection against 14.5mm all aspects and at least a single AT mine. External stowage bins will have a similar effect as the "Birdcage" and be useful for the crew. I once saw a modified Coyote which had all external stowage removed and the muffler replaced to reduce thermal and radar signatures, and a smooth exterior of closed and latched bins would provide a similar effect for our vehicle. I havn't specified a DAS, although something along those lines would be useful, and an active protection suite would not be as limiting as one in a combat team setting, since the patrols will be operating in a more dispersed manner and not usually with dismounted Infantry and Engineers close by.

One of the biggest challenges will be power management, with all the electronic devices aboard. The LeClerc tank uses a very small gas turbine to act as a constant speed turbocharger (as the engine picks up from idle, more and more of the energy to spin the turbine comes from the exhaust) as well as an engine pre heater and an APU (a high speed alternator is also driven off the turbine). Given a proper muffler system, there is your power source for silent overwatch. Any GD lurkers want to put together a prototype?

JPz Raket and Kannone information was cribbed from one of those old Osprey(?) AFV paperbacks, so I could well be wrong. Given the size and shape of these things, I understand where the idea would have come from...

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Leaving the details of design for a moment, I'd like to go back to first principles for a moment.  What tasks are implied in the role of reconnaissance?  From these tasks will fall capabilities that our equipment, training, doctrine and organization will need to produce.

Do we accept that a possible bare bones role of reconnaissance forces (at any level) is to obtain information for the supported commander regarding the enemy and terrain (and weather etc etc)?  If so, what tasks are implicit?

    a.  reconnaissance (the active search for information)?

    b.  surveillance (the monitoring of a given area for a given time)?

    c.  other tasks?

What do our reconnaissance forces need to be able to do to achieve these tasks? 

    a.  the ability to move about on the battlefield (does that capability require more than just a means of locomotion)?

    b.  the ability to detect opposing (or friendly) forces in all conditions?

    c.  the ability to communicate information found?

    d.  the ability to conduct analysis before the information is sent?

    e.  the ability to fight for information?

I'd say that the first capability requirement is probably the most difficult to achieve and will provide a lot of controversy.

Is "counter-reconnaissance" part of the role of reconnaissance, or should that be the role of some other type of organization?

Thoughts?

 

[a_majoor]

I think Major Taylor would probably agree with the list based on his paper, and is suggesting thet there is no "passive" way to get this information in the quality and quantity required.

Your second block (What do our reconnaissance forces need to be able to do to achieve these tasks) pretty much spells out the need for armoured mobility to actively seek out information in a hostile or potentially hostile environment. To be able to move not only implies some means of locomotion, but also protection (the enemy is using various weapons systems to reduce your mobility, after all). Major Taylor also stresses that "speed of movement" is our asymmetrical advantage, which leads to the conclusion that "stealth" is of only limited utility.

Counter reconaissance is a more difficult question. In the "heavy metal" scenario, this is very straight forward, you can have DFSVs in your patrols or attach tanks and so on. In the "Full Spectrum" environment, enemy recce is likely to be some kids with a cell phone. The Recce organization should still have some means to deal with this (electronic disruption of cell phone towers, dismounting patrolmen to talk to the kids and maybe scroll through the last number called records), but I think (SWAG) that the most effective means of doing counter-recce would be to have our recce able to identify enemy "recce" and vector other means ranging from MPs to a CIMIC team to deal with them.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am still to be convinced by anybody that "recconaissance" and "advancing to contact" and possibly "reacting to effective enemy fire" are not all being conflated here.

I understand the tempo issue,  the desire to act as soon as information becomes available, although there does seem a counter-argument that wishes to slow reaction to permit effective response.

But reading Maj. Taylor and others here it seems to me that at heart we have a difference in understanding of recce, in part driven by the fact that the US Cavalry maintained their independence from the Armoured Corps largely by accepting the recce role, one of many tasks the Cavalry has traditionally performed, but also wished to maintain their role as a "fighting" formation.

They conduct recconaissance, they lead the advance to contact and as a result they initiate an enemy response and end up reacting to effective enemy fire.  At that point the formation commander will start feeding in other arms to try to win  the battle. 

The question that intrigues me is, if the Cavalry is heavily engaged, tied down or damaged by effective enemy fire, and the recce elements of the Cavalry are "no longer" useful (as far as the Cavalry commander is concerned) once the enemy has been engaged, who is running the picquets on the flanks and rear to ensure that the enemy isn't moving "undetected" forces into position?

It seems that the argument about the need for "active" measures to gain information is akin to what we used to call "recce by fire".  If you don't know if there is enemy in the bush line, spray the bushes and watch to see what you flush out.  In most situations all you are likely to have done is give away your own positions and strength.

there is no "passive" way to get this information in the quality and quantity required

What I take from this is that until the enemy is engaged there is no way to fully appreciate the enemy's strength, deployment, capabilities and intention.  I thought this was always a given and why formations (whether platoon or corps) tended to advance 1 or 2 up with 2 or 1 back.

As I've suggested previously, I don't think recce will ever tell you "Col Mustard in the living room with a candlestick". It might tell you that Col Mustard isn't in barracks, the candlestick is missing and there is nobody in any of the other rooms in the house.  You'll have to make of that information what you will - whether he brought along a couple of friends, more heavily armed, is probably not going to be known until you kick down the door.  At that point it would seem likely to have some back-up available.

However to blame the lack of info on recce is misguided IMHO.  As misguided as expecting recce to bust down the door and count the number of people in the room shooting at them.  What you guys seem to be debating is not who should kick down the door but whether they should complete the job themselves and take out the occupants. This pretty much eliminates the need for inf/armd/arty/eng.  The alternative you seem to be offeing is, having kicked the door in, and alerting the occupants (taking casualties in the process) whether they should then withdraw to allow heavy forces to move in and complete the job - likely allowing the Col and his minions to move on with the candlestick still in possession.

Again, IMHO, it seems much more reasonable, after recce has reduced the possibilities to a single door, or maybe multiple doors that are manageable with forces available, to move heavy forces up to do the door-kicking and re-position recce to make sure the Col doesn't abscond and to give warning if any more of his buddies are coming to the party.

Negative information, absence of evidence, is as important as positive information.  For me, it is as important to find out where my competitors ARE NOT, as to  find out where they ARE and what they are doing.  My opportunities come from the open ground, not the contested ground.

For the strategists amongst you look up the Lanchester Strategy.

Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

I certainly don't intend to have recce as "door kickers", but the point of this mental execise is to figure out the best way to do recce in a Full Spectrum" environment.

Trying to put Major Taylors arguments into your analogy:

Col Mustard moves around a lot, so you often don't have the time to sneak up on him.

Col Mustard very rarely wears his uniform, but has been seen wearing a track suit in the local gym, dressed in a suit and tie outside the courthouse and wearing jeans and a sweater in the local Tim Horton's. Trying to get an ID using passive sensor technology is difficult, because everyone else in the gym, courthouse and Tim's is wearing similar attire and doing similar things. Passive sensor enthusiasts will tell you you can piquit a Tim Horton's with a UAV or similar, but even if you catch a glimpse of the wiley old Colonel, what exactly is he doing there? This is the problem of "templating" or "Blobology" Maj Taylor is addressing.

When you are moving around to see if Col Mustard and his gang are in the area, there is a possibility that they might surprise you instead. If you are in a Jeep/Illtis/G-wagon/HMMVW "Scout"/etc., this could be Very Bad (with a BIG capital "B"). The possibility that Col Mustard could do this to you might reduce your ability to find him, as "light" recce assets are consigned to the rear (as the scout platoons were in OIF and the Persian Gulf War).

If Col Mustard is to take the .455 Magnum Express off the wall and go hunting you, using your firepower to reply is appropriate. In most instances, though, he isn't yet interested in shooting you, so you need other alternative means to find out what is happening. Moving swiftly from place to place with a fair degree of confidence helps a lot (narrowing down the places he is or isn't), so do the ability to pull out that brass bound telescope to scan the area, or send a few people to take a look around where you have difficulty otherwise in going or seeing (complex human or physical terrain). Armoured mobility gives you the ability to cast a wide net and makes it harder for the enemy to stop you from doing so.

Winding back to some other threads (Our (maybe) new recce vehicle and ones about the RG-31), we are focusing on specific tasks and getting some really good kit to do these things, but the G-Wagon or proposed Eagle IV is really appropriate for low to medium areas of the "Full spectrum ops", and the RG-31 isn't really Sabre or Stealth, which leaves a big gap should we need to go live in the high end of full spectrum ops. Perhaps designing a special purpose recce vehicle was a bit whimsicle on my part, but as 2Bravo says, we need to look at the entire picture to decide on organization, training and equipment.

The question that intrigues me is, if the Cavalry is heavily engaged, tied down or damaged by effective enemy fire, and the recce elements of the Cavalry are "no longer" useful (as far as the Cavalry commander is concerned) once the enemy has been engaged, who is running the picquets on the flanks and rear to ensure that the enemy isn't moving "undetected" forces into position?

This is the danger of the American model, Armoured Cavalry teams are able to act as combat teams, and there seems to be a distinct desire or at least willingness to do so when confronted with an enemy. On the other hand, the HMMVW equipped scout platoons were unable to move fast enough in stealth mode, and unable to deal with enemy forces when attempting to lead the way in a high speed advance. There needs to be a middle ground, which gives us the ability to move and act with the proper speed, without carrying out the fight ourselves.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

I had to get out the dictionary to figure out what "conflate" meant.

I suppose that there are several techniques available to find the enemy.  We have some technical means that minimize exposure but perhaps take a lot of time or do not give us enough information.  At the other extreme we can lead with combat teams and define the enemy through contact.

I should note here that the US Cavalry was (the last time I checked) part of the Armor branch.  In the US constructs I trained under, Battalions had "scouts" and scouts alone. These were in HMMVWs at the time.  The scouts conducted reconnaissance for their battalion/task force.  Divisions had a Cavalry Squadron.  These Squadrons had Troops composed of both Scout and Tank Platoons.  Cavalry forces provide protection to a supported formation.  Part of that protection is the prevention of suprise (finding the enemy without having to put your main body into an ambush or kill zone).  Another part is the prevention of the enemy's detection of the supported force (which can include finding and killing the enemy recon).  The scouts in a Cav unit (usually M3 Bradleys in the "heavy divsions" and "heavy ACR" would find the enemy.  The tank platoons would destroy enemy recon found by the scouts or fight to get the scouts out of a tight spot.

During offensive operations, a Cavalry unit could have several tasks.  It could be conducting an area or zone reconnaissance which involves finding out where the enemy is and getting info on the ground.  The Cavalry would stop once they found the enemy's main defensive area.  Along the way they would neutralize the enemy's security forces to conceal the location and intentions of the main body.  At least one Troop (company sized element) would also have the task of flank security.  They would rarely, if ever, go in and attack a position.  This is left to the follow-on main body.

I guess my point is that the US Cavalry had a Reconnaissance task as well as a robust security task.  The scouts were a big part of that equation.  I should point out, however, that despite the nearby presence of the M1 platoons the scouts in the Bradleys would still seek to employ stealth and avoid disclosure.  One way they did this was through the two scouts in the back of each Bradley.  On NTC rotations (Brigades did not have Cavalry of its own, but the Brigade went alone), the Task Forces would often form a "counter-reconnaissance" team by combining the Battalion scouts with a tank/mech infantry team to provide their own security.

I see "active" recce as being more than simply shooting up a woodline and seeing if anybody shoots back.  Active reconnaissance (to me, a redundant expression) simply means that you are going out to look for the enemy and not relying on seeing him with passive/static systems.  You are accepting some risk to get in relatively close and thereby gain sufficient information on the enemy to prevent suprises for you own side.

I would argue that stealth alone or achieving stand-off will not get the job done.  Our recce forces need some protection to get close enough.  Firepower is an interesting question.  What threat should recce elements be capable of dealing with on their own (even if they are part of a cavalry-style force)?

Cheers,

2B

 

[DG-41]

Is "counter-reconnaissance" part of the role of reconnaissance, or should that be the role of some other type of organization?

It absolutely is, for the stupid simple reason that the first people to encounter the other guy's recce elements will be our own recce elements (assuming that our recce elements are doing their job correctly) and there is an opportunity to blind the other guy and deny him information in the very early stages of the operation.

The risk you run is that our recce gets bogged down chasing the other guy's recce around, and so denies our commander his eyeballs - consider Stuart's absence at Gettysburg, and what that meant to Lee. But consider also that the primary reason that Stuart was absent at Gettysburg was that he had clashed with Custer at Hanover.

I love Gettysburg because it is so instructive as to the power of recce used correctly. Custer conducts a counter-recce operation that ties up Stuart (Lee's recce) at a crucial moment. Buford crosses the ground at Gettysburg and realizes the tactical importance of the ground, and when he contacts Lee's vanguard in the low ground, deploys himself as infantry to force Lee (blinded by the absence of Stuart) to himself deploy in disadvantageous ground and giving the advantageous ground to his own follow-on forces.

In the language of the new doctrine, this is "battle shaping recce" at its finest.

Recce needs to be able to fight. It doesn't need to be able to bring overwhelming firepower to bear (and if you try, you create a force that is too large and ponderous to do a proper recce job) But it needs enough integral firepower to be able to exploit the rare golden opportunity when it occurs and is recognized. Buford and Custer at Gettysburg, or Lt Ed Perkins at the Melfa River - these are examples of the sweet crunchy goodness that can happen when recce choses to fight.

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

If we keep this I up I'm afraid Parker Bros is going to start claiming copyright infringement.  ;D

WRT the good Col.'s movements - it sounds like we need more bodies with better reporting skills in the gym, the courthouse and at Timmy's.  They might even be able to overhear a conversation of two.  Much better by far if the Col. doesn't know they're in attendance I would have thought.  Passive sensors might be appropriate if you can plant the mike and a camera and disappear unobtrusively. And if a UAV is available, why waste it picqueting? Once the Col.  is detected/suspected why not try and track him from 10,000 feet?

The question to be asked though is what is our intention.  To protect the house from all comers or to eliminate Col. Mustard from contention?

Moving on to the vehicle - What was that about shine, shape, shadow, silhouette, movement?  I thought movement made it more likely that you would be detected and possibly surprised. While I agree that could be a very bad thing (leading to the infamous "Contact, wait....." followed by the hiss of static) by attacking you the Col. has confirmed presence and intention.  Higher is duly informed and acts accordingly.  

Do you see more on the move or when static? Are you more of a target on the move or static? When you are leading a formation in an advance to contact you are forced to move and keep moving.  How does that compare with conducting patrols and OPs in a fixed AO with "permanent" bases?  When you are conducting these operations should you opt for a beat up Toyota Corolla so as to blend into the scenery on the highways and in the cities or adopt a vehicle that attracts attention and needs armouring?  If working outside populated areas what type of vehicle best supplies mobility and avoids attention?  Armouring can be done unobtrusively so that even if a vehicle stands out from the background it can at least pass itself off as any other vehicle?  If you stick a RWS or Turret with a gun on it doesn't that immediately make the vehicle more noticeable and more identifiable?

IMHO the vehicles necessary to lead a formation advance to contact are not the same vehicles necessary to recce and survey a fixed AO in a peace support operation.  Bradley's and Abrams may indeed be the right solution for the former.  Are they the right solution for the latter?  I tend to agree with you on the Eagle IV / Duro vehicles as being compatible with low/med intensity conflicts - but that is what you are involved in currently.  

If we accept that recce, like ISTAR is a process, then it is platform independent.  The basic skills of the recce patrolman or trooper seem likely to be the same whether he/she is riding a Lynx, M151, Motorcycle, Bicycle, Black Caddy's or some armoured creation currently available or otherwise.  If that is the case then it seems reasonable that a variety of vehicles could be purchased that would get the job done.

Lessee.  A LAV III costs about 4 MUSD.  An RG-31 costs about 1 MUSD.  An FMTV or LSVW costs about 100 KUSD.  Assuming a limited budget of 12 MUSD then that could offer the prospect of splitting it 1/3 - 1/3 - 1/3 in which case the force could supply itself with 1 LAV III for 4 MUSD, 4 RG-31 for the second 4 MUSD and 40 LSVW vehicles for the third 4 MUSD.  That leaves a fleet of 45 vehicles for 45 crews all of which are learning skills that can be moved up to the other vehicles or can be broadly applied in a variety of theatres depending on the intensity of the threat.

Play with combinations and permutations to heart's content.  

The single vehicle concept is likely to yield only 3 LAV IIIs, inadequate to operate effectively in any environment and with no platforms available for other troops to operate and learn on, not to mention no replacements for vehicles or personnel.

WRT your final comment on the Recce/Cav "There needs to be a middle ground, which gives us the ability to move and act with the proper speed, without carrying out the fight ourselves."

This sounds reasonable to me.  My son gets entirely fed up with three words that dominate our discussions "eventually, compromise and balance".  #4 is Moderation.

2B,

The critical parts of your comments for me were:

I guess my point is that the US Cavalry had a Reconnaissance task as well as a robust security task.

You are accepting some risk to get in relatively close and thereby gain sufficient information on the enemy to prevent suprises for you own side.

I would argue that stealth alone or achieving stand-off will not get the job done.  Our recce forces need some protection to get close enough.

By accepting a "robust" security task aren't you encouraging moving away from the primary focus of gathering information for the commander and the rest of the force?

Isn't there a degree of contradiction there? You want to get as close as possible to gain information.  Fair Enuff.  But don't you want to do that without being detected? Once you are detectected two bad things happen: one to you (your immediate concern) but the other is that once the enemy detects you you have supplied him with information and is likely to change his plan - not necessarily to the benefit of your formation commander's plan.

I can understand the desire to be protected if detected but not if the protection itself makes you more detectable.

Sitting back comfortably in my armchair  

DG - funny you mentioned Stuart.  I was just thinking of him myself in terms of drawing off the screen and getting bogged down.  I was also thinking of Rupert's cavalry in the English Civil War being drawn off and unavailable in their heavy "shock" role.



 

 

[George Wallace]

Talk about becoming convoluted.

In the examples of Col. Mustard, I would hesitate to say that he is no longer a concern of Recce.  He is a problem for SF and Sons of Sinister Sam to deal with.  Recce has more obvious Military targets to look for, not someone like the Col blending in with a civilian population.

Recce in the Counter-Recce role, as stated by DG is a monumental waste of resources and compromises Security.  Our Recce will Report their Recce passing through and have follow-on forces dispatch them.  Infantry Anti-tank platoons can take on the job, as can Arty or Fast Air.  No need to announce our presence to a few Enemy Recce cars.  We so not engage other Recce, unless it is a last resort in self-defence.

Some of the problem with this discusion is the difference of Trades and Experience involved.  We have people applying Infantry Recce to Armd Recce.  We have people applying US Cav doctrine to CA Armd Doctrine.  It is getting rather convoluted in the attempts to come to a concensus of where we are going.

 

[Kirkhill]

In the examples of Col. Mustard, I would hesitate to say that he is no longer a concern of Recce.

Thank God.. I was expecting a call from Parker Bros. any moment.

 

[TCBF]

I haven't a Clue(TM) what you guys are talking about.

;D

Tom

 

[a_majoor]

The problem here is the enemy gets a vote, and we need to be as adaptable as possible to figgure out which ballot is being cast.

Major Taylor's examples from OIF are very illustrative. Although the Coalition could "see" the disposition of Republican Guard formations, they could not determine what their intent was through sensor technology. The sensors determined some formations were strung out in ways which did not fit any standard "template", but a few encounters with the Republican Guard that netted prisoners cleared up a lot of questions. The Fedayeen Saddam were another paramilitary formation which attacked the lines of communications using irregular warfare tactics (blending in with the civil population, using suicide bombers etc.), which sounds right up Recce's alley with rear area security. 

After major combat operations ceased, the focus of the battle shifted to the Jihadis, who attack both the coalition forces as well as the Iraqi population and infrastructure. Once again, Armoured Recce with its ability to move quickly and cast a wide net using everything from surveillance sensors to dismounted patrolmen could have a role in defining where the enemy is, as a means of vectoring in Infantry forces to conduct close recce and the "boys" to deliver the kinetic effects once we discover which Tim's the good (bad) Colonel is visiting. WRT UAVs or hidden microphones, having the Recce units setting up snap VCPs and conducting surveillance is a way of focusing the attention of the shadowy people who employ such things (negative information, i.e. where they are not, is very important in this situation). In the situations above, the sudden escalation of force when encountering the enemy (for any reason) made doing these tasks in "light" vehicles extremely dangerous.

Kirkhill, while each vehicle you have suggested is the "best" in the proper context, unless the enemy is monumentally stupid or you have a huge resource pool, you will end up with the wrong piece of kit at the wrong time. As our friend Donald Rumsfeldt said, "you fight with the army you have, not the army you desire". An earlier poster corrected me when I suggested we take the surveillance masts out of the recce squadrons and place them on modified RG-31s, while a "good idea" we simply don't have the resources to do so. A relatively small "general purpose" armoured recce vehicle like the design exercise I indulged in gives you a fairly wide range of options in a wide range of situations. The Coyote is what we have in the here and now, so we have to adapt TTPS to make the most of it.  Driving around in a beat up Toyota Land Cruiser or a delivery truck is not the perview of Armoured Recce, check out the sign on the side of the truck: "John's Trout Farm".

Counter recce is such a can of worms in the Full Spectrum environment that I would suggest starting a new thread on the topic. As a practical matter, I would want the Recce crews to have at least the limited ability to perform the task. George has the right idea for the heavy metal scenarios, but what should you do when the enemy "recce" is a kid with a cell phone? A guy on a motorcycle (who might have a counter recce task of riding into you and detonating an IED)? The CBC correspondent?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

George,

I suppose I am deliberately asking some basic questins and trying to get at some basic assumptions.  Brining in Cavalry and other elements might cloud it somewhat, but I am seeing if we come up with something outside of the schoolhouse answer.  Perhaps we want a Cavalry capability and not just a Recce one?  Are we trying to give Cavalry capabilities to Recce vehicles?  We Canadians tend to assume away the counter-reconnaissnace piece, since we never fight a real enemy.  A few CMTC serials may change this.

DG41,

I would argue that Buford (my man) was in command of a Cavalry force, not a purely reconnaissance force.  The opening phase of Gettysburg is the classic Cavalry case study.  Cavalry can conduct the "cover" mission, which includes more than just finding the enemy.  Cavalry includes the capability to conduct fighting (if not going in and pushing off infantry/artillery forces).  Buford's men could dismount and fight and he had some cannons with him.  He could, therefore, fight a "covering" action to allow the follow-on forces to occupy the key terrain. (p.s. This does not mean that I want scouts in the Coyote to dismount and fight).

Kirkhill,

A moving system will usually be at a tactical disadvantage to a static one (all else being equal) since the moving vehicle is easier to see.  Life is hard sometimes, especially when your army is advancing.  I'm no big fan of "recce by death", but we will need to advance from time to time without knowing where the enemy is.  I suggest that we plan to employ stealth but be able to survive your own mistakes and the supported commander's lack of patience.  Planning to rely on stealth alone could lead to either massive losses in recce elements or the decision by the commander not to use them.  We probably need to find the middle ground.

I am in favour of blending in, but we'd need to trick out the Toyotas with an up-armour package.  I don't know if 16 RG31s give the same capabilities as 4 Coyotes.  Our biggest costs are personnel related.

All,

What fighting ability to we want for our recce forces?  Do we leave counter-reconnaissance to follow-on forces or do we design and build Cavalry style units that incorporate hunters and killers?

 

[DG-41]

I would argue that Buford (my man) was in command of a Cavalry force, not a purely reconnaissance force.

And I can't really argue against that. But I can point out that the difference between "Calvalry" and "Recce" are points along a gradiant, not hard definitions with sharply defined boundaries. And Buford having guns is not a hard indicator of the "calvalry" mission, as the artillery has historically been the main offensive weapon of recce.

OK, Buford's attached artillery was direct fire, not indirect fire... but you see what I'm getting at.

It's my opinion that "recce" and "cavalry" have always had the same basic mission, but in the Cold War era, the Soviets had so much artillery and so much front-loaded direct fire assets that there was no way that any "fighting recce" could hope to survive very long without adding so much of its own heavy assets that it became a de facto heavy unit itself. In the face of all that firepower, the only real option was to go for extreme steath - at the loss of a lot of useful capability.

But now that making contact no longer means that the Soviet Army Front Artillery obliterates the grid square you're hiding in, perhaps we can start returning some of the more cavalry-esque recce missions, per WW2 experience and Gen Buford and similar examples.

Certainly the Cold War skills of rapid rates of advance, high stealth, self-sufficiancy, and flexibility and inventiveness in the face of the enemy are still useful. Couple that with some limited warfighting capability, and you've got yourself a rapidly-deployable, fast-moving, and highly flexible and self-sufficient force. (and cheap, when compared to heavy forces like mech infantry or massed tank units)

But while I am advocating a return to giving recce the abillity to fight, I'm NOT advocating adopting the American "heavy cavalry" model either. If it's "cavalry" we're advocating here, it's LIGHT cavalry. Recce can fight, but it shouldn't be SEEKING a fight unless it is particularly advantageous to do so (the Buford example), it is needed to grab a key feature in advance of slower, heavier forces arriving (the Melfa River example) or it has an opportunity to disable enemy recce and blind the enemy commander (the Custer example)

But even then, the tradeoff is that when you are fighting, you aren't dong the recce job, and if you get too caught up in the fighting aspect, then you may be denying your own commander vital information (the Stuart example) - and not just during the actual firefight, but afterwards, when you have to regroup and resupply to make up your (inevitable) losses.

So there's a lot of tradeoffs and compromises going on, and a recce commander must always be evaluating how his actions affect the flow of the battle both locally and in the bigger picture. Given that recce's biggest asset is freedom of movement, compromising that by getting sucked into an extended dustup had better pay some pretty big dividends (in the big picture sense) for doing so.

An eight car recce troop, equipped with Coyote, with two scouts per car, makes for a pretty effective light cavalry unit. I even think that a mixed RG31-ish and Coyote (6 RG-31, 2 Coyote) makes for a pretty good force mix, and while it might not have the firepower of an all-Coyote troop, it probably has *enough* firepower for a light cavalry role (and it'd be better at stealth - and cheaper - than an all-Coyote troop too)

DG



 

 

[TCBF]

"....face of all that firepower, the only real option was to go for extreme steath - at the loss of a lot of useful capability"

- Well....  Fact is, when you employ the Izzard Triangle Theory (Us+Them+Ground/Density), there was no chance for stealth because there was no ROOM for stealth.  You can't find out about the major routes and bridges if every time you go near one you die.  Also, every en c/s you bypass is one that will shoot YOU in the back as you pass his new OP on the way to your next point.

It works on JCATS?  Uh, OK, how many 'B' vehs are in the JCATS OPFOR orbat?  Now, in real life, when you consider that every single woods and village in the WarPac rear would have had something in it, just how long would dainty recce survive?

4 Cdn Mech Suicide Recce Sqn indeed!  When 'Roman' joked  years ago about losing the Regimental Polo Team in one fell swoop during on the withdrawl to the channel in a 3rd World War, he wasn't entirely joking, methinks.

Tom

 

[a_majoor]

This argument is neither new, or even particularly "American" or "Canadian"

I stumbled across this, a translation of a captured German document during WWII, they are concerned their organization is too light and are considering how to make it more effective.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/armored-reconnaissance-ww2.html

"Suggested Reorganization of the Rifle Company of a German Armored Reconnaissance Battalion" from Tactical and Technical Trends

A report based on a captured German document in North Africa which details a German unit's suggestions for the reorganization of the rifle company of a German panzer reconnaissance battalion, from Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 24, May 6, 1943.

[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from the U.S. War Department publication Tactical and Technical Trends. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]

SUGGESTED REORGANIZATION OF THE RIFLE COMPANY OF A GERMAN ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

The following is an extract from a document prepared by a rifle company of a German armored reconnaissance battalion. While the reconnaissance battalion is no longer included in the German armored division, its functions having been taken over by a division motorcycle battalion, this document is felt to be of interest in that it shows how the principle of decentralization, visible throughout the entire German army, is given emphasis. Furthermore, German tactical groupings organized along lines essentially similar to both the units discussed below may well be encountered. The document has reference to operations in North Africa against the British during the early summer of 1942. The extract therefrom follows:

*          *          *

a. Present Organization, Equipment, and Functions

(1) Organization and Equipment

The organization and equipment of the company consists of:

Three light platoons, each with seven armored half-track personnel carriers, and one 37-mm antitank gun on an armored half-track.

One heavy platoon with nine armored half-track personnel carriers, and two armored half-tracks with heavy mortars.

In all there are 37 half-tracks, of which 32 are armed with machine guns.

(2) Missions and Operations

The company, as such, was fought as a unit. It performed combat tasks and security missions. Reconnaissance missions were not assigned the company. However, individual platoons, reinforced with armored cars, antitank guns, and a captured 25-pounder (British 3.45-in field artillery piece), were used for reconnaissance in force.

The following types of operations were performed by the company:

Attack against hostile forward positions and counterreconnaissance screens;

Breaking through hostile motorized elements to eliminate flank threat;

Attack on enemy positions;

Blocking hostile attempts at penetration;

Defense against attacks by enemy armored vehicles; Counterattacks.

b. Suggested Reorganization

(1) Changes in Organization

It is suggested that the number of half-tracks in the three light platoons and the heavy platoon remain the same, but that the weapons be as follows:

Light platoons--each to have two (instead of one) 37-mm antitank guns on half-tracks;

Heavy platoon--four half-tracks with 75-mm guns, two with heavy mortars, and four with 28/20*-mm, or French 25-mm,** antitank guns.

(2) Advantages to be Gained

The offensive power of the company would be considerably increased by the incorporation of the additional weapons. Machine guns and 37-mm antitank guns remain indispensable for ranges below 2,000 yards. With the 75-mm gun, fire superiority can be quickly obtained at longer ranges, especially in attacks on the move; at short ranges they constitute a superior weapon against enemy positions, dug-in antitank guns, etc. The antitank section with four guns should supplement the 37-mm antitank guns, which are not effective against armored targets at long ranges.

The existing heavy platoon organization with its two heavy mortars and six machine guns is not sufficient for the tasks of the platoon in Africa. Even support from the artillery battery, which is usually available, is not sufficient. As the platoon which must support the company attack, provide the main weight of fire and establish fire superiority, the heavy platoon must be more generously equipped with heavy weapons. For the most part, it is this platoon, which has to deal with enemy self-propelled guns, armored cars, tanks, and dug-in antitank guns. The 75-mm gun, the mounting of which on half-track personnel carriers has been successfully tried out, is the weapon needed. Against enemy tanks the company requires a reliable antitank weapon. The 28/20-mm antitank gun or the French 25-mm gun mounted on a half-track is suitable. The above reorganization of the heavy platoon is required in the African Theater. On its own initiative the company has already created a heavy platoon with two 75-mm infantry guns and four 25-mm antitank guns mounted on personnel carriers.

*Choked bore--tapering from 28 mm to 20 mm.
**This is a dual-purpose AA/AT gun.

We can see this is a unit which was already fairly "heavy" by the standard of the day being augmented with extra firepower to deal with hard targets. A modern analogue would be a DFSV troop with medium calibre cannons or ATGMs rather than Gerlich "Squeeze bore" cannons and 75mms. This certainly is able to deal with the "high" end of the full spectrum ops, in the medium or low levels, the heavy platoon/troop could be detached for tasks  like convoy escort duty or manning the outer cordon on a cordon and search op.

 

[a_majoor]

It occurs to me (rather late, I'll admit) that we have been rather focused on the idea of physical speed in Major Taylor's paper. He certainly makes a point of speed being the Western Asymmetric advantage over the other types of forces we will encounter, and getting there "Firstest with the Mostest" causes no end of complication for the enemy.

What we haven't touched on is the dissemination of information, the Recce patrol/troop/squadron's ability to not only physically get to and observe the point or area of interest, but also the means of reporting and how fast this gets into the "world view" of the rest of the force. Our current model seems to be based on a very centralized system of pumping informnation from the Recce as well as everything else through the ISTAR process, Athena tactical C4I system and so on. While this gives a more comprehensive picture in theory, in practice I wonder if it isn't attempting to drink from a fire hose. The system will have to deal with incomplete and conflicting data, errors induced by human factors (fear, fatigue and so on), not to mention deliberate attempts to spoof the system by the enemy in order to distract and mislead. An enemy rocket or suicide bomber taking out the ASCC will also have a pretty dramatic effect on the system.

I am thinking the tactical elements should be able to get reports from the recce elements at the same time as the command elements, with the view to shortening the decision making loop. The higher elements should certainly listen in, and use this information to plan "Sequels and Branches", but the direct exchange of information at the cutting edge would allow for much faster and more flexable responses. By way of simple analogy, social insects like ants look for the chemical traces of previous foragers, rather than go back to the nest and get an "O group" from the queen. Similarly, if the Recce element sees a contact, this gets broadcast to the net and the most appropriate element can move to investigate/prosecute, bypass or attack it as best fulfills the commander's intent.

 

[TCBF]

"Recce Pull" is our doctrine now. Recce finds the holes and sucks the striking elements in through the gaps behind them.

As far as speed goes: "Fight the enemy, not the ground."

And:  "Slow is smooth - smooth is fast."

Tom

 

[George Wallace]

Art

You have just brought up an interesting part of the discussion, not looked at before.  In the race, as you quoted "Firstest with the Mostest", we have totally forgotten the Armd Recce's most valuable weapon; its' Radios.  If we do intend on being in there and being the "Firstest with the Mostest", we must also consider the range of our radios.  That range will limit us, unless we upgrade.  What will we have to do to maintain that uplink of info from a fast moving Recce element?  Looks like with digitization, we must now start thinking of our Satellite Uplinks and using them to our best abilities.  Satellite phones are making their appearances everywhere now.  I may be time to have each Patrol Comd and Troop Leader equipped with a Satellite Uplink that will transfer Voice, Video and Data.  UAVs can be used as RRB also, but their Time over Tgt is limited.  Satellites can be in geo-synchronous orbit and provide better quality Real-time comms.  AWACs will almost constantly be in comms with major 'sources', both in the air and on the ground.

Looks like we will be adding more kit to our Recce vehicles, if we want to stay ahead of the game.  As technology advances, we must keep pace, but still maintain our Basics, so that when the technology fails, it will not endanger our troops.