Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[Fide et Fortitudine]

Thanks,

ArmyRick,

In that case I was wondering if I could pick your brains a bit (ask some questions). I have read a lot about the TICs in Afghanistan and of the things that occur, but I still don't see a lot of the big picture. If I see some footage of a contact I have very little idea of what is going on (since I only see troops shooting behind a wall). What are the TICs like over there, when do they normally hit you guys, and what type of activities are you exactly doing? I hear of guys on patrol and getting hit, but what do their patrols consist of? Maybe this would fit better in the "Lessons learned in Afghanistan", but I was just wondering. Any info would be great thanks,
MPF

 

[helpup]

Double tap, dash, down, crawl, sights observe, indicate, "seen" rapid fire, win the firefight, the approach, assault. or hold and call in support.

Of course all of this must take in ROE's and identifiable Tgt's.  use of dead ground, cover,
Some don't shoot, immediately they seek cover first and locate the En.  Others who do double tap would of been better to not fire as rounds go 3 feet in the ground in front of them or high in the hills.  Still it is a system we have all trained on and variations of it work.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Double tap, dash, down, crawl, sights observe, indicate, "seen" rapid fire, win the firefight, the approach, assault. or hold and call in support.

Of course all of this must take in ROE's and identifiable Tgt's.  use of dead ground, cover,
Some don't shoot, immediately they seek cover first and locate the En.  Others who do double tap would of been better to not fire as rounds go 3 feet in the ground in front of them or high in the hills.  Still it is a system we have all trained on and variations of it work.

Take 2 well aimed shots

 

[daftandbarmy]

Talking to those who've just returned, it's also important to note that the 'fight through' can take several hours. One particular punch up that was described to me lasted 8 hours - at 50C. Locating the enemy and winning the fire fight sounds good in theory, but can take hours in reality. We seldom practise this in training, and the strains it puts on the troops in contact, as well as the indir fs, ops, med and log systems, are hard to replicate.

This is in line with what colleagues of mine told me about the battles they fought in the Falklands War e.g., the Battle of Goose Green was an 11 hour fight through, against an enemy 3 times the strength of the attacking force, with few people really understanding what was happening across the whole battle. I went through the Pl Comds Battle Course at Warminster after the Falklands and they had incorporated this 're-learned' reality of the infantry battle into the training. We were therefore subjected to very complex battle scenarios, at the coy gp level, lasting several hours, most of it spent on my belly going 'WTF?'.

Unfortunately, in my experience, our training programs tend to prefer nice, neat, fast little attack scenarios so we can quickly assess a candidate before we change command roles and take on the next 500m segment of the Lawfield corridor. This may have changed since my time there (back when the earth was still cooling), but based on what I'm hearing from my subbies, probably not much.

 

[vonGarvin]

OK, jumping in here.
Reaction to effective enemy fire is pretty well a very good drill. 
Double Tap
Dash (to cover)
Down (into said cover)
Crawl (to a position of observation)
Observe (to see where the bad guys are)
Sights (as in set your sights to the range to the bad guys)
Fire (as in fire at the bad guys: don't light a fire to warm your tea)

So, thus ends battle drill number 2.
Key here is to aim your shots.  If you just blast away, you may as well light that fire for the tea.  OK, so what's next?
Locate the enemy.  This is a tough one, especially when bad guys don't want to be located! ;D  This is a group effort, but let's not forget that it takes people observing (see above)
Win the Firefight.  As mentioned, this could take hours.  And could involve anything from rifle to 155 Artillery (or more)
So, just remember that these are drills, set in a logical manner (eg: you can't win the firefight before you've located the enemy, unless your side has nukes and you can use them safely, perhaps, but I digress...)
Which brings me to the following point:

Take 2 well aimed shots

See above.  I ask: how can you take two, well-aimed shots before you've located the enemy?  I'm just guessing here, but the double tap is probably more for psychological effect than for lethal effect on the enemy.  In other words, it gives the shooter (eg: you) the knowledge that you are still in the fight, even though those two rounds will either (a) go in the ground to your front or (b) go into orbit.

The thing to remember is that even though it's in Afghanistan, and we have big guns and jets on our side, some old lessons still apply.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

True on that Mortarman, was just going on what was corrected of me by people that returned from TF1-07  :-\

EDITED TO ADD

I have done a far share of Section Attacks but I will leave the correct information/tactics to the Infantry SME's here.

 

[davidk]

What I was taught was that the double-tap was not only to "keep you in the fight" but to get the enemy's collective heads down, if even for a second, so you have time to dash for cover.

 

[Teflon]

Not a poke at anyone but just a thought,...

See above.  I ask: how can you take two, well-aimed shots before you've located the enemy?  I'm just guessing here, but the double tap is probably more for psychological effect than for lethal effect on the enemy.  In other words, it gives the shooter (eg: you) the knowledge that you are still in the fight, even though those two rounds will either (a) go in the ground to your front or (b) go into orbit.

... Or possibly into some afghani civi unlucky enough to be around you when you believe you are coming under contact - adding yet another name(s) to list of unintentional injuries that certain members of the masses love to wave about as bad PR for us and the mission.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I was strongly advised at one time, by those far more battle experienced than I will ever be, 'not' to train soldiers to double tap when coming under contact. The reason? If you do, the enemy will know exactly how many troops you have, and where they are - at least in the lead wave. The assumption we make is that the enemy knows where you are whern he opens fire. More often than not, he may see one or two troops but may not know where the rest are, or how many are actually in the area.

The 'double tap' was supposed to get you conditioned to start shooting back immendately, following on from the observations of those such as SLA Marshall in his book "Men Against Fire', who suggest that very few troops actually use their weapons in a fire fight. This thesis has since been questioned viz:

"Some 20 years later, the validity of Marshall’s analysis was called into doubt. Respected researchers interviewed those who had accompanied him in World War II and also pored over his personal notes during the mid-1980s. Convincing evidence pointed to his having fabricated his World War II ratio-of-fire values, still so widely accepted at the time. The question seemed inevitable: Had there been a problem with Americans’ willingness to engage the enemy in World War II? If so, had it actually been rectified during the Vietnam War as Marshall claimed, or was the research done there just as flawed as had been the case a quarter of a century before?"
http://www.historynet.com/men-against-fire-how-many-soldiers-actually-fired-their-weapons-at-the-enemy-during-the-vietnam-war.htm

A well trained, agressive, professional infantry unit will try to get the enemy to fire first, thereby revealing their strengths and locations, after which they can be singled out for destruction through well planned fire and movement at various levels.

 

[davidk]

A well trained, agressive, professional infantry unit will try to get the enemy to fire first, thereby revealing their strengths and locations, after which they can be singled out for destruction through well planned fire and movement at various levels.

That is by far the smartest thing I've read all day.

 

[vonGarvin]

I was strongly advised at one time, by those far more battle experienced than I will ever be, 'not' to train soldiers to double tap when coming under contact. The reason? If you do, the enemy will know exactly how many troops you have, and where they are - at least in the lead wave.

Of course, the enemy is counting the exact number of rounds being returned to them, and dividing by two (or more, in the case of MGs firing...) :

 

[Fusaki]

A well trained, agressive, professional infantry unit will try to get the enemy to fire first, thereby revealing their strengths and locations, after which they can be singled out for destruction through well planned fire and movement at various levels.

A well trained, aggressive, and professional infantry unit should strive to mow down the bad guys before they have their boots on.  A "reaction to effective enemy fire" is what you do when the bad guys get the drop on you.  I'd prefer to have good int, JDAMs on C2 nodes, then an ambush of the bad guys as they flee the area.  Firefights are dangerous.  Shootings are a better idea.

In the event that you do need to react to effective enemy fire, my opinion is that the section should be letting rip on rapid rate as it moves out of the killzone and into fire positions.  Forget doubletap dash down.  Just keep squeezing the trigger at the bad guy while you're moving towards him and towards cover.  If you can't see the bad guy, spec fire.  The enemy should be wondering how such a small element is putting out so much suppressive fire.  Take back the initiative through speed of movement and violence of action.  The bad guy didn't open up on you because he thought he could only hit part of your patrol.  He waited to fire untill he thought that he could maximize your casualties.  That is the definition of effective enemy fire.

In the event that you receive ineffective enemy fire, that is when you save your ammo and your position.  If the fire is ineffective then it is because the bad guy doesn't know exactly where you are.  Find cover, find the bad guy, and communicate.  In a fighting patrol, some parts may be receiving effective enemy fire while other parts are receiving ineffective fire in their general vicinity. 

This means that when you hear gunshots you have to decide on one of only two choices:

Effective fire? Fire and move!

Ineffective fire?  Orient yourself!

 

[helpup]

Take 2 well aimed shots

I get your meaning but will also point out you can well aim a double tap.  (2 rds, .45 sec  X ring )  However in Trg ( that falls out of tour work ups) the double tap ( correct me if I am wrong here as haven't taught BSL in a couple of years) is still a quick aim ( see also in the general direction) of the direction of fire.  Having said that I have always been a proponent and teach if you don't see the enemy don't fire a double tap until you do.

 

[helpup]

Talking to those who've just returned, it's also important to note that the 'fight through' can take several hours. One particular punch up that was described to me lasted 8 hours - at 50C. Locating the enemy and winning the fire fight sounds good in theory, but can take hours in reality. We seldom practise this in training, and the strains it puts on the troops in contact, as well as the indir fs, ops, med and log systems, are hard to replicate.

Your right on the timeline of course and the stages I stated do come across as quick and we do teach at the BSL level quick with out the emphasis that all this will take time.  A good deal of this is to emphasis a drill and make it a sequence.  In reality not wanting to get ones A$$ shot off slows it down and can ground depending reduce pepper podding to a crawl or a hold for a flanking unit.  Add to that you do now have to work on redeploying your forces for a likely En Flanking maneuver. 

Still the basis we were on was the Sec Atk and the sequences are still the same and at any stage you may have to go back to start it again as you have not kept putting down more rounds then the enemy has.

 

[helpup]

Not a poke at anyone but just a thought,...

... Or possibly into some afghani civi unlucky enough to be around you when you believe you are coming under contact - adding yet another name(s) to list of unintentional injuries that certain members of the masses love to wave about as bad PR for us and the mission.

I added on the bottom of my post about ROE's  the drills are just that and they can, have, will be modified to suit the Deployment.  But I maintain that a Double tap can still be well aimed and fast when you can see the Tgt and if ROE's allow in the general direction of where your coming under fire from. ( that mindset I firmly believe can be turned off and on especially with the work up time we have to train.

 

[helpup]

This means that when you hear gunshots you have to decide on one of only two choices:

Effective fire? Fire and move!

Ineffective fire?  Orient yourself!

Agreed to a point, Ambush drills are better reaction in many cases but not all cases of comming under contact.  and the subsequent Inf Atk.  Depending on terrain Pepper podding can be A$$ crawling ( not fun with FFO) duck and hug ( better still not fun) one Knee ( he wont shoot at me ) or advance firing ( he is too close for us to get to ground )

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed to a point, Ambush drills are better reaction in many cases but not all cases of comming under contact.  and the subsequent Inf Atk.  Depending on terrain Pepper podding can be A$$ crawling ( not fun with FFO) duck and hug ( better still not fun) one Knee ( he wont shoot at me ) or advance firing ( he is too close for us to get to ground )

Which reminded me of an idea that Patton advocated: Marching fire...

MARCHING FIRE: One of General Patton's favorite tactics was known as "marching fire". It is often described in books about Patton, usually in terms indicating what a wonderful tactic it was. The general idea was a fairly dense skirmish line of infantry, with armored vehicles following closely behind them. The men and vehicles marched forward toward the assumed enemy defenses as artillery fired in support. Each man would, two or three times a minute, fire a round from his rifle in the general direction of the enemy (aimed if he had a target, into a likely spot in the brush if not). The soldiers were taught to shoot low (most soldiers tend to shoot high in brush or smoke) so that bullets would strike the enemy or ricochet off the ground and scream into the enemy positions as they tumbled in flight. The armored vehicles fired bursts of machinegun fire at likely points of resistance at odd intervals.
The tactic has its uses, mostly when advancing in fairly flat or rolling country where brush or trees obscured enemy defense lines. By constantly pumping out bullets, the entire formation would keep the enemy's heads down and could reach the point for a determined assault without becoming pinned down, since it was in effect constantly pinning down the enemy. In its purest form, Marching Fire was the 1944 equivalent of the traditional "push of pike".
The problem was, it didn't always work, and often the more traditional tactics of scouting forward and making a deliberate assault when the enemy was found produced the same results with fewer casualties. Marching fire gave up the advantage of shock. It placed more troops into the range of enemy weapons and denied them cover. When an enemy strongpoint was found, units could not concentrate to destroy it or maneuver around it, since the entire front was occupied by the advancing wave of infantry. Some units ended up on poor ground where they could not maintain the speed of the advance, forcing other units to slow down while under fire.--Stephen V Cole

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/19990927.aspx

 

[Haligonian]

In a few posts throughout this conversation Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook has been brought up.  He advocates that sections should consist of a support, assault, and exploitation element.  In reading the "Future of the Infantry" thread I believe I saw that Marine Corps was looking at a 'breeching' element in the section, which I think was referring back to Lind's exploitation element.

I was hoping that someone could shed some light for me on the actual employment of this exploitation element.  As I currently conceive the infantry attack, a limit of exploitation is set by the higher commander and then the assaulting forces would exploit to that limit, then consolidate.  I am under the impression that Lind intended that assault elements would capture/destroy the intended enemy position and then the exploitation element would carry on the exploitation which would be much more extensive than the traditional "X meters past the objective."  Am I close with this?

I tried Amazon for his book however they are currently sold out, however, I intend to get my hands on this book!

 

[KevinB]

IIRC Breeching the USMC is talking about is for Urban CQB

 

[ArmyRick]

I personally don't agree with a specific breaching element. I would much rather see the infantry sections equipped and PROPERLY trained to breach (make it a mission specific task based on your estimate).

My personal feeling towards infantry and really thinking about it alot, this for me would be the ideal platoon (dismounted role) 36 strong Close Combat Platoon

Platoon HQ
LT (Commander), WO (2IC), Signaller, Medic (Actually OPCON to PL)

Support Section
Sgt (SPT Sect COMD/Gun Controller), 4 x PTE or CPL (manning 2 x C6 GPMG)
MCpl (SPT Sect 2IC/Targetting NCO), 2 x CPL Marksman role (equipped with 7.62mm HK417 or something similar)

3 x 8 man sections as they are currently equipped and organized (I think it is very flexible).

The key to making this platoon structure work would be training the men properly. If your going to do an OP requiring breaching, then train the men to do so. I also beleive that every soldier on a DP1 infantry should do basic demo course (1 week). But thats me.

Now for added fire power at Coy Level, I would add in a Stand Off Combat Platoon
PL HQ (Same)
60mm Mortar Section (8 pers) 2 x 60mm mortars (Get the american modernize ones and bin the ancient things we use)
2 x ALAWS Section (8 pers) Use 2 x Javelin/Spike each when threat is AFV. In place have them use the good ole fashion 84mm SRAAW(M) and its FULL family of ammo availible (3 types of HEAT, HEDP, HE, Smoke, Illum, Canister). 84 still has a very deadly effect on enemy in open and fortifications.
Finally a Coy GPMG Section (8 pers) use 2 x GPMG.

The Coy would be Coy HQ, Stand off combat platoon and 3 close combat platoons.

I beleive my ORBAT would be ideal. If you do an estimate for threat situations out there, I think you will find my suggested ORBAT very flexible and capable.