Think Tank Analysis of Taliban Campaign in Kandahar

[The Bread Guy]

"The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar" (PDF)

Includes loads of detail of Canada's fight around Kandahar City - says more resources needed to win the fight against the Taliban in Kandahar, which is necessary to start momentum rolling against the Taliban elsewhere in AFG.

Also looks at the Deh-e Bagh model village model as a good one, but because it was reasonably secure before the development work began.

Enjoy!

 

[The Bread Guy]

Brian Stewart, CBC.ca, 16 Dec 09

.... In an interview, the author of the report, military analyst Carl Forsberg said: "It did surprise me that Canada did not make more noise about the difficult situation it was in, and did not press loudly more for outside help."

Forsberg spent over a year researching and analyzing the campaign in Kandahar and his findings suggest Canada's role there remains one of the many questions still to be answered in the conduct of this war.

The report pounds away at consistent weaknesses.

On their own, Canadian units "were too small to employ important counter-insurgency tactics, like conducting clearing missions and holding terrain … and were limited in their ability to generate actionable intelligence … and there were insufficient troops to conduct night patrols for more than a few weeks at a time or in large areas."

Most serious, from the McChrystal-camp viewpoint, was the failure of Canadians to consistently pursue counter-insurgency actions because of rising casualties from Taliban bombings.

While it makes gloomy reading, the report is careful, however, not to call the Kandahar campaign "lost." ....

Ottawa Citizen, attributed to The Australian, 19 Dec 09 (I haven't been able to find a link to article in The Australian yet - will share when located)

“Canada’s military strategy in Afghanistan has been criticised in a study by a US think tank, the Institute for the Study of War. It claims Afghan guerillas outmanoeuvred a hopelessly under-strength Canadian force that was never able to put more than a few hundred soldiers into combat at the same time. The Taliban used diversionary attacks to draw Canadian units into costly fights in Kandahar's rural Zhari and Panjwai districts, where they were never able to hold any ground they took.

The big blunder of the war in the south was to leave the under-resourced Canadians to hold Kandahar, the true axis of the battle in the region, while others focused on the struggle in Helmand, the report says. ``If ISAF does not generate sufficient force densities in critical areas, its attempted counter-offensive will fail, giving enemy fighters a permissive environment and allowing the Taliban's campaign of terror to continue in Kandahar city.''....

 

[Infanteer]

http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf

Worthy of a read, especially for a "big-hand, small-map" observation of Canada's contribution and effect.  Of note from the author's perspective:

1)  We ran smack into a Taliban offensive and smashed it on  Op MEDUSA;
2)  We tried to repeat it and the Taliban adjusted (successfully) by refusing to mass and hitting us with IEDs;
3)  Continuous disruption operations have a minimal affect on the Taliban's ability to influence the population of Kandahar Province; and
4)  Recently, with the arrival of additional forces from the US, Canada has seen a change of focus and real gains in counterinsurgency.

 

[jeepsport]

http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf

Worthy of a read, especially for a "big-hand, small-map" observation of Canada's contribution and effect.  Of note from the author's perspective:

1)  We ran smack into a Taliban offensive and smashed it on  Op MEDUSA;
2)  We tried to repeat it and the Taliban adjusted (successfully) by refusing to mass and hitting us with IEDs;
3)  Continuous disruption operations have a minimal affect on the Taliban's ability to influence the population of Kandahar Province; and
4)  Recently, with the arrival of additional forces from the US, Canada has seen a change of focus and real gains in counterinsurgency.

Speaking of effects ... anyone who still actually thinks hat OP Medusa was a successful Op should shake their heads!

Back to effects, by killing off un-told numbers of Tier 1, 2 and 3 Insurgents during Medusa what secondary and tertiary effects do you think would have spun from this.

The majority of the insurgents killed on Medusa were simply locals, farmers etc, now by killing them all we simply did was eliminate the bread winners from those families (fighting age male = working age male). Now that was the secondary effect, the tertiary effect from that was these families now hate ISAF and the coalition because "WE" just made them hungry, and pushed them either from our side of the fence to the insurgents side.

Now after Op Medusa thousands of IDP's were created, then comes the IDP camps which set the conditions for recruitment into the insurgent's ranks pretty good.

Yeah ... Op Medusa, doctinally good and well executed ... but it's ripple effects for everyone after was not well thought out.

I'm not by any means saying violence is not the key, I believe that insurgents are bad and bad guys have to die, but large scale kinetic operations like Medusa is not the key, and does not really do us any favours in fighting the counter insurgency.

 

[vonGarvin]

Hey, Jeepsport, your profile is rather thin to be making such unqualified (?) statements.  You make such heady claims, such as claiming that we created many IDPs, killed off the breadwinners, only the locals were there, etc. 

I have a different take on MEDUSA.  I'll leave it at that.

 

[jeepsport]

Sorry I wasn't aware that your post count was the deciding factor of having a valid point.

Everybody has always claimed Medusa as the golden child of Afghan operations, hind sight being 20/20 operations like that does not win in a COIN environment.

I'm guessing that you've read the COIN manual? Multi pronged approach, center of gravity ....... etc???

Again I'm not saying that kinetic does not have a place, but in effects based operations every action has a ripple effect, and the days of the left or right flanking after the fire mission isn't helping like it used to.

 

[vonGarvin]

Sorry I wasn't aware that your post count was the deciding factor of having a valid point.

Everybody has always claimed Medusa as the golden child of Afghan operations, hind sight being 20/20 operations like that does not win in a COIN environment.

I'm guessing that you've read the COIN manual? Multi pronged approach, center of gravity ....... etc???

Again I'm not saying that kinetic does not have a place, but in effects based operations every action has a ripple effect, and the days of the left or right flanking after the fire mission isn't helping like it used to.

Slow down, shooter, I'm not talking post count, I'm talking that one cannot see where you're coming from by having a (virtually) blank profile.  To say that Medusa is the red-headed step child of ops in Afghanistan is also without merit.  If you recall, the Taliban were attempting to turn the Arghandab red with the blood of NATO troops, much as they did with the Soviets many years ago.  By killing so many of us, so early in the game, they then reasoned that NATO would simply call it a draw and head home, thus influencing the locals by showing their might and prowess.  In the end, they failed miserably.  Hundreds of them died at our hands, and they had to revert (back) to assymetrical tactics, such as support by force from the locals, etc. 

So, yeah, I've read the COIN manual, and I've also been responsible for the planning of many operations "over there".  So I know of what I speak, and that has the square root of fuck all to do with my post count.


(Edited for clarity)

 

[jeepsport]

doctrine wise it was successful, it killed the enemy and was a large scale OP with a lot of moving parts yes I recognize that. BUT looking at the effects it potentially had on the population was it a success or a step back?

 

[tomahawk6]

Karzai finally has given the green light for the Kandahar offensive. This is an imperative to attrit the taliban in their birthplace.
Second,we need to do something lethal about the ISI which continues to train and lead the taliban both inside Afghanistan and Pakistan.

 

[vonGarvin]

doctrine wise it was successful, it killed the enemy and was a large scale OP with a lot of moving parts yes I recognize that. BUT looking at the effects it potentially had on the population was it a success or a step back?

As far as the population goes, I believe that it was progress in some respects.  Remembering that not all Zharians (?) supported the Taliban, it was the Taliban who chose to make Zhari the battleground on the western approach to Kandahar.  The civilians were allowed to evacuate, and we supported their move out, and back.  And as far as I know, the Taliban have done no reconstruction projects in the area, so, in that vein, I would offer that Medusa, and beyond, was a step in the right direction.  And even though it was frought with some less-than-stellar aftereffects, the alternate would have been suicide for NATO: Just leave the Taliban with control of the population centre so close to Kandahar.

They threw down the gauntlet, and we picked it up and slapped them in the face with it, and then proceeded to rip their guts out with M-777 rounds.

 

[SeanNewman]

3)  Continuous disruption operations have a minimal affect on the Taliban's ability to influence the population of Kandahar Province; and

That's the kicker right there, and I completely agree with it.

Since we didn't have the numbers to do an effective ink spot until 2009, all battlegroup efforts basically from 2006-2009 were essentially "Whack-a-mole" battles and not war-winning.

That's not to say that we are losing; what the OMLT has done in passing the baton to get the Afghans prepped to take care of themselves is the real victory anyway, not how many Taliban we kill or how many Afghans like us.

 

[jeepsport]

the Afghans still have to like and support the ANA for it to be effective.

What is the center of gravity in Afghanistan?

 

[Journeyman]

What is the center of gravity in Afghanistan?

Should be pretty obvious to an Afghanistan/COIN SME 

 

[Sprinting Thistle]

In terms of Op MEDUSA, there's more to it that a few simple lines in a post.  In fact all through work up trg the 1 RCR BG trained COIN ops.  There was no expectation of a stand up battle with the insurgents.  Through the summer months the 1 PPCLI BG probed more and more in the Zari District kicking over a hornets nest of insurgency.  The insurgents had been quite happy up until that point occupying the region.  On TOCA between the two BGs, the ink on the transfer agreement wasn't even dry and the 1 RCR BG found itself embroiled in a huge fight outside Panjwayi.  Elements of A Coy conducting a leaders recce were cut off and surrounded by insurgents who had surged from Bazari-Panjwayi into the attack.  The insurgents were in such force that these guys fought their way out with their lives earning well deserved decorations. 

If you have read Mao's little red book you will understand that even he advocates an insurgency transitioning at some point to a conventional fight.  The insurgents were at that point in the summer of 2006.  Intelligence reports at the time indicated that they were massing to envelope Kandahar City.  The estimate was that they were at the culminating point in becoming conventional in their tactics.  They had no intention of investing the city.  The belief was that by cutting of K City they would demonstrate to the population that NATO was ineffective = strategic failure for NATO.  The population was expected to turn against NATO at that time.  Brigade HQ planned a conventional attack.  The entire Arghandab was to be isolated and the Canadian BG was to conduct a feint that would see them roll up to the western edge of Zari - Panjway and stop.  Intelligence suggested that the insurgents would stay and fight from well prepared defended localities with over head protection, trench systems with communications trenchesdirect and indirect fire weapons systems, interlocking fields of fire, kill zones, obstables and mines.  As the BG adopted its feint positions, and the insurgents stood to in their positions, they would be destroyed by masses of indirect fire from an amazing array of assets.  By the time the operation was launched all the locals had fled the area.  The only people left in the area were confirmed insurgents,  we watched the locals stream out of the area in endless lines of vehicles.  So, it can be said without a doubt that farmers and locals were not in the area.  They did return after the insurgents were destroyed.  Life returned to normalcy fairly quickly. 

So as to effects, MEDUSA was extremely successful both in kinetic ops and non-kinetic effects.  The insurgency to this day has never managed to regain its levels of command, control, support and massed numbers as it was in the summer of 2006.  The reason is because successive rotations have gone in and built upon each and every previous roto.  MEDUSA was a start but even it sprang out of the previous rotos work in the region.  To criticize the operation and look at it as one isolated event is a fallacy.  In fact one could argue that every operation since is just the same op continued and continuing. 

 

[Fusaki]

An interesting thread.

Journeyman, do you have a larger version of that image?

 

[Infanteer]

Speaking of effects ... anyone who still actually thinks hat OP Medusa was a successful Op should shake their heads!

Back to effects, by killing off un-told numbers of Tier 1, 2 and 3 Insurgents during Medusa what secondary and tertiary effects do you think would have spun from this.

The majority of the insurgents killed on Medusa were simply locals, farmers etc, now by killing them all we simply did was eliminate the bread winners from those families (fighting age male = working age male). Now that was the secondary effect, the tertiary effect from that was these families now hate ISAF and the coalition because "WE" just made them hungry, and pushed them either from our side of the fence to the insurgents side.

Now after Op Medusa thousands of IDP's were created, then comes the IDP camps which set the conditions for recruitment into the insurgent's ranks pretty good.

Yeah ... Op Medusa, doctinally good and well executed ... but it's ripple effects for everyone after was not well thought out.

I'm not by any means saying violence is not the key, I believe that insurgents are bad and bad guys have to die, but large scale kinetic operations like Medusa is not the key, and does not really do us any favours in fighting the counter insurgency.

I'll disagree with your comment - Spinning Thistle has the right of it, and his viewpoint closely matches the assessment in the article I linked too above.

If you want proof, take a look at Zharei-Panjwayi now; insurgency raging?  Yes, but they are unable to mass to any degree to pose a serious military threat to the Afghan Government (thus stuck in Mao's 1st Stage).  Thus what we now see the insurgent strategy having morphed into one of harassing security forces with IEDs and using intimidation and coercion with the locals.

So, Medusa essentially convinced the insurgents that they could not mass to stand up and fight conventional forces.  Want proof - go to Bazaar-e-Panjwayi, the scene of the battles mentioned above; they place is a boom-town now.  So much for "displaced persons".  Nobody should believe it was decisive - as the good General Vance stated yesterday, those things don't happen in insurgencies.  LGen Saddler made the mistake of ignoring this in 2004 when he said Fallujah "broke the back of the insurgency"....

 

[Journeyman]

Journeyman, do you have a larger version of that image?

PM. Not condusive to online post. Désolé