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The War in Ukraine

Flip side, Ukraine has shown how hideously the balance has shifted to defensive firepower.
Has it truly though, or is that just the specific conditions of Ukraine?

Most the war has been fought in Eastern Ukraine which has been progressively and heavily fortified over the last decade. Very few places on the planet can claim the same treatment. Add in the lack of offensive equipment Ukraine has. The limitations placed by the West (our equipment can only be used in ‘x’ areas, you cannot go into Russia, etc.). And you end up with conditions which favour defence heavily but aren’t necessarily able to be repeated in other parts of the world.

The Kharkiv Offensive/retaking shows that you can still advance quickly and effectively, as does the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the 2023 continuation of such.

Russia would have also had much more success earlier in the war if they actually prepared to invade, the whole failing to have fuel for their vehicles and the traffic jam it created really prevented them from actually being able to effectively invade the North. If it was a more serious military at the time the war would have gone very differently.
 
Has it truly though, or is that just the specific conditions of Ukraine?

Most the war has been fought in Eastern Ukraine which has been progressively and heavily fortified over the last decade. Very few places on the planet can claim the same treatment. Add in the lack of offensive equipment Ukraine has. The limitations placed by the West (our equipment can only be used in ‘x’ areas, you cannot go into Russia, etc.). And you end up with conditions which favour defence heavily but aren’t necessarily able to be repeated in other parts of the world.

The Kharkiv Offensive/retaking shows that you can still advance quickly and effectively, as does the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the 2023 continuation of such.

Russia would have also had much more success earlier in the war if they actually prepared to invade, the whole failing to have fuel for their vehicles and the traffic jam it created really prevented them from actually being able to effectively invade the North. If it was a more serious military at the time the war would have gone very differently.
I’m talking about stuff like the mass dissemination/spamming of FPV drones that can take out AFVs, and the ubiquity of UAS surveillance down to very low levels, as well as individual AT weapons that seem to have increased in potency and ease of use.

Maybe a properly equipped and prepared mech brigade/division might fare much better, or maybe it would get swarmed with loitering munitions and have the wind knocked out of it. Tough to say, but I would not be super optimistic as an attacker if the defender has taken note of technological advances like we’ve seen in Ukraine.
 
I’m talking about stuff like the mass dissemination/spamming of FPV drones that can take out AFVs, and the ubiquity of UAS surveillance down to very low levels, as well as individual AT weapons that seem to have increased in potency and ease of use.

Maybe a properly equipped and prepared mech brigade/division might fare much better, or maybe it would get swarmed with loitering munitions and have the wind knocked out of it. Tough to say, but I would not be super optimistic as an attacker if the defender has taken note of technological advances like we’ve seen in Ukraine.
I think well executed fire plans as well as effective armored C-UAS vehicles (like the Geopard) would allow a well trained and equipped Bde/Div to be extremely successful against the Russians.
 
The thing with those cheap and plentiful FPV drones is that they still have quite limited range. If you can put enough mass into an attack (and enough suppressive fires) to force the enemy to start to pull back then those drone operators are forced to pull back as well, effectively removing that threat until such time as they can effectively be operated on the move.
 
I think well executed fire plans as well as effective armored C-UAS vehicles (like the Geopard) would allow a well trained and equipped Bde/Div to be extremely successful against the Russians.

I am inclined to agree, at the Bde/Div level. At a minimum, offensive operations are possible at the tactical level provided they are well coordinated. I would add engineers to the list of things that are necessary - the two sides have placed vast minefields between their positions and lots of attacks fall apart due to failed (or a lack of) breaching attempts.

Restoring operational maneuver - in the Russian sense of "operational," with drives of 100km or more into the depths - is going to be a harder problem. Breaking through the defensive system will require a considerable effort, then enough mobile forces have to be committed to start pushing into the depths, and it all has to happen quickly enough that the defender can't bring up enough reserves to contain the attack. This requires lots of uncommitted formations (maybe one or two Army-level organizations) that can be concentrated without being detected or disrupted.

I don't think either side is in a position to do this, so the small scale tactical bite-and-hold regime is likely to continue for a while.
 
Apparently Ukrainian special forces have been operating in Syria since the beginning of the year and alongside Syrian opposition forces have been conducting attacks on Russian positions in the Golan Heights.


Previously there were reports of Ukrainian troops operating in Africa (South Sudan in particular) against Wagner PMC forces. I wonder where else they are operating?
 
I'm waiting to see come August how low the Dnipro River gets in the delta area and if the Ukrainians are able to expand their bridgehead in that area. I'd like them to take the crossroads west of Oleshky, at the south end of Hola Prystan and west of Oleshky in the area of Zhytloselyche and Sahy. If they can take and hold both of those areas, then Oleshky itself will fall. That would give them the ability to pressure the western land corridor directly to the Crimea at Armiansk and Perekop.
 
The thing with those cheap and plentiful FPV drones is that they still have quite limited range. If you can put enough mass into an attack (and enough suppressive fires) to force the enemy to start to pull back then those drone operators are forced to pull back as well, effectively removing that threat until such time as they can effectively be operated on the move.
Yes, for now. The UA is already fine tuning mothership/repeaters with extended range and satlinks vs radio. Think of a heptacopter like the BabaYar carrying (under the arms) 6 FPV, an extended range LiFePO4 pack and a radio repeater/satlink. Unsure the effective range but if it is a consumable then it could conceivably go 30-50k. And still be a cost effective weapon.
 
Apparently Ukrainian special forces have been operating in Syria since the beginning of the year and alongside Syrian opposition forces have been conducting attacks on Russian positions in the Golan Heights.


Previously there were reports of Ukrainian troops operating in Africa (South Sudan in particular) against Wagner PMC forces. I wonder where else they are operating?
Where else are Russians active....
 
... Previously there were reports of Ukrainian troops operating in Africa (South Sudan in particular) against Wagner PMC forces ...
As well as Africans reportedly working both sides of the fight in Ukraine ...
 
As well as Africans reportedly working both sides of the fight in Ukraine ...

Machiavelli had a good observation about mercenaries: "I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy."
 
A few decades ago, when we were somewhat talking to the Russians, I got to have a discussion about that with two of their Spetsnaz. They where of the opinion their vehicles where flaming death traps that where very hard to exit under fire due to the cramped space - as such they chose to ride outside, preferring any to chance DF and IDF to burning alive inside.
Considering the fact that the two rear exit doors on the rear of the BMP-1/2 also serve as auxiliary fuel tanks I would also be worried about getting fried.
 
Considering the fact that the two rear exit doors on the rear of the BMP-1/2 also serve as auxiliary fuel tanks I would also be worried about getting fried.

It's even worse than just the rear doors - those are auxiliary tanks which are intended to be used for longer road moves.

Check out item 20 on the diagram below - the infantry sit with their backs on the primary fuel tank.

1717458233164.png
 
Yes, for now. The UA is already fine tuning mothership/repeaters with extended range and satlinks vs radio. Think of a heptacopter like the BabaYar carrying (under the arms) 6 FPV, an extended range LiFePO4 pack and a radio repeater/satlink. Unsure the effective range but if it is a consumable then it could conceivably go 30-50k. And still be a cost effective weapon.
The problem is the repeater, the extended range, and armament all add up to that cost. Not to mention the production time and cost
 
As well as Africans reportedly working both sides of the fight in Ukraine ...
And are those governments expressing displeasure and analysts spouting warnings doing the same about Russian recruitment? I have my suspicions...
 
The problem is the repeater, the extended range, and armament all add up to that cost. Not to mention the production time and cost
True, but if only half of the FPV take out an IFV or tank, hell even if only 1 does, the total cost is still less than a Javelin shot and far less than the cist of the armor they just mission or hard killed. Economically a win.

Take a look at the number of missiles fired against low cost Houti drones and missiles, more than 350 air-to-surface weapons, mnd more than 50 air-to-air missiles and more than 100 Standard and Tomahawk missiles. All to take out about 430 "targets". Care to add up the total value of all that US hardware vs the cost of all the Houti targets? The cost per kill exceeds the cost per target by a long shot. Not economically sustainable. Don't take my word for it, listen to experts like Perun.


 
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