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The utility of three military colleges, funded undergrad degrees; Officer trg & the need for a degre

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Spectrum said:
Considering many successful people manage to work their way through an undergrad education without CAF subsidization, I'm curious why we need ROTP at all. Wouldn't it be better to have new officers that have demonstrated sufficient dedication and planning to fund their own degree? That way we'd get them at 21/22 (a little more mature than 17-18) and they could immediately be put through their training. It might make for more well rounded candidates as well...

Once they have put some time in (and showed they can perform) I am not against subsidizing Master's level programs (MPA,MBA, MEng etc) at RMC or a civilian school (would be my preference)

So why so much focus on ROTP vs DEO? Are we worried we won't be able to recruit anyone? Or is ROTP/RMC just sacred ground for the CAF? I think I know the true answer, but I am curious to hear what others think.


It's hard to disagree with this article IMHO. Degree granting Military colleges are a 'colonial anachronism', pretty much:

Let’s abolish West Point: Military academies serve no one, squander millions of tax dollars

http://www.salon.com/2015/01/05/lets_abolish_west_point_military_academies_serve_no_one_squander_millions_of_tax_dollars/

Many pundits have suggested that the Republicans’ midterm gains were fueled by discontent not merely with the president or with the (improving) state of the economy, but with government in general and the need to fund its programs with taxes.  Indeed, the Republican Party of recent decades, inspired by Ronald Reagan’s exhortation to “starve the [government] beast,” has been anti-tax and anti-government. Government programs, as many of their thinkers note, primarily exist to perpetuate their own existence. At the very least, they have to justify that existence.



In the spirit of hands across the aisle, I’d like to suggest that the first thing the new Republican majority devote itself to is not, say, the repeal of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), but to converting the four hugely expensive and underproductive U.S. service academies (Navy, Army, Air Force and Coast Guard) — taxpayer-funded undergraduate institutions whose products all become officers in the military — to more modest and functional schools for short-term military training programs, as the British have repurposed Sandhurst.

Training is something the military does—education, certainly, is not. Indeed, undergraduate education of officers has already largely been outsourced, since most new officers come from the much cheaper Reserve Officer Training Corps programs at civilian universities (at one-quarter the cost of the academies), or from the several months of Officer Training Corps (one-eighth the cost) that follows either an enlisted career, or college. By all standards, these officers are just as good as those who come from the service academies, which now produce under 20 percent of U.S. officers.

The service academies once had a purpose: when they were founded in the 19th century (the Air Force split off from Army after World War II), college was classics and religion for gentlemen, so it made sense to have technical training institutes for people who would be in charge of increasingly technical warfare.  All the service academies have now to justify their cost and their pretensions, it seems, is their once-illustrious history, and the club of “tradition,” which they wield mercilessly against students who dare question why things are as they are.

Who benefits from these strange historical holdovers? Not the taxpayers who fund them. The service academies are the vanity projects of the brass who went there. Their interest is in looking good (it’s good for their careers) and in keeping the tax dollars flowing. All official information taxpayers get about the service academies comes from the brass who run them and who use them as their private country clubs — at taxpayer expense. Military subordinates (which includes the students) are legally unable to offer conflicting views. The result is that the service academies are feel-good hype factories that operate with virtually no accountability and little oversight, the very definition of government bloat on autopilot.

Oh, yes—there’s one more group of people who defend these places to the death: the parents of the young military members who attend them. Why wouldn’t they?  Having their children admitted is a government-sponsored guarantee of a golden ticket to life: college at taxpayer expense with no student debts, the highest salary of any set of graduates, and guaranteed employment and (no-Obamacare-necessary) health benefits for at least five years, frequently well beyond. And no, most people in the military aren’t remotely likely to be shot at.

The service academies are poster boys of the out-of-control entitlement programs Republicans say they hate. So I say to the new Republican Senate majority and the strengthened House majority: Welcome to Washington, and get to work.

Yet they are alluring, and seem on the surface to offer a better alternative to other colleges that gave in long ago to the idea of keeping students happy with as few requirements as possible. By contrast, the mission statement for the Naval Academy, whose graduates cost taxpayers about half a million dollars each and who become officers in the Navy and Marine Corps — and where I am in my 28th year as a professor — makes for stirring reading. So too do the mission statements of the other service academies, all government programs with one purpose only, to graduate military officers: West Point for Army, Colorado Springs for the Air Force, and New London for the Coast Guard. Navy’s mission statement speaks—in contrast to almost all other colleges in the U.S.– of purpose. The mission of the Naval Academy is “to develop midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor, and loyalty,” How inspiring these ideals are!

There’s one problem. Nobody ever asks if we achieve these goals. I know after 28 years that we don’t.

The service academies in the new millennium are little more than military Disneylands for tourists. They are also cash cows for the brass who send their own children there at taxpayer expense: the children of multiple current and past administrators have gotten this taxpayer-supported present, which looks to me like (illegal) nepotism. And far from “imbu[ing] them with the highest ideals,” the service academies are in fact the graveyards of the ideals of students who come looking for something that transcends the watery values of secular humanism that are the best many other institutions can offer.

Conservatives bash welfare and food stamps, but in fact the service academies are the most generous government giveaway going. But just try, as I did, finding out who gives away the benefits or even on what basis. That’s information the taxpayers can’t know. Three rounds of FOIA requests to see who admits and why have hit the brick wall of the brass refusing to answer. The military prides itself on accountability, but the admissions office of Navy wants to give away the taxpayers’ money with no accountability whatsoever. Why did a football player get in, while the high-flyer woman who led her class was rejected? They informed me it was because admitted candidates showed “leadership.” What’s that?  How was this measured? (We don’t even require an interview to gauge charisma, which the vast majority of our students lack.) The message from the brass is clear:funnel the money to us and don’t ask questions.

Ever tried to debate with one of the beneficiaries of this taxpayer-supported largesse? I have, on NPR, when I was informed by a proud and defiant recipient of this government give-away that the service academies were a “national treasure”—not, coincidentally, one that enriched him personally. Service academy officers aren’t better—but almost invariably, they’re convinced they are: the administrators assure midshipmen repeatedly that they are “the best and the brightest” and are “held to a higher standard.”  So it’s not coincidence that service academy officers have a negative reputation in the military as smug ring-knockers. They didn’t have to work their way through college..

And they’re hardly, on average, the “best and the brightest.” In fact more than a quarter of the class has SAT scores below 600, and our average is lower than the nearby state school University of Maryland. Twenty percent of our class comes through a taxpayer-supported remedial 13th grade (another almost $50,000 per student for taxpayers). They fill our remedial courses (I am teaching some of these this semester, as a full professor)—a second try at getting them up to college level.  The top 10 percent are impressive. But they are the exceptions rather than the rule, and almost all (I know from talking to them) are deeply disillusioned by the Academy and by what they found there.

But we’re ferociously selective, right?  The Naval Academy has highly creative definitions of what constitutes an applicant, and applying these makes us more selective, on paper, than all but a handful of U.S. schools—and boosts our beauty quotient in the so-important U.S. News and World Report rankings. In fact we count all 7,500 applicants to a week-long summer program for 11th graders, that enrolls 2,500, as Naval Academy applicants, as well as anybody who fills out enough information to create a candidate number. It was just last year we stopped counting the 3,000 applicants to ROTC programs at civilian schools as Naval Academy applicants (say what?) when a reporter discovered it, but when I was on the admissions board for a year a decade ago we considered nothing close to the 20,000 applicants they claim. It was actually fewer than 5,000 candidates for 1,800 admits. Is this an outright lie to scam taxpayers, or simple unfamiliarity with the legal requirements of the Department of Education as to what constitutes an “applicant”?
 
dapaterson said:
Officers lead.  If they're not good with people, they should not be serving as officers.

Too many technical occupations have built Ottawa-centric communities of practice.  Hint: If over half your trade is in NDHQ, it should probably be civilianized.

I didn't say no leadership; just not natural leaders.  As well, you can have people that you would never follow into combat be fantastic at leading  a large project team to deliver a new capability, so it's about using peoples strengths rather then forcing them into a mold. And having actual practical experience is a huge asset for the engineer types for getting things that will actually work in the real world. 

You could decentralize ADM(Mat), but it kind of makes sense given the amount of common equipment and push for interoperations to have everyone co located.  Doesn't have to be in the NCR, but given the dollar value of the projects, makes it much easier when you have to sell it up the govt food chain.

Given how reliant modern military forces are on equipment, you need a lot more on the technical backend and logistics side to keep that all functioning.  That requires people with a lot of different skill sets to get things that will actually work when you need them too and keep them working.  Considering the massive handicap placed on us by our own governmental rules, really kind of impressive anyone has any working kit anywhere.

Getting back to the point though, making blanket statements about all trades and degrees is pretty silly given the massive range of officer trades employed in the forces.  There are a lot of pointy end trades where a degree after the fact may make sense (although then once someone is proved competent, you then lose them for several years for a BA), and there are others where it makes no sense to not have it as a prereq, but can easily be met with standard civilian degrees and maybe some delta training for CAF specific requirements (ie engineers, dentists, doctors, etc).  Like any program, you have the rockstars and the duds, but you could say that for all entry streams.

They do the same with some NCM technical occupations as well, where we partner with civilian colleges for the background training with a bit of navy specific training at the end to get their basic tickets, and it can work out pretty well. 
 
I've never called for decentralization; I'm calling for the engineers in uniform to be replaced with engineers in civilian clothing.  The MARE, RCEME, AERE and Signals officer communities have become primarily Ottawa-based groups.  With a fixed number of military positions available, that's a problem.  Add to that the frequent churn in such jobs for military members, and you contribute to the delays experienced by many Defence projects.

The technical skills are great places to employ civilians.
 
dapaterson said:
I've never called for decentralization; I'm calling for the engineers in uniform to be replaced with engineers in civilian clothing.  The MARE, RCEME, AERE and Signals officer communities have become primarily Ottawa-based groups.  With a fixed number of military positions available, that's a problem.  Add to that the frequent churn in such jobs for military members, and you contribute to the delays experienced by many Defence projects.

The technical skills are great places to employ civilians.

So are you including the Construction And Field RCAF and Army engineers in this too? Speaking form a Civi U educated 45B/45C /24A / 00181  I don't agree with that.
 
If you are mostly doing PM work from an office, then I question the need for the work to be done by uniformed personnel.

If there are some garrison positions to maintain some balance with field deployable positions, then I can see the requirement.

A military is not a staff organization.  Staff organizations must be lean and designed to enable and support the force.  Static HQ functions are a waste of military personnel.  (And contribute to oversize HQs that are slow, plodding and unresponsive, but that's another issue...)
 
dapaterson said:
If you are mostly doing PM work from an office, then I question the need for the work to be done by uniformed personnel.

If there are some garrison positions to maintain some balance with field deployable positions, then I can see the requirement.

A military is not a staff organization.  Staff organizations must be lean and designed to enable and support the force.  Static HQ functions are a waste of military personnel.  (And contribute to oversize HQs that are slow, plodding and unresponsive, but that's another issue...)

That is a key requirement.  The civi types don't deploy very effectively without the military training component. When you need them, you need them now going in with the advance party and coming back last. The reserves have a tough time providing even rudimentary trained engineers / techs as they usually have a good job somewhere that keeps them steadily employed full time. I am sure you know all this intimately.

 
Look at the ratio of field to office for MARE, RCEME, AERE and Signals officers.  It's a tad skewed.  I know of one TDO who had to fight to keep "battlefield damage repair" in one occupational specification; the so-called SMEs didn't see the need, since it wasn't something they did day to day.  :facepalm:
 
dapaterson said:
If you are mostly doing PM work from an office, then I question the need for the work to be done by uniformed personnel.

If there are some garrison positions to maintain some balance with field deployable positions, then I can see the requirement.

A military is not a staff organization.  Staff organizations must be lean and designed to enable and support the force.  Static HQ functions are a waste of military personnel.  (And contribute to oversize HQs that are slow, plodding and unresponsive, but that's another issue...)


Although I've been retired for many, many years, I want to chime in and support dapaterson. I understand that the training regime for e.g. naval engineering officers is long and technically demanding and I am aware that not many civilian universities offer suites of programmes that are tailored to the needs of e.g. the RCN and RCAF engineering communities. But, in general:

    1. Some branches, especially some engineering branches are "out of balance" ~ too many people doing what is, essentially, civil service or civilian contractor work while wearing a uniform and occupying a valuable CF establishment
        position. They are what Evelyn Waugh described (in one of the Sword of Honour series of novels) as "heavily armed civilians;"

    2. This misbalancing means that essential, operational, combat functions get shuffled into second or third place behind e.g. project management skills; and

    3. One result of the misbalancing is that the sorts of military/operational skill/experience sets that a uniformed member ought to bring to project office are all too often absent in some engineering branches.

I'm not suggesting that the CF doesn't need some uniformed engineering officers in Ottawa: it does; there are valuable, important jobs to be done there, but I believe the current plethora of inexperienced junior officers that I see in Ottawa is dangerous. I concede that, back in the 1980s, at least, there were not enough civil servants or contractors to fill all the project team slots that we needed and so we employed relatively junior AERE and MARE officers because they were qualified and available ... but that was not the case for all branches and I suspect it is not the overall situation now.

Perhaps my previous suggestions about delaying degree programmes for all officers is too ambitious. Perhaps some engineering branches need more academics in order for the officer to complete training ... but is that a full BEng degree or it is, say, the equivalent of, maybe, ⅔ or ¾ of the courses needed for a degree? (I remember, by the way, when RMC produced loads of good "engineering" officers, in the 1950s, without, ever, awarding a degree in anything. The College taught them all the math, science and technology they needed ~ and in the 1950s the military was at the leading edge of technology and RMC was ahead of most universities in e.g. the emerging field of computing ~ but it did not award degrees. Officers who finished RMC and needed or wanted a degree went to civilian universities for one (quite relaxing, I was told) academic year, at DND's expense, to get it.)
 
Uniformed personnel should primarily be the champions of the operational requirement and form part of the checks and balances that ensure the design and implementation of a particular capability meets the stated needs of the CAF.  Appropriately-qualified military personnel can do this, even on a relatively abbrviated HR posting cycle compared to civilian project management staff, without unduly compromising the integrity and consistency of project, progam or portfolio management.

:2c:

G2G
 
In other words: requirements definition requires a strong military presence; procurement, not so much.

 
dapaterson said:
In other words: requirements definition requires a strong military presence; procurement, not so much.

  :nod:
 
Spectrum said:
So why so much focus on ROTP vs DEO? Are we worried we won't be able to recruit anyone? Or is ROTP/RMC just sacred ground for the CAF? I think I know the true answer, but I am curious to hear what others think.

I'm not going to say that it's the primary reason, but I think there is a cost/time benefit to ROTP vs DEO.

Let's say a DEO enrolls in May, about the same time ROTP students are commissioned following successful completion of their degrees. At this point, the difference is that ROTP students could have completed up to Phase IV of their MOC trg (more likely just 3 phases), they have a commitment to 5 years in the forces, while the DEO students are just starting basic and have no financial commitment. Basically, you get more employable officers at 22 year old through ROTP.

It's thin, I know. I'm trying to find better justifications.
 
Lumber said:
I'm not going to say that it's the primary reason, but I think there is a cost/time benefit to ROTP vs DEO.

Let's say a DEO enrolls in May, about the same time ROTP students are commissioned following successful completion of their degrees. At this point, the difference is that ROTP students could have completed up to Phase IV of their MOC trg (more likely just 3 phases), they have a commitment to 5 years in the forces, while the DEO students are just starting basic and have no financial commitment. Basically, you get more employable officers at 22 year old through ROTP.

It's thin, I know. I'm trying to find better justifications.
Very thin.  If the comparison is going to be from the date of graduation and not date of enrollment, your ROTP guy only has 5 years remaining on his initial engement while the the DEO has 9 years.  The ROTP guy only has to work for 20 to 21 years before being entitled to a pension while the DEO must do 25.  I am not sure how you define "more employable" but it seems to be based on an ROTP entrant being able to actually start working (ie. hit OFP) up to one year younger than a DEO entrant.  Does that one year at the front really matter when career and pension systems will keep the DEO for more than one extra year at the back end?
 
I think the title should be corrected: There is no way in hell Canada is buying back Royal Roads. So the issue should be the utility of two military colleges.

I suggets some data on the following question would be useful here, if any one has such data: Since CMR has been cut down to a CEGEP course with the OCdts then being sent to Kingston for their bachelor's degree, did the number of French Canadian recruits to the military college drop significantly?

If it did drop significantly, and if it was determined that having a military college vs. not having a military college is a useful employment of resources, then I suggest that having two such colleges providing full degrees, one English and one French, makes perfect sense.
 
MCG said:
Very thin.  If the comparison is going to be from the date of graduation and not date of enrollment, your ROTP guy only has 5 years remaining on his initial engement while the the DEO has 9 years.  The ROTP guy only has to work for 20 to 21 years before being entitled to a pension while the DEO must do 25.  I am not sure how you define "more employable" but it seems to be based on an ROTP entrant being able to actually start working (ie. hit OFP) up to one year younger than a DEO entrant.  Does that one year at the front really matter when career and pension systems will keep the DEO for more than one extra year at the back end?

Just to clarify, the ROTP initial engagement is 12-13 years depending on your trade, which means the ROTP entrant has 8-9 years remaining upon completion of University. The 5 years is just the obligatory service period, during which if we release we would owe the government back for our subsidized education.

Other arguments:
1. as a recruiting tool; who doesn't love free education, followed by guaranteed employment; and
2. (and you're going to hate this one) RMC is sometimes seen a prestigious institution that attracts some of the best of the best who have proven leadership skills. Don't we want to attract some of these people into the forces?
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
I think the title should be corrected: There is no way in hell Canada is buying back Royal Roads. So the issue should be the utility of two military colleges.

I don't know...a few years ago, anyone thinking that ranks for the CA and RCAF would be changed/reverted would have probably been told "hell no" as well. 

Actually....is the riding that RRMC is in a contentious one?  >:D
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
I think the title should be corrected: There is no way in hell Canada is buying back Royal Roads. So the issue should be the utility of two military colleges.
The title is correct.  RMC, CMR and CFC.  We have three.
 
MCG said:
The title is correct.  RMC, CMR and CFC.  We have three.

Except CFC grants no degrees; those who pursue a Masters at CFC get it through RMC.


 
dapaterson said:
Except CFC grants no degrees; those who pursue a Masters at CFC get it through RMC.

But it could easily be U of T or any one of a dozen other universities, right?  :nod:
 
daftandbarmy said:
But it could easily be U of T or any one of a dozen other universities, right?  :nod:
Precisely.  A Sandhurst model that provides officer training, while leveraging the civilian university system for education.  A broad-based education means not drawing a significant portion of the officer corps from any one school.

A revitalized COTC, perhaps?
 
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