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The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

You can’t say that this wasn’t greatly helped by Afghanistan.
As a matter of fact I can. There wasn’t a single piece of AFG-related justification to government for the 147F.

In fact, for a period, 147D actually endangered 147F. Some said, just rebuild the D instead of getting new F.
 
As a matter of fact I can. There wasn’t a single piece of AFG-related justification to government for the 147F.

In fact, for a period, 147D actually endangered 147F. Some said, just rebuild the D instead of getting new F.
Because there was no formal justification doesn’t mean it didn’t have an impact.
 
So what impact then do you think it had then between the 147F being procured or not, or in what fleet size or what configuration? Specifics would support your argument.
 
So what impact then do you think it had then between the 147F being procured or not, or in what fleet size or what configuration? Specifics would support your argument.
Not necessarily what we procured but how fast it was procured.
 
Again, I’ll point out that MHLH timeline was impacted (extended) due to the temporary staff refocus on IMLC. If the Manley Report had not supported heavy-lift helicopters, which resulted in the provision of $292M of funding to support the procurement of six CH-47Ds for AFG, MHLH would have gone to TB 9-10 months earlier and the contract with Boeing would likely have been signed in late-Fall 2008, not Summer 2009. Not a big delay, but an AFG-induced delay nonetheless.
 
The blog Best Fighter 4 Canada made a new post a few days ago.

UPDATE: MISCELLANEOUS MUSINGS MESSING WITH MY MIND...
Re: The potential issues with Gripen E and certification. This is not a new requirement. All the bidders must have been informed that their bids would have to comply with 2-Eyes requirements.

The article it references is also 2 years old, but this could be a face-saving move by Saab to back out at the last minute as well.

Dassault backed out over similar issues in 2018. When that happened, I was really shocked Saab stayed in.
 
Re: The potential issues with Gripen E and certification. This is not a new requirement. All the bidders must have been informed that their bids would have to comply with 2-Eyes requirements.

The article it references is also 2 years old, but this could be a face-saving move by Saab to back out at the last minute as well.

Dassault backed out over similar issues in 2018. When that happened, I was really shocked Saab stayed in.
If you are a company like Saab (incredibly impressive given it’s size/base) - the opportunity to sell 88 fighters to Canada for Billions of dollars is obviously extremely attractive…yet daunting when the competition are two of the big American giants.

Add to this the 2-Eyes requirement, and both of your competitors are not only giants, but they are based in one country of the 2-Eyes agreement.

Having Dassault withdraw must’ve been encouraging for them, as it’s one less company to compete with. Their chances went up, mathematically speaking, when the number of competitors shrank.

If they lose, they lose. Their bid wasn’t selected. But if they win…. That’s a huge win for a company that size


0.02
 
As a matter of fact I can. There wasn’t a single piece of AFG-related justification to government for the 147F.

In fact, for a period, 147D actually endangered 147F. Some said, just rebuild the D instead of getting new F.
And to think they pushed ahead with the new build 147F - AAAANNNNDDDD managed to get them with nifty fuel tanks to boot 👍🏻

Glad someone pushed back.
 
Again, I’ll point out that MHLH timeline was impacted (extended) due to the temporary staff refocus on IMLC. If the Manley Report had not supported heavy-lift helicopters, which resulted in the provision of $292M of funding to support the procurement of six CH-47Ds for AFG, MHLH would have gone to TB 9-10 months earlier and the contract with Boeing would likely have been signed in late-Fall 2008, not Summer 2009. Not a big delay, but an AFG-induced delay nonetheless.
Could one not argue that if we weren't in Afghanistan, we wouldn't have acquired Chinooks at all?

So while Afghanistan may have delayed the formal contract signing of the 147F due to focusing on acquiring the 147D as soon as possible, if it weren't for Afghanistan we wouldn't have had either. (??)
 
Could one not argue that if we weren't in Afghanistan, we wouldn't have acquired Chinooks at all?

So while Afghanistan may have delayed the formal contract signing of the 147F due to focusing on acquiring the 147D as soon as possible, if it weren't for Afghanistan we wouldn't have had either. (??)
No.

TALC (Tactical Aviation Lift Capability) started pre-ID activities in 2000 in 1 Wing HQ, in coordination with DAR staff in NDHQ and Army staff in DGLCD (DG Land Capability Development) prior to 9-11. While TALC formally entered Definition phase in 2005, after four years of SOF and initial conceptual combat Ops, and two years of ISAF stability ops in AFG, the heart of the pre-AFG capability development effort to re-establish a doctrinal medium transport helicopter (MTH) capability in Canada remained. AFG was referred to as a potential theatre of operations, as were the Balkans (still operating, although down from the SFOR BG to about 80 observers to EUFOR) as were potential African AOs (which required airlift to a far greater degree even than AFG or The Balkans). TALC was renamed MHLH (Medium to Heavy Lift Helicopter) shortly after the Harper Conservative government took over the Martin Liberals. A set of mandatory capability requirements was issued, and based on those MCRs, the EH-101, Mi-17 and EC-725 were eliminated as non-compliant for capacity (they couldn’t lift the M-777 155mm howitzer), leaving the CH-47 Chinook, CH-53K King Stallion and Mi-26 Halo remaining, however the 53K was eliminated because the USMC procurement process would not support procurement by a foreign nation ahead of its procurement, and Mi-26 was eliminated due to supply chain incompatibility. So, single-bidder compliant and the government moved forward, taking another year of Definition Phase until late-2006, then 2-1/2 years of Development Phase culminating in Implementation Phase approval in June 2009 and signing with Boeing.

AFG’s biggest influence was the 9-month delay of ILMC on the MHLH timeline.
 
I’m almost certain that NOBODY - minus yourself and a select few others - are aware of that. You certainly sound like you know what you’re talking about.

I imagine most people, whether in the CAF at the time or the public, are under the impression that the 147 was acquired due to the Manley report and our operations in AFG.

I didn’t know about any of the things you wrote about until now. Thank You for posting that 👍🏻
 
CBH99, there is a trail of this information available publicly, including some presentations that were released back in the day, some in officially archived GoC material, some through investigative reporting, etc., just that most people just don’t care at the time since it isn’t an issue for most. Some people have out this all together, like CGAI’s David Perry, arguably the most knowledgeable external-to-CAF SME to be found, regarding Canadian military procurement. Others do a decent job on augmenting details to known challenging procurements, Murray Brewster and the like, and even some others get some isolated facts right.

The biggest issue for the current Chinooks, most of it back in pre-MHLH days, ie. TALC, then the early days of MHLH (2006-ish) when there was a pocket of criticism that the system was rigged for the Chinook. The MCRs were developed to capture the enduring requirements that the helicopter would need in service with the RCAF supporting CAF ops globally. The potential contenders were assessed and as previously noted, were eliminated. The government then issued an ACAN (Advance Contract Award Notice) in 2006, notifying its intent to procure the Chinook. Public records confirm that only Augusta-Westland challenged PWGSC’s ACAN, but it was a puffed up chest kind of thing, because its argued product, the EH-101, could not lift the Army’s M-777. AW withdrew its challenge, or PWGSC just said ‘sorry’, I can’t recall which, and the Government THEN proceeded to announce a sole-source procurement based on there only being one compliant bidder - Boeing. Those docs were all on MERX at the time. I’m not sure if they still are. A good reference MHLH project quad chart (also attached below) that remains archived in the Canada.gc.ca site at https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/quad-charts/mhlh-quad-chart-en.pdf

Apologies to those wishing to discuss the Future Fighter Capability Project, but I figured there is some tangentially-related applicability to being informed on the process to the degree that heresay (well intentioned, or for other reasons) could do with some firm facts and framework of how it all went down back in the day. I could get into FFCP in greater detail as well, but will save that for another day. Its political factors in play make the Chinook look like a very simple procurement (which, for a $5B project, it actually was).

I’m quite comfortable in opining that even if we had never gone to Afghanistan, we would have CH-147F Chinook helicopters today.

Regards
G2G
 

Attachments

He absolutely does...
Well I did mess up the terminology a bit, 😉 throwing ‘Development’ into the ID-OA-Def’n-Impl-CloseOut spectrum. Some of us informally called the second half of Def’n as Development, but technically there is only Definition Phase before Implementation Phase.
 
Don’t forget the 5th step, dap - close out and sitting back on the couch with a nice cold beer. 😉
 
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