The Defence Budget [superthread]

[Rifleman62]

Expectations on defence spending from the Liberals? Who has those?

Blame the Conservatives will never stop. Both political parties share blame, but the Liberals get most of it.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/sajjan-to-lower-expectations-for-future-military-purchases/article34882029/

Sajjan to lower expectations for future military purchases

DANIEL LEBLANC AND STEVEN CHASE - OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail

Last updated Wednesday, May 03, 2017 8:07AM EDT

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, under pressure to deliver a new purchasing plan for big-ticket military goods, is preparing to lower expectations for the amount of cash available by blaming the former Conservative government for leaving the Canadian Armed Forces with a multibillion-dollar budget shortfall.

Mr. Sajjan will deliver a speech in Ottawa on Wednesday that will lay out the lack of available funds for essential procurement projects into the next decade, arguing that this is creating unexpected challenges for the long-term plan for the CAF, federal officials said.

After a series of delays, the results of the defence policy review are expected to be unveiled in coming weeks, the officials said.

Mr. Sajjan, who had to apologize on the weekend for overstating his role as an officer in the war in Afghanistan, is now facing pressure to deliver on the Liberal Party’s 2015 promise for a “leaner, more agile, better-equipped military.”

However, defence officials said the minister will clearly lay out to Canadians that he is facing budget constraints that go well beyond the expectations of most military experts.

“We need to get more hard facts into the public domain about the real state of affairs and where we’re starting from. It has made the challenge deeper than it was widely understood to be going in,” said a senior defence official, speaking ahead of the speech on condition of anonymity.

In particular, defence officials said there are 18 major projects, which are all essential to the continuing operations of the Armed Forces, that are currently unfunded. As such, any future budget increases awarded to the Department of National Defence would have to go to these projects rather than to new purchases that will be called for in the defence policy review.

The unfunded projects include a replacement fleet for Canada’s decades-old Aurora aircraft, new communications satellites for the Arctic, new military-grade bulldozers and new refuelling trucks. All together, these projects are worth well more than $10-billion, with additional needs to train CAF members.

But the Conservative Party, which is calling for Mr. Sajjan’s resignation for having called himself the “architect” of Operation Medusa in Afghanistan in 2006, is refusing to shoulder the blame for DND’s current budget problems.

“I’m very concerned that our Armed Forces will be hollowed out, as they have been by previous Liberal governments,” Conservative MP James Bezan said. “In terms of hard dollars, we were spending more than they are by quite a bit.”

Meanwhile, Canada’s Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson is facing new pressure to reopen an investigation into whether Mr. Sajjan violated the Conflict of Interest Act by refusing to open an inquiry in the Afghan detainee controversy.

During Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, prisoners captured by Canadian soldiers were handed over to Afghanistan’s notorious National Directorate of Security, where they were tortured to produce intelligence that could help the fight against the Taliban.

Mr. Sajjan, a former reserve soldier who served in Afghanistan, declined to open an investigation into Canada’s role in the matter, saying Canadian troops’ handling of the detainees was in accordance with international law.

When Ms. Dawson questioned him about his involvement in the detainee matter, Mr. Sajjan told her “at no time was he involved in the transfer of Afghan detainees, nor did he have any knowledge relating to the matter.”

However, NDP Leader Tom Mulcair is now pointing to praise for Mr. Sajjan’s intelligence-gathering role in Kandahar, such as a letter from a superior saying the minister was a key liaison with Afghan forces, including the Afghan National Police.

“This information casts further doubt on the minister’s truthfulness in the account of his role that he provided to you. It is simply not plausible for a military intelligence liaison officer who had such a role on the battlefield to have had no access whatsoever to information relating to the capture and transfer of Afghan detainees,” Mr. Mulcair wrote in a May 2 letter to Ms. Dawson.

“This is a clear conflict between the minister’s responsibilities and his personal interests regarding events before his appointment.”

The issue of procurement has long been a challenge for governments of all stripes.

Back in 2008, the Conservative government laid out a Canada First Defence Strategy that would build 15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates, buy 65 new fighter jets and 17 fixed-wing search-and-rescue planes, among other items.

Mr. Sajjan is expected to make the case on Wednesday that Canada will need much more than 65 fighter jets when it buys its next fleet in coming years, adding billions to the final price tag.

Vice-Admiral Mark Norman publicly warned Canadians of this funding shortfall shortly after the Liberals won election under Justin Trudeau. The veteran officer, now suspended pending the outcome of an RCMP probe into the leak of confidential information, went public in late 2015 with a frank discussion of the lack of sufficient money allocated to building Canada’s future fleet of military ships.

He said in December, 2015, when he was head of the Royal Canadian Navy, that the military would need twice as much money set aside for warships, saying the initial cost estimates of $14-billion had doubled and would cost as much as $30-billion.

The Liberal Party has historically found itself divided over military spending, which tends to restrain its enthusiasm for funnelling cash into the Department of National Defence.

But the Conservative Party, which is avidly pro-military, nevertheless delivered far less than it promised for the Forces during nearly a decade in office. The government of Stephen Harper had a few early successes in its mandate – such as heavy-lift aircraft – but then quickly became bogged down in efforts to deliver planes and ships.

Military procurement has proven difficult for successive governments over the decades. For example, it was only in 2015 that Ottawa finally took delivery of the first six of 28 naval helicopters originally ordered more than a decade ago. Former Harper defence minister Peter MacKay called that helicopter purchase the “worst procurement in the history of Canada.”

 

[dapaterson]

Does this mean he has no idea what it will be? The military must have had some input. Did the military do a draft based on the parameters the government gave them or is Mr Butts just writing it in isolation?

The CDS cannot make public comment on anything until it is released by the government.

 

[Rifleman62]

I get that, but his newspaper quote did not sound like he knew what was coming down: "eager to see". He must have seen a draft. He could have said something like eager to see it on the street or eager to see it implemented.

 

[The Bread Guy]

I get that, but his newspaper quote did not sound like he knew what was coming down: "eager to see". He must have seen a draft. He could have said something like eager to see it on the street or eager to see it implemented.

Maybe he meant, "eager to see the final version," given he probably had some level of contact with a draft?  I think he'd be smarter than to comment on an internal draft that isn't gov't policy quite yet.

 

[Journeyman]

Maybe he meant, "eager to see the architectural schematics"....  :-*

 

[MilEME09]

Military grappling with years of underfunding, Sajjan acknowledges



OTTAWA - Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan is calling attention to years of underfunding for the Canadian military, which he says has hollowed out the Armed Forces and left them struggling to do even basic tasks.

The minister says successive governments are responsible for the defence-spending hole, though he is particularly critical of budget cuts implemented under the previous Conservative government.

The result is that money has not been set aside for essential but aging military equipment that must be replaced soon.

Sajjan's comments come as the Liberal government prepares to unveil its new defence policy, which the minister says will start fixing some of the problems.

That includes predictable, sustainable defence funding and better accounting to ensure money is available to meet the military's needs.

One thing Sajjan isn't saying is whether the plan will provide more money for the military, or whether the government plans to cut non-essential projects.

since the conference just happened this is pretty bare, more to follow.

 

[The Bread Guy]

And this from the Info-machine (whether it's a transcript or speaking notes, who's to say anymore?) -- also attached if the link doesn't work for you -  highlights mine ...

Thank you, Mr. Battista and the whole CDA Institute team, for hosting today’s event. It’s a pleasure being here with you today.

I understand the CDAI had a productive exchange with the Chief of Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance, in February about a range of issues facing the Canadian Armed Forces.

I’m here today to outline where we’re really starting from with Canada’s new defence policy. The Government will be releasing that policy very soon, and the depth of the challenge has come into more stark relief through the course of our analysis.

This analysis consisted of a thorough public consultation. Canadians provided over 20,000 submissions online. Parliamentarians held over 50 town hall discussions.  107 subject area experts participated in roundtables across the country, from Vancouver to Yellowknife, Edmonton to Toronto, in Halifax, Ottawa and Montreal.

I’m going to be very frank, because I believe it’s important to be clear about the hole we are starting in. I’ll say up front that successive governments contributed to the current state of affairs.

This audience is keenly aware of the extent of the challenges facing our military as a result of under-investment.

And yet, the state of affairs is, in some ways, worse than realized by most observers.

I know that you understand that we cannot build the Canadian Armed Forces this nation needs through a series of short-term decisions.

I know you understand that a military is not strengthened by cobbling together pieces from one budget to the next.

By succumbing continually to the pressures of the urgent at the expense of the strategic.

By hoping that 20 years down the line, all of the disjointed ups and downs will somehow result in the military we need.

That is why, in launching a Defence Policy Review, we set out to take the long-term view – to deliver a credible, realistic and funded strategy for our military.

Let me state outright and up front that the Canadian Armed Forces deliver what governments ask of them every time. They perform superbly regardless of the resource constraints they face.

All Canadians can be proud of the fact that our women and men in uniform answer the call of duty whenever and wherever it sounds.

In recent years alone, they have deployed to Iraq to contribute to global efforts to fight DAESH.

They deployed to Nepal in just 48 hours, after a tragic earthquake struck the tiny nation, and…

They deployed with NATO to bolster alliance resolve and deterrence against aggressive Russian actions in Ukraine.

…at home, they have helped residents of Winnipeg and Fort McMurray overcome massive floods and devastating forest fires.

The Canadian Armed Forces is an inspiring institution that makes me proud every day. Responsive, professional and dedicated, they are counted amongst the best militaries in the world.

But militaries cannot perform well forever without proper support.

Governments have a responsibility to uphold their end of the bargain…To care for their militaries, resource them properly, and fund them in a responsible way that meets their needs.

Since being elected a year and a half ago, we have worked hard to address the complex challenges that the Defence Team has faced in recent years.

Doing this properly has been a very large task.

We have spent a lot of time and attention assessing what’s working, what isn’t, and why.

We engaged with defence and security experts in Canada and abroad to increase our understanding of modern security threats.

We met with allies and partners to better understand the best defence role for Canada, and…

We listened to Canadians about their aspirations for the Forces and our country.

At every stage, the take-away has been clear:  Governments have not delivered predictable, sustainable, long-term funding for the Canadian Armed Forces.

It has not been a straight line. Let me take a moment to retrace some twists and turns.

In 2004-05, Prime Minister Paul Martin’s government implemented annual budget increases of around $1.5 billion in successive years.

After that, the budget grew incrementally, predominantly to cover the cost of the combat mission in Afghanistan until it ended in 2010-11.

Two deficit reduction programs followed, Strategic Review and the Deficit Reduction Action Plan. By the time these were fully implemented in 2015, each reduced the annual defence budget by $1 billion dollars, for a total of about $2 billion per year.   

The defence escalator, which was implemented to protect the DND budget from defence inflation, was increased from 1.5% to 2% in 2011. And beginning this fiscal year, it increased from 2% to 3%. Yet even that will not be sufficient to meet our future requirements.

Years of ups and downs have contributed to unpredictability for those responsible for supporting, maintaining and sustaining the Forces and planning for its future.  The reductions have left the organization hollow in a number of areas.

Fighter jets and ships are prime examples of the unfortunate link between inadequate investment and capability gaps.

Canadians were told a few years ago that the government would buy 65 new jets to replace our aging fleet of CF-18s. But for the missions we ask the Royal Canadian Air Force to undertake, and for our alliance commitments, 65 jets would simply not be enough.

If we want to fully meet our commitments to NATO and NORAD simultaneously – and we do – then 65 jets would not be a full fleet. It would only be a fleet for risk managing our requirements, not meeting them.

Furthermore, the $9 billion in funding that was earmarked for the jet replacements by the previous government is nowhere near enough to even cover the 65 jets they proposed.

For the Navy’s new surface combatants, the previous government ended up saying they would buy up to 15. As has been well reported, the budget identified was dramatically insufficient and unrealistic.

The Royal Canadian Navy deserves a clear, realistic and fully funded commitment.

Canada’s naval capabilities are at a 40-year low.

The number of operational ships in Canada’s fleet has dropped by five in the last two years alone. Ships have been retired without replacement because any plans for investments simply came too late.

Without a single destroyer in its fleet, Canada will rely on the United States and NATO for Area Air Defence until  the introduction of our new Surface Combatants.

Without a single supply ship, Canada is reliant on the capabilities of allies and partners for its replenishment needs, as well.

These examples alone would be troubling enough, but there is much more to grapple with.

The previous government’s budget cutting means $2 billion dollars less in the defence budget this year. This has exacerbated an already challenging situation.

Closing recruitment offices made it harder to attract new recruits.

Cutting the number of procurement officers made it difficult to buy, maintain and sustain all the tools and equipment we actually could afford for our military.

We are now in the troubling position where status quo spending on defence will not even maintain a status quo of capabilities.

Current funding has us digging ourselves into a hole…A hole that gets deeper every year. As a percentage of our GDP, we are spending less on defence today than we were in 2005.

There is a list of major capital projects that are entirely unfunded. These aren’t ‘nice to haves’, these aren’t frills. These are projects that must be completed to allow our military to just keep doing what it’s doing. Investments that need to be made into the Forces key equipment and capabilities….And no funding has been allocated for them.

Our Air Force will need funding for mid-life upgrades to its Cormorant search and rescue helicopters. We are talking about a critical need to invest in a fleet of aircraft that our Air Force uses on operations every day to help Canadians in distress.

And they will also need sufficient funds to extend the life of the Griffons. These are highly reliable helicopters that have served our Air Force faithfully on missions at home and abroad for over 20 years.

These helicopters are used to transport troops and materials, as they have on humanitarian missions and on operations in Afghanistan, and now in Iraq. And they can fit right inside the C-17 Globemaster, so they’re easily transportable, and give the Forces flexibility and agility in responding to crises around the world.

But if we don’t fund their life extension project, we need to phase them out because helicopters with obsolete instrumentation can’t fly in North American airspace.

And yet…no money was allocated to keep them running in the years to come.

With the Army, we discovered that no funding had been allocated to allow soldiers to keep doing some of their most important work.

Without support from our allies, Canadian soldiers deployed overseas would be exposed to threats emanating from aircraft, missiles and long-range artillery.  Therefore, investments in Ground Based Air and Munitions Defence systems are required to guarantee the safety of our deployed troops.

Yet no money was earmarked to provide this protection to our soldiers in the past.

There are several other examples of projects that the Army needs the government to fund in order to ensure it can continue to assist Canadians during natural disasters, and to meet international commitments.

Its fleet of Heavy Support Equipment such as forklifts, dozers, loaders, and excavators, needs to be replaced so that our soldiers can build camps, protective works as well as roads and shelters. 

The list of activities that our soldiers undertake with this equipment is long. Yet here, too, no investments were planned.

Furthermore, the Army’s fleet of Logistic Support Vehicles, such as trailers and medium-size trucks, used to transport supplies and essential equipment, has been significantly degraded over time and must be replaced.  These capabilities are essential to sustain our soldiers at home and abroad.

Again – no investment planned.

But the resourcing problems that we have found the most troubling, are the ones that have directly affected our service members.

In over 25 years as a Reservist, I saw firsthand the ways that Canada’s government have failed to properly equip our Reserve force.

Not only is there not enough equipment, but the training to use what equipment they have is lacking, as well.

Our Reserve units are tremendously resourceful, and they perform extremely well, despite having been under-funded for so long. But that does not excuse the failure to properly resource our Reserves.

They deserve gratitude from the Governments that deployed them away from their families and into harm’s way.

Instead, when they take off the uniform, they get pension cheques delivered late.

They have to run an obstacle course when they retire from the military, and they get short-changed in more ways than any Government would want to admit.

So, these are some of the problems to be solved. Before it can build anything new, Canada’s new defence policy must first get us out of the hole that we’re starting in.

Part of the solution will lie in financial rigour.

Some of the decisions by previous governments about funding for major capital investments were based on overly optimistic assumptions about how far they could stretch the dollars in their defence budget to purchase military equipment.

But it is difficult for Canadians to hold the Government to account, because so few people understand the financial framework to begin with.

Defence budgets lack sufficient transparency and openness.

The capital budgets themselves have not been informed by full-life costing, and defence funding was unpredictable, so long-term planning has been extremely challenging.

That is why we promised a comprehensive review of Canada’s defence policy in 2015.

It is why we sought the input of Parliamentarians from all parties, and why we sought input during a series of expert roundtables, including the Industry roundtable last July.

It is why we consulted Canadians across the country through our online portal and Town Hall discussions.

We also held roundtable discussions to hear from Indigenous community members and academics and others with expertise on gender-related issues.

We wanted a thorough understanding of how every facet of our defence policy would impact our own people and Canada more generally.

We will act on the evidence gathered throughout of defence policy review process.

The process made clear the need to focus on emerging domains, like space and cyber.

The need to remain a trusted and capable ally and a respected voice on the international stage – to protect Canadians and their interests.

Most of all, we need to take better care of our Canadian Armed Forces personnel and their families. And we need to level with Canadians about what that really costs.

This Canadian defence policy will be the most rigorously costed one ever produced.

It has been developed with support from global costing experts from Deloitte, one of Canada’s top professional services firms, who also participated in Defence reviews among our Five Eyes partners.

But then we went a step further. We asked five other major accounting firms in Canada to review the methodology we used.

This will be a fair and accurate assessment of challenges, and a sound plan for how to address them.

Roméo Dallaire once said that we need “an unambiguous statement of what is expected of the Armed Forces. How the Forces will be structured. What resources will be available to them, and how the government will guarantee that it will be sustained in the future”.

Canada’s new defence policy will be that plan.

It will be a plan to get out of the hole we are starting in, and it will be a plan to build an even stronger military.

It will be a plan to allocate realistic funding to those “bread and butter” projects that will keep our military running efficiently and effectively for years to come.

Most of all, it will be a plan to care for the women and men who put on the uniform.

I look forward to doing right – now and for the long term - by those who defend Canada, our people, and our way of life.

Thank you.

Number of mentions of boots:  0  >

 

[dapaterson]

...Number of mentions of boots:  0  >

To be fair, he's an architect, not a cobbler...

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

To be fair, he's an architect, not a cobbler...

He only conceptualizes what the boots will look like, he doesn't actually make them  ;D

I'm sorry but any time someone says architect I only think of this:

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

To be fair, Milnews, he does say towards the end, and I quote:

"It will be a plan to allocate realistic funding to those “bread and butter” projects that will keep our military running ..."

bread and butter project, to keep the military running obviously equals "boots"  :bowing:

On a serious note, if this speech is the beginning of "sell the Defence review" program, I am at least comforted by the fact that it includes a reference to lack of AAD destroyers until the surface combatant comes along, which would indicate to me that there is an intent to retain the Canadian Task Force concept for maritime affairs, and that there is a reference to GBAD and requirement for realistic training for the army.

 

[Kirkhill]

The "edited" version didn't seem to have much to say about things that go bang.

Priorities

Saving Canadians
Reserves
Thanking ancient warriors.

 

[Gunner98]

We should consider - do we want first-class or affordable - can we really have it both ways?  Source:  http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/Compilations/FederalGovernment/PaperList.aspx?Menu=Fed-Doc-White&Paper=c6a4db8e-e464-430b-bbfe-ca77532e9ccb&Year=0&Department=defence&Minister=&Title=&Subject=

The 2008 Defence White Paper was called the Canada First Defence Strategy. Its synopsis was:
"The Canada First Defence Strategy provides a detailed road map for the modernization of the Canadian Forces, building on the Government’s investments in the military since taking office in 2006. It will produce a first-class, modern military that is well trained, well equipped and ready to take on the challenges of the 21st century. This Strategy is based on the Government’s vision for defence as well as an extensive and rigorous analysis of the risks and threats facing Canada and Canadians in the years to come. Starting from the Government’s clearly defined roles and level of ambition for the Canadian Forces, the Strategy identifies the military capabilities required to meet these objectives, which in turn determine where investments are most needed. This Strategy also takes into account valuable lessons drawn from recent experience at home and around the globe."

The last true Defence White Paper was in 1994 - its synopsis was- "With this White Paper, the Government has fulfilled its obligation to provide Canadians with an effective, realistic and affordable defence policy. From the outset, our objective was not to discard sound practices in favour of simplistic solutions. Rather, the Government was committed to reviewing carefully every aspect of Canada’s defence policy so that it could make reasoned judgements on how best to ensure the nation’s security and well-being. At the heart of our approach were extensive and far-reaching public consultations, lasting for most of 1994. The Government believes the defence policy enunciated in this White Paper reflects a Canadian consensus."

 

[GnyHwy]

Anyone ever wondered why it takes so long to get stuff? There are 3 desirables of procurement, but you only get to pick 2 of them:

1. Quality
2. Price
3. Speed of delivery

The 1994 paper makes a lot of sense to those who have been in long enough. "Affordable"+"consultation"="Decade of Darkness".

 

[Edward Campbell]

Sadly, there were decadeS of darkness, beginning, I would argue in about 1968 or '69.

The financial problems facing national defence in the West started in the late 1950s: the costs associated with replacing quantity (massed, conscripted armies using hand-me-down, war surplus stocks of materiel) with quality (relatively large (by 1930 standards) professional forces using first class, modern, sophisticated equipment that had very high R&D costs that needed to be recouped) became apparent circa 1960 and they were, in large measure, what drove Paul Hellyer to look for innovate, organizational ways to square the affordability vs first class circle. He failed, of course, because the problem wasn't organizational it was, and remains, financial ... and it's not that Canada, one of the ten largest and "best" economies in the world, cannot afford more and better, it is just that we, voters, do not want to spend any more on our defence ~ nor, I hasten to add on our home and car insurance or on our police and fire departments, either.

So the decadeS of darkness were the 1970s, '80s, '90s and the last 17 years, too. Yes, for a wee, tiny bit Paul Martin and Stephen Harper reversed the decline ~ or, at least, slowed the rate of decline ~ but that was temporary and it only lasted while we you were taking casualties.

I know I'm repeating myself but unless or until there is a real, credible, comprehensible (to Joe Sixpack and his wife) threat to Canada, and to their safety and prosperity (such as it is in Trutopia) they are not going to vote for politicians who (like e.g. Erin O'Toole) promise to spend 2% of GDP on defence and reform the defence procurement system. They will vote, instead, for politicians who promise to "help" the middle class ... even when that help never materializes.

 

[Carbon-14]

Anyone get the feeling they're laying the foundation to decrease the size of the Reg Force, increasing the PRes, and put that freed up money towards equipment?  The Minister specifically mentioned the Reserve Force in his speech, which I found out of place.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Anyone get the feeling they're laying the foundation to decrease the size of the Reg Force, increasing the PRes, and put that freed up money towards equipment?  The Minister specifically mentioned the Reserve Force in his speech, which I found out of place.

This is a topic which has been discussed here, several times: the notion that the long service, career, regular (permanent) force should be heavy on people who are harder and more expensive to train ~ technicians and so on ~ and the reserve force (much reformed, revitalized, reorganized and reequipped) should provide platoons or soldiers who can be (relatively) quickly and easily trained in communities.

The model has a lot to recommend it, in economic (productivity) terms, but it would be hideously complex and risky, too.

Still, it is a useful discussion to have ... if only to expose the flaws in the proposal.

 

[Lumber]

This is a topic which has been discussed here, several times: the notion that the long service, career, regular (permanent) force should be heavy on people who are harder and more expensive to train ~ technicians and so on ~ and the reserve force (much reformed, revitalized, reorganized and reequipped) should provide platoons or soldiers who can be (relatively) quickly and easily trained in communities.

The model has a lot to recommend it, in economic (productivity) terms, but it would be hideously complex and risky, too.

Still, it is a useful discussion to have ... if only to expose the flaws in the proposal.

It IS really hard finding things for radar operators to do when we're not sailing. Radar techs, not so much. I imagine the case is similar for infantry.

 

[jollyjacktar]

It IS really hard finding things for radar operators to do when we're not sailing. Radar techs, not so much. I imagine the case is similar for infantry.

But how much training does it take to get the Dibs up to speed?  I would imagine that the training for an operator is not something that could easily be accomplished on a part time basis and once trained the skills would be difficult to maintain at a Stone Frigate in Saskatoon.  I agree they seem to have jack shit to do except to scull around the main cave while alongside.  There's always cleaning stations.  Or the trainer.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

It IS really hard finding things for radar operators to do when we're not sailing. Radar techs, not so much. I imagine the case is similar for infantry.

We've got lots of infrastructure that needs to be cleaned  8)

And on occasion we go mechanized to change it up, with trace orders issued of course! 

I'm convinced the sole purpose of MAPLE RESOLVE is to help keep the Wainwright training area fertilized by using the boots of soldiers to evenly distribute the waste produced by the cattle we allow to graze there  ;D

 

[Lumber]

We've got lots of infrastructure that needs to be cleaned  8)

And on occasion we go mechanized to change it up, with trace orders issued of course! 

I'm convinced the sole purpose of MAPLE RESOLVE is to help keep the Wainwright training area fertilized by using the boots of soldiers to evenly distribute the waste produced by the cattle we allow to graze there  ;D

Let me amend:

It is very difficult finding MEANINGFULL AND ENGAGINE work for radar operators while not sailing.

When my ship was in a shore office for a year, there were weeks, months on end where sailors literally sat in a large office and did literally nothing (except PT and cleaning) for days on end. Morale was shit. We didn't have a ship, and without a ship, we were zero priority for any kind of simulator trg. We had a few people release just because, try as we might, we couldn't get them attach-posted somewhere. It didn't matter that they knew we would eventually get our ship back (in half a year or so) and be much busier then.