The Defence Budget [superthread]

[OldSolduer]

I prefer actual maps and map boards over fancy electronic gadgets. A good coffee pot is hard to beat though ......

 

[Journeyman]

.... If I see one more fancy hot fluid making machine I'm going to lose my tiny mind.

rly:  I have no heartache eliminating the "fancy," but tread lightly if you're suggesting taking away my coffee!

 

[dapaterson]

rly:  I have no heartache eliminating the "fancy," but tread lightly if you're suggesting taking away my coffee!

Don't worry, the medical system is ready for you:

 

[Wookilar]

Lol absolutely not!! I need it as much as the next guy, but seriously, do you need to bring your capachino (sp?)maker to the field? Seen it, don't laugh. Ever want to hear a 10K TQG bog down, there's your culprit.

A 5K will run everything you need. The tassimo can stay home.

 

[McG]

Here are a few ways that I see to immediately cut costs while protecting capability:

• Reduce/Stop the use of “tactical infrastructure” in field exercises
• Do not bring kitchen appliances to the field (with the exception of in field kitchens)
• Maximize the use of local training areas before traveling
• Teleconference to avoid TD for meetings and working groups
• Prohibit the use of WSE on deployments (We do not need to pay guys above their rank when there are other sitting at home already collecting pay at that level)
• Deploy the next Op ATTENTION as 100% Reg F (again, Reg F pay is a sunk cost while a year of Class C pay for a Sr NCO of Jr Offr to train & deploy could instead added another training day for a Class A unit)
• No new “buttons & bows” announcements
• Do not rebadged any more units for the sake of resurrecting old regiments
• Stop any unannounced plans to rebrand/rebadged/rename any branches, corps or organization for the purposes of historical sentimentalism
• Stop using rented civilian vehicles when military patter vehicles are available and serve the purpose

And here are some options options for long-term savings (though most will cost money up-front prior to the savings being achieved later):

• Consolidate all of NDHQ and appropriate other NCR units on the Nortel Campus
• Move CFC from Toronto to Ottawa (Nortel Campus) or Kingston (RMC or the closing prison)
• Divest unnecessary niche vehicle micro-fleets (if required, increase size of standard fleets to maintain platform numbers)
• Smash LFDTS & CTC into a single layer of HQ, transfer capability development functions from LFDTS to COS Land Strat
• Re-close CMR and consolidate ROTP back into RMC
• Consolidate all of 1 CMBG in Edmonton to reduce future steady-state cost moves
• Procure more training simulators for diesel guzzling equipment (like aircraft, Engr Hy Eqpt and MBT)
• Re-evaluate rank levels in HQ establishments

 

[dapaterson]

A few more contentious suggestions:

* Top to bottom compensation and benefits review to eliminate duplication and overlap
* Revisit posting policy to reduce annual move requirement (excluding off-BTL)
* Revisit IPR move policy to eliminate same-location moves (eg a paid move from Orleans to Kanata on release)
* Replace CANEX with private suppliers (who will pay market rents for CF facilities)
  * Retain small deployed NPF expertise to surge for deployments if required (hint: this does not include a Tim Hortons trailer)
* Return to annual TOS boards, particularly at ranks of LCol and above and MWO and above, to determine whether continued service meets a military requirement
* Enforce limits on GOFOs as ordered in the 1997 MND report (roughly a 1/3 reduction)
* Return to performance pay for GOFO and Capt(N)/Cols
  * Make PMAs and performance info per above public
* Make PMAs and performance information for all Public Servants public


For IM/IT

* Migrate from MS Office to Open Office to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Migrate from Outlook to open-source web-based DWAN email to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Dissolve ADM(IM), putting IM/IT support into CANOSCOM, IM/IT procurement into ADM(Mat), and comms and ISTAR systems under CJOC

 

[PanaEng]

MCG, what is “tactical infrastructure” ?

Great  ideas, from you and dapaterson;  can't argue against any of them.

does anyone have a DND or gov wide figure for licensing costs of MS Office, Outlook and servers?
I think shared services will be better positioned to handle a conversion as opposed to each department independently.

 

[McG]

MCG, what is “tactical infrastructure” ?

They are the FOBs complete with many giant circus tents, stadium lighting, daily showers for everyone, sea container sized electrical generators, and more protable diesel heaters than one cares to count.

* Return to performance pay for GOFO and Capt(N)/Cols

While we are at it, lets also tie pay incentives for all other ranks to performance and conduct.  If you are on a remedial measure (IC through to C&P) then the pay incentive is delayed by the duration of that remedial measure.  If you receive an unsatisfactory PER, then the pay incentive is delayed by a full year.

 

[dapaterson]

Forgot a few:

* Restructure establishment to differentiate between Lt and Capt
* Return to competitive promotion to Capt
* Revisit Degreed Officer Corps decision
  * Permit short engagements with no promotion beyond Capt without a degree
* Eliminate full-time second language training
  * Individuals may elect to pursue SLT on their own time; a decision not to get a language profile will limit future promotion possibilities

 

[Edward Campbell]

This report, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from CBC News deals with our favourite topic:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/11/09/f-military-policy.html?cmp=rss

What kind of military can Canada afford?
Doing the same with less after spending cuts

By Daniel Schwartz, CBC News

Posted: Nov 12, 2012

While Canadians remember their fallen, there are questions about what kind of military Canada will have in the near future.

Defence spending has increased by about a billion dollars every year under the Harper government, but the military faces shrinking budgets in the years ahead.

National Defence cost the government $22.8 billion in the last fiscal year, almost 10 per cent of total program expenses. The cuts are expected to take $2.5 billion out of the military budget.

For Esprit de Corps magazine editor Scott Taylor, the military must "sacrifice something, whether it's capability, or whether it's manpower, something's going to have to go."

Prime Minister Stephen Harper set out a different challenge in his speech on Oct. 29 welcoming Canada's new chief of defence staff: "Within very real budgetary constraints, Canada needs to maintain a modern, general purpose military capability."

In his speech after his appointment, Gen. Tom Lawson acknowledged that the military would "have to stay within a budget that will be tighter than what we had expected," after what he described as "a wonderful new period where we've had a chance to refurbish many of our capabilities."

When defence spending increased

That period began in 2005, with the Liberal government under Paul Martin announcing in its budget that it would provide the military with $13 billion in new funding over the next five years, which it described as "the largest increase in defence spending in the last 20 years."

Martin had been finance minister 10 years earlier, when the government faced a debt crisis that led to massive cuts in spending by all government departments, including National Defence.

The new direction was the result of an improved financial situation, a changed international climate and a new prime minister more inclined to hand money to the military.

A 2005 white paper set out what the government wanted from all that new funding. The Canadian Forces would be "reorganized and retooled" to carry out both short missions and emergencies as well as longer mission-specific task forces. Full-time troop strength, then 60,000, would increase by 5,000 and new equipment would be purchased. The emphasis was on the army.

The Martin government would soon fall, and although the new Harper government would set its own defence policy, it would carry out the plans for increased spending. They would emphasize Arctic defence and move away from the focus on the army.

In 2008, the Harper government released its Canada First Defence Strategy, which set out plans to spend $490 billion on defence over 20 years.

Defence expert Philippe Lagassé, from the University of Ottawa, described the strategy's "very broad list" of six missions as something "you can pretty much put everything in under the sun." In terms of equipment, especially the major fleets, "the strategy is simply to replace everything you have."

Teeth vs. tail

That was also the year of the global financial crisis, and although the government continued to increase defence spending, and underestimate costs, it soon recognized problems ahead.

The government appointed Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie to review spending and requirements and recommend where to cut. In his 2011 report, Leslie detailed how headquarters staff had grown by nearly half but the regular forces by only a tenth since 2004.

Spending on consultants and contractors was up $2.7 billion per year.

"We are going to have to reduce overhead and invest in output; we have to become slimmer," Leslie wrote in the report. He recommended a major change in the way the department operates, with major cuts at headquarters and especially to spending on consultants and contractors, while continuing to carry out all current operations.

"In short, we are going to have to reduce the tail of today while investing in the teeth of tomorrow," Leslie wrote.

Lagassé is skeptical about Leslie's approach.

"The department has pushed back a bit, because as easy as it may seem to try and find efficiencies, there aren't that many places you can cut and still keep everything you are doing, as you are doing it," he says.

He told CBC News that the military is concerned "that you can only slash administration so much before it begins to affect your ability to be an effective force, even on the field."

Taylor, a former soldier, notes that the culture at the Department of National Defence is not one that embraces change.

"There's a culture of resistance, a culture of internal empire-building, so these guys are going to push back at everything."

However, Harper has continued to back Leslie's general recommendations. In a June letter to Defence Minister Peter MacKay, which was later leaked to Canadian Press, he made that clear.

"It is important that we reduce the current overhead," he wrote MacKay, adding not to expect "that the defence budget will grow in the next few years."

Two weeks ago, in his speech marking Lawson's appointment as CDS, Harper echoed Leslie: "The Canada First Defence Strategy must continue to advance, and as I’ve said before, with the constant search for more teeth and less tail."

Impact on troops

For Taylor, that strategy is "a hodge-podge and every direction you look it's going to need huge amounts of money." If the military goes ahead with its current procurement plans, Taylor notes, the operating costs for the new equipment will be huge.

"We just can't move forward in all the directions they say they are going to move forward, not with the amount of money that's in the pot now," Taylor told CBC News.

He says the military also faces retention problems, and that "morale is going into the toilet for the army." Once the training program in Afghanistan is over, the forces will be without a mission. For a soldier, Taylor says, that's like attending hockey practice all the time, without ever playing a game. Despite the dangers, soldiers want to do their job for real.

As well, along with the frontline experience the troops got in Afghanistan came increased pay and rapid promotion, which also means a higher income, Taylor explained.

"Love it, hate it, disagree with it; the mission in Afghanistan was a mission," Taylor said, and it gave soldiers and pilots a sense of purpose. Now, with just training exercises ahead, the fear is they will get bored, which, of course, produces more problems.

While the idea is out there that the absence of a mission like Afghanistan means substantial budgetary savings for the military, Lagassé notes that while the savings are fairly significant, the mission received incremental funding from the House of Commons.

What did come out of the DND budget won't be "sufficient to make up for the cuts DND is being asked to take in, simply because there was that incremental funding."

A more specialized military?

Canada is not alone in facing questions about what kind of military it can afford. In 2010, NATO proposed that its members eliminate some overlapping capabilities, with just one or a few members specializing in some tasks. However, Harper has made clear that he wants to continue with the general-purpose military of the Canada First Defence Strategy.

The government has said it will issue a "reset" of that strategy, which should be made public soon, but Lagassé doesn't expect anything to change except for some numbers.

"We're simply moving forward with an unaffordable strategy that will ultimately leave us with forces that have been devised in an ad hoc manner."

If Canada's military were faced with a choice of hoping for new funds in the future or taking the specialization road, Lagassé says, they'd rather wait and hope. For now, he said they will take "a two-pronged approach."

On the one hand, they will be "cutting back on operational readiness in the short term on the assumption they probably won't be deployed on any major operation for some time."

At the same time, the military keeps going with its procurement programs, "even though they are unaffordable, and eventually force the government to be in a bind and have to give you more."

Lagassé points to the huge $35-billion shipbuilding program.

"If it so happens you can't build the number of ships you stated you were going to build with the amount of money you'd been given, then given the amount of attention the government has drawn to the shipbuilding strategy, you can force their hand and force them to give you a top-up in order to ensure that you can build an additional number of ships."

Faced with situations like this in the past, Lagassé notes that the Canadian Forces ultimately made it through and did their jobs, which he said is "somewhat their curse."

"Even when they're dealt a relatively difficult circumstance, they seem to make it through, never really forcing the government into a crisis situation, where they have to resolve the problem once and for all."

Despite having lived and served through several decades of darkness™ and watched the CF not only survive but do hard, credible work (in e.g. Gulf War I and the Balkans) without anything like an adequate budget, I agree with Prof. Philippe Lagassé when he says:

1. "We're simply moving forward with an unaffordable strategy that will ultimately leave us with forces that have been devised in an ad hoc manner." That, ad hoc planning with insufficient resources, is all we have had since 1969;

2. The DND senior management - civilian and military - would rather wait and hope than speak out ~ "speak truth to power;" and

3. The CF is, in a way, its own worst enemy having, as I mentioned just above, again and again, to muddle through and do what was needed despite the government.

I remain wedded to desire for a military establishment that would do what External Affairs Minister and later Prime Minister Louis St Laurent wanted Canada to do in the 1950s: be a leader of the "middle powers" in the world. That requires a mix of soft and hard power. Both cost money and sufficient hard power requires, in my considered opinion, a sustained (for decades) investment of never less than 2% of GDP for DND's budget. We currently spend about 1.4% of GDP, according to the SIPRI Yearbook. Other, roughly comparable countries spend (same source):

Australia:            1.8%
Malaysia:            2.0%
Netherlands:      1.4%
Norway:            1.5%
Portugal:            2.1%
Singapore:        3.7%
-------------
World Average:  2.2%

 

[McG]

* Restructure establishment to differentiate between Lt and Capt
* Return to competitive promotion to Capt

Absolutely.  On Army establishments there are 183 Lt positions that should probably all become Lt/2Lt positions (there is currently no concept of a Lt/2Lt position, and the Army has zero established 2Lt positions).  There are 296 C/Lt positions that could probably all be converted to hard Lt positions, and that is without looking at any other L1’s positions.

* Revisit Degreed Officer Corps decision
  * Permit short engagements with no promotion beyond Capt without a degree

We do this.  It is called CEOTP and they are limited to the rank of Capt until a degree is completed.  Once the guy is in the CF we then have the IBDP to then send a Capt at full pay to pursue a full-time undergrad programme.  I am not sure it is the best cost saving approach.  Anyway …

In the current climate, we need to look at more than just where to cut.  We also need to look at where to get better mileage from the same resources.  Here are a few thoughts to that end:

• Replace SDA, LDA, dive pay and parachute allowance with enhanced casual allowances – the current systems reward posting messages as opposed to rewarding/compensating for the behaviour that we want: going to sea, going to the field, diving, and jumping out of aircraft.
• Reduce the number of PRes unit HQs.  Individual sub-units can retain unique regimental identities, but they will be grouped under a single stronger battalion HQ.
• Revisit the requirement for Reg F bands.  There are 71 musicians from Sgt to CWO on Army Ref F establishments alone.  That is a lot of PYs that could be put to better purpose (especially when we have been cutting from operational units to put PYs in new capabilities)

 

[Old Sweat]

The C/Lt positions are worth a hard look. They came about in 1967 or 1968 when, as the rumour goes, Paul Hellyer decided to do the same thing with junior officers that he had done with junior ranks, that is promote automatically to captain after a certain period of time regardless of establishment positions. I seem to recall that the time in the rank of lieutenant was pegged at two years, and as second lieutenant had been abolished, this meant that all at once literally hundreds of lieutenants became captains (or lieutenants (N)) overnight.

 

[Journeyman]

• Replace ....dive pay and parachute allowance with enhanced casual allowances
• Reduce the number of PRes unit HQs.  Individual sub-units can retain unique regimental identities, but they will be grouped under a single stronger battalion HQ.

Yes, and yes.

While the money is a nice perk that no one will willingly turn away, most jumpers and/or divers I know would do it for free.

How many Res Infantry units parade at less-than optimal strength in Toronto? Ottawa? Montreal? I think it is doable from a logical and leadership perspective. I also suspect that the hand-wringing over cap-badges will be horrific, regardless of how it is worked out and marketted.

 

[dapaterson]

We do this.  It is called CEOTP and they are limited to the rank of Capt until a degree is completed.  Once the guy is in the CF we then have the IBDP to then send a Capt at full pay to pursue a full-time undergrad programme.  I am not sure it is the best cost saving approach. 

CEOTP is officially an interim measure, and can be turned on or off each year.  We need to institutionalize it.

We also need to revisit the ROTP/DEO weighting.  ROTP is very expensive, and loses four years of military service to undergrad studies.  Shrinking ROTP would save significant money; we'd likely have to triage the programs at RMC and save only those that are unique - why build our own at extra cost when we can buy off the shelf? (And why does RMC have military members and public servants teaching an "MBA"?  Isn't the DND/CF requirement for MPA instead?)

 

[Edward Campbell]

CEOTP is officially an interim measure, and can be turned on or off each year.  We need to institutionalize it.

We also need to revisit the ROTP/DEO weighting.  ROTP is very expensive, and loses four years of military service to undergrad studies.  Shrinking ROTP would save significant money; we'd likely have to triage the programs at RMC and save only those that are unique - why build our own at extra cost when we can buy off the shelf? (And why does RMC have military members and public servants teaching an "MBA"?  Isn't the DND/CF requirement for MPA instead?)

Many, many years ago Gen (Ret'd) Ramsey Withers did a study on RMC.

Amongst the  several proposals considered was one for a slimmed down RMC with three departments:

1. Engineering - teaching selected core course curricula for MILE, MARE, AERE and electronics - of course CELE and EME would be trained but the core courses would be as indicated. Equally all officers could take engineering degrees but within the limits indicated;

2. Logistics - teaching a range of topics, including courses leading towards a BComm, but aiming to produce a recognized degree in Logistics/Management; and

3. The Military Arts - history, economics, geography, etc, etc, etc, all wrapped up in a strategic studies sort of programme.

The premise was that most CF officers would come from Civvy U, through a reborn UNTD/COTC sort of thing. RMC would be even more selective and much more specialized.

I'm not sure how the whole project ended, nor do I know how that particular submission was received. I recall it because Gen Withers asked my boss for some inputs and he (RAdm Ed Healey) told me to draft them; but it was a very secondary task and, for the life, of me, I can't remember what we said except that we insisted upon a solid core course curriculum for MARE officers.

 

[dapaterson]

Ah - but do we need a degree-granting institution?  Or more of a trade-school that provides additional education needed for specific occupations?

AFAIK Sandhust is not a university; why does RMC need to be one?

(And why does a Commander for 600-700 officer cadets need to be a 1*, when a battle group of 1500 can be commanded by a LCol?)

 

[Edward Campbell]

Ah - but do we need a degree-granting institution?  Or more of a trade-school that provides additional education needed for specific occupations?

AFAIK Sandhust is not a university; why does RMC need to be one?

(And why does a Commander for 600-700 officer cadets need to be a 1*, when a battle group of 1500 can be commanded by a LCol?)

Good and fair points.

I think there was an earlier discussion about this, here on Army.ca, where someone, maybe even me, raised the prospect of a training/education > service > education/training scheme wherein all prospective officers, degree holding or not, would do two years at a military college at which they would, over say, two years, receive extensive and detailed military training and some university level education with a distinct military flavour: history, leadership, geography, etc. (Think Sandhurst.) This would be followed by commissioning as a 2Lt and by service (three to five years) in the fleet or the field during which both the officer and the CF could make decisions about his/her future. Those selected and agreeing to stay in the CF would go on to finish their degrees, some at RMC some at Civvy U. This phase would be followed by more, advanced classification and generalist training, including staff training for some (those who gained entry to the staff college through rigorous, competitive examinations) . A few officers might, during this phase, decide that they do not wish to finish their degrees; they will be warned that their prospects for promotion beyond Maj are lessened but some, a "happy few," might do very well, despite a lack of formal education, because they are first rate leaders and decent military managers, too.

 

[McG]

Good and fair points.

I think there was an earlier discussion about this, here on Army.ca, where someone, maybe even me, raised the prospect of a training/education > service > education/training scheme wherein all prospective officers, degree holding or not, would do two years at a military college ...

I think you will find that somewhere in here:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/105418/post-1132127.html#msg1132127

 

[McG]

Defence will also cut spending: MacKay
Minister says economic realities can't be ignored
Lee Berthiaume
Ottawa Citizen
16 November 2012

Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Thursday that the Canadian Forces will do its part to help the federal government balance the books by cutting administration and exploring new partnerships with foreign allies.

That may be easier said than done, however, as military officials have been quietly fretting over a very public order delivered by Prime Minister Stephen Harper late last month that the Defence Department focus on "more teeth and less tail."

Speaking to Postmedia News from Halifax as he prepared to welcome foreign dignitaries and military officials to an annual international defence summit, MacKay said Canada's defence budget is necessarily large.

"It is out of necessity given the importance of security," he said.

But MacKay also said National Defence cannot ignore the economic realities facing the country, including the need to rein in spending to cut the federal deficit.

"That's what the prime minister expects, that's (what) the government and taxpayers want us to deliver," he said.

"We're very familiar with the necessity to be responsible to taxpayers while at the same time continuing to deliver excellence at home and abroad."

That will be welcome news to Harper, who sternly warned the Defence Department during a change-of-command ceremony last month that the era of increasing military budgets is over and that belt-tightening is the order of the day.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Meanwhile, closer to the sharp end....

With a volatile federal budget still in the red, cuts are being made across the country, including at CFB Edmonton, where a multitude of issues are currently being faced.

According to Lieut.-Col. John Reiffenstein, base commander at CFB Edmonton, the local base is seeing cuts of more than 50% to its operations and maintenance budget.

Reiffenstein said that, as a result of the new budget, some programs will have to be cut.

“Whereas before we relied on commissionaires... to provide security in a couple of spots, that ate up a considerable portion of my budget,” he said at the Fort Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce’s monthly luncheon.

“We can’t do that anymore, so we’ve got to figure out what risks we can assume in terms of, say, roving patrols; what risks we can assume in terms of having a soldier who’s also a clerk, keeping an eye on the front entrance to a building — things like that.

“We cannot continue to spend money the way we were spending it while we were fighting the war in Afghanistan. Those days are over and our job in uniform is to get on with it.”

Although it has not yet been confirmed, Reiffenstein said that programs associated with areas such as the family resource centre, which provides services like daycare, could be some that see cuts.

“We’re still working through that. I am concerned,” Reiffenstein said.

“I provide a certain amount of support to them right now and I am concerned about what I am going to be able to continue to do in the future. (Right now, the daycare) is right where they work and everybody wants that... But if I can’t continue to provide funds, do I look at things like that? I don’t know.

“And are there other options available to our families, albeit not as good of ones? Yes.” ....

Edmonton Sun, 14 Nov 12