Ostrozac said:
Never is a long time. The Free French Army used Crusader tanks in the North African campaign, hence why the 501e Regiment de Chars de Combat holds the battle honour El Alamein 1942.
Many African wars have featured the use of tanks, most notably Angola.
In typical Army.ca fashion comments get taken out of context. Yes, in World War II, the FFF deployed tanks into North Africa; however, they haven’t used tanks in Africa since then. The wars in Indochina and Algeria were insurgencies and the terrain was unsuitable for tanks. The French Army used Armoured Cars instead such as the M8 Greyound, Panhard EBR and Panhard AML. The French Army also made extensive use of Light Infantry, Paratroopers and Heliborne Forces and were responsible for pioneering some of the early use of Helicopters in combat.
French Sikorsky H34 with 20mm cannon (More firepower in 1960 than our helicopters have today)
This was in the late 1950s early 1960s and the trend in the French Army has continued today with Tactical Aviation considered the 3rd combat arm in the French Army, with Combat Teams able to be Aviation led.
As for tanks in African conflict, yes tanks were used in Angola but that was because, unlike other African Conflicts of the time, the war had a conventional aspect because of the presence of Conventional Cuban Forces and large supplies of heavy weapons given to FAPLA forces in Angola by the Warsaw Pact. This culminated at the Battle of Cuito Cuavanale where South African Armour went up against a large Cuban and FAPLA Force. South African Conventional Forces weren’t there to take over Angola though, they were there to prevent the spread of communism in to Southwest Africa and allow South Africa to maintain control of what is now known as Namibia; thus, they were primarily defensive in nature. The asymmetric aspect of the war against SWAPO was fought by light infantry, special forces and specialized police units with the primary insertion method being specialized vehicles and helicopters.
South African Alouette Helicopters
The use of helicopters in African conflict has been an enduring aspect of conflict in Africa since the Algerian War; with The British, French, Portuguese, Rhodesians, South Africans and others all making extensive use of them. Why is it that the Canadian Army sees no utility in Utility Helicopters, let alone actual Attack Helicopter platforms?
Tanks are great but their application is more limited, helicopters, particularly attack variants give forces the ability to provide precision fires in a three-dimensional battlespace to supported ground forces, it’s also an incredibly capable ISR platform. The latest version of the AH-64 has the ability to control MUAV’s which further enhances its capability as an ISR platform (see link).
http://newatlas.com/boeing-apache-demonstrates-uav-control/5506/
I personally feel that the Canadian Army overvalues the tank as a fighting platform and the reason the capability has been maintained has as much to do with politics as it does with the actual worth of tanks on CAF operations.
Do tanks have value? Absolutely, but do we get the most bang for our buck at the expense of other assets, i.e. attack helicopters, MUAVs and SUAVs, heavy engineering equipment, additional variants of crew-served weapons, MLRS systems, better logistics capabilities, etc?
It’s a discussion I believe we as an Army should have, especially if we are going to be oriented towards peace support/peace enforcement operations. We’re kidding ourselves already if we say we’re optimized for full-spectrum operations.
George Wallace said:
I believe the French have deployed AMX 10 RC to Africa, along with a wide variety of armoured cars with very big guns such as Panhards and Elands.
Lets not kid ourselves though George, the Stryker MGS has a 105mm cannon, that doesn’t make it a tank.
Altair said:
This is true, however books are not my only source of information on the use of armor in a COIN environment.
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/forces/D12-11-10-4E.pdf
There is also the argument that can be made that the Canadians use of armor influenced the Americans and was a factor in the Marines deploying Abrams in Afghanistan during their surge in 2010.
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/tanks-to-afghanistan-analysis/?_r=0
So while its true that Canadian literature on the subject is sprinkled with a significant amount of pixie dust, a lot of other sources say the same thing.
Tanks do a have a role to play in a COIN environment and they are a welcome asset for both our troops and those we work with.
So you admit that anything written by the Canadian Armed Forces is usually sprinkled with pixie dust than you cite a government document to substantiate your claim? How does that make any sense other than in political spin land?
Here is an excerpt from the recent Army Lessons Learned analysis on RCAC in Afghanistan:
Observation 6 – Employment of Direct Fire Capabilities
Limited combined arms team experience in the employment of direct fire (tanks)
assets, particularly in the counter-insurgency (COIN) environment, led to the
employment of armour for non-standard tasks. This approach limited the
opportunities to achieve full potential on other armour tasks.
Discussion
This observation is not intended to challenge the judgement of the commanders of
the day. Sound rationale and informed trade-offs for the employment of armour in
theatre were consistently applied. Indeed, there were numerous examples where
tanks were effectively employed in conventional roles and exploited to great effect.
However, there was no consistently defined concept for the employment of tanks;
their use varied significantly from rotation to rotation and only rarely were their
capabilities leveraged to their full extent. While there was much positive
experimentation, the absence of doctrine on the employment of tank squadrons in
COIN was evident.
The tasks mentioned include Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Observation Post (OP), Convoy Escort and Surveillance. Is QRF and Convoy Escort really an appropriate use of a tank? Are we achieving Economy of Effort doing this?
If you want to quote a government document, let’s look at the Manley Report from Afghanistan, pg. 37:
To better ensure the safety and effectiveness of the Canadian contingent,
the Government should also secure medium helicopter lift capacity and
high-performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance before February 2009.
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf
So it’s 2016, the war ended for us five years ago with the leased Helicopters and UAVs long since retired. Our Medium-Lift Helicopter Capacity is still not FOC and we have no High-performance UAVs for ISR with no word on when the JUSTAS program is going to actually move but boy oh boy we’ve got Tanks! Perhaps if our military was properly equipped with ISR, Helicopters and a proper sustainment plan, the roads might just be a little safer the next time we go on operations in a faraway land and we wouldn’t need tanks for Static Ops and Convoy Escort?
