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The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)

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Bird_Gunner45 said:
I also served in Afghanistan and visited friends in Beechwood who gave their lives there, so don't discount my opinion out of hand is if I just fell off of a turnip truck.

Many of us do - sadly.  That still doesn't mean I have to agree with your assessment that our effect in AFG was, as you said, "negligible at best."  I think you under appreciate the contribution we (and NATO) made in AFG to make a point that the UN isn't as bad as many are making it out to be.  My assessment of your argument stands.  UN is notably less effectual than NATO.  I and many others are perhaps not as willing to "give the benefit of the doubt" to the government regarding how well the next UN mission will be.  I hope to be proven wrong, but I (sadly) doubt it.

:2c:

Regards
G2G
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
I would ask that you re-read the statement. I never suggested that we don't deploy with NATO on future missions.... I was simply pointing out that Afghanistan was a NATO operation and wasn't a rousing success. The point was that while UN missions have been ineffectual in the past, we can't just write them off OUT OF HAND without at least KNOWING WHAT THEY ARE. NATO, NORAD, and the UN are all tools available to the government to achieve a strategic effect.

I also served in Afghanistan and visited friends in Beechwood who gave their lives there, so don't discount my opinion out of hand is if I just fell off of a turnip truck.

Who knew that stating military personnel should wait to see what the mission is, what the intent of it is, and how it will be conducted and THEN have a professional debate about the merits of the mission would cause such strong emotions.

How do you gauge success?  Afghanistan was a total failed state before 2001 in the hands of a despotic islamist regime that was a safe haven for terrorists intent on killing Westerners!  It is no longer such a country. 

80% of the country is controlled by the Afghan government and while the war is still ongoing, the Taliban cannot militarily defeat the Afghan government and have openly admitted as much.  Is there still fighting?  Of course, but Afghanistan wasn't going to turn in to Dubai overnight. 

I consider Afghanistan to be an operation in a larger campaign against Islamic extremism.  As Canadians, our biggest problem is we are generally terrible at "looking Up and Out" and are far more comfortable looking "Down and In".  Prime example, our most celebrated battle "Vimy Ridge" was one part of the larger Battle of Arras; however, if you read Canadian History, you'd think we single handedly defeated the Huns that day.

In other words, Canadians as a rule have a poor understanding of grand strategy and generally mix up the different levels of warfare.  We tend to look at the tactical level and think it's the strategic.   



 
Good2Golf said:
Many of us do - sadly.  That still doesn't mean I have to agree with your assessment that our effect in AFG was, as you said, "negligible at best."  I think you under appreciate the contribution we (and NATO) made in AFG to make a point that the UN isn't as bad as many are making it out to be.  My assessment of your argument stands.  UN is notably less effectual than NATO.  I and many others are perhaps not as willing to "give the benefit of the doubt" to the government regarding how well the next UN mission will be.  I hope to be proven wrong, but I (sadly) doubt it.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

I'll agree to disagree. I think Afghanistan wasn't a "success" but it wasn't a "failure" either. But that's like a different thread.

That said- I also wasn't advocating to give the government the benefit of the doubt, but rather waiting until we actually have some details other than "Africa" before making judgments. Once the mission is it than it's fair game- if it's a poorly defined mission than critique; I'll be in line to do so as well.

I just dont see the point in yelling at a wall for no reason.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
I'll agree to disagree. I think Afghanistan wasn't a "success" but it wasn't a "failure" either. But that's like a different thread.

That said- I also wasn't advocating to give the government the benefit of the doubt, but rather waiting until we actually have some details other than "Africa" before making judgments. Once the mission is it than it's fair game- if it's a poorly defined mission than critique; I'll be in line to do so as well.

I just dont see the point in yelling at a wall for no reason.

Now this is an interesting discussion to have, certainly far more enlightening than the endless debate about buying 65 fighter jets, a rather insignificant number in the world of global military affairs. 

Why exactly wasn't Afghanistan a success? 

Remember this?

hqdefault.jpg


What are infanteers supposed to do in a react to ambush?  especially if the ambush is near?

Return fire and assault through the objective, which is exactly what we did in Afghanistan. 
 
Medak Pocket, Somalia and Rwanda cause me not to be as generous in the wait as are you. 

Perhaps that's a shortcoming on my part, but I am prepared to be, once again, sorely disappointed with a troubled UN mission, and believe there to be only an outside chance for things to have somehow improved markedly within the entire UN peace'keeping' construct.

I will be pleasantly surprised should the mission unfold in such a manner that primacy is placed on helping the people of the troubled region, not just one step on the way to trying to get a seat on the UNSC.

Regards
G2G
 
PuckChaser said:
Pick a mission in Africa that we could have an appreciable effect on the ground with 2000 pers deployed, around 500-750 are your BG. There's missions with 15,000 troops deployed from all nations, and they're able to do very little to help.

I'd love to see whole infantry regiments deploy at a time. Switch between Bn ops and autonomous fighting-companies. Well maybe if it's peace keeping then something peacenik like shield companies lol
Throw in some TOW & mortar teams in the mix.  FOO/FAC,  some engineer dets. Whatever works but really concentrate on mobility and combined arms. Tons of firepower and options at company level.

We can keep the peace by training local forces to go out and smash ISIS or whoever the jerks of the hour are. With local forces our companies could probably act as battalions. Bring tanks to act as a reserve force/hammer.  Pad our numbers even further with lots of reservists.

We could probably turn the MSVS's with their sweet A/C into some decent jingle truck looking uparmored monstrosities.
 
Jarnhamar said:
We could probably turn the MSVS's with their sweet A/C into some decent jingle truck looking uparmored monstrosities.
:rofl:  Oh man, you were doing so well........    ;D
 
Good2Golf said:
Medak Pocket, Somalia and Rwanda cause me not to be as generous in the wait as are you. 

Perhaps that's a shortcoming on my part, but I am prepared to be, once again, sorely disappointed with a troubled UN mission, and believe there to be only an outside chance for things to have somehow improved markedly within the entire UN peace'keeping' construct.

I will be pleasantly surprised should the mission unfold in such a manner that primacy is placed on helping the people of the troubled region, not just one step on the way to trying to get a seat on the UNSC.

Regards
G2G

Meanwhile, in Steele Barracks: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEgqIY7xgtE
 
Good2Golf said:
Medak Pocket, Somalia and Rwanda cause me not to be as generous in the wait as are you. 

Perhaps that's a shortcoming on my part, but I am prepared to be, once again, sorely disappointed with a troubled UN mission, and believe there to be only an outside chance for things to have somehow improved markedly within the entire UN peace'keeping' construct.

I will be pleasantly surprised should the mission unfold in such a manner that primacy is placed on helping the people of the troubled region, not just one step on the way to trying to get a seat on the UNSC.

Regards
G2G

I'll open with the disclaimer that I'm a believer in the fight against Islamic Extremism.  It's why I joined the military, probably one of the only reasons as I don't really have any sort of attachment to the institution (no family connection or anything) and I'm not a particularly patriotic individual.  I saw the 9/11 attack as a direct assault on Western financial and military might.  The symbolism was very powerful.  Hit the two biggest symbols of Western Financial and Military Power:  WTC and the Pentagon.  Only target that was missed was Capitol Hill i.e. the Political Power.  It was a very good attempt at cutting off the heads of the snake of your enemy, that's Sun Tzu 101.

My problem is the GoC doesn't seem to understand the strategic relevance of any of their decisions.  Lets face it, in the world of military/global affairs, Canada is a PAWN.  Our military is very small and as others have said, we need to be pragmatic about where and when we use military force.  We've got an Army that's streamlined to fight constabulary type operations in far flung reaches of the globe which makes us perfectly suited for an operation in Africa, particularly the Sahel.  I believe we can make a valuable contribution there as part of a larger effort in the global war against Islamic extremism. 

The government is going to send us there for their own political reasons, which are more than likely designed to satisfy a short game.  Governments in the West are all about the short term and working towards the next election every four or five years, continuity rests in the Bureaucracy.  Our military leaders need to be that continuity, we need officers and senior NCO's that think about how our operational tempo ties in to a long term campaign plan, I'm talking like 30+ years or decades. 

I had the opportunity to sit down and listen to General Vance five years ago give a lecture on how the Canadian Military was involved in a new "Thirty Years War."  This was in 2011.  Last year, many academics began calling the wars in the Middle East a "New Thirty Years War".  My point is, General Vance is a military leader that gets it, he isn't thinking about a month from now or even a year from now, he's thinking in decades.  We need more political and military leaders like him.
 
Humphrey Bogart said:
Now this is an interesting discussion to have, certainly far more enlightening than the endless debate about buying 65 fighter jets, a rather insignificant number in the world of global military affairs. 

Why exactly wasn't Afghanistan a success? 

Remember this?

hqdefault.jpg


What are infanteers supposed to do in a react to ambush?  especially if the ambush is near?

Return fire and assault through the objective, which is exactly what we did in Afghanistan.

The lack of a clearly defined end state was what to me make it "not a success". If we define success as not being attacked in Canada than its a difficult argument based on the fact that we may never have been attacked in the first place. We can't assume what would have happened if we had chosen a different option.

I judge it as "not a failure" as Afghanistan in a lot of ways is better off than it was before we got there. The true test will be once NATO pulls out. If the government can stand by itself and not fall like the communist one did once the Soviets left than I would change my opinion.

From the strategic viewpoint, if the intent was to destroy Al Qaeda than success. However, it would be difficult to state today that the fight against terrorism has gotten appreciably better with current fights in Africa and the middle east.

So as we sit in 2016 I view the war as a strategic draw. However, as the war continues this can change. Perhaps a UN mission to Africa can continue to allow us to impact the overall strategic vision of the GWOT? We'll see.

I understand the call for action in the post 911 era. I remember a Time magazine article that came out right after 911 that a poll that simply stated, "Who should we attack". 30% of respondents said, "doesn't matter". For the ambush example- returning fire and attacking through the objective is valid as long as it isn't what the enemy intended you to do. 
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
The lack of a clearly defined end state was what to me make it "not a success". If we define success as not being attacked in Canada than its a difficult argument based on the fact that we may never have been attacked in the first place. We can't assume what would have happened if we had chosen a different option.

I judge it as "not a failure" as Afghanistan in a lot of ways is better off than it was before we got there. The true test will be once NATO pulls out. If the government can stand by itself and not fall like the communist one did once the Soviets left than I would change my opinion.

From the strategic viewpoint, if the intent was to destroy Al Qaeda than success. However, it would be difficult to state today that the fight against terrorism has gotten appreciably better with current fights in Africa and the middle east.

So as we sit in 2016 I view the war as a strategic draw. However, as the war continues this can change. Perhaps a UN mission to Africa can continue to allow us to impact the overall strategic vision of the GWOT? We'll see.

I understand the call for action in the post 911 era. I remember a Time magazine article that came out right after 911 that a poll that simply stated, "Who should we attack". 30% of respondents said, "doesn't matter". For the ambush example- returning fire and attacking through the objective is valid as long as it isn't what the enemy intended you to do.

I agree, I think the opening salvos within Afghanistan were well done,  the US moved in and rapidly ousted the Taliban from power.  It's when they began to play the Nation Building game that things began to fall off the wagon.  I blame it on American Exceptionalism and also Colonial inexperience.  The Brits and the French are far better at this sort of thing because they've got centuries of experience doing it all over the world. 

A better strategy would have been to keep Western troop numbers in country small and not aim to hold ground.  Buy off whoever you need to buy off to keep control and prop up whoever you need to prop up.  Aim should be to always float like a butterfly and sting like a bee.  Sure the Taliban would keep coming but that's what uppercuts to the mouth (aka US Marines) are for.  Eventually, after enough Fallujahs, they would get the message. 

 
Humphrey Bogart said:
I agree, I think the opening salvos within Afghanistan were well done,  the US moved in and rapidly ousted the Taliban from power.  It's when they began to play the Nation Building game that things began to fall off the wagon.  I blame it on American Exceptionalism and also Colonial inexperience.  The Brits and the French are far better at this sort of thing because they've got centuries of experience doing it all over the world. 

A better strategy would have been to keep Western troop numbers in country small and not aim to hold ground.  Buy off whoever you need to buy off to keep control and prop up whoever you need to prop up.  Aim should be to always float like a butterfly and sting like a bee.  Sure the Taliban would keep coming but that's what uppercuts to the mouth (aka US Marines) are for.  Eventually, after enough Fallujahs, they would get the message.

The issue here is 4GW warfare. So long as the enemy does not lose, they are winning, and so long as *we* are not building and supporting alternative structures and institutions to undermine the sort of structures and institutions *they* use to build and nurture support for their cause, then they have a distinct advantage. Playing "whack a mole" is a good short term solution, and expedient, but unless the hard work of nation building (or some acceptable substitute) is being done, then you simply need to go back and do it again.

Case in point is the US experience in the "Banana Wars" The US marines with a force of @ 3000 took the entire island of Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic) as part of their larger strategy to control the approaches to the Panama Canal. The Marines were there on and off until 1934, and during that time they built roads, hospitals, ran the post office and instituted a tax collection system to keep things funded. However, since they apparently believed that the local would adopt American practice by osmosis, they did little to train locals and indoctrinate them. The results were predictable; one the Americans left, everything that wasn't nailed down was stolen and everything else was left to deteriorate. Max Boot's book "The Savage Wars of Peace[" outlines much of this story.

You are correct that *we* in general have a very poor record of nation building and lack both the experience and patience to do so. Until we are willing to either go "all in", accept and tell the public this is a short term expedient or apply the Roman solution ("They create a wilderness and call it peace") then we may end up with a legacy of Afghanistans, where the job never seems to be finished and few people are satisfied with the results.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
The lack of a clearly defined end state was what to me make it "not a success". If we define success as not being attacked in Canada than its a difficult argument based on the fact that we may never have been attacked in the first place. We can't assume what would have happened if we had chosen a different option.

I judge it as "not a failure" as Afghanistan in a lot of ways is better off than it was before we got there. The true test will be once NATO pulls out. If the government can stand by itself and not fall like the communist one did once the Soviets left than I would change my opinion.

From the strategic viewpoint, if the intent was to destroy Al Qaeda than success. However, it would be difficult to state today that the fight against terrorism has gotten appreciably better with current fights in Africa and the middle east.

So as we sit in 2016 I view the war as a strategic draw. However, as the war continues this can change. Perhaps a UN mission to Africa can continue to allow us to impact the overall strategic vision of the GWOT? We'll see.

I understand the call for action in the post 911 era. I remember a Time magazine article that came out right after 911 that a poll that simply stated, "Who should we attack". 30% of respondents said, "doesn't matter". For the ambush example- returning fire and attacking through the objective is valid as long as it isn't what the enemy intended you to do.

Success is over rated, the best you can expect in the ME is stalemate with a slight improvement.  By that measure Afghanistan is a success, it is better now than then.  Part of the problem was we got wrapped around making the world safe for Muslim women as a justification for our role there.  We raised our own expectations beyond what the situation could ever resolve. 
 
Success in the Middle East (courtesy of Wiki)

Within hours of the coup, British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers were flown into Oman to further bolster the counterinsurgency campaign. They identified four main strategies that would assist the fight against the PFLOAG:

Civil administration and a hearts and minds campaign;
Intelligence gathering and collation;
Veterinary assistance;
Medical assistance.
[18]


The military commanders on the ground (rather than the UK Ministry of Defence) suggested the implementation of a "hearts and minds" campaign, which would be put into operation primarily by a troop (25 men) from the SAS. The British government (then under Conservative leader Edward Heath) supported this unconventional approach to the counterinsurgency campaign. It approved the deployment of 20 personnel of the British Royal Engineers, who would aid in the construction of schools and health centres, and drilled wells for the population of Dhofar.[19] Royal Army Medical Corps Field Surgical Teams and some Royal Air Force medical teams would also operate out of Salalah hospital, in order to open a humanitarian front in the conflict. The operation was almost a carbon copy of a system that had proved successful in the Malayan Emergency some twenty years previously. The British government additionally provided monetary support for the creation of the Dhofar Development Programme, whose aim was to wrest support from the PFLOAG through the modernisation of Dhofar.

To assist in the civil development and coordinate it with the military operations, the command structure in Dhofar was reorganised, with the newly appointed Wāli or civilian governor (Braik bin Hamoud) being given equal status to the military commander of the Dhofar Brigade (Brigadier Jack Fletcher to 1972, Brigadier John Akehurst from that date).


Caption on British poster: "The Hand of God Destroys Communism"

A major effort was made to counter rebel propaganda and induce the Dhofari population to support the government. In particular, appeals were made to Islam and to traditional tribal values and customs, against the rebels' secular or materialistic teachings. A significant outlet for government propaganda was the many inexpensive Japanese transistor radios which were sold cheaply or distributed free to jibalis who visited Salalah and other government-held towns to sell firewood or vegetables. Although the PFLOAG could also broadcast propaganda by radio, the Government's propaganda was factual and low-key, while that of the rebels, broadcast by Radio Aden, was soon perceived to be exaggerated and stereotyped.[20]

Government counter-attacks[edit]

One step which had a major impact on the uprising was the announcement of an amnesty for surrendered fighters, and aid in defending their communities from rebels. A cash incentive was offered to rebels who changed sides, with a bonus if they brought their weapon. The rebels who defected to the Sultan formed Firqat irregular units, trained by British Army Training Teams, or BATTs, from the Special Air Service. Eighteen Firqat units, numbering from between 50 and 150 each, were eventually formed.[21] They usually gave themselves names with connections to Islam, such as the Firqat Salahadin. (Some of the PFLOAG units also gave themselves ideological names such as Ho Chi Minh or Che Guevara.)[22] These firqat irregular groups played a major part in denying local support to the rebels. Being jibalis themselves (and in many cases with family connections among the communities on the Jebel), they were better at local intelligence-gathering and "hearts and minds" activities than the northern Omani or Baluchi personnel of the regular SAF.[23] The first serious step in re-establishing the Sultan's authority on the Jebel took place in October 1971, when Operation Jaguar was mounted, involving five Firqat units and two squadrons of the SAS. After hard fighting, the SAS and Firqats secured an enclave on the eastern Jebel Samhan from which they could expand.[24]

Meanwhile, the regular units of the SAF were expanded and re-equipped. Extra officers and NCO instructors from the British Army and Royal Marines (and also the Pakistan Army)[25] were attached to all units (there were nominally twenty-two British or contracted personnel with each infantry battalion) while Omani personnel were educated and trained to become officers and senior NCOs. British specialist elements, including mortar locating radar troops and artillery observation officers, also rotated through Oman over several years.

12 years on the ground and continuing engagement to this day - 46 years later.

Net benefits - a stable launch point at the mouth of the Persian/Arabian Gulf from which to launch assaults into Iraq and Kuwait as well as to counter Iran (and Pakistan and Saudi).  All the more so when coupled with similarly engaged Kingdom of Jordan.  Efforts in the Emirates and Kuwait have been more problematic but also useful.
 
Thucydides said:
The issue here is 4GW warfare. So long as the enemy does not lose, they are winning, and so long as *we* are not building and supporting alternative structures and institutions to undermine the sort of structures and institutions *they* use to build and nurture support for their cause, then they have a distinct advantage. Playing "whack a mole" is a good short term solution, and expedient, but unless the hard work of nation building (or some acceptable substitute) is being done, then you simply need to go back and do it again.

Case in point is the US experience in the "Banana Wars" The US marines with a force of @ 3000 took the entire island of Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic) as part of their larger strategy to control the approaches to the Panama Canal. The Marines were there on and off until 1934, and during that time they built roads, hospitals, ran the post office and instituted a tax collection system to keep things funded. However, since they apparently believed that the local would adopt American practice by osmosis, they did little to train locals and indoctrinate them. The results were predictable; one the Americans left, everything that wasn't nailed down was stolen and everything else was left to deteriorate. Max Boot's book "The Savage Wars of Peace[" outlines much of this story.

You are correct that *we* in general have a very poor record of nation building and lack both the experience and patience to do so. Until we are willing to either go "all in", accept and tell the public this is a short term expedient or apply the Roman solution ("They create a wilderness and call it peace") then we may end up with a legacy of Afghanistans, where the job never seems to be finished and few people are satisfied with the results.

That I believe that 4GW is just a new, western interpretation of styles of warfare that have existed throughout history notwithstanding, the difficulty in applying our, western, style of warfare is problematic for many reasons. First, western nations view warfare as being a set of events that take place within a set period of time with clearly delineated periods of war and peace. Culturally, our opponents in the GWOT don't see such distinctions, so are more inclined to take a long term approach to warfare and view it as a semi-permanent state of struggle rather than specific periods. As western nations view war as a distinct period it has led to a cultural desire to restore peace as quickly as possible leading to problem 2, being our style of warfare.

Western warfare, as indicated in US and western doctrine and the writings of Clausewitz and Jomini, emphasize the destruction of the enemy military as the pre-eminent intent of a military. In Clausewtiz's trinity, the destruction of the enemy military is critical as it allows the political element to establish the terms of peace. Where this is problematic is that our enemy views warfare more from a political than fighting standpoint, so the main point of western warfare, the decisive battle, is incongruent with them.

The problem with the GWOT is that we don't have clear political aims for the war. "destroying terrorists" is simplistic and does not speak to the nature of the war in which we are fighting, a key issue in the Clausewitzian trinity. Further, as we are culturally indoctrinated to our style of war with it's focus on the enemy and war being a specific period of time, we design militaries to engage in decisive battles to restore the political elements to create peace. In this way, we create a military that is akin to a "hammer". As such, when we evaluate military manners we lean towards the problem of, "when your only tool is a hammer, all problems look like nails". This leads us to try to solve all problems military by hoping we can engage and destroy the enemy, which isn't feasible in our current conflict. Finally, as society views war and peace as separate entities, and war as a condition to be avoided or dealt with quickly, we tend to shy away from prolonged conflicts.

These are the key factors to why A-Stan wasn't a "success" in the traditional sense. Over the long haul it could be but not now.
 
How does this sound?

War:  That period of time when one government's police are forced to coalesce to actively oppose the concentrated efforts of another government's police.

The period of peace that exists between periods of war allows the government to use its police to maintain order domestically.
 
Lightguns said:
Success is over rated, the best you can expect in the ME is stalemate with a slight improvement.  By that measure Afghanistan is a success, it is better now than then.  Part of the problem was we got wrapped around making the world safe for Muslim women as a justification for our role there.  We raised our own expectations beyond what the situation could ever resolve.

Half the time Muslim women don't even seem to want that. It's like they enjoy being treated like property.

Problem we gave ourselves in Afghanistan IMO is that we introduced them to western style welfare. We swooped in and started throwing money around which made people greedy. Maybe we could have accomplished more if we treated it like an advance to contact from one end to the other instead of trying to impress our culture over top theirs.
 
I will argue that the west’s focus on Kandahar/Kabual while ignoring the more stable parts of Afghanistan did not help. More development in the non-Pastun area’s would have strengthened them and given a firmer base to build economic vitality. As a number of these areas were in the Northwest, the west should have worked harder at improving western transportation linkages across Central Asia and extended the rail system down south. Building a railway would provide a lot of low tech jobs and make mines and such viable, eventually the rail could connect to Iran opening up non-Pakistan seaport access. This would reduce Pakistan’s deathgrip on the balls of US/ISAF/Afghanistan logistics. The above would draw the ire of the Pastun’s and given the west a bargaining chip to force the Pastun tribes to the table with less chips.
 
We had a northern rail route. We were at the mercy of the neighbouring 'stans and Russia as to what, when and in what direction we could ship things. But I agree that a railroad would have been a worthy infrastructure project. Seems to have helped Canada, parts of Africa, etc. get a step up.
 
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