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Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle - RG-31, LAV Coyote, and (partial) G-Wagon Replacement

Ponies and Carthorses.
And yet some folks decide to just buy a Mule...

The fact is one vehicle will not be able to do everything - and while it makes a solid talking point for commonality etc - it glosses over a lot of missing mission capabilities.

- See the all singing and dancing LAV 6.0 ;)

Honestly I really wonder what the Armoured Corps was smoking in their requirement writing - as neither of the options make any sense for the role.
I tend to think that CCA would have given them a more relevant base vehicle (assuming it was a CV90 style system) to work from, as opposed to a vehicle that was designed to do secondary tasks and have no direct combat role (the Commando).
 
And yet some folks decide to just buy a Mule...

The fact is one vehicle will not be able to do everything - and while it makes a solid talking point for commonality etc - it glosses over a lot of missing mission capabilities.

- See the all singing and dancing LAV 6.0 ;)

Honestly I really wonder what the Armoured Corps was smoking in their requirement writing - as neither of the options make any sense for the role.
I tend to think that CCA would have given them a more relevant base vehicle (assuming it was a CV90 style system) to work from, as opposed to a vehicle that was designed to do secondary tasks and have no direct combat role (the Commando).

I don't know that you can blame the RCAC . I think this guy sums it up pretty well.

Now in reality there ended up being 3 projects that were thrown into the one project that they bought the TAPV to fill. The Armd Corps has been looking to buy a "Light Recce Vehicle" since the mid 90s to compliment the Coyote (not replace it). Later on the Infantry Corps wanted a "Patrol Carrier" for 1 coy of their Light Battalions and then after our Afghanistan experience the CAF wanted to replace the G-Wagon in conflict zones as the run about vehicle. Somehow all three projects got moulded into one. The Textron Commando that we now know as TAPV was bought to answer all three needs. The 100 or so that were going to the Infantry were rejected because the Infantry decided that with only 3 dismounts the vehicle did not meet their needs. Although the Armd Corps took delivery of the vehicles it was much larger than the Light Recce Vehicle we were looking for. Also as has been pointed out by others, the weapon system is not configured for what the Armd Corps does ( Recce or anything else). This leaves the Run About vehicle in a conflict zone. It actually works very well for that as the original vehicle was designed for the US Army Military Police to drive around the Vietnam countryside without getting their butts shot off.


The RCIC wanted a Patrol Carrier - They were using the 7.3 tonne, 2+6 RG-31 Nyala to some benefit I understand. They got an 18 tonne, 3+3 TAPV.

The RCAC wanted a Light Recce Vehicle - Perhaps something along the lines of the Panhard VBL or the Fennek? A vehicle in the 4 to 10 tonne range with a crew of 3 that would work well with both the LAV and Lt elements.

And the CAF wanted an armoured runabout - Perhaps along the lines of the IVECO LMV? A 6.5 tonne vehicle with a crew of 1 + 3 to 6.

The magic number, I believe, was around the 7 tonne mark of the JLTV/IVECO LMV-Panther.

Or the JLTV. Which is now in the Light Utility Vehicle area?

The (LUV) project must also fill a key logistics role. The Navistar Medium Support Vehicle System MILCOTS trucks have a 10-tonne cargo capacity and the Logistics Vehicle Modernization project is expected to deliver a light truck in the five-tonne range to replace the Western Star LSVW. But to transport the increasingly heavier gear of small units on base or on operations, LUV must bridge a gap below the much larger MSVS and LVM vehicles with something around two tonnes.

As a reconnaissance platform that is often operating with the fighting forces, the LUV will need built-in or bolt-on armour protection from improvised explosive devices and small arms fire and the mobility to travel off-road. Conversely, it’s also the vehicle for Course Warrant Officers conducting training courses at home where weapons, armour and mobility can be set aside.

Furthermore, it will be the prime vehicle for signallers to lay communication cable, and may be tasked to provide tactical support to light infantry forces.
 
I don't know that you can blame the RCAC . I think this guy sums it up pretty well.




The RCIC wanted a Patrol Carrier - They were using the 7.3 tonne, 2+6 RG-31 Nyala to some benefit I understand. They got an 18 tonne, 3+3 TAPV.

The RCAC wanted a Light Recce Vehicle - Perhaps something along the lines of the Panhard VBL or the Fennek? A vehicle in the 4 to 10 tonne range with a crew of 3 that would work well with both the LAV and Lt elements.
The Infantry said F no, which is what the Armoured should have done...

And the CAF wanted an armoured runabout - Perhaps along the lines of the IVECO LMV? A 6.5 tonne vehicle with a crew of 1 + 3 to 6.

The magic number, I believe, was around the 7 tonne mark of the JLTV/IVECO LMV-Panther.
Again I see a vehicle that was bought that met absolutely none of the needs/wants/desires (in short requirements) for the vehicle.
Who in the F does that?
Or the JLTV. Which is now in the Light Utility Vehicle area?


I foresee another train wreck fast approaching, mainly because the CA doesn't seem to be able to put pen to paper and articulate actual needs in the form of requirement documents.
 
Again I see a vehicle that was bought that met absolutely none of the needs/wants/desires (in short requirements) for the vehicle.
Who in the F does that?

A two year bureaucrat who wants his ticket punched?
 
When you have nothing it is hard to figure out what gaps you are going to have to fill when you buy stuff that you have never worked with before. I can see why there is a degree of angst over the Logistics Vehicles Modernization project and starting with the meat of the curve - the Medium. But they had to start somewhere. I'm not bothered about the starting point so much as I am about the speed of developments since that time - and for that matter before that time.

Edit: Or.... it's not the decision, it's the indecision.
 
Honestly I really wonder what the Armoured Corps was smoking in their requirement writing - as neither of the options make any sense for the role.
They probably did not get a choice to separate their requirement from the pseudo-MRAP that someone in NDHQ wanted.

The RCIC wanted a …
No they did not. They did not ask for it. Someone else had a good idea that the Infantry needed something to institutionalize the “capability” that was the RG-31.
 
Later on the Infantry Corps wanted a "Patrol Carrier" for 1 coy of their Light Battalions and then after our Afghanistan experience the CAF wanted to replace the G-Wagon in conflict zones as the run about vehicle.

The source of my error. See above.
 
When you have nothing it is hard to figure out what gaps you are going to have to fill when you buy stuff that you have never worked with before.
It's actually very easy -- go play with your allies -- see what works and what doesn't, that allows you a good start to write the Requirements.

They probably did not get a choice to separate their requirement from the pseudo-MRAP that someone in NDHQ wanted.


No they did not. They did not ask for it. Someone else had a good idea that the Infantry needed something to institutionalize the “capability” that was the RG-31.
That's a problem that really should never have existed - the Nyala was a niche system that clearly didn't apply to any sort of large scale conflict.
 
That's a problem that really should never have existed - the Nyala was a niche system that clearly didn't apply to any sort of large scale conflict.
Just 12 months ago, there were still people who would have dismissed any arguments that NATO armies might possibly find themselves in conflict with Russia. Insugencies and small wars were the new way of things. Those same people will likely see the TAPV as exactly adequate to fight another war vs the Taliban. The idea that the CA must prepare primarily for a war against the Taliban has infected other projects over the last 15 years, and we still have projects in the pipes that are optimized to sustain Kandahar. It’s not right, but it is where we are.
 
It's actually very easy -- go play with your allies -- see what works and what doesn't, that allows you a good start to write the Requirements.


That's a problem that really should never have existed - the Nyala was a niche system that clearly didn't apply to any sort of large scale conflict.

Pretty effective for South African bush wars where, of course, the opposition was largely light infantry with no heavy armour, artillery, engineering or air support....


So pretty much the perfect choice for Peacekeeping! ;)
 
Pretty effective for South African bush wars where, of course, the opposition was largely light infantry with no heavy armour, artillery, engineering or air support....


So pretty much the perfect choice for Peacekeeping! ;)
Yeah -- I don't understand why so many Armies take thew wrong lessons learned and enjoy applying them...
 
Just 12 months ago, there were still people who would have dismissed any arguments that NATO armies might possibly find themselves in conflict with Russia. Insugencies and small wars were the new way of things. Those same people will likely see the TAPV as exactly adequate to fight another war vs the Taliban. The idea that the CA must prepare primarily for a war against the Taliban has infected other projects over the last 15 years, and we still have projects in the pipes that are optimized to sustain Kandahar. It’s not right, but it is where we are.
I'd suggest those folks should have been retired long ago ;)

Want to have a BN worth of stuff that is niche - sure park it in Montreal in a dusty depot for someone to keep the rust off, but the focus of any Army should be High Intensity Peer fighting - and that doesn't mean that Canada should view the Taliban as a peer...
 
I'd suggest those folks should have been retired long ago ;)

Want to have a BN worth of stuff that is niche - sure park it in Montreal in a dusty depot for someone to keep the rust off, but the focus of any Army should be High Intensity Peer fighting - and that doesn't mean that Canada should view the Taliban as a peer...

Dude, you don't get the Trudeau Government, do you? ;)

Liberals give themselves more time to meet five-year-old peacekeeping pledge​



 
Those same people will likely see the TAPV as exactly adequate to fight another war vs the Taliban.

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Well, it would likely be a fair fight - although I would give the Afghan turret the edge. Could we check with them to find out how many troops they carry?
 
Just 12 months ago, there were still people who would have dismissed any arguments that NATO armies might possibly find themselves in conflict with Russia. Insugencies and small wars were the new way of things. Those same people will likely see the TAPV as exactly adequate to fight another war vs the Taliban. The idea that the CA must prepare primarily for a war against the Taliban has infected other projects over the last 15 years, and we still have projects in the pipes that are optimized to sustain Kandahar. It’s not right, but it is where we are.
Keep in mind the same situation existed in the reverse in June 2001. Tell the Army you be fighting a COIN war in Central Asia for a decade, taking causalities and killing bad guys, with Leopard 2 tanks, leased Mi-17's and Chinooks. They would laugh you out of the room. The lesson is that we are terrible at predicting the next war we be in. That is the message that needs to be sent to the politicians. Prepare well or suffer.
 
Keep in mind the same situation existed in the reverse in June 2001. Tell the Army you be fighting a COIN war in Central Asia for a decade, taking causalities and killing bad guys, with Leopard 2 tanks, leased Mi-17's and Chinooks. They would laugh you out of the room. The lesson is that we are terrible at predicting the next war we be in. That is the message that needs to be sent to the politicians. Prepare well or suffer.

Green with envy... our usual posture ;)


 
I'd suggest those folks should have been retired long ago ;)

Want to have a BN worth of stuff that is niche - sure park it in Montreal in a dusty depot for someone to keep the rust off, but the focus of any Army should be High Intensity Peer fighting - and that doesn't mean that Canada should view the Taliban as a peer...
Prepared for A war. Peer or near peer.

Fight THE war whatever it is.
 
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