Tactical Airlift - Replace the Herc!

[Good2Golf]

Personally and professionally, I would like to see C-17s of our own, even if just 2 or 3.  I mentioned the Il-76 because that may be a way the Canadian Government can "get it's feet wet" withough incurring huge cost.  If the concept of us having our own dedicated machines is seen positively, then the case is made for the utility of our own heavy lifters. Had we had our own heavy strat lift, the DART certainly could have gotten into theatre faster.  Our own machines would also make sustainment of our other current ops run a bit more smootly, perhaps.  Some of us have buds who were actually flying C-17's into theatres around Bagram, Kandahar and other places, and they're quite a viable piece of kit.

Who knows, we may see some short term "creativity" in the rotary side as well, before we see any long term action on rotary med/heavy lift.  The RAF ran into extreme shortages of rotary med/hvy lift in theatre (Iraq), thus the leasing of Mi-17's to fill the gap.  Although Canada doesn't quite seem to have the Brit's spirit of "innovative trial", we might look at lift options for activities coming up later this summer as a short-term solution before a longer term solution comes along...but that's just conjecture at this point.

In the end, the Herc still represents a good, solid workhorse in the "T"actical environment, and if kept up to date on a regular basis (like updgrading our H82s and H90s, and whatever the two L30's are called? and maybe getting some J's as the E's are all decommissioned) would I'm sure, continue to serve us well.

Cheers,
Duey 

 

[Edward Campbell]

Please see the item below from today's Ottawa Citizen.

The Ottawa insiders are 'guesstimating' that there is one, not too large, pot of money for strategic airlift and that either Boeing or Lockheed Martin will get it all.

Leaving aside a VIP/passenger fleet, it seems to me that a revitalized CF, which will have and use (moderately) rapidly deployable light expeditionary joint task forces, needs three fixed wing transport fleets:

1. A relatively small, high endurance aircraft which will meet SAR and many domestic utility/transport needs â “ something like the Lockheed Martin C-27J Spartan;

2. A medium tactical transport â “ something like the Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules; and

3. A strategic heavy lifter â “ something like the being C-17 Globemaster III.

The question is: how to afford more than one?

Maybe we can follow the British lead and lease the aircraft and lease maintenance and support from a mix of Boeing and the USAF.  (See: http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2001/q2/news_release_010523n.htm and http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/c-17.html )  Maybe we could further lower the costs by leasing the aircraft and then basing them, with their Canadian crews, at a convenient US base (McGuire AFB in New Jersey or McChord AFB in Washington).

Maybe, also, if we have enough (and if four is enough for the UK (although they plan to get four more, I understand)) strategic heavy lifters then we can 'make do' with a smaller number of up-to-date tactical transporters â “ especially if their domestic chores are handled by a smaller, cheaper aircraft.

In my view we must have a mixed fleet solution and I disagree with Sen. Kenny that a C-17/ C-27J Spartan type mix will do the job.  I also believe that all major combat systems must be 100% supportable on-shore, from Canada and the USA, so I would not buy a European aircraft â “ not the CN-235 and not the A400M, either.

 

[a_majoor]

One argument for an "all C-17" fleet is the fact that even trips across Canada are at ranges most other airforces consider srtategic rather than tactical. While this is interesting, I still don't buy into the idea of the C-17, simply because of the gigantic costs involved. If the government goes that route, I can see the false economies of them buying just 3, completely forgetting about such issues as downtime for maintainence etc. etc.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I still don't buy into the idea of the C-17, simply because of the gigantic costs involved

What about the the costs that would be incurred for converting the IL76s to NATO and Canadian standards? IIRC you and others are  major supporters for the CF to get the IL76. At least this way we would not have to rely on Russia or the Ukraine for spare parts.

 

[Edward Campbell]

We need to consider, especially with aircraft, the complete system life cycle costs*, over the complete service life â “ which for some aircraft (some CC-129 Dakotas and some C-130 Hercules) stretch to the half century mark.

I don't know how long C-17s might last but I am not afraid of the costs if, Big IF they are expressed in life cycle terms. â “ this is very, very hard for politicians but some military officers but many senior bureaucrats are very keen on the idea if, another Big IF are items in a class (fixed wing aircraft, for example) are dealt with on a life cycle cost basis.   This is a very hard concept for many politicians and senior military officers and some civil servants because it means long range planning, programming and budgeting.   This flies in the face of a Canadian (Westminster) political maxim which says that a government cannot (not may not, cannot) bind its successors â “ that's one of the reasons Jean Chrétien could, cavalierly, cancel the EH-101 project ... the other reason was that he campaigned on a promise to do so and he destroyed the Progressive Conservative Party in the election.

The way we plan and programme in Canada gives Project Plowshares and the Soviet daycare lobby an absolute advantage ... they can use capital costs as a weapon, saying, â ?Look, here, Canadians!   They want this many billions for airplanes!   We need those billions for free daycare.â ?   If we used, consistently, a life cycle cost analysis system the overall system costs would be huge ... so big, in some cases, that they defy discussion, but the 'answer' is, always, â Å“It's not those billions, it is just this many paltry millions per year ...â ?

I you 'programme' most major (expensive) combat systems over reasonable life cycles â “ meaning that there is less distinction between capital, personnel and O&M budgets, which means that there is more room, for a while, anyway, for bureaucratic screw-ups of monumental proportions and less for political gain â “ then the government and the military would be forced to plan, something both groups hate, and explain their plans to Canadians who might, at long last, be able to 'see' the plan, in broad outline ... frightening concept, isn't it?

----------

* Gross oversimplification but accurate enough for the internet, I think. Tutorial at: http://www.barringer1.com/pdf/lcctutorial.pdf

 

[Good2Golf]

We need to consider, especially with aircraft, the complete system life cycle costs*, over the complete service life â “ which for some aircraft (some CC-129 Dakotas and some C-130 Hercules) stretch to the half century mark.

I don't know how long C-17s might last but I am not afraid of the costs if, Big IF they are expressed in life cycle terms. â “ this is very, very hard for politicians but some military officers but many senior bureaucrats are very keen on the idea if, another Big IF are items in a class (fixed wing aircraft, for example) are dealt with on a life cycle cost basis.   This is a very hard concept for many politicians and senior military officers and some civil servants because it means long range planning, programming and budgeting.   This flies in the face of a Canadian (Westminster) political maxim which says that a government cannot (not may not, cannot) bind its successors â “ that's one of the reasons Jean Chrétien could, cavalierly, cancel the EH-101 project ... the other reason was that he campaigned on a promise to do so and he destroyed the Progressive Conservative Party in the election.

The way we plan and programme in Canada gives Project Plowshares and the Soviet daycare lobby an absolute advantage ... they can use capital costs as a weapon, saying, â ?Look, here, Canadians!   They want this many billions for airplanes!   We need those billions for free daycare.â ?   If we used, consistently, a life cycle cost analysis system the overall system costs would be huge ... so big, in some cases, that they defy discussion, but the 'answer' is, always, â Å“It's not those billions, it is just this many paltry millions per year ...â ?

I you 'programme' most major (expensive) combat systems over reasonable life cycles â “ meaning that there is less distinction between capital, personnel and O&M budgets, which means that there is more room, for a while, anyway, for bureaucratic screw-ups of monumental proportions and less for political gain â “ then the government and the military would be forced to plan, something both groups hate, and explain their plans to Canadians who might, at long last, be able to 'see' the plan, in broad outline ... frightening concept, isn't it?

----------

* Gross oversimplification but accurate enough for the internet, I think. Tutorial at: http://www.barringer1.com/pdf/lcctutorial.pdf

ROJ, you are absolutely right about life cycle costs!  Unfortunately, there are also precedents at many levels of cost where government has taken the cheaper route to begin with that has cost far greater in the long run...SK replacement but one example.  It's sad to say, but many in the money-dispensing arms of governmnet see DND as one of the last bastions of large chunks of money that can be distributed regionally without nearly as much microscoping by TB as all the other departments.  Sadly, many of us cynics who have worked within of nearby DSP activities see the frustrating side of folks ignoring the life-cycle cost purity...

Cheers,
Duey

 

[a_majoor]

I will still get up on my hind legs for the IL-76 solution as a last ditch response to the lack of strategic airlift in the CF. Lifecycle or just direct purchase cost wise, it is hard to argue that an airplane which may cost $50 million/unit after refit isn't a more paletable pill to swallow than an aircraft which costs $250 million/unit. You could buy a six IL-76 squadron for a bit more than the cost of one of the C-17s, and the life cycle costs would be proportionatly less.

If there were more choices I would be all over them, but there is one AN-70, and lots of computer generated graphics of the A400, so our ability to choose is a tad constrained, to say the least.

 

[honestyrules]

reference you last, with that chechnya thing going on in former u.s.s.r, i don't thing the canadian gov would purchase stuff from them. (PR wise). Plus, i'm not aware of any military supplies or kit from the russians being purchase by a north american army. Ok, they rent the Antonov though.
My 2 cents...

 

[Edward Campbell]

...   it is hard to argue that an airplane which may cost $50 million/unit after refit isn't a more paletable pill to swallow than an aircraft which costs $250 million/unit. You could buy a six IL-76 squadron for a bit more than the cost of one of the C-17s, and the life cycle costs would be proportionatly less ...

That's not necessarily true ... one of the reasons so many people hate life cycle costing is the detailed RAM (Reliability Availability Maintainability â “ I think) analyses which must be done ... including historical analyses of similar systems.   Sometimes (often, actually) there is a good reason for higher capital costs: much lower RAM costs, which, when factored over the life cycle mean that sometimes (often) the higher initial costs item is the cheapest.   One of the factors which must be included is the cost of catastrophes â “ crashes for airplanes.

Life cycle costs can, also, be dynamic; they can change with experience â “ rising ort falling.   This is a legitimate complaint about them which I failed to mention up above.   There is a certain pig-in-a-poke aspect to the whole thing ... but I figure that's infinitely superior to Jean Chrétien's Cadillac judgement ...

 

[Edward Campbell]

One thing I forgot to mention re: life cycle costing (and, indeed, life cycle management/support of weapon systems) is that you need to factor in all directly associated casts including e.g:

"¢ Project/acquisition management;

"¢ Basing (new construction, simulators, lengthened/strengthened airfields etc);

"¢ Personnel/training costs (but not, necessarily, the salaries of crews/maintainers ... although some purists insist they should be included.   I disagree because, in order to 'save' one might cut people or reduce flying hours or days at sea, etc, and, consequently, 'mothball' systems or, in other ways, reduce use - such changes are 'imposed' and should not, in my view, by 'borne' by the system's life cycle);

"¢ System upgrades, refits and life extensions.   These should be planned and programmed at the start.   Many (most) major systems ought to have two major 'refits' - now called half life and, then, life extension; and

"¢ Disposal costs - and they do exist and can be significant.

Thus, leasing aircraft (maybe purchasing them, later, as the RAF is doing) and even basing them in the USA might both lower life cycle costs, especially if systems, like aircraft, are [configuration controlled so that they remain, 100%, within the US logistics system, which significantly lowers costs.

I know this is just about as exciting and operational as accounting can ever get; sorry ...

 

[Good2Golf]

...I know this is just about as exciting and operational as accounting can ever get; sorry ...

ROJ, I use my copy of the DMS Manual to help me fall asleep at night!  ;D

 

[Cloud Cover]

From Defence Aerospace.com, this is not a good sign for us buying the c130J:
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34 
 
C-130J Flunks Testing
 
 
The C-130J cargo aircraft essentially flunked its initial evaluation by the Pentagon's top independent tester, Tom Christie, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. 

Christie's new report dubs the C-130J as â Å“neither operationally effective nor operationally suitable,â ? and notes that the Air Force intends to deploy the aircraft despite â Å“limited capabilitiesâ ? to the Central Command early this year, before it completes the second phase of operational testing. 

Christie's report was released just after the Pentagon leaked a proposal that it intends to terminate the C-130J cargo aircraft program. The C-130 Hercules has become a legend in military transport. However, the program to develop the C-130J, an aircraft that is â Å“70 percentâ ? different than previous models, has been characterized by inefficiency, waste, and a misguided acquisition strategy that doubled its original cost. In fact, none of the 50 or so aircraft already acquired by the Air Force had been certified as combat ready, according to a highly critical audit last summer by the Department of Defense Inspector General. 

Though the cost-cutting measure is a good idea, in upcoming months, the Secretary of Defense appears headed for a dogfight with several members of Congress who are acting on behalf of defense contractors and in their own political self interest, rather than looking out for the taxpayers and the nation's fighting men and women. Earlier this month, 24 U.S. Senators sent a letter to President Bush asking that he not allow the C-130J program to be eliminated. 

The Senators' letter disingenuously touts the merits of the original legendary C-130, not the â Å“Jâ ? model. But Christie's report said the C-130J â Å“has more than 70 percent new equipment, relative to previous C-130 models,â ? and some have even said the C-130J should even have a new name of its own because it is so different than the original C-130. 

Among the criticisms contained in Christie's report: 

-- Problems confronting the C-130J include â Å“funding of logistics support and training systems; hardware, software and technical order deficiencies; manufacturing quality; subsystem reliability; failure to meet required measures of system effectiveness; and resolution of documented deficiencies." 

-- Major aircrew workload issues remaining include cargo loading and constraint requirements. 

-- The aircraft's defensive systems have yet to demonstrate that they will work properly and the aircraft's airdrop mission has yet to be evaluated by Christie's office. 

-- Issues still confronting the weather reconnaissance version of the aircraft include radar performance in hurricane reconnaissance missions, propeller anti-ice protective cover peeling, and excessive vibration. 

The Project On Government Oversight investigates, exposes, and seeks to remedy systemic abuses of power, mismanagement, and subservience by the federal government to powerful special interests. Founded in 1981, POGO is a politically-independent, nonprofit watchdog that strives to promote a government that is accountable to the citizenry. (ends) 


Click here for a copy of the Senators' Jan. 13, 2005 letter to President Bush 


-ends- 

If you go to the website, the Senator's letter references something we can relate to: $800 million in liability costs for terminating the program plus billions more to keep the E and H models flying. 

 

[Kirkhill]

Probably doesn't do much for the C27J either given the high degree of commonality.

On the other hand what are the alternatives?  The paper A-400M?  The Casa beast might handle SAR and MP work but couldn't replace the Herc.  Russian/Ukrainian beasts? Are their support costs going to be any less?

Short answer: I don't think the Americans have got any alternative but to make them work.  The Brits have them operationally, as do the Aussies and the USAF in Iraq.  A US squadron commander over there has stated that he was satisfied with them as compared to the earlier models.  A number of Air Forces are operating the C27J with the same engines and similar avionics and airframe components.

At what point do paper standards drift from field applications?

Is this one of those cases?

 

[Storm]

Probably doesn't do much for the C27J either given the high degree of commonality.

On the other hand what are the alternatives?   The paper A-400M?   The Casa beast might handle SAR and MP work but couldn't replace the Herc.   Russian/Ukrainian beasts? Are their support costs going to be any less?

Short answer: I don't think the Americans have got any alternative but to make them work.   The Brits have them operationally, as do the Aussies and the USAF in Iraq.   A US squadron commander over there has stated that he was satisfied with them as compared to the earlier models.   A number of Air Forces are operating the C27J with the same engines and similar avionics and airframe components.

At what point do paper standards drift from field applications?

Is this one of those cases?

The Americans may not have much of a choice, but for us it certainly is something to think about.

From same site:

First Production Item for A400M Airframe
 
 
(Source: Airbus Military; issued, Jan. 26, 2005)
 
 
Airbus Military has today launched production of the first major airframe component for the A400M military airlifter.  

â Å“The event took place at a ceremony held in the Varel facility of Airbus Germany, where representatives of the seven launch customer nations joined government officials and members of the Airbus Military management team to witness the milling of the first lower fuselage frame.  

One of eighteen such frames located in the centre fuselage section that will support the floor and carry the main fuselage structure, the 5.4 metre long element is milled from a single aluminium billet. Starting with a raw material mass of over two tonnes, the finished frame will weigh only 25 kg. 100% of the machined waste will be re-cycled.  

The first metal cut for the A400M comes only 18 months after the programme launch, in May 2003, demonstrating that the rigorous timetable established for the new airlifter is being strictly respected. The lower fuselage frames are classified as long-lead items, hence the early start to manufacturing. They represent the beginning of a rapidly increasing industrial process, which will see more and more components put into production as work on their detailed design is completed.  

â Å“This truly marks the start of the A400M production phaseâ ?, said Adolfo Revuelta, Head of A400M Programme. â Å“We are proud to be able to demonstrate both to our customers and to the world that the well-proven Airbus industrial methodology is being successfully applied to our military programme.â ?  

The A400M programme was launched in May 2003 when 180 A400M airlifters were ordered by seven European NATO nations: 60 for Germany; 50 for France; 27 for Spain; 25 for the UK; 10 for Turkey; 7 for Belgium and 1 for Luxemburg. The A400M will first fly in 2008 with first deliveries beginning from 2009.  

Does anyone think that, even if leadership stated flat out tomorrow morning that we will be getting C-130J's ASAFP, we would have them any sooner than the 2009 A400M timeframe above? I have my doubts. I honestly wonder if the A400M is really all that impractical by comparison wrt delivery time for Canada's situation.

The way I imagine things playing out - irrespective of what is used to replace the hercs - is that the new SAR birds will be used to take as much pressure as possible off of the current hercs (i.e. no more SAR role for hercs), with a herc replacement coming in sometime around 2010+.

Assuming A400M's as replacements for a second, if there's enough pressure, maybe we would lease a couple strategic aircraft for a few years to fill the gap. With our movement towards LAV-based Forces I can't think of any equipment that couldn't be hauled by an A400M, so once the A400M's entered service, the leased strategic lift could be dumped with the A400M's taking it.

Then again, that's just my imagination...

On a more factual note, does anybody know when the Airlift Capability Project is supposed to say what our airlift capability should be?

 

[STONEY]

Hmmm so to sum all this up.

IL-76 can be purchased new at 50 mil a copy with western P&W engines & western avionics.

The Brits bought C-130J's but only as an interim measure until A400M becomes available because their Hercs were almost as clapped out as ours and they couldn't wait, while it seems we can. While the C130J has been around for awhile and sold to several countrys & showing promise has so far been a sort of flop and still not combat qualified so it can only fly into airports used by civilan aircraft off load onto old Hercs who fly into war zones.

The C-17 is an excellent a/c but expensive and Canada being destitute cannot afford them.

We shouldent buy A european a/c but The C-27J is to the Italian G-22 as the C130J is to the C-130 & can lift an Iltis.


The A400M is just a paper a/c but is  being procured by 7 of our NATO allies & can lift anything in Canadian inventory, has strategic range, almost as fast as C-17 , can land anywhere a Herc can , cheaper than a C-17 . 

Its no wonder the Government can't make up its mind it seems no-one here can either, do i see a typical Canadian compromise in our future.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

Does anyone think that, even if leadership stated flat out tomorrow morning that we will be getting C-130J's ASAFP, we would have them any sooner than the 2009 A400M timeframe above? I have my doubts. I honestly wonder if the A400M is really all that impractical by comparison wrt delivery time for Canada's situation.

Fair comment.

The A400M is just a paper a/c but is  being procured by 7 of our NATO allies & can lift anything in Canadian inventory, has strategic range, almost as fast as C-17 , can land anywhere a Herc can , cheaper than a C-17 . 

Actually, now that Gen Hillier has put his cards on the table relative to the Airlift/Sealift debate - maybe the A-400M might not be a bad bet?

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/fla/

On the domestic front could the A-400 be used to deploy the Griffons to the Arctic for Arctic Rescue missions?

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

I wonder if we could get the Aussies interested in a shared fleet of C-17's....2 each would not be a huge financial burden but would provide a significant surge capacity if necessary.

In fact, it would be interesting to consider a standardization of our airlift assets as a whole so that we flew common models making upgrade and procurement decisions more streamlined.

Each Country:
2 C-17's
Mixed C-130's (eventually moving to common standards)
XXX C-27

In why not go all out.   Most of their forces and roles are very similar to ours.   Whether it's land, sea or air forces there must be commonality that we can take advantage in procurement, training or joint doctrine development.


F-18 upgrades
Coastwatch Program
Patrol Aircraft Upgrades (I think they use Orions)
LAV's
New Tactical Helicopter
Amphibious Assault Ship
Joint Naval Resupply Vessels
Frigate Upgrades
UAV procurement
Hooking into their M1 purchase....   ;D


Matthew.    

 

[a_majoor]

Let's share the Austrailian Defense minister as well!  ;D

 

[Lethbridge U]

While the recent budget allocates an additional 12.7 billion extra dollars over the next five years seems good, I'm not sure how much of that could be used towards tactical airlift.  It seems that the federal government will only spend $2.7 billion of that money between 2007 and 2010 to be used on helicopters, trucks, aircraft and a training facility for JTF2. Each of these activities must have a very expensive price tag, so there is only a small piece of the pie (perhaps at most 500 million) that could be used in this endevour.  Given the pricing that has been outlined in CASR what do you think the Canadian Forces is going to choose? C130J, C-17, Antonov An 70?

 

[Kirkhill]

Lethbridge:

IIRC there was 2.7BCAD of promised funding for the material you listed but there was also - very unusually - a 3.2 BCAD of promised funding "to be determined".  Kind of a blank promisory note to be filled in after the defence review is released.  So who knows what kind of magic stuff is under consideration just now.

From the thread on Budget it seems that the same A/C under consideration for the FWSAR may also be used to replace Otters and a good chunk of the Hercs dedicated to tactical lift. 

Even if it is only an intellectual exercise, this defence review is likely to be pretty interesting reading.