Strategic vs. Tactical Airlift - What balance do we need? (from: Military wins no matter what after election)

[Bert]

FoverF

The comparative features of the C-130J and A400M are similar in regards to medium lift.  My point in the
other posts were there are deployments and taskings that do not require the size of the IL-76 or C-17 or
there are soft FOD littered airfields these jet engined aircraft cannot land on.  The C-27/G-235 types do not
have the capacity for larger cargo like vehicles or mixed cargo.  Each type; light, medium and heavy, has its
own niche and purposes.  The CF has used the Herc as a main carrier and its been successful partially due to
the fact it meets the needs of many remote and internal operations.  Acquiring strategic lift allows for faster,
controlled, larger deployments with decent airfields and light lift for SAR, surveillance, multi-purpose support.  
Medium lift falls into maintaining operations that require more robust cargo and vehicle lift where larger aircraft
cannot go or cannot be slated to go.  These are only a few examples, but search for Boxtop, Op Hurricane,
Eureka, and CFS Alert and note references to airfields, scope and supply.  I doubt strategic lift and light lift
(unless many aircraft are involved) are suitable for the job in these cases.  There are other examples.  In this regards,
phasing out medium lift is more cumbersome as not having or contracting out stategic lift especially at current tasking
levels.  Any improvement to air-lift is a good thing however.

As far as adding to the Polaris fleet, its out of my lane.   In theory, one can look across the aircraft in the CF and
see definite excellent quality acquisitions and compare it to mixed contractor and maintenance solutions.   Domestically,
i don't know if A310 acquisition would be beneficial as civilian carriers are often convenient.   Good question.

 

[Kirkhill]

Quibbling a bit here Bert

But as I understand it the C-17, with a light load, not a 70 tonne Abrams, can land on rough strips and is being used that way just now.   The problem is that FOD is reducing engine life and the stress of landing on the strips is reducing airframe life.   Early model C-17s (the first 50 to 70) are losing 10   to 20 years of service life as a result - a major problem not just because of the loss of 165 MUSD aircraft but also because of the need to replace them AND add a few more.   Unfortunately it seems that the USAF hasn't quite bitten that bullet yet.

http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=HTAIRMO.HTM  
April 17, 2005 article

The C-17 entered service ten years ago, and those first few aircraft quickly compiled 3,000 flight hours supporting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Each C-17 has a useful life of 30,000 flight hours, but the current force is flying such long, and hard (landing on rough fields) flights that many of the early model C-17s will be worn out within five or so years. This attrition is accelerated by the fact that the early model C-17s are structurally different, and weaker, than the later model C-17s. The wing box in the center of the fuselage was insufficiently strong   for the loads placed on it. This was corrected later in the production run, but those early planes are going to wear out faster than later model planes of the same flight hours. Adding to this problem is the fact that many C-17s are landing on rough fields with heavy loads and are taking life time shortening structural damage. We have flown a lot of C-17s into northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and a bunch of other 'stans with rough/short strips in 2001 and 2003. The C-17 was built for this sort of thing, but lots of these landing come at the price of shorter useful life.

Both these items reference the C-17 situation.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/05/us-congress-passes-441b-budget-for-fy-2006/index.php

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/10/us-cbo-gives-ok-to-hula-airships-for-airlift/index.php

Peculiar that IIRC the Senate/Congress had to "force" the Air Force to buy 6 unbudgeted C-17s to keep the line open though.   I can only assume it has to do with cash flow in the Air Force budget.

C-17s would supply a rough strip capability but it might be husbanded for critical situations (NEO perhaps? Or other wartime taskings). As you suggest, if there are regular flights to gravel strips something else, like the C-130 or the A-400   is probably more appropriate.

In the absence of those aircraft perhaps, as I suggested on another thread, buying or leasing aircraft like the C-17 and C27/G-235/C-295 which appear to be more readily available, could offload some C-130H hours and extend their useful life that way,   at least for a couple more years than currently projected.

 

[canuck101]

I was just reading this article on http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-airlift-tactical.htm and i thought it looked interesting. I did not hear anything about airbus offering this solutions sounds interesting.

 

[Zoomie]

Interesting discussion here folks.

Let me add to your propositions with a concrete fact that needs to be addressed.  The FWSAR aircraft which is scheduled to replace the CC-115 and CC-130E's must be able to fly 300kts and still be able to work in the mountains.  This effectively eliminates all EADS-CASA products (too slow) and there goes the Twotter idea too - the Herc is fast enough, it just can't work in the rocks (established fact).

So...  If you want Strat and Tactical lift, you must take into account that $1.4BCAD is already set aside for FWSAR which is not any of those two.

Merry Christmas

 

[Kirkhill]

Zoomie:

I know that you have been pretty pleased with the C27 as a FWSAR platform.  How do you feel about its production status, the reliability of Alenia as a supplier and its possible value as a transport?

 

[McG]

Between the tactical and strategic levels is the operational level.  It might be said that the Herc is operational level airlift (movement from a staging area into theatre and within the theatre) with tactical and limited strategic level functions.

The C-17 may be able to by-pass the staging area and fly direct into theatre (eliminating or reducing one function of operational airlift) but may often be overkill for operational or tactical airlift requirements within a theatre of operations.

But where is the balance?  If we use charter & CC-150 to move pers to a staging areas (for onward travel in operational airlift) and move material direct to theatre in C-17, what do we need?

I see tactical airlift primarily filled by Chinooks and fixed wing aircraft conducting parachute operations.


. . . or, maybe I am confusing things by redefining our vernacular?

 

[Kirkhill]

No McG, I don't think you are confusing things by redefining the vernacular.

I think you are right to open up the discussion.  The vernacular of Strategic, Operational, Tactical, Fixed or Rotary, or for that matter Air, Sea, Road, Rail or Cross-Country, imposes a series of fixed cells (silos or stovepipes if I understand those current buzz words from the vernacular).  The real issue is the effect (more jargon).  Where, how much and how fast can men and materiel be delivered and recovered?  From a very large spectrum of transportation options, some of which are readily available and some of which are not, which are currently available to the CF and which are most compatible with CF needs?

It may simplify discussions by being able to split transport into defined categories but when the platforms start to cross the boundaries of the categories (ie is a hovercraft a boat, a plane or a truck? or less extreme is a 7.5 tonne truck a heavy medium or a light heavy?) it seems to me to force looking at the entire spectrum, even if that spectrum consists of hundreds of individual options, some radically different in their capabilities and some overlapping.

 

[Sf2]

We need something that will transport a few Griffons without having to dismantle the damn things.

 

[FoverF]

Apologies in advance for a long-winded post :

I'm 100% with shortfinal on this one; we need something that can haul ready-to-go equipment. You may not have the need all the time, but when you do have a need to hit the ground rolling, it can be the difference between success and impotence. This goes for Griffons, MGS's, those BV206 doo-hinkeys, and a whole lot of other kit which is very easily transported by air with minimal disassembly (maybe folding some rotors, or dropping some suspension). This gives us the option of deploying everything at an air-head, or (given that we do have a rough field requirement) drop them off on an airfield or farmer's field, or prepped highway 20km from the fighting.

There is also the very real scenario (which the CAF has had to face a number of times in recent history) of not having a secure air-head. This was the case in Sarajevo, was an issue in Afghanistan before our guys arrived, and WOULD have been the case in Rwanda.

And I'm going to have to hammer on that last scenario a bit. Even had there been the political will to intervene, the Canadian military was completely unable to do so. And this was mainly due to the complete absence of strategic airlift. Having to lease your heavy lift is not an 'inconvenience'. It is a disgrace, and can be a catastrophe. In the event, the Canadian military was pretty much a no-show, despite the fact that a deployment there should have been well within the abilities of the CF (I'm not saying we could have secured the entire country, but we certainly could have created some safe zones). Although not the sole cause ,the biggest contributor to this failure was an absence of heavy lift. If the events were repeated today, the outcome would probably be identical. Leasing aircraft would not be an option, since Vogla Dnepr can simply say 'no thanks, too dicey for us, find your own ride'. The essential need for a Canadian heavy-lift capability was cruelly highlighted, and promptly ignored.

But this is exactly the kind of scenario that we can expect to continue popping up (Congo, Sudan, Chad anyone?), and exactly the reason we need strategic lift capability. As I said before, having a secure air-head or staging area is not a guarantee. And even if it is, in these kinds of sparse conditions, we may have to essentially drop into a hostile country, with little or no infrastructure and resources on the ground. With even a modest fleet of heavy lift (say 6 a/c) you can drop enough armour and helo support to secure the airfield on day one, and enough to start serious operations within a few days afterwards.

You can distribute poeple and equipment within-theatre in whatever fashion you see fit (Chinooks, C-27Js, Griffons, balloons, whatever you want), but you still have to get them into the theatre, sometimes on VERY short notice, and sometimes that will have to happen under less-than-ideal conditions. Tactical, and utility transport are only issues if you have the strategic transport to get in-theatre in the first place. Operational and strategic transport become very blurred when the situation on the ground is unstable. You need something that can do both (which is why virtually all heavy-lifters are also rough-field and/or semi-STOL capable). I realize that simply having bigger airplanes isn't going to necessarily give you the ability to do a mission. But there are a lot of missions that can't be done without them. And yes, I do realize that even these kind of light-combat operations would soak up all the manpower we could possibly generate and then some, but getting other nations to contribute boots on the ground is the easy part. It's getting those boots where you want them, and getting them their beans, bullets and band-aids that's that hard part.

Shifting gears completely, and addressing the fixed-wing SAR issue;

The need to operate from short strips, and in the mountains is obviously a given. No flexibility there.
But I don't see the need to have much more than a 'utility' class payload. More is obviously better, but if you expect more than, say, six casualties, you should be sending Hercs, and choppers, and anything else that can fly too. Generally, I think that anything big enough to go far, and drop some bundles and a SAR tech or two is just fine. Also, I'm not so sure about the requirement for such a high speed. Obviously getting to an emergency quickly is critical, but it all depends on what you're planning to do when you get there. And this requirement eliminates a lot of a/c that are very desirable from a cost/short-field/off-base supportability stand-point. I think the number of airframes, and particularly how easy they are to forward deploy is more important than how fast they are. I would much rather see a 50 a/c fleet of Twin-Otters (not all of which need be dedicated SAR) than 15 C-27Js. Heck, howabout (brace for it)... Cessna Caravans? Not the least because if I plunk an airplane into the bush by Slave Lake,, a Twin Otter may only have to fly from their detachment Yellowknife, or Edmonton. Or we could park a Caravan just about anywhere there's an air cadet detachment. But a C-27J is much less likely to be based away from home due to cost and supportability issues. Of course the cost of more pilots, and basing considerations are going to limit this, but it's a LOT more feasible to have SAR detachments with the smaller airframes. Also, I think that amphibious capability is something we should be looking closely at. Being able to push stuff out the back is good, but if someone's in the water, it's always nice to just land, and pick them up. And on this score, a Twin Otter or Caravan (on amphibs) can get you home just as quick as it found you. And while the SAR tech deployment might prove to be a bit problematic, what about the CL-415 too. Amphibious, great for maritime ops, reasonably priced, Made In Canada.

All things considered, however, I'm fine with C-27s, but would like to see a much more widely distributed, and cheaper aircraft, even if this means sacrificing payload and speed. There are a LOT of good options to fill this role, and I don't think that limiting the contest to larger, transport-types is necessarily going to give us the best solution. (dangit, we should just build some re-engined Buffalos... Stupid technological progress...)

 

[Rescue Randy]

The problems with the CL415 are a lack of range, and a basic inability to fly in bad weather (icing conditions).  Caravan has the same weather problem, there have been a number of them gone down in weather related (icing) conditions.  Most of the time that SAR is called, the weather is a good part of the reason for the emergency, and the SAR aircraft has to have  good ability to fly in bad weather.  Agree fully with the requirement for the aircraft to deploy to remote locations and operate there unsupported, it should be able to work for at least a week away from home base in austere locations with just the crew.  At this time I don't think that is being considered as a factor by those who are involved in trying to get a new FWSAR aircraft - I am not sure on this one, maybe someone can advise?

 

[mover1]

If there are any professional logisticians out there please feel free to jump in and correct errors here - but just to give a sense of scale

OK I will.....

A common pallet used in a civilian warehouse and handled by a bog standard forklift is designed to handle roughly one tonne of material and occupies roughly one square meter of floor and one cubic meter of volume.   Depending on the material loaded   one or more of those parameters will change.

1 tonne of water - enough to supply 4l per man per day for a platoon of 30 for more than a week = 1 pallet
1 tonne of diesel - enough to supply 4 Bv206s with fuel   to carry a   platoon of 30 for about 500 km = 1 pallet
A one tonne pallet can deliver 48 crates of 5.56 mm ammunition for C7s and C9s or about 80,000 rounds.   By my reckoning that is enough to resupply 270 riflemen or 135 C9 gunners with small arms ammunition.
A pallet of rations, weighing about half a tonne, will keep a platoon fed for about a week.  

Four pallets - 3.5 tonnes would keep one platoon supplied, and then some, for a week.   One C27/C295 with a 10 tonne payload could lift that with room to spare, even at maximum range.   2 or 3 flying daily missions could keep 25 to 50 platoons supplied - by my reckoning that would be about 750 to 1500 troops.   Those types of flights are the norm.  

Mail, spare parts, food, paper, medicine.....
Wow what a light load... Most of our Aircraft pallets are 108x88 inches they have a capacity to hold between 7-10000 lbs and the only restrictions in size are we cant go higher than 110 inches for the Herc and 76 inches for the airbus. A lot of items are incompatible and are "cargo Aircraft only" therefore the airbus would be a non option.
The average Herc palette I have seen has been around 3-4 thousand pounds. We often bulk out before we weigh out

Flying in vehicles in large numbers happens infrequently as is the case for troops - once the force is established there will be a smaller, steady flow of individual vehicles flying in and out.

Yep thats sounds right........except for the swapping of ROTO's

Large carriers are needed for these bulky items but a small number can be well employed if they only have to shuttle a short distance from the terminus to FEBA,   making up in frequency of flights what they lack in numbers.    Once the rush is over then they frequency of flights can be scaled back.

Setting aside the FWSAR project a Squadron of 8 C27s backed up by one or two C17s could likely keep a Task Force supplied.   Two such groupings could sustain two Task Forces.   A similar grouping could be on hand in Canada for domestic ops - including FWSAR (large aircraft can carry helicopters into the arctic).   The C-17s could be held centrally at Trenton and tasked out to support the forward deployed squadrons.

ITs not the flying thts hard on the airplanes....its the taking off and landing.
I disagree, where are you going to land these big aircraft in the Arctic.. they need long STURDY runways....It takes us 8 Herc loads to get a fighter Sqn to Inuvik....Anything other than a Herc is too heavy for the airport.

Given that scenario the need for middle weight lifters would be greatly reduced.   Possibly eliminated?

Never.... you said so yourself in the above quote......I have moved a lot of things and I have loaded a lot of A/C of all different types and nationalities....All I can say is the bigger the Aircraft, the longer it takes to on/ offload.
The Airbus is a great freighter but its no cargo plane, The Herc is tried true and tested, there still is a need for them. As well a small cargo plane would be beneficial as well to get IOR's and mission critical equipment to a location when you can't or don't want to spare a bigger plane......

 

[McG]

You can distribute poeple and equipment within-theatre in whatever fashion you see fit (Chinooks, C-27Js, Griffons, balloons, whatever you want),

Don't forget that Canada is a theatre of operations.  Our requirement for domestic operational lift is probably in the range of the CC-130 (and not just C-27).

 

[kj_gully]

Although I will hate to see FWSAR get sidetracked by the tactical transport requirement, I disagree with the assertion that the C27J is unsuited to medium transport within Canada. Consider that currently, CC115's participate in op hurricane, and you will agree that the c27 will fill that role with ease. The fact that at least for the next 20 year, Canada will have a fleet of highly serviable aircraft to rely on at a "reasonable" cost is the most important thing. The US experience in Afghanastan showed that in some cases, the smaller, more manouverable aircraft was preferable to even the c130. My vote would be for say 4 C17's( 2 servicable and available, with the 3rd at "reserve" or short term maintenance, and the 4th in refurb), with c27's in theater. That's the thought of an operator not a strategic planner.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks  mover1 

Just to clarify - I was referring to warehousing pallets not the 463L air transport pallet. 

I take your point on the advantages of medium lift aircraft in certain situations.  I also see the merits in maintaining aircraft that can continue to operate with facilities that were built to support them.  At the same time, it strikes me that if those aircraft had not been available then facilities would have been built to accomodate the aircraft that were available.

As to the actual load - yes it is a light load.  That was actually the point I was trying to convey.  That a viable military force like a platoon, or even a battalion, might be maintained with relatively light supply runs.  Therefore, beyond the bulky, but relatively light vehicles, actual supplies can be maintained on a conveyor of smaller aircraft.

 

[McG]

I disagree with the assertion that the C27J is unsuited to medium transport within Canada.
...

My vote would be for say 4 C17's( 2 servicable and available, with the 3rd at "reserve" or short term maintenance, and the 4th in refurb), with c27's in theater.

I can't find the assertion that the C27J is unsuited to medium transport within Canada.  I think it could fill many of our domestic airlift needs.  However, I do not think it can do this itself; it needs a bigger brother (the herc).

I think back to moving a Sqn to conduct a SOVOP on Baffin Island.  Two Herc chalks were all we could get.  We barely fit everything into those two flights (had to leave a lot behind, and there were no vehicles).  I have a hard time imagining that with smaller aircraft we would get many more chalks, no could I see a C17 being made available for these types of Ops (they would remain stratigic & supporting international ops or domestic emergencies) - especially with a fleet as small as you've proposed.

 

[kj_gully]

I hear you, and if we can get' em, then 130 J (same powerplant as C27J) would be great. You got 2 chalks on a herc probably because there were hardly any serviceable in Canada, and the cost to fly, fuel and maintain is prohibitive. The smaller plane hopefully will require less to maintain, be more efficient, and the Airforce will have enough frames and manpower to properly support the Army. The C17 has to fly. The crew has currency requirements that would include precisely the thing that the Army wants them to do. Loadies gotta load, FE's gotta run in flight checklists pilots gotta fly, navs gotta do whatever nav's do ( book hotels?) joking, kinda. If you could get 2 c27's for everything you ever got 1 c130 for, I hink the Army would come out way ahead.

 

[Sf2]

what about my Griffon?  I don't what to have to fly a full test card after it gets off-loaded from an aircraft.

 

[McG]

If you could get 2 c27's for everything you ever got 1 c130 for, I hink the Army would come out way ahead.

Is it possible that we could double our number in aircraft?  Sure the airframes are cheaper to buy, but what is the bill in manpower (aircrew and ground crew)?

 

[Kirkhill]

C27J/C295 - 2 in the cockpit (pilot - copilot)
CC-130 E/H - 4 in the cockpit (pilot - copilot - navigator - flight engineer)

C27J/C295 - 2 engines
CC-130H - 4 engines

One for one on airframes and avionics

On the other hand updated kit is not expected to cost as much to maintain as old kit.

Might could afford 2 for 1?

 

[mover1]

Just rmember that for every pound of freight you put on an airframe, you have to compensate for something else. That something else is range,

The more weight the more fuel used or fuel not put on the AC because you have or will exceed your Max Payload MPL. 
A smaller A/C may also not be an option in moving around some of the wonky equipment, the beauty of a C-130 is we have enough space to move the load around, which helps us do a proper weight and balance.......