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South Alberta Light Horse Regiment to amalgamate with larger reserve force

Honestly perhaps it’s better to fold the PRes Inf units into the Regular Regiments.

1-9 PPCLI
1-9 RCR
1-9 R22eR

(Or maybe 1-6 is a better idea I don’t know the numbers well enough to give an educated opinion).

To keep the symmetrical “needs” appeased you can have:
1 Light (Para) BN at 100% Regular. Domestic and international QRF’s.
1 Light (Para) BN at 30/70

1 Heavy Mech BN at 70/30 earmarked to Latvia
1 Heavy Mech BN at 30/70 earmarked to Europe
2 LAV Bn at 30/70.

For a total of 6 LIB’s, 6 Heavy Mech Inf, 6 LAV BN, which I suspect at that point you have now run out of Infanteers.

Do the same with the Armoured units etc.

Sure some of the PRes units will have angst with losing their unique “Regimental” identity, but I think the ability to train as part of an operational entity will quickly become more important.

*I also wouldn’t be against amalgamation of the majority of PRes ‘Armour’ units into the Inf LAV BN’s as crewmen to make those blended Cavalry units.

I like the idea. I would make provincial Inf Bns, with our current ARes regiments converted into Coys and Platoons (size dependent) of that provincial Inf Bn. The Provincial Inf Bn would then in turn be cap badged into RCR, PPCLI or R22R depending on geo location.

You could carry this on for all the arms including Svc Bns. Example, 36 Service in Halifax, would become a reserve coy of 2 Service Bn. And would have parent child relationship with 2 Service with expectation of the Reg Bn to provide training and employment opportunities for the Reserve Bn folks to leverage and develop and hone skill sets.
 
I like the idea. I would make provincial Inf Bns, with our current ARes regiments converted into Coys and Platoons (size dependent) of that provincial Inf Bn. The Provincial Inf Bn would then in turn be cap badged into RCR, PPCLI or R22R depending on geo location.

You could carry this on for all the arms including Svc Bns. Example, 36 Service in Halifax, would become a reserve coy of 2 Service Bn. And would have parent child relationship with 2 Service with expectation of the Reg Bn to provide training and employment opportunities for the Reserve Bn folks to leverage and develop and hone skill sets.

This is similar to the British model, which relies on a much larger cadre of Reg F training/ admin staff per Reserve Unit than we currently deploy.
 
Bit of a chicken and the egg situation innit? ResF needs to get more serious - agreed. But how do they get more serious if the RegF doesn't want serious reserve?
That really is the fundamental question. You can't have either one side or the other responsible for the process. It needs to be a combination of the two. And that means a heavy commitment by full-timers to the planning process.

I’d actually be stunned in anyone in the reserves remembers that. I don’t recall it ever being a discussion point when I was a reservist.
Believe me it is in the officers' mess and amongst those honouraries that the RegF fears so much.

Honestly perhaps it’s better to fold the PRes Inf units into the Regular Regiments.

1-9 PPCLI
1-9 RCR
1-9 R22eR
That is part of the problem when folks think reorganization ResF. It won't be a serious outfit until it adopts a RegF name or some neutral 4th Ontario Bn. The ResF incorporates over 150 years of this country's military history and full war experience. Why throw that under the bus when you can make use of it. It's because the current crop of full-timers refuse to give up their own regimental affiliations and bling in favour of something that they consider beneath them.

Personally, I would reduce the three RegF regiments to three 100/0 high readiness para battalions (1 RCR, 1 PPCLI and 1 R22R - and in fact take away the number 1 from each) and the CSOR and one regiment each of 30/70 RCHA and RCDs. Everyone else gets existing ResF names.

And just a reality check; whether a unit is RegF or ResF or SpecF or Supp OoB is merely the matter of a stroke of the pen from the folks in charge. The value that we place on the names of units is a subjective/cultural issue.

Let me ask you this - since you’ve both argue for whole sale reorganization and against it in your post. How many sets of night visions and pieces of armour do we send to the SAHL or the KOCR? What is their TO&E? What is the structure of the artillery in XX CBG? How can we possibly effectively equip a force that has no structure?

That question has little to do with the overall issue of the need to reorganize. The real issue is what should be our end objective for a force capable of actually providing both the expertise and mass needed for the foreseeable conflicts Canada might be involved in?

But since you ask ...

First. I'm not arguing both for and against wholesale reorganization. I'm arguing only for wholesale reorganization but am saying that you do not throw out babies with bathwater. Some things we will still need at the end of the reorganization such as some 100% high readiness RegF units. Other things like historical heritage still has great value in both facilitating the reorganization and in providing the esprit de corps military units require.

Second. The equipping is commensurate with the structure. If we are forming a 30/70 battalion it will be because we consider our force structure will at some point need a full battalion but until that day comes we will save the costs of a full battalion by having 2/3 of it as reservists. Since we see that the day may come where we need a full battalion and since equipment isn't made in a minute, then the full set of equipment will have to be in place at some point. Until that day arrives, the battalion shares the existing equipment as training stocks while an operational stock is set aside for existing planned tasks.

So the point is, give the force structure now, equip it with what we have and then run an equipping programme to properly fill it out. That's the problem with the current structure. It looks at the need for reserve personnel as a possible resource but provides zero reserve equipment. That's a fundamental flaw.

I've posted this before but here's a structural organization as an example. Effectively its start state is the existing army's personnel and equipment and the end state is a fully equipped force. (Note in this one the RegF contingent has been reduced from the existing PY structure by transferring resources from RegF inf, armour, arty and engrs to logistics capabilities therefore the largest RegF entities are 70/30 battalions in the field force. - it's just one concept but it admittedly reduces the number of RegF company level entities while enhancing service support entities)

00 CA 5.0.png

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That really is the fundamental question. You can't have either one side or the other responsible for the process. It needs to be a combination of the two. And that means a heavy commitment by full-timers to the planning process.

I find these counters very contradictory. On one hand the mighty mo will be bemoan the RegF to end say it gets no support, and then on the other it wants the RegF to come in and fix everything for them.

I don't expect that the ARes can do this themselves. But if it wanted to be taken seriously it should be the organization leading the charge.
 
Did/does it work well ?

Short answer: Yes, it works very well. Or at least did when I was there.

I think the CAF does a better job at some aspects of training for Officers, with the RESO system, though. Reservists in the UK get a much shorter training period than CAF Reserve Officers and are not really 'on par' with their Reg F counterparts.

Nevertheless, and this may have changed a bit, Reserve Units will usually have a Reg F Training Major in charge of the individual and collective training, supported by a training team of up to 10 x SNCOs and other staff. There is also a Reg F CO, and BOR staff to handle the Pers Adm.

Consequently, everyone gets trained, from the Company Commanders down to the junior soldiers. Weekend exercises are all managed by the Reg F staff and can be quite complex with battalions heading off to parachute into mainland Europe somewhere for an airborne raid of some kind, or live firing of individual and crew served weapons on one of the many UK based range areas.

4 PARA, for example, is sending a unit to Cyprus on a UN tour and has reinforced Reg F Parachute Regiment units ( 2 & 3 PARA) during the various GWOT campaigns and other previous operations.

You'll note their mission:

THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT RESERVE, providing the Parachute Regiment and 16 Air Assault Brigade with High Readiness Reservists

 
This is similar to the British model, which relies on a much larger cadre of Reg F training/ admin staff per Reserve Unit than we currently deploy.
I’d be curious to see the actual ratio. Since the Brit’s have actual Bns / Regiment of reservists vs our present absurdity.
 
I’d be curious to see the actual ratio. Since the Brit’s have actual Bns / Regiment of reservists vs our present absurdity.

Don't be too sure, they have their recruiting issues too and I assume unit strengths 'ebb and flow' in a way similar to ours.

They are, though, far more integrated with the Reg F than our ARes IMHO ;)
 
That really is the fundamental question. You can't have either one side or the other responsible for the process. It needs to be a combination of the two. And that means a heavy commitment by full-timers to the planning process.
Taking more experienced soldiers away from Reg F units to babysit the P Res has never gone over well. Unless we go back to the "70's where an RSS posting was an end-of-career experience for some and a banishment for others.
That is part of the problem when folks think reorganization ResF. It won't be a serious outfit until it adopts a RegF name or some neutral 4th Ontario Bn. The ResF incorporates over 150 years of this country's military history and full war experience. Why throw that under the bus when you can make use of it. It's because the current crop of full-timers refuse to give up their own regimental affiliations and bling in favour of something that they consider beneath them.
Affiliations, loyalties and turf protection are not confined to the higher echelons of the Reg F.

Contempt for the A Res runs deep. Shortly before I retired, I was in the CANEX in Petawawa one evening, in civvies, and over heard three Cpls, uniformed Reg F members of The RCR, talking about how they were going to put the boots to the next Reservist they saw wearing the eight-pointed star. Yes, it's a micro example but how many more troops think the same way?
 
I’d be curious to see the actual ratio. Since the Brit’s have actual Bns / Regiment of reservists vs our present absurdity.
The British army reserve is not the be-all and end-all of the reserve system. Despite having large battalions it is more like the Canadian ResF than one might think. The last time serious reform was looked at there was under their Future Reserves 2020 program. Brit ResF officer production is a known weakness. Our RESO program is generations better.That was heavily undermined by their RegF because the governments plan was to reduce the size of the RegF army and increase the size of the ResF. There was much yelling and screaming that the Brit RegF was losing cap badges. Here's one article on the matter. Within 3 UK Div the solution is pairing a RegF bn with a ResF bn. The same is not true within 1 UK Div. Also much of the ResF manning is in the combat support and especially combat service support.

The Brit's "Future Force" is changing. Here's a recent article with one man's opinion as to how that should function. Note the two forces concept: "First battle/deep battle" and "Second battel/close battle."

IMHO, the US Marines and US ARNG structures are much better than the Brits. There is a greater number of active Marines embedded in MARRES units while in the ARNG its full-time ARNG troops in the units performing the same tasks. More than either Canada or the UK do. The issue isn't so much RegF v ResF as it is having sufficient full-timers support a part-time organization with leaders, trainers and support staff.

I find these counters very contradictory. On one hand the mighty mo will be bemoan the RegF to end say it gets no support, and then on the other it wants the RegF to come in and fix everything for them.
It has to be a total force effort. As I mentioned before, the issue isn't RegF bailing the ResF out but full-timers doing the job in ResF units that need to be done by full-timers and with the experience and credibility that only service in a full-time career can bring.

As an aside, it isn't just line diagrams that are needed to reform the army. There are numerous critical factors that need fixing in order to reform the army from better employment protection for reservists and their civilian bosses, terms of service, recruiting, training and employment models, mandatory training and obligatory service in exchange for education benefits etc etc. Line diagrams are pretty; but they don't solve the issue.

Just as an aside, what is that role you assigned FGH? Everything you made is straightforward but Im not savvy on what exactly that represents. Light armoured anti-tank?
Divisional deep reconnaissance/cavalry. Each of the armoured regiments in each brigade have three tank squadrons and a brigade reconnaissance squadron. The Division has a full recce regiment that provides deeper recce on the divisional front. Note that only 1 Div is expected to deploy as a division in extreme circumstances. 2 Div is designed to generate brigade and below level task forces and as such does not need a divisional recce asset.

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The British army reserve is not the be-all and end-all of the reserve system. Despite having large battalions it is more like the Canadian ResF than one might think. The last time serious reform was looked at there was under their Future Reserves 2020 program. Brit ResF officer production is a known weakness. Our RESO program is generations better.That was heavily undermined by their RegF because the governments plan was to reduce the size of the RegF army and increase the size of the ResF. There was much yelling and screaming that the Brit RegF was losing cap badges. Here's one article on the matter. Within 3 UK Div the solution is pairing a RegF bn with a ResF bn. The same is not true within 1 UK Div. Also much of the ResF manning is in the combat support and especially combat service support.

The Brit's "Future Force" is changing. Here's a recent article with one man's opinion as to how that should function. Note the two forces concept: "First battle/deep battle" and "Second battel/close battle."

IMHO, the US Marines and US ARNG structures are much better than the Brits. There is a greater number of active Marines embedded in MARRES units while in the ARNG its full-time ARNG troops in the units performing the same tasks. More than either Canada or the UK do. The issue isn't so much RegF v ResF as it is having sufficient full-timers support a part-time organization with leaders, trainers and support staff.


It has to be a total force effort. As I mentioned before, the issue isn't RegF bailing the ResF out but full-timers doing the job in ResF units that need to be done by full-timers and with the experience and credibility that only service in a full-time career can bring.

As an aside, it isn't just line diagrams that are needed to reform the army. There are numerous critical factors that need fixing in order to reform the army from better employment protection for reservists and their civilian bosses, terms of service, recruiting, training and employment models, mandatory training and obligatory service in exchange for education benefits etc etc. Line diagrams are pretty; but they don't solve the issue.


Divisional deep reconnaissance/cavalry. Each of the armoured regiments in each brigade have three tank squadrons and a brigade reconnaissance squadron. The Division has a full recce regiment that provides deeper recce on the divisional front. Note that only 1 Div is expected to deploy as a division in extreme circumstances. 2 Div is designed to generate brigade and below level task forces and as such does not need a divisional recce asset.

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Ah! Old school div recce. Neat. Square LAV LRSS in your opinion or more Second World War style deep recce with a mix of light armour, jeeps, light tanks and beefed up assault troops with internal AT and mortars?
 
It has to be a total force effort. As I mentioned before, the issue isn't RegF bailing the ResF out but full-timers doing the job in ResF units that need to be done by full-timers and with the experience and credibility that only service in a full-time career can bring.

We dont disagree here. It has to be a total force effort. My opinion is that if the ARes wants to change, it needs to lead that change; and actually want it itself; and propose what it sees a viable alternative. Until that point no one will pay attention. And part of that is structural and organizational. And it means breaking some sacred cows.

As an aside, it isn't just line diagrams that are needed to reform the army. There are numerous critical factors that need fixing in order to reform the army from better employment protection for reservists and their civilian bosses, terms of service, recruiting, training and employment models, mandatory training and obligatory service in exchange for education benefits etc etc. Line diagrams are pretty; but they don't solve the issue.

Agreed on all points. A lot of this is getting politicians onside to push procurement and legislation. I would love to see employment protection, love love love to see that.
 
Ah! Old school div recce. Neat. Square LAV LRSS in your opinion or more Second World War style deep recce with a mix of light armour, jeeps, light tanks and beefed up assault troops with internal AT and mortars?
The latter and riffing off the 1 Brit Deep Recce Strike Bde Cbt Team. I initially had it within the arty bde but decided against that for a host of reasons.

We dont disagree here. It has to be a total force effort. My opinion is that if the ARes wants to change, it needs to lead that change; and actually want it itself; and propose what it sees a viable alternative. Until that point no one will pay attention. And part of that is structural and organizational. And it means breaking some sacred cows.
You'll have to remember that I come at this by having spent more than a half a decade sitting on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council (as it was then called) and having a pretty biased opinion as to what the senior ResF leadership (myself included) was capable of doing and just how much water we carried at the Armed Force Council (hint: not bloody much). Unfortunately you are right - the senior ResF leadership actually needs to want to change. I pushed several initiatives for that (much milder than the ones I push here) and there was close to zero appetite for it. Let's just put it this way - does anyone honestly believe that the senior ResF leadership will be happy with a ResF structure like the one that I recommend where the probable career end point for most reservists is the major/master warrant officer level.

At some point one has to determine what is best for the health of the army as a whole rather than its RegF or ResF components.

I need to sign off for some hours - I need to get some work done.

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You'll have to remember that I come at this by having spent more than a half a decade sitting on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council (as it was then called) and having a pretty biased opinion as to what the senior ResF leadership (myself included) was capable of doing and just how much water we carried at the Armed Force Council (hint: not bloody much). Unfortunately you are right - the senior ResF leadership actually needs to want to change. I pushed several initiatives for that (much milder than the ones I push here) and there was close to zero appetite for it. Let's just put it this way - does anyone honestly believe that the senior ResF leadership will be happy with a ResF structure like the one that I recommend where the probable career end point for most reservists is the major/master warrant officer level.

At some point one has to determine what is best for the health of the army as a whole rather than its RegF or ResF components.

I need to sign off for some hours - I need to get some work done.

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I have a great appreciation for your background and experience, I take all of your posts as valuable and they are hoisted onboard, to use a nautical term ;).

Maybe at the Maj/MWO level is where we offer component transfers to selected folks in an effort to offer more advancement, of course coming with the added obligations that RegF employment demands ?

As for whats best for the Army as a whole, if that is capping ranks and trades available then we should do that. I want the best Army that Canada can get.
 
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The army is risk adverse. Every time something is proposed it dies.
 
There is no formation or chain of command called " the Army Reserve". There is the Army, which consists of units and formations under a single command.

That is where the discussion needs to start, not with protecting the glorious history of the Royal MukLuk Fusiliers of Flin Flon.
 
There is no formation or chain of command called " the Army Reserve". There is the Army, which consists of units and formations under a single command.

That is where the discussion needs to start, not with protecting the glorious history of the Royal MukLuk Fusiliers of Flin Flon.

Maybe they need to adapt something like NavRes that has a headquarters and a Cmdr in charge and regional staff.


Not that I want to promote more HQ Bloat, but perhaps advocacy for the organization would help, no ?
 
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