GO!!! said:
Now, would you compare Roto 13 to the current Ops in Afghanistan, in terms of the intensity of the conflict, the difficulty of the mission or the number of casualties being experienced?
Never even consider it. Bosnia and A'stan are apples and oranges. Bosnia was (is) a mature theatre wherein any threat has been pretty well castrated by the application of the GFAP. There is still a threat, however, or we wouldn't have to be there. If, for example, Serbian General Ratko Mladic were to be taken down, that could start the spiral all over again. That being said, the indicators would be pretty easy to see.
GO!!! said:
Given that vehicle accidents and rollovers are a leading cause of injury/death, and that in most cases, the driver of the vehicle in question has at least a year of trg under his belt (usually more) and the number of accidents is still high, how can you make a case for deploying even less experienced/trained soldiers? Would this not be tantamount to setting them up for failure?
I think Afghanis and Bosnians went to the same driving schools anyhow
. The Bosnians just have better vehicles and infratructure. The Infantry Reserve Roto 13 drivers logged thousands of kilometers (PLUS ferrying the majority of the TF's "B" vehicles from VK to Split, an 8 hour trip - one way - three days a week) with an accident rate no higher that the the rest of the BG or the previous rotos. Many said that driving in Toronto, Ottawa or Montreal during a long weekend was a similar experience. ;D
GO!!! said:
The two options, (in my mind) are to either train the reservists to a reg force standard (a common point raised on this site)
The funny thing is that the Air Reserve and the Naval Reserve seem to be able to do it, why can't we?
GO!!! said:
or use reg force troops in the first place.
Which is one of the reasons why Rotos 0, 1 (and possibly up to rotos 4 or 5) should be populated with a significant number of Reg F. By that time, there is usually a place for substantial Reserve participation because, if there is ever any hope of relieving the Reg F in mature theatres (like Bosnia now and, possibly, A'stan in 4-6 years), the Reserves have to be able to get some operational experience. Tour fatuigue can set in after 5 or more rotos. Many Reg F soldiers have been to Bosnia 4-6 or more times. (How many times did you go to Bosnia?) It gets old, fast. How many time will you go to A'stan? How many times would you want to go, particularly once A'stan has become "Bosnia-ized" and the new, sexier Roto 0 is about to launch.
GO!!! said:
I fail to see how neglecting to give reservists "months and months" of training will serve anyone's interests.
Nobody's "neglecting" anything. Part of it is a monetary thing. Roto 13's troops were limited to no more than 365 Class C days by DCDS (which included DAG, TMST, MSIT, Warfighter Trg, two validation ex's, the tour and earned leave).
Back in post 161, you noted that
your chain of command had declared:
GO!!! said:
a bunch of reservists with two weeks workup get to go instead
Clearly that indicates that not every Reservist has to start at square "0" in order to deploy. If they don't need it (due to good selection, screening and preparation by the parent units/bdes/ASU) then why put them through it? Save some money for other things (like ammo...).
It's a fact of life that most Reservists who show up for pre-training with a yellow DAG are that way because the supporting ASU has failed to provide the services needed (dental, shots, I cards, kit, etc.) to DAG the soldier green.