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Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]

Low oil prices and economic sanctions have certainly taken their toll on reequipping the Russian Army:

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/09/russia-getting-100-new-armata-tanks-and-usa-upgrades-abrams-again.html

Russia getting 100 new Armata tanks and USA upgrades Abrams againbrian wang | September 7, 2017 | 

The Russian Ground Forces are expected to receive up to 100 third-generation T-14 Armata main battle tanks (MBT), by 2020 and not the old plan for 2500 new tanks by 2020.

The T-14, an armored vehicle based on the “Armata” universal chassis system, is one of the world’s first battle tanks to feature an unmanned turret. The MBT’s main weapon system is a 2A82 125-millimeter smoothbore cannon, capable of firing high-powered munitions (10 shots a minute at an effective range of up to 7 kilometers). The 125-millimeter variant will be replaced with a more powerful 152 mm cannon in later versions.

General Dynamics Land Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics (NYSE: GD), recently received two contract awards from the U.S. Army for Abrams main battle tank upgrades, which will boost the platform’s capabilities and help the Army lead the way into the future.

The company will design, develop and integrate multiple engineering changes into the Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Package Version 3 (SEPv3), creating a SEPv4 and further modernizing the tanks. Abrams main battle tanks are produced at the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio.

The first contract is for SEPv4 upgrades, which include the Commander’s Primary Sight (formerly known as the Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer), an improved Gunner’s Primary Sight and enhancements to sensors, lethality and survivability. General Dynamics Land Systems will deliver seven prototype M1A2 SEPv4 tanks to the Army. The contract has an initial value of $311 million. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, Mich.; Lima; Scranton, Pa.; and Tallahassee, Fla.

The second award was a $270 million contract from the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command to produce 45 Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 tanks. The first pilot vehicles, which feature technological advancements in communications, reliability, sustainment and fuel efficiency and upgraded armor, are expected to roll off the production line in fall 2017.

To put it in perspective this is slightly more than 2 tank battalions worth of tanks (indeed if many are taken for training, testing and evaluation etc then they may end up fielding one and a fraction of a battalion).
 
Russian wargames designed to head off colour revolutions?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-war-games-aim-to-head-off-another-color-revolution/2017/09/14/53aa93d8-9896-11e7-af6a-6555caaeb8dc_story.html?utm_term=.332378100999

Russia kicks off war games with Belarus as U.S., NATO watch anxiously
Russia and Belarus hold joint military exercise

Russia began a week-long military exercise with its ally Belarus on Sept. 14. (RU-RTR/AP)
By David Filipov September 14 at 4:02 AM

MINSK, Belarus — Russia on Thursday kicked off a week-long military exercise with its ally Belarus that has its NATO neighbors and the United States watching anxiously, but actually addresses one of Moscow’s primary fears.

Shortly after Russia’s Defense Ministry said the war games dubbed “Zapad,” or “West,” had begun, it announced that elements of its First Tank Army had been “put on alert” and moved into Belarus for the exercise. Airborne units stationed in Russia have also been put on alert and are getting ready to join the drills, the ministry said.

At a time of renewed Cold War-style tension between Russia and NATO, the symbolism couldn’t have been more striking. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact once used the Zapad exercises to prepare for war with the West; that tank army’s job was to smash through NATO lines, including 300,000 U.S. troops.

The Russian announcement Thursday was accompanied by a reassurance repeated by Moscow for weeks, that the current exercise is “of an entirely defensive nature and is not aimed at any other states.” The Russian scenario for the games is a separatist incursion into Belarus spurred on by three imaginary countries, Veishnoriya, Lubeniya and Vesbasriya — in which NATO observers and others recognize Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. 

Concerns in the Western alliance were raised by the apparent difference between official Russian figures about the size of the exercise — 12,700 troops and 680 pieces of military equipment, including 138 tanks — and Western estimates, based on troop and equipment movements,  that the number could range from 70,000 to as many as 100,000 participants.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Belarusan counterpart, Alexander Lukashenko, will appear on the sidelines of the drills this weekend, a sign of how important the drills are to the Russian leader, who has vowed to prevent “color revolutions” in the former Soviet region similar to the 2014 rebellions that established a pro-Western government in Ukraine.

The exercises — an update of Zapad war games held in 2009 and 2013 — show off a military that Putin has transformed into an effective force that has deployed to Syria and Ukraine in recent years.

The story line of the exercise sees militant groups linked to Veishnoriya and backed by the West cross the Belarus border, similar to the way “little green men,” widely assumed to be Russian soldiers, appeared in Ukraine in 2014 prior to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. The Russian forces cut off the insurgents’ access to the sea and air to prevent the Western coalition from providing backing to the separatists.

Western military officials have expressed concern that Zapad 2017 will serves as a “Trojan horse,” allowing Moscow to leave behind some of the military personnel and equipment it deployed for the drills. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told The Washington Post  last week that Russia could build trust and head off possible accidents by being more transparent.

On Thursday Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters, “We reject complaints of these exercises not being transparent.” He accused the West of “whipping up hysteria” as a “provocation.”

In Latvia, Foreign Minister ­Edgars Rinkevics told The Post that the country’s leaders are “not panicking” but are being “cautious” because “what we are seeing is that the exercises are of an offensive nature, they are exercising access and area denial, they are exercising against at least four NATO member states under the pretext that they are fighting [separatists].”

NATO, which has been conducting its own exercises in Europe this summer, has stationed four battalions — including U.S. troops — in the Baltic states and Poland.

Western officials in the Baltics last week said they saw the games as a rehearsal of the capability to seal off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and deny access to the Baltic Sea to NATO forces attempting to come to their rescue. They also see a larger strategic goal: to demonstrate to U.S. and NATO leaders the high cost of defending the Baltics, and thus bringing into question the viability of the alliance.

In Belarus, the country’s small opposition, which fears Moscow could leave its troops in order to head off any attempt to remove Lukashenko from power, last week held a protest over the presence the Russian military.

Ishaan Tharoor in Washington and Michael Birnbaum in Brussels contributed to this report.
 
Interesting, if true. Long term, it would seem to be more in Russia's interests to retain the resource base of Siberia than to focus on Kazakhstan, but logistics and lines of communication makes the idea of rebuilding a Greater Russia or Russian Empire Redux somewhat of a dubious prospect:

https://strategypage.com/on_point/20170919222549.aspx

Russia's War in Ukraine and War Games in Belarus
by Austin Bay
September 19, 2017

Russian President Vladimir Putin's personally expressed dismay at the collapse of the Soviet Union connects directly to two current events: Russia's war of conquest in Ukraine and the Russian Army's large-scale war games in western Russia and Belarus. By the way, the Russian military calls its war game enemy "The Western Coalition." The name deliberately incriminates NATO, the USSR's Cold War nemesis and an outfit on which Putin ritually blames 21st century Russian woes.

A minor dispute rages over the precise translation of Putin's April 25, 2005, USSR lamentation. Did he say that the USSR's demise was "a major geopolitical disaster of the (20th) century" or that it was the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century"?

The BBC and NBC News chose the "catastrophe" translation. Both renditions confirm the USSR's collapse appalled the former KGB colonel, who is now Russia's president.

Putin's dismay says a lot about him. The USSR was a Russian empire with Communist trappings. The czars portrayed themselves as defenders of Orthodox Christianity. The Communist dictators claimed they were the vanguard of global Marxism defending Workers' Paradise. Both regimes relied on gulags, secret police and state terror to maintain power.

Both appealed to Russian ethnic solidarity and nationalist aspirations. In WW2, when invading Nazi armies threatened his regime, Communist dictator Josef Stalin called on the people to defend Mother Russia, not communism.

Putin bewails the lot of Russians living in non-Russian, former Soviet territories. Putin repeatedly claims he must act to protect "cut off" Russians or secure "Russian rights" in these regions. The Kremlin invoked these justifications in 2008 during the Russo-Georgia War. They also provided propaganda cover for the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Protecting ethnic Russians justifies Kremlin support for the rogue Transnistria statelet, a Russified sliver of Moldova. In different disguises (including peacekeeping contingents), the Kremlin has kept a Russian military force in Transnistria since 1992.

In early 2014, Russian agitators orchestrated incidents to "prove" the fiction that violent "Ukrainian fascists" threatened Russians living in Crimea. Such a dire situation! The Kremlin had to take all means necessary to protect ethnic Russians. The Kremlin made the same claim when its proxy forces invaded eastern Ukraine. It continues to use the propaganda trope.

But on March 18, 2014, the Kremlin didn't protect people -- it seized territory and annexed Crimea to Russia. For the first time since WW2, military aggression in Europe by a major European power led to political annexation and territorial expansion. Moreover, Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, a multi-lateral diplomatic agreement guaranteeing Ukraine's territorial integrity. That agreement helped stabilize post-Cold War Eastern Europe.

The Crimean annexation and the war with Ukraine are evidence Putin intends to rebuild the USSR, or at least control key parts that would make Greater Russia a global power.

RUBK -- pronounced "rubik" as in in the puzzle Rubik's Cube -- is an acronym for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Under Kremlin control, the RUBK would have the demographics and natural resources to once again make Greater Russia a global power.

Super-power status takes money and a large number of people (how large is arguable, but 200 million is a plausible figure).

Russia needs Ukraine's immense agricultural productivity.

Russia already wields immense political and economic influence in Kazakhstan; the country is essentially a Kremlin satrap. At the moment Belarus escapes complete Kremlin control. However, several analysts claim the huge on-going war game in Belarus could easily mask an invasion of the country. What does Belarus do if the Russian Army just decides to stay?

Perhaps the Kremlin intends to forward deploy Russian tank divisions in Belarus. Belarus is a route to Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic. The Kremlin wants to "re-connect" Kaliningrad. However, Lithuania and a sliver of Polish territory known as the Suwalki Gap separate Belarus from Kaliningrad. Russians in Kaliningrad are definitely "cut off."

Polish Army units defend the gap. Remember, Poland is a NATO nation, an armed member of that great Western coalition.
 
Interesting look at Russia's use of "Hybrid Warfare" against America. What is illuminating is the "trigger" for Russia's use of Hybrid Warfare against the United States, and what needs to be determined is the end point and what responses the United States either can or should take against Russia:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/18/vladimir-putins-rage-triggered-by-president-obamas/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTldVM1pXSTVZV1JsTkdFNCIsInQiOiJDMWRrMnhzeHEyY2xCaVVkR0tmcmlIUkNRaHJVcXNxXC85eUtPdlpCT2ptVVUrNk55SCtFbmcybnk0XC83T044SEpqTVVFREJBK0U3OEp5SEV5aFRHem9MbnJwNDlSSUpSbXV5YUt1QUdHbTRCZmRMK095SkFiOXk1Z0w5WmxpQlV0In0%3D

Putin’s rage triggered by Obama’s moves
Fearing meddling by U.S., Moscow now turns to ‘hybrid warfare’
By Dan Boylan and Guy Taylor - The Washington Times - Wednesday, October 18, 2017
Part of an occasional series

In interview after interview with top U.S. intelligence officials and foreign diplomats about the downward spiral in U.S.-Russian relations, one date keeps resurfacing: January 2012.

That month Michael McFaul, President Obama’s newly appointed ambassador to Russia, arrived in snow-covered Moscow and almost immediately began meeting with opposition leaders and human rights activists critical of the Kremlin.

It was a provocative move at a sensitive moment when Vladimir Putin was already seething over perceived American backing of mass protests designed to smear him. The Russian president was also facing a wobbly economy as global oil prices plunged as he struggled to reclaim Russia’s influence on the world stage.

Mr. McFaul, an academic by training and a political appointee, had never served as an ambassador before. The sandy-haired Montana native was 49 at the time, and in the midst of his whirlwind first month in Moscow, he blogged that he’d started things off “with a bang.”
An investigation into what’s happened since, down to and including explosive charges of Russian meddling in the U.S. political process, suggests the fallout was greater than anyone could have predicted.

In interviews The Washington Times has conducted with several foreign diplomats and more than a dozen current and former high-level U.S. intelligence and national security officials, Mr. McFaul’s arrival in Moscow has been cited as being like a bee sting that enraged the Russian bear.

It actually “pissed off Putin so much” that the Russian president personally vowed revenge, said one former official involved in the intelligence debate raging over the causes of the Kremlin’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

“The Washington establishment drastically underestimates who started this,” a foreign diplomat with access to Mr. Putin told The Times. “It was actually Obama and Hillary, not Putin. They sent McFaul over to Russia to try and overthrow Putin, and it made him livid.”

Mr. McFaul in an email exchange insisted it was never the Obama administration’s policy or goal to overthrow the Russian president. But he acknowledged outright that Mr. Putin “perceived us — of course, wrongly, in my view — as trying to undermine his legitimacy.”

“Could that perception have been one of the motivating factors for his attack on our sovereignty in 2016?” the former ambassador wrote. “Yes.”

Mr. Putin’s inner circle, including a mysterious Army general who would later rise in prominence to craft the Kremlin’s policy of “hybrid warfare” against Washington, already knew Mr. McFaul well before 2012.

A political scientist at Stanford who helped set up the Moscow Carnegie Center in the mid-1990s, Mr. McFaul had served as the top Russia policy adviser on Mr. Obama’s National Security Council during the administration’s fumbling attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow in 2009. By the time he showed up as U.S. ambassador, he was viewed by Mr. Putin’s allies as a henchman for then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Just before Mr. McFaul’s arrival, Mr. Putin and Mrs. Clinton had engaged in a nasty public exchange over the 2011 Russian legislative elections, which triggered the largest Moscow street protests since the 1990s. Mrs. Clinton criticized the vote as “neither free nor fair” and called for a “full investigation.”

Mr. Putin countered by accusing Washington of supporting the opposition protesters. “We need to safeguard ourselves from this interference in our internal affairs,” he declared.

‘To punish Hillary’

The politics had become deeply personal, according to former U.S. officials who worked on Russia policy with Mrs. Clinton.
How Mr. Putin would strike back at her wouldn’t be known for another four years, and it would come about in ways that may take Washington many more years to fully comprehend.

Former CIA and NSA Director Michael Hayden said Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election were the “most successful covert influence campaign in the history of covert influence campaigns.”

“The Russians,” he added, “wanted to punish Hillary and erode confidence in the American electoral process itself.”

Back in 2012, Mr. McFaul felt the Kremlin’s wrath immediately. Within a month of his posting to Moscow, Russian state TV launched a major propaganda campaign blasting him with tabloid exploits of his meetings. Picket lines also sprung up at the U.S. Embassy, with a pro-Kremlin youth group even playing dead at the front gate and referencing U.S. involvement in the Arab Spring protests breaking out across the Middle East.

Mr. McFaul increased his security.

Speaking to reporters at the time, the new envoy said he’d never anticipated “the relentless anti-Americanism” that had taken hold in the Russian capital.

With the hindsight of five years, he told The Times this week that his “reaching out to opposition figures was deliberately and grossly exaggerated by the Kremlin and state-controlled media.”

Mr. Putin felt threatened by the Moscow street demonstrations, said Mr. McFaul, who returned to Stanford and is also a contributing columnist at The Washington Post.

“The Kremlin needed a way to discredit the opposition, so they accused them of being puppets of the West, Obama and me,” he said. “In my view, their propaganda efforts succeeded.”

‘Hair standing on end’

A former covert intelligence agent previously based in the region said Mr. McFaul underestimated the threat Mr. Putin felt.
“We were not at war with [Russia], but they were at war with us,” the former agent said.

“McFaul made the Kremlin’s hair stand on end,” added a prominent Western journalist based in Moscow during Mr. McFaul’s ambassadorship.
In November 2012, 10 months into the McFaul ambassadorship, Mr. Putin raised the stakes significantly by appointing General Valery Gerasimov, a mysterious operator within the Russian military’s brain trust, as chief of staff of the Russian armed forces.

Now 62, Mr. Gerasimov hailed from a region of Russia home to the ethnic Tatars. His early career included one of Russia’s bloodiest recent conflicts, the second Chechen War, which pitted separatist rebels against the Kremlin and was one of Mr. Putin’s signature initiatives.
‘Hybrid warfare’

In 2013 the new military chief published an article in a Russian journal that widely has come to be considered the strategic foundation undergirding the Kremlin’s subversion policies in the years since.

Known in military commands as the “Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare,” the theory encourages blending conventional and unconventional warfare, essentially expanding military battlefield options infinitely — including into cyberspace.

“In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace,” the general wrote. “Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template. The very ‘rules of war’ have changed.”

The general also addressed the Arab Spring. Mr. Putin, who obsessed over the mass protests that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse, believed a hidden U.S. hand factored heavily in the “color revolutions” in former Soviet states such as Georgia and Ukraine and the 2011 popular uprisings that rocked the Muslim world.

The Kremlin particularly feared the power of Twitter and other social media platforms during the Arab Spring and their ability to mobilize opinion and organize protests even in authoritarian countries. In his writing, Gen. Gerasimov warned the Arab Spring-type events were “typical of warfare in the 21st century.”

It was here, intelligence officials told The Times, that Mr. McFaul — who had studied and taught at Stanford and prominently used American social media as a diplomatic tool to connect with the Russian people — and Mr. Gerasimov intersect. “McFaul was the essence of the Twitter culture, sunny California high-tech solutions and Democratic optimism,” a former intelligence officer said. “Gerasimov and Putin were two guys who studied the best way to smash you over the head with a rock.”

Fast-forward four years to the U.S. presidential election of 2016, and the Kremlin stands accused of using those same social media tools to sway the political debate during the campaign.

It’s not clear whether the U.S. intelligence community or multiple congressional investigations into Russia’s activities — not to mention former FBI Director Robert Mueller’s special counsel probe — can stop the Russians if they try again.
 
The Russians have always been extremely interested in PSYOPS and propaganda, if this excerpt is any indication they are at least researching ways to more subtly influence people in their target audiences (full article behind paywall):

https://pjmedia.com/instapundit/280550

DO TELL: Nudging can also be used for dark purposes: The path of least resistance can easily direct people to do the wrong thing.

Policy wonks have nudged people to sign up for organ donation, to increase their pension contributions — and even insulate their homes by coupling home insulation with an attic-decluttering service. All we have to do is make it easy for people to do the right thing.

But what if you want people to do the wrong thing? The answer: make that easy; or make the right thing difficult. Messrs Thaler and Sunstein are well aware of the risk of malign nudges, and have been searching for the right word to describe them. Mr Thaler likes “sludge” — obfuscatory language or procedures that accidentally or deliberately encourage inertia. Voter ID laws, he says, are a good example of sludge, calculated to softly disenfranchise. Meanwhile Mr Sunstein has written an entire book about the “ethics of influence”.

And as we are starting to realise, Vladimir Putin is well aware of the opportunity that behavioural science presents, too. Rumours circulate that the Russian authorities are keen recruiters of young psychologists and behavioural economists; I have no proof of that, but it seems like a reasonable thing for the Russian government to do. I am willing to bet that not all of them are working on attic-decluttering.

You know who’s an expert at nudging? Satan. Just sayin’ . . . .
 
A look at one of Russia's Arctic bases.Throw in robot subs and you have an interesting force projection or area denial capability.

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20171121-why-russia-is-sending-robotic-submarines-to-the-arctic

The Arctic: the smallest of Earth’s five oceans, with icy waters and dagger-like winds, is home to some of the most unforgiving conditions on the planet.
But far below the skin of sea ice that waxes and wanes with the seasons, this inhospitable ocean is hiding a treasure trove of natural resources – one that’s largely untapped by mankind.
The Arctic Ocean is estimated to hold billions of barrels of oil, and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas – accounting for 16-26% of the Earth’s undiscovered reserves. And there’s a superpower scrambling to beat all others in the race to exploit this chilly mother lode of polar resources: Russia.
 
The fate of the Su-57:

https://warisboring.com/russias-su-57-stealth-fighter-is-doomed-to-fail/

Russia’s Su-57 Stealth Fighter Is Doomed to Fail
WIB AIR December 11, 2017 Tom Cooper

Westerns analysts have concluded that Russia’s fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter is unlikely to enter operational service before 2027. Postponements, cost-overruns and research and development-related problems mar the project.

This should come as no surprise. The Su-57 program was never really viable.

Back in early 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin integrated all of Russia’s aviation companies into a single, state-owned holding — the United Aircraft-building Corporation.

Over the time, UAC absorbed more than 20 aviation companies, and re-organized these into four aircraft-manufacturing divisions. One for combat aircraft, one for military transport aircraft, one for civilian aircraft and one for aircraft components.

In the course of the streamlining, most of the state-owned enterprises became joint-stock companies. However, the government owns at least 90 percent of shares.

Despite the resulting centralized and vertical structure, most of enterprises integrated within UAC have retained some level of autonomy. MiG and Sukhoi both have their own board of directors.

However, with few exceptions, these directors have no say. On the contrary, the entire UAC conglomerate is subject to a board of 14 directors, most of them well-known associates of Putin. Few are skilled industrial managers.

At top and above — Su-57s. Photos via Wikipedia

Despite bombastic reports in the Russian media, UAC turned out to be a lame duck. The conglomerate proved capable of re-launching production of types designed back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Otherwise, UAC is incapable of innovation and adaptation.

The main reason is that most of UAC’s directors are hand-picked yes-sayers — people more than happy to discuss planning, strategies and new projects, but lacking the ability to make hard decisions. Unsurprisingly, over the last 10 years UAC has made promises it cannot fulfill,

In the case of the Su-57, UAC’s crucial failure was the early decision to close its Combat Aircraft Division to foreign investors. The first director of the consortium, former deputy minister of defense and later prime minister Sergey Ivanov, insisted back in 2006 that Russia “plans to develop this sector on its own.”

Combined with the dramatic collapse of the Russian economy in the wake of Western economic sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the inflexibility of UAC made the Su-57 impossible to realize. No matter how large or populated, a country with GDP comparable to that of Australia cannot afford to play at being a superpower, fight a protracted war in Syria and develop its own stealth fighter.

The last hope for the project was the serious Indian interest in financing the conversion of the Su-57 into a stealth strike fighter in the class of the Su-30MKI. But the management structures Putin imposed undermined that collaboration.

Of course, the Kremlin’s core interest in the Su-57 is scoring big propaganda points by creating a supposed match for Lockheed’s F-22 Raptor. This is something the business-minded Indian air force is not keen to finance.

And that means the Su-57 is going nowhere fast.
 
And now Russian strategic deterrence with conventionally-armed cruise missiles (ALCM and SLCM)--very relevant for NORAD and new RCAF (whenever, whatever) fighter and for surface-to-air missile suite for RCN CSCs:

The Russification of U.S. Deterrence Policy

The new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which was unveiled on December 18, is a thoroughly realist document that places premium on effective deterrence—which, the document says, has degraded in the recent years. The key paragraph describing these challenges paints a troubling picture:

“The spread of accurate and inexpensive weapons and the use of cyber tools have allowed state and non-state competitors to harm the United States across various domains. Such capabilities contest what was until recently U.S. dominance across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They also enable adversaries to attempt strategic attacks against the United States—without resorting to nuclear weapons [emphasis added]—in ways that could cripple our economy and our ability to deploy our military forces.”

...These capabilities, indeed, change the strategic landscape in a fundamental way—after a quarter-century monopoly on such capabilities, the United States finds itself essentially in the same predicament that the Russians or Chinese have faced since the end of the Cold War: the threat of a strategic non-nuclear use.

When Russia’s President Vladimir Putin announced in the end of 2013 that Russia was working on long-range conventional weapons, few U.S. analysts paid attention at all. When, in December 2014, Moscow unveiled a new military doctrine that introduced the notion of non-nuclear deterrence [emphasis added], it generated some interest. But the belief in Russian inability to catch up with the United States remained so strong that few considered it a realistic prospect with serious consequences. Only when long-range conventional sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and ALCMs) were deployed in Syria did American analysts begin to pay attention.

We still do not know what the consequences of Russia catching up with the United States in the only usable strategic capability might be; it is still unclear how the United States and its allies might react, and what the Russian counterreaction might be. But at least we are paying attention—and this is a welcome first step.

...the United States’ strategic conventional capability has been a nightmare for Russian military planners since at least 1999, when it was employed in the Balkans. The initial Russian response was to increase reliance on nuclear weapons, which were assigned a mission of limited nuclear strike in response to a large-scale conventional attack. Moscow stated, however, that this was a temporary fix and that reliance on nuclear weapons would again decrease when it acquired a conventional strategic capability. Last month, Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, confirmed that Moscow planned to reassign some deterrence missions from nuclear to conventional assets at an undefined future time [emphasis added]...

Dr. Nikolai Sokov is a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russification-us-deterrence-policy-23785

Mark
Ottawa


 
More, by Dave Majumdar (further links at original):

Russia's Military in 2035: Killing the Enemy from Distance (With Cruise Missiles)

Ultimately, Russia is not the threat that the Soviet Union once was. But nor is Moscow quite as weak as it was in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union where the Kremlin had to rely solely on its nuclear arsenal for deterrence. Modern Russia has the means to strike back conventionally against potential threats. “Russia now has a really decent conventional standing force,” Kofman said. “They no longer depend on nuclear weapons as their only deterrent.”

The shape of Russia’s military in 2035 will largely be determined by how successfully Moscow can transition from projects originally conceived by the Soviet Union into efforts that originated in today’s Russian Federation. Many of Russia’s most modern weapons such as the Kalibr-NK cruise missile or Iskander-M ballistic missile are actually projects that were on the drawing board in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union began to falter.

True next-generation Russian weapons—that don’t have their origins in the Soviet-era—include the developmental S-500 air and missile defense system, Zircon hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile and the Tupolev PAK-DA stealth bomber. Other next-generation systems include the operational izdeliye 129 engines for the Sukhoi PAK-FA fifth-generation stealth fighter. It’s not clear how much of a learning curve Russia will face in developing those new motors since the country has not developed a new fighter engine since the Soviet-era. “Engines are really hard,” Kofman noted. “If they weren’t, China wouldn’t still be buying Russian engines.”

In the future, Russia is likely focus “non-contact” warfare—that might include long-range strike capabilities, long-range air and missiles defense systems and precision-guided weapons. The idea is to be able to punish a potential aggressor at long-ranges—striking back directly against a potential aggressor. “They’re working on deterrence by punishment, which is what all this long range strike potential is about,” Kofman said. “The ability to retaliate and to strike with conventional weapons, not nuclear weapons [emphasis added].”

The Russians are also developing unmanned systems in a completely different way than Western militaries. Russia is currently behind the West in terms of unmanned technology, but the Kremlin and the Russian defense industry is dumping money into such systems. As such, the Russia is rapidly moving forward in the area of robotics. “There is a rapid proliferation of drones across the Russian military,” Kofman said.

Compared to Western forces, there is much less focus on large medium altitude unmanned aircraft and much more focus on tactical systems for the Russian Ground Forces. Thus, the Russians are focused on cheap, plentiful and disposable drones that can be used as reconnaissance assets to provide targeting capability for heavy artillery.  The Russian “are trying to enable our surface-to-surface long-range fires,” Kofman said. “There, they very quickly started adapting drones to the way the Russian Army would like to fight. And the Russian Army would like to fight with face-melting firepower.”..

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-military-2035-killing-the-enemy-distance-cruise-23808?page=show

Mark
Ottawa
 
Longish article on Strategypage on Russia's situation:

https://strategypage.com/qnd/russia/articles/20171219.aspx

Full article here: https://army.ca/forums/threads/127127.0.html

Russia: Avoiding The Judgement Of China

December 19, 2017: Russia ends 2017 still trying to hide the damage done by over three years of low oil prices and sanctions. There are certain indicators that cannot be completely concealed. One is the number of rubles it takes to buy a dollar (the benchmark for buying foreign goods or services.) After the Soviet Union dissolved most of the 1990s were spent with the new Russian economy getting used to the real world. By the late 1990s the Russian currency had reached a realistic value versus the dollar (about 30 rubles per). It is currently 60 rubles per dollar. In 2016 it hit 80 rubles to buy a dollar. All because of low oil prices and sanctions. More sanctions are coming in 2018 as the U.S. unilaterally sanctions about a hundred Russian business and government officials for their role in various illegal activities. While the travel and banking sanctions applied to these people is a minor inconvenience, being named and having your misdeeds explained is embarrassing and could cause long-term problems.

Meanwhile the government spent a lot of money to get a more favorable exchange rate but that uses up a lot of foreign reserves. As the ruble loses value versus the dollar and other foreign currencies imported goods become noticeably more expensive and there is a lot of essential stuff Russian can still import, if they can afford it. Meanwhile Russian citizens are less able to afford overseas vacations and those that do go find that Russians are not as welcome as they used to be. Russian airlines have seen foreign traffic decline as foreign passengers switching to non-Russian airlines when travelling into and out of Russia.

Since 2013 GDP dropped from $2.1 trillion to about half that as and the ruble lost about half its value compared to the dollar (the currency of international trade). Russia dropped from being the sixth largest economy in the world to the 14th. Russian banks are a good example of what is happening because they are increasingly insolvent. The government tries to hide that but foreign financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, with experience measuring situations like this know better. Thus Russian claims to current and future GDP growth are exposed as deceptions based on accounting tricks and don’t really conceal unresolved and worsening problems. Reality is the shrinking defense budget and spending on needed infrastructure maintenance and construction.

The two main sources of capital (cash to work with) was oil income and access to investment or loans from foreign (usually Western) sources ( like banks). Those two sources are gone and now Russia has to seek loans from nations it really does not want to become indebted to, like China. In part that is because China is very strict when it comes to business and loans. This is the case even when there is a diplomatic or political angle involved. China will charge you market rates (of interest, much higher for worse risks like Russia or Venezuela) and cut you off if your financial situation is considered desperate. Russia does not want to risk the judgement of Chinese lenders. But Russia is running out of money, credit and options. Grabbing more of Ukraine won’t help because Crimea turned out to be a lot more expensive than expected and the subsidies to the half of Donbas they have already taken (or, rather, their mercenaries and hired rebels have taken) is a drain on the shrinking economy. The costs of Crimea are even worse.
 
Swarming drone attack reported against Russian bases in Syria. A forecast of what we can probably expect going into the future:

http://www.sciencealert.com/swarm-home-made-drones-strike-military-base-first-attack-kind-russia-uavs

First-Ever Drone Swarm Attack Has Struck Russian Military Bases, Sources Claim
We knew this day was coming.
PETER DOCKRILL 11 JAN 2018

Ever since technological advancements made drones possible, people have warned of the potential dangers of weaponised UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), which could effectively become murderous slaughterbots we need to defend ourselves against.

Now, it looks like those fears have become a reality. The Russian Ministry of Defence claims its forces in Syria were attacked a week ago by a swarm of home-made drones – the first time such a coordinated assault has been reported in a military action.

According to the Ministry of Defence, Russian forces at the Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval facility "successfully warded off a terrorist attack with massive application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)" last Friday night.

"As evening fell, the Russia air defence forces detected 13 unidentified small-size air targets at a significant distance approaching the Russian military bases," the Ministry said in a statement.

"Ten assault drones were approaching the Khmeimim air base, and another three – the CSS point in Tartus."

Six of the assault force drones were intercepted by Russian electronic warfare units, with three of the UAVs being brought to land outside the base, while the remaining three exploded on contact with the ground.

Another seven drones were "eliminated" by Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missiles fired by the Russians, with the bases reporting no casualties or damage, the statement explains.

If the report is accurate, the Russian forces are lucky the attack wasn't worse, because whoever unleashed these drones wasn't fooling around.

While photographs of the improvised UAVs used in the assault make the drones look clunky and strung together, the Russians' analysis reveals they were armed with explosives and launched from a site more than 50 kilometres (31 miles) distant from their targets, navigating the trek via GPS and altitude-control sensors.

The Ministry says a technical examination indicates these drones would have an effective attacking range of about 100 kilometres (62 miles) – which is pretty terrifying – and means that in the new era of UAV warfare, locations that once may have seemed immune to attack, are in fact exposed.

"They thought the base was secure, but now it seems it is vulnerable," Maxim Suchkov of the Russian International Affairs Council told The Washington Post.

It's unknown who launched the swarm, with the attack being unclaimed at present. But the Russians have hinted that the technology used was too advanced for local militants, seen as a suggestion it could have been supplied by US forces in the vicinity – something the Pentagon says is "absolutely false".

There's an awful lot about this incident that's unconfirmed right now, but one thing we can be sure of is this technological first could usher warfare into a terrifying new chapter – and towards a grim future scientists have been desperately warning we need to prevent.

"Who knows how accurate some of these details really are, but if the number of drones launched at the facility is anywhere near correct, it would seem to be the first self-contained, large scale, coordinated, standoff drone assault on a fixed installation like this," Tyler Rogoway reports at The Drive.

"It seems that the age of drone swarms has arrived, and that's a terrifying reality to comprehend."
 
The Skynet Funding Bill is passed. The system goes on-line August 4th, 1997. Human decisions are removed from strategic defense. Skynet begins to learn at a geometric rate. It becomes self-aware at 2:14 a.m. Eastern time, August 29th. In a panic, they try to pull the plug.

Skynet fights back.
 
It's unknown who launched the swarm, with the attack being unclaimed at present. But the Russians have hinted that the technology used was too advanced for local militants, seen as a suggestion it could have been supplied by US forces in the vicinity – something the Pentagon says is "absolutely false".

In the grammatically-correct sense, would CIA assets be considered "US forces?"  If no, then the Pentagon would indeed be accurate in its reply. :nod:
 
Good2Golf said:
In the grammatically-correct sense, would CIA assets be considered "US forces?"  If no, then the Pentagon would indeed be accurate in its reply. :nod:

And now you better keep an eye open for black helicopters in your vicinity.......  ;D
 
Chris Pook said:
And now you better keep an eye open for black helicopters in your vicinity.......  ;D

Saw Tom Cruise in "American Made" recently. 
 
While blaming Americans is an international pastime, the Chinese have been very heavily involved in research about drones and swarming as well.
 
Thucydides said:
While blaming Americans is an international pastime, the Chinese have been very heavily involved in research about drones and swarming as well.

While true, what's the PLA's angle in Syria such that attacking Team Vlad makes sense?
 
Humphrey Bogart said:
Well the AD network around the base worked as intended  8)

Not surprised.  Pantsir S1 is a nasty (i.e. capable AD) one!


G2G
 
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