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Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]

Thucydides said:
The problem is much more difficult.

Nations like the Baltic Republics are seen by Russia as in Russia's "sphere of influence", as well as buffer states to absorb invading armies. From Russia's perspective, it is unforgivable for nations in the "near abroad" to decisively reject Russian influence and literally turn their backs on Russia to face West and seek the opportunities available in the EU and North America.

Since Russia has few natural barriers against invasion from either the East or West, losing the former buffer states is scary. In addition they are now a nation with a GDP about the size of Spain sandwiched between the EU (with a population and GDP similar to the United States) and China (the second largest economy in the world and a population of over a billion), which is very much at odds with Vladimir Putin's 2008 speech where he declared Russia is indeed a Great Power and should be treated as such, as well as deep seated Russian Mythology of Moscow being the "Third Rome" and Russia being destined to unite and rule over the civilizations of the West and East.

Putin and the Russians are very opportunistic and using every opportunity to sow confusion and attempt to turn Western nations against each other in order to keep their cards in play as long as possible, but the mismatch of resources will eventually tell so long as the West or China have resolute leadership. Even the Gulf States could collapse the oil market and upend the Russian position, which is not a good place to be in.

Expect Putin to continue to try to exploit the seams for as long as possible, and jump at every opportunity to sow confusion and discord in his wake.

While I agree that Russia will pursue its self interest, it doesn't possess the military or economic strength to challenge NATO so there is no threat for the baltic nations of direct invasion. What Russia is left with are 3 options- either participate as a member in the US liberal world order, move outside the world order, or lead a new world order. The reality is that Russia doesn't have the ability, militarily or diplomatically, to create a classic realist "balance of power" against in the US in the way that the Warsaw Pact operated. They are better to operate within the current system in a contradictory role to the US than to attempt to directly challenge it, a challenge it will lose. Further, if Russia was attempting to create a new world order or alliance to counter-balance the Americans and the west it would have to do so diplomatically through either soft power alliance or by showing other nations who may oppose the US led order (China, most of Africa, Brazil, etc) that their leadership can provide a real alternative that is beneficial for all parties. Things like influencing the US election can be seen as much more effective means of undermining US credibility than any attack... the US has already lost face due to Trump and is likely to lose more as time passes on.

In neither scenario do I see Russia directly attacking any NATO country despite where its "sphere of influence" lies. If they want to power balance than having the appearance of at least some ability to militarily stand up to the west is vital but they cannot maintain any military influence through direct conflict.

So I still submit that our military efforts are better situated elsewhere than eastern Europe. 
 
No, Russia won't send a Division into Estonia guns blazing.

Yes, Russia will/may undercut the Estonian government by supporting legitimate opposition parties with policy differences, Estonian businesses opposed to government tax or employment plans, Ethnic Russians, criminal elements, supportive foreigners, activities in international fora like OSCE and the UN, media and television, social media, economic actions and anything else that will destabilize the situation.  Ultimately they will seek an opportunity to exploit any opening that comes their way. 

That exploitation could mean "little green men" and/or "division" invited by the opposition or an elected government or just to "stabilize" a "failed state" on its border, or with a mandate from the UN Human Rights Committee.

 
Chris Pook said:
No, Russia won't send a Division into Estonia guns blazing.

Yes, Russia will/may undercut the Estonian government by supporting legitimate opposition parties with policy differences, Estonian businesses opposed to government tax or employment plans, Ethnic Russians, criminal elements, supportive foreigners, activities in international fora like OSCE and the UN, media and television, social media, economic actions and anything else that will destabilize the situation.  Ultimately they will seek an opportunity to exploit any opening that comes their way. 

That exploitation could mean "little green men" and/or "division" invited by the opposition or an elected government or just to "stabilize" a "failed state" on its border, or with a mandate from the UN Human Rights Committee.

I agree, which is why us spending money and our limited resources in Latvia is futile in my opinion (aside from it being a better training activity than Maple Resolve). Russia has interests in its neighbouring countries, no doubt. But our presence will do absolutely nothing in curbing any of it
 
I disagree.

Even a company of troops standing alongside the locals will tend to discourage incursions by little green men.  And the type of actions the LGM are likely to be able to undertake can be countered by Light Infantry on Para-Military/Constabulary duties.  Think Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie Nationale level of operations.  A couple of mixed battle groups currently seen in the Baltics would, I believe, have changed the calculus in the Crimea. 

The "locals" would then have had to wonder about the consequences of killing Italians and Frenchmen, amongst others.
 
Chris Pook said:
I disagree.

Even a company of troops standing alongside the locals will tend to discourage incursions by little green men.  And the type of actions the LGM are likely to be able to undertake can be countered by Light Infantry on Para-Military/Constabulary duties.  Think Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie Nationale level of operations.  A couple of mixed battle groups currently seen in the Baltics would, I believe, have changed the calculus in the Crimea. 

The "locals" would then have had to wonder about the consequences of killing Italians and Frenchmen, amongst others.

I disagree with your disagreement. Your "little green men" will infiltrate into the baltics if it is what Russian strategy desires whether they are there are not. The Russians are well aware that those nations are in NATO and are well aware of what any sort of hostile action towards a baltic nation would mean.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
I disagree with your disagreement. Your "little green men" will infiltrate into the baltics if it is what Russian strategy desires whether they are there are not. The Russians are well aware that those nations are in NATO and are well aware of what any sort of hostile action towards a baltic nation would mean.

Good.  We are in agreement then.  We disagree.  [:D
 
Chris Pook said:
No, Russia won't send a Division into Estonia guns blazing.

Yes, Russia will/may undercut the Estonian government by supporting legitimate opposition parties with policy differences, Estonian businesses opposed to government tax or employment plans, Ethnic Russians, criminal elements, supportive foreigners, activities in international fora like OSCE and the UN, media and television, social media, economic actions and anything else that will destabilize the situation.  Ultimately they will seek an opportunity to exploit any opening that comes their way. 

That exploitation could mean "little green men" and/or "division" invited by the opposition or an elected government or just to "stabilize" a "failed state" on its border, or with a mandate from the UN Human Rights Committee.

This is absolutely the MO of Hybrid Warfare, and it can escalate into Direct Action, such as kidnapping people (like the Estonian customs officer taken at the border and then charged with Espionage when inside Russia), as well as threats like cyber war impeding communications and utilities operations. Hybrid warfare, like Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare" is deliberately designed to be ambiguous, non attributable and limit the possibilities of retribution, so there is a possible argument against using our resources to send a battlegroup to Latvia. The question then becomes what, exactly, are we going to do?

Sitting on our hands is not an option, but Canada's "soft power" is laughably small (the only people who say the world wants more Canada are Canadians), we have very limited alternative enablers like Cyber, IA, economic warfare or other non traditional means, so even a small application of Hard Power in the right place to send a massage of resolve both to the Russians and the Baltic Republics may be the best we can do for the moment. Resolve in the face of ambiguity may well be one of the better counters to Hybrid Warfare.
 
Thucydides said:
This is absolutely the MO of Hybrid Warfare, and it can escalate into Direct Action, such as kidnapping people (like the Estonian customs officer taken at the border and then charged with Espionage when inside Russia), as well as threats like cyber war impeding communications and utilities operations. Hybrid warfare, like Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare" is deliberately designed to be ambiguous, non attributable and limit the possibilities of retribution, so there is a possible argument against using our resources to send a battlegroup to Latvia. The question then becomes what, exactly, are we going to do?

Sitting on our hands is not an option, but Canada's "soft power" is laughably small (the only people who say the world wants more Canada are Canadians), we have very limited alternative enablers like Cyber, IA, economic warfare or other non traditional means, so even a small application of Hard Power in the right place to send a massage of resolve both to the Russians and the Baltic Republics may be the best we can do for the moment. Resolve in the face of ambiguity may well be one of the better counters to Hybrid Warfare.

Understood (though this sounds like 4GW, which absolutely is not a thing). It belies the point that deploying a BG to stretch our already stretched resources, is futile in the face of the threat. Assets such as EW, cyber warfare, etc woudl be more appropriate. I dont believe that the Russians care that Canada has sent troops to the baltic nor do I believe that it has any affect other than providing a good training opportunity.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
... It belies the point that deploying a BG to stretch our already stretched resources, is futile in the face of the threat ...
And convince enough NATO & allied governments of this, and Russia has checkmated without needing to deploy divisions ...
 
Thucydides:
Sitting on our hands is not an option, but Canada's "soft power" is laughably small (the only people who say the world wants more Canada are Canadians (Liberals)..........
 
Deploying traditional military forces has more of a political objective than a military objective.  It reassures our host allies (and other nearby allies) that we are willing to meet our treaty obligations to defend their territory by putting some of our forces in the potential direct line of fire of the enemy.

At the same time is serves to fairly clearly set the upper limit of what Russia can do in the area.  Annexation or direct military action is effectively off the table, unless things get to the point where they are willing to face all out war with NATO.

The trick then is not being pressured into wasting our militarly resources on political deployments which serve to limit our actual military capability.  The deterrent force only really needs to be symbolic.  Just large enough to provide the political deterrent to a Crimea-style fait accomplit annexation and halt but not so large that the forces themselves could be used to Russian political means (targets for pro-Russian protests, being seen as "occupation" forces, etc.).

That should (hopefully) leave us (the "collective" us) enough resources to provide the kind of resources which could counter Russian non-conventional actions.

Does that maybe raise the question of how we should organize our military forces in general?  If small conventional forces are enough to shape the types of conflicts we can expect in known hot spots, then should the bulk of our remaining forces be organized in such a way to be most effective in unexpected situations/locations rather than as additional conventional forces designed to augment our already deployed forces against a conventional attack that is unlikely?

 
Russia won't use force if facing NATO;  I guess that depends on how strong and effective you see NATO as.
 
Eye In The Sky said:
Russia won't use force if facing NATO;  I guess that depends on how strong and effective you see NATO as.

Considering Europes energy dependence on Russia, I would much more expect to see Russia play that card.
 
On the resurgence of Russian Naval power. Notably this is consistent with Russian History dating back to Peter the Great, so once again, the lessons of history are available to whoever is willing to look for them:

https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/russia-a-land-power-hungry-for-the-sea/

Russia: A Land Power Hungry for the Sea
Tom Fedyszyn
‎18‎/‎04‎/‎2017

Trying to understand the military behavior of nations has been a hobby of Western academics, beginning with the great geopoliticians of former centuries, such as Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Simply, the argument is that geography demanded that insular and coastal nations such as England, Japan, and the Netherlands develop strong navies to support their national economic and political interests. Conversely, Germany, the Turkish Republic, and the Roman Empire were required to use their formidable land armies to defend and expand their territories. Russia stands out as a one-off. Situated squarely on the borders of Eastern Europe and central Asia, she endured numerous land assaults, and, accordingly built large defensive and offensive land armies. However, in fits and starts, she has also assembled naval forces equal to or greater than most of her presumptive adversaries. Why does Russia, a traditional land power, engage in such counterintuitive and unique behavior? Do recent international events shed light on Russia’s future naval activities?

When Tsar Peter the Great embarked on building a navy 330 years ago, he did so to defend the homeland from Swedish and Turkish enemies, north and south, while at the same time buying Russia a seat at the “great power” diplomatic table. Serendipitously, his navy did enable him to expand Russian boundaries and give him access to the world’s oceans. A second noteworthy Russian foray into the sea was at the height of the Cold War when Soviet Adm. Gorshkov planned and built a naval force that rivalled American supremacy at sea. His submarines alone (385) outnumbered those of the NATO Alliance and they regularly patrolled off the American Atlantic and Pacific coasts until the fall of the Soviet Union. On the surface of the oceans, it was commonplace for U.S. warships visiting exotic ports around the world to be joined by their Soviet counterparts throughout the Cold War.

All this ended abruptly with the implosion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 5th Eskhadra ingloriously slipped out of the Mediterranean in the dark of night once it was determined that there wasn’t enough money left in the Kremlin’s coffers to sustain its operations in late 1989. Russian ballistic-missile submarines gradually reduced their Atlantic Ocean patrols until they reached zero in 2001.

Almost as quickly as the Russian Federation Navy vanished, it reappeared. A convenient benchmark for this turnaround is 2008, since a number of factors began to congeal. First, the Russian military (including its navy) performed deplorably while defeating hapless Georgia in a short war of annexation. This incited the Putin-Medvedev team to spur Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov to reform the defense establishment. He mimicked U.S. initiatives to become more professional and “joint.” Additionally, he also addressed the training, morale, and recruit quality in the Russian navy, since it was equally unsatisfactory. Second, the price of oil (Russia’s only meaningful export commodity) began to skyrocket, filling Russian pockets with vast reserves of discretionary resources.  Third, and finally, Putin and Medvedev decided to invest much of this money building a bigger and better military, and the Russian navy got more than its fair share of the 10-year building plan.

Today, we once again are being treated to witness a land power whose sea power switch has been reactivated. For instructive purposes, let’s take a close-up look at Russia’s Syria interlude: The Russian navy had awakened from its Rip Van Winkle-like 20-year sleep and in 2013 re-established a “permanent flotilla” in the eastern Mediterranean, serviced by all four of its major fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific). After the Obama administration’s “red line” pronouncement on Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons, only this Russian naval force was in position to escort the vessels carrying Syrian chemical weapons to their ultimate destruction. The world acknowledged Putin’s diplomatic lead on this navy-enabled initiative. Then, Russia’s air force required additional air defense and communications support in its operations in support of the Syrian regime. The Russian permanent naval flotilla obliged. The Russian air campaign was then augmented by the arrival of Russia’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, last fall. Finally, in an act that surprised and impressed most of the world, the Russian navy launched multiple long-range Kalibr cruise missiles on so-called terrorist positions in Syria from both small Buyan-M patrol boats in the Caspian Sea as well as similarly small Kilo-class diesel submarines in the Mediterranean. Perhaps of greatest importance, Russia provides virtually all of its logistical support for its Syrian operation with logistic ships operating from the Black Sea and escorted and defended by the naval flotilla, enroute to its base in Tartus, Syria.

Worldwide, the Russian navy has made equally impressive gains, particularly in view of its low starting point in the 1990’s. Operating jointly with the Russian Air Force, there is no point on the Russian periphery where a foreign military can now operate with impunity. This is most obvious in Russia’s northern reaches where she has militarized the Arctic with a vengeance. This initiative is led by the Russian Northern Fleet, which has once again begun deploying submarines into the North Atlantic in great numbers. Given the political focus caused by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and expansion of its base in Sevastopol, the Russian navy has also been rushing new frigates and submarines to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Former head of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral Mark Ferguson, has described this as Russia’s “Arc of Steel” from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, vaguely reminiscent of the Churchillian Iron Curtain.

What lessons might we learn about the future behavior of this land power with a hefty appetite for maritime power? Does the United States have reason for concern as it, too, launches naval cruise missile strikes into Syria, with the well-armed Russian navy observing on the sidelines?

From the perspective of the United States and its allies, the current status of the Russian navy offers both comfort and consternation. On the plus side for the West, irrespective of how much money Russia throws at its navy, no serious analyst thinks that the Russian navy can contend for control of the world’s oceans. This is eminently logical because the Russian fascination with the sea does not rest on economic necessity. Moscow never had, and still today does not have, an economy that is dependent on global trade, much less one that demands control of the seas. In addition, Russia’s stark inability to build large ships (think, aircraft carriers) ties its hands in any attempt at blue water sea control and power projection. Plus, it goes unsaid that the Russian economy is always at risk. Continued stagnation in Russian GDP growth probably is the death knell of expanding its navy.

Nonetheless, Putin’s navy continues to perform the missions outlined by Peter the Great, which should begin to offer a stew of comfort mixed with consternation. First, defense of the homeland. The Russian navy’s principal focus is on real estate close to the Russian border. Most of its operations and exercises are in waters adjacent to Russia. Think of it as high firepower potential but limited range. This, however, is comforting only if you are not a NATO member in Eastern Europe near the Russian border. Russia’s resumed deployment of ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic could be unnerving, but is more readily construed as defense of the homeland, since these submarines, more than ever, will constitute Russia’s second strike – that is, deterrent — capability. Tsar Peter’s secondary consideration – gaining international diplomatic respect and recognition – continues to be supported by Russian Navy port visits and exercises around the world. In recent months, Russian ships have visited Namibia, the Philippines, South Africa, and the Seychelles and also conducted fleet exercises with the Indonesian and Chinese navies. While Putin has lost no ground to Peter the Great, this activity need not keep us awake at night.

Now, for the anxiety. The Russian naval mission appears to have quietly expanded to become a vehicle to sell sophisticated weaponry. Witness the salability of the Kalibr cruise missile and the Improved Kilo-Class diesel submarine, highlighted by its recent combat performance in Syria. Weapons exports follow behind the sales of petroleum products as the leading source of Russian foreign exchange. This may be of minimal concern, but even strategically important and friendly nations can unwittingly become client states as they realize weapons systems purchases addict the purchaser to follow-on supply, repair, and support contracts. Think India.

Of even greater concern is that Russia’s navy is now conducting military operations (Syria) some distance from its borders and it can apparently shoot straight. The U.S. Navy has learned over history that there is no alternative in learning to “fight the away game” than by sending naval forces beyond their security umbrella and forcing them to learn how to operate without an umbilical cord to fleet headquarters. This has never been a strong point of the Russian navy in the past. Also, should Russian national strategies be taken seriously, we might anticipate seeing the development of maritime hybrid warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, so well-perfected by Russian ground forces in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the greatest and most serious concern is Russian national security decision making, concentrated in Vladimir Putin. He sure seems to love his navy. For unscientific proof, Google him and note the frequency with which he dons nautical fashion (hint: somewhat less often than bare-chested bear riding). At a recent press conference, he boasted that Admiral Kuznetsov’s deployment to the Mediterranean was his “personal initiative.” Based on the frequency with which he attends naval events and dresses in its uniforms, it is not unreasonable that he has a special affinity for his fleet. Further, he is a risk taker, known to overplay weak hands – and get away with it. And, finally, he is a judo master, fashioning himself along the lines of a navy destroyer: sleek, lean, lethal, vicious, stealthy and a very impressive sight to witness.


Tom Fedyszyn is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. A retired Navy captain, his military assignments included command of a cruiser and naval attaché to Russia. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any part of the U.S. government.
 
And keep in mind that Russia is investing heavily in its leased (just renewed in JAN 2017, until 2066) base in Tartus, Syria.  Additoinally, it seems they are looking to increase the ship-handling capability significantly.

People would do well to try and appreciate why the Russian's will be very protective of the Regime in Syria.  They essentially took Crimea because the extant Ukrainian Government significantly changes its position regarding Sevastopol; no reason to think Syria would be the other exception for Russian Naval bases outside of Russia.

:2c:

Regards
G2G
 

Attachments

Russia having difficulty keeping troop numbers up.

More foreigners.  More PMCs. More forced conscripts.

APRIL 24, 2017
Russia’s Desperation for More Soldiers Is Taking It to Dark Places
BY VALENTYN BADRAK, LADA ROSLYCKY, MYKHAILO SAMUS, AND VOLODYMYR KOPCHAK

Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and intensive military operations in Syria have caused a very big problem: a shortage of qualified people to man its occupation forces. This personnel gap, caused by permanent, heavy losses suffered by Russia’s forces, has drastically changed the scale and character of its military missions.

At the early stages of the conflicts, this shortage of qualified military personnel was corrected by recruitment from the Army Special Operations Forces, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service, and other special services. But now, to fill this gap further, Russia has moved to employ private military companies (PMC), expand its recruitment base, and punish contract soldiers for refusing to partake in its illegitimate operations.

To date, information about Russian PMCs remains limited. At least ten PMCs exist in Russia; some operate outside its jurisdiction. Following the Kremlin’s September 2015 intervention in Syria, about 1,500 Russian mercenaries arrived from the Russian PMC “Wagner,” which is linked to operations in Ukraine, where the group is known as “The Cleaners” in areas controlled by Russian and Russian-backed forces. Soviet fighters of the PMC “Malhama Tactical,” with mainly Uzbek and North Caucasus roots, have been noted as forming the first jihadist PMC with a “distinct niche between the worlds of professional PMCs and jihadi groups operating in Syria.”

To further expand its contracted recruitment base, the Kremlin has also amended the recruitment process for Russian conscripts, military reservists, stateless persons, and foreign nationals. Recruitment of Russian citizens for contracted military service is facilitated by the legislative package “On the Introduction of the Draft of Federal Law on Amendments to the Federal Law on Conscription and Military Service,” which passed on October 14, 2016. It enabled short-term missions for contracted recruitment of Russian conscripts and reservists.

Previously, the first military contract with the rank of soldier, seaman, sergeant, or sergeant-major was to be signed for two or three years. Positions with the rank of warrant officer, sub-officer, or officer stipulated five years. Now, these categories are allowed to sign for a term of "between six months and one year" in the cases of “disaster relief or efforts related to a state of emergency, restoration of the constitutional order, and other extraordinary situations, or to take part in collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Importantly, the amendments are further justified by “changes in the military and political situation, and intensified activity of international terrorist organizations,” resulting in “the necessity for increasing of mobility of troops (forces), the creation of combined and irregular detachments, and their expedited staffing by contract servicemen, to quickly accomplish short-term yet crucial missions related to participation in peace support operations and operations to fight against terrorist and extremist organizations.” The amendments were signed into law by President Vladimir Putin on December 28, 2016.

These amendments enable Russia to rapidly deploy and use a large invasion and occupation army, under the pretext that the detachments are carrying out “peace support operations” and “fighting against terrorist and extremist organizations.” In effect, they legalize the unlawful recruitment of conscripts for “short-term tours of duty” to Ukraine as contract soldiers.

Significant changes have also been made to the procedure for contracted recruitment and service in the Russian Armed Forces for stateless persons and foreign nationals. On January 2, 2015, a presidential decree amended the “Provision on the Procedure of Military Service” to facilitate the contracted participation of stateless persons and foreign nationals in the Russian Armed Forces; the adoption of Russian citizenship is not required. This includes active service and operations abroad.

The low quality of life, high unemployment rates, and Russian military bases in Central Asia and the Caucasus region make the CIS a fertile recruiting ground. Importantly, the territories of other separatist regions fomented by the Russian Federation (i.e., Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria) also contain Russian military bases and equipment, and may also deliver fresh recruits. Russian-speakers in Western Europe, the Middle East, or North America may be willing to join; but with payment and social benefits well below international standards, they are likely to come from fringe groups. Russian experts estimate that twenty-five million Russian speakers could be recruited from abroad.

Such foreign recruits may be used as part of Russia’s neo-imperial policy and hybrid war waged through illegal armed formations, which could, at any point, turn into an open, armed aggression of the Russian army. A real and serious threat lies in the recruitment and training of foreign individuals by Russian special services for use in extremist or terrorist groups and activities. The increase of this risk can be seen in the growing number of Russian and CIS militants actively participating in extremist and terrorist acts by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

High casualty rates in the Russian military have also resulted in widespread avoidance of tours to the Ukrainian border. Between 2014 to mid-2015, the most avoided appointment was service in the 12th Reserve Command of the Russian Armed Forces, in Novocherkassk, Russia, which was created to “officially deploy” Russian military servicemen (under concealment) to Ukraine. Servicemen who try to avoid serving there have found themselves on the receiving end of the Russian government’s repressions. Russian courts fast-track resolutions to discharge and convict them, at times under threat of sentencing to penal colonies.

Employing PMCs, recruiting foreigners, and forcing servicemen to fight in illegitimate wars and follow unlawful orders may be categorized as war crimes. In addition to creating military advantages and cutting costs, Russia’s leadership may also be facing criminal liability for its decision to initiate armed aggression with the use of unlawful forces in Ukraine and Syria. The best evidence of such a course of events is the experience of leaders from former Yugoslavia, whose aggressive Balkan wars and ultra-nationalistic policies landed them as war criminals at the International Tribunal in The Hague.

Valentyn Badrak is the Director the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; Lada Roslycky is a soft power security expert and strategic communications adviser to government and nongovernmental institutions, including DCAF; Mykhailo Samus is the Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; and Volodymyr Kopchak is the Deputy Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-s-desperation-for-more-soldiers-is-taking-it-to-dark-places
 
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