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Role of Officer vs job of NCM [Merged]

  • Thread starter Thread starter Argyll 2347
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Don't you really think that this is a problem that is systemic in Western Society?  We don't have to go far to experience the problems.  Just look at some of the inquiries made on this site.  What proportion of "young Recruits" today are asking questions on how they can become Officers, probably with aspirations of becoming CDS someday, as compared to those who just want to join as an OR?

GW
 
I definetly agree with George on this one, not so as to say "screw you" to anyone who wants to become officers, but because it seems there are getting to be too many chiefs in the military and not enough indians. If these people are serious about joining the military, then they need to look at all options, especially at NCM positions. As I keep hearing, the officers get all the prasie, but they also get all the shit if something goes wrong. Officership brings with it a great deal of responsibility. I go to RMC and I have absolutely no desire to ever make it above the rank of LCol. Above that, it gets far too political, and you're almost always a desk jockey. If you want to join the army and want to see the world, the best way to go would be NCM. THis coming from an RMC officer cadet...
 
I'm currently in the recruiting process trying to enter the CF as an Officer Cadet.  I chose to apply as an officer because I already have my BA, and because that's the way the regiment's recruiting Sgt. preferred it.  I would just as happily apply for NCM, but the regiment seems to be hard pressed to find people to fill their officer slots.  It was amazing how the recruiter's face lit up when I said I qualified for DEO.  "My, and you have a friend who wants to apply too, eh?"
I'd be just as happy as a Lt. as a Lt. Col., for me it's more a this-is-what-my-unit-needs-so-rise-to-the-occasion-already.
 
The only place where excessive middle management bureaucracy has been replaced is private businesses where shareholders have the ability to hold the executive accountable for specific measureables.

In the case of corporation, shareholders demand earnings per share which drive investment for efficiencies and regular restructuring of internal personnel which has eliminated multiple layers of middle management and as such lowered the number of strata between the top decisionmakers and the front-line personnel.

Government bureaucracies on the other hand don't appear to have any internal perogaitve to become more efficient and downsize that middle management.   On the contrary I would argue that their primary objective is preserving the existing management structures and expanding it where possible.



Matthew    ???
 
Cdn Blackshirt said:
Government bureaucracies on the other hand don't appear to have any internal perogaitve to become more efficient and downsize that middle management.   On the contrary I would argue that their primary objective is preserving the existing management structures and expanding it where possible.

Strictly speaking, not quite true.  I work for the provincial government in Ontario; there is enormous pressure to "flatten" the organization by eliminating layers of management.  The rationale is the customer i.e. the taxpayer, for most service-delivery parts of the government, really doesn't care what happens "behind the counter", as long as the "counter" delivers the services he/she wants.  In that sense, the taxpayers are playing the role of shareholders in a corporation.  The government of Ontario now recognizes 3-4 layers of management--senior managment, which includes Assistant Deputy Ministers and Directors, and one, and perhaps two levels of straight "management".  And that's it.

The military doesn't have quite the same imperative, so I'm more inclined to agree with you in its case.  There really aren't "customers" receiving direct service or filling the role of shareholders, in the same sense (yes, the taxpayers of Canada are the army's shareholders, but they don't generally have the same direct interaction with the armed forces).  So there's a lack of general accountability; to the average Canadian, the CF is a "black box" that consumes resources, and in turn provides a service, but not in a way that the typical taxpayer understands in a detailed way.  That's probably both a benefit and a weakness.  So, there's no real check and balance on the bureaucratic growth of the military (and various other government departments, incidentally).
 
Without trying to be insulting to officers or potential officer candidates, I would suggest the best way to check this "top heavy" progression would be to insist that all officers are CFRs. This would limit the pool of potential officers, ensure they are proportional to the branches and regiments they represent and also ensure they have some real world experience to guide them.

Arguments like "they will be too old/ have to drop out for 3 years to get degrees" etc. are technicalities which can be managed with some planning and imagination.

As to eliminating the existing overage, the best way it could be managed in the CF would be to make the CDS a Lt Gen appointment, which would have a knock down effect on subordinate staffs. I would be interested to see calculations of the number of officer positions this could effect.
 
a_majoor said:
Without trying to be insulting to officers or potential officer candidates, I would suggest the best way to check this "top heavy" progression would be to insist that all officers are CFRs. This would limit the pool of potential officers, ensure they are proportional to the branches and regiments they represent and also ensure they have some real world experience to guide them.

This is an interesting and, in my experience, much bandied-about argument.   I tend to agree, actually.   However, I would be concerned about the effect this would have on the rate at which we could produce officers.   This might seem an odd comment; the whole point is to decrease the number of officers, I know.   However, we would have to carefully determine the effect on our rate of officer production, to ensure that we don't overcompensate and leave ourselves with a leadership shortage at some future point, which would then take time to sort out.   This is the situation we now face with Jr NCOs, thanks to well-intended but problematic changes to the way we train soldiers during their first 3-5 or so years (i.e. what we now call DPs 1 and 2).

As to eliminating the existing overage, the best way it could be managed in the CF would be to make the CDS a Lt Gen appointment, which would have a knock down effect on subordinate staffs. I would be interested to see calculations of the number of officer positions this could effect.

I have somewhat more difficulty with this one.   Reducing our CDS to a 3-star will make him the equivalent of the commander of a component or a senior staff officer in many other militaries, some of whom are no larger and, in fact, may be smaller than ours.   This will affect the "standing" of Canada in global military matters (all right, stop laughing...I'm making a serious point here).   Believe it or not, Canada is still widely respected for its military acumen and contributions; this may have more to do with the quality and capabilties of our soldiers than higher-level factors we all know and love, but it is there.   So our CDS comes to the multinational table as a four-star, which gives him a degree of standing he wouldn't otherwise have (I have no doubt, as an aside, that any decent CDS would acknowledge a significant amount of that standing comes from him riding on the shoulders of Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen, and their accomplishments, but again, it's there).

I would rather see a more carefully managed officer development system in place, with higher standards and, MUCH more significantly, more accountability.   I'm afraid that for much of the military, the RCR motto of "Never pass a fault" are just nice-sounding words, with the result that we have too many personnel (officers and NCMs) advancing to levels they shouldn't.

 
Some armies have (had, anyway) an officer 'aspirant' system which involves a year or two of service in the most junior ranks before officer training, per se, begins.

There are many and varied (and often contradictory) arguments in favour of such a system: some proponents believe it is essential to drive out the old, ancien régime style system in which officers were from the aristocracy and had no interest - nor any need to have an interest - in the goings on in the rank and file; others suggest that good officers need some rank and file experience in order to be good leaders.

I find no convincing merit, none whatsoever, in any of the arguments.   Some, many of the officers I knew who went through such a system were first rate men - many others were dumpkopfs - in almost the exact same proportions I suggest as e.g. American, British and Canadian officers, most of whom came up through an officer only recruiting, education and training system.

Many armies are top heavy - principally because governments (bureaucrats) make it too hard to thin out the ranks with early, un-penalized retirements and serving officers have little incentive to leave, leaving behind decent (not great) pay and benefits just to help balance the books.   Some senior officers are happy to have a few too many lieutenant colonels and colonels - especially if they are fairly young - to serve as a base for sudden, emergency expansion: filling territorial/militia CO and formation commander slots, for example.   In at least one country it was (but I suspect no longer is) possible to 'delete' officers from the lists by 'loaning' them to the public service - as executive; many of the most senior public servants liked military officers because of their training and experience.

We need to recruit tough, smart, enthusiastic young men and women for all of the army; officers are no less important than ORs.   Our recruiting, selection, education and training programmes for officers should be rigorous - ensuring that we get the right people and prepare them well for an honourable challenging and sometimes deadly profession.

There is no doubt in my mind that lieutenant general is the right (highest possible) rank for our CDS.   I would argue that we need three, only three, 'hard' LGens: CDS, DCinC NORAD and CANMILREP NATO.   All the other LGen position should be downgraded to MGen and so on.   I am not concerned with 'standing' - my experience when our CGS was a LGen was that he was treated with respect and as an equal by his American and British four star counterparts.   Some of our allies roll their eyes a bit these days when they see a Canadian LGen whose 'command' experience is limited to a small, non-combat ready brigade.

Reducing the rank levels, however, is a lot harder than it looks because the military pay and benefits system is a civilianized bugger's muddle - based on an ill considered (but oh so welcome at the time!) system of benchmarking.   I would agree with some, limited, benchmarking; for example: CDS = middle range deputy minister; LCol = 1st level civil service executive/director, most senior CWO (technical) ≤ lowest paid LCol, trained private ≥ StatsCan's low income cut off for a medium sized city; no performance pay etc - real 'steps' between each rank, etc.   Example only - not a proposal!

There is a fine balance between keeping the peacetime military leadership young enough to withstand the rigors of battle and retaining enough experienced people to plan and teach etc.   There is another problem in, especially the Canadian and American military: every time the press or parliament coughs we establish a director general something-or-other to ensure that this, that or the other does not happen again.   I have yet to meet a DG who didn't empire build - several lieutenant colonels are the norm after a year or two. I am prepared to state, despite no having been near the place for years and years, that we could cut NDHQ by another 15% - eliminating whole branches - and have no measurable impact on operations, administration or policy: we would just save lots and lots of money.

All that to say: don't blame the officers for systemic inefficiency, and the production of good officers is dependent, mainly, on how well they are recruited and trained as officersrather than service in the ranks.
 
I agree with most of your points ROJ, but CFR does make the production of officers proportional to the size of the various branches/corps/regiments etc. Surplus officers sloshing around the system would eventually be squeezed out, the CDS knock down would eliminate their "jobs" in the various HQ's and directorates, while the CFR pool officer candidates will be filling the slots in the units/branches.

The argument about having the "right" number of officers can be answered by looking at WWII Germany. No matter how desperate the situation became, the academy never lowered it's standards and the Wermacht fought on under the leadership of the NCO corps. Even the Staff schools would not have full classes, if enough candidates who met the standard could not be found. The Genman army did not run out of officers, but men, equipment and fuel...Having a Left Out Of Battle (LOOB) pool for sudden expansion is a good idea, but must be managed rigorously, I am sure we have enough LOOB officers right now to outfit at least a traditional division.

This is related to arguments on other threads, but the large bureaucracies we have now slow down the decision making process, making nonsense out of so much of the promise of the "RMA". A simple and telling example can be found in the book Blackhawk Down; there was a PC-3 Orion orbiting over Mogadishu with a panoramic view of the entire AOR. By the time the Orion's instructions filtered down through the various levels to the ground convoy, the unfortunate soldiers had already driven past the intersections they were supposed to turn down.

If we don't buy into the idea that CFR is the right way to go, my next offer would be something like SAS selection: put all officer candidates through a very rigorous "Outward Bound" type program for a summer and only make the offer and RMC positions available to those who have the combination of fortitude, teamwork and smarts to pass.
 
I think a_majoor has a point, given the increased professionalization of the NCO corps, however I don't think it's necessary or desirable to insist on an all-CFR officer corps.

If there is something that should be addressed it is the entry age of recruits for either officer or NCM.

I also agree on the downgrading of ranks. As ROJ pointed out, Allies will regard our people with the respect of the position, not the braid. I think if there is a problem, it's more one of the LGen "Bob" (the NATO milrep) talking to the LGen "Alain" (who is CDS) as an equal. Such a disagreement can be sorted by clearly defining the autority and chain of command.

Acorn
 
My dark talent is that I rub people the wrong way.   That said, my position is that the CDS and 63 (+/-) other generals are not overpaid or overranked.   Many have the equivalent of graduate and post graduate degrees and decades of experience.   Some are so good that on retirement they roll over to $250k +++ jobs in the civy sector.   In terms of sheer survival, we must have external consistency in terms of renumeration.

As a young soldier I got laughs by joking "I'm from Div/Bde staff and I'm here to help you".   At present I do work for a staff or 'brain trust' as it were.   There are LCols with M Eng, Majs with B Eng and MBA.   These are the people that study problems, make policy and listen to peoples' concerns.   Surprisingly, I don't see surplus officers 'sloshing around'.   I see educated and dedicated people who are actually the glue that holds our military together.

For those enamored of the German example, Friederich Von Paulus was Oberquartermaster I in 1940.   Look at his performance.

To reiterate my MTP - we have no economies of scale.   With a 40% increase in funding we could almost double our defence capability.   Don't blame the officers/NCOs in NDHQ, as they are only serving the mandate dictated by the politicians.   Go right to the source.
 
While I certainly don't doubt there are a lot of very talented and dedicated people in high positions, the "tooth to tail" and "Leader to Led" ratios seem really out of whack. How can we be spending 9+ billion a year and only have @5000 infantrymen? And is there really a correlation between rank and ability? I am a Sergeant operating in the G6 cell in a reserve brigade (one of only three members), yet I make policies which affect the Bde, take part in managing a large fraction of the Bde's internal budget, and have come up with ideas which we managed to push up the rope to Area...I really could use a clerk to assist me, rather than another Captain, Major or LCol.

A smaller. flatter officer corps will have a faster decision cycle, and we can only hope people like Von Paulus (or Rommel for that matter) can be quickly identified early in their careers.

 
I am a Sergeant operating in the G6 cell in a reserve brigade (one of only three members), yet I make policies which affect the Bde,

Umm, I really hope that you meant to say that "you make policy recommendations to your brigade commander, who subsequently sets brigade policy".   It may seem like semantics, but I believe that the distinction is vital. If not you are, however well intentioned, usurping your commander's legal authority to command.

 
Worn Out Grunt said:
My dark talent is that I rub people the wrong way.

Thanks - I needed a good chuckle this morning ...
And, your post was excellent, too (not that my opinion matters ... chuckle!)

Yup - the Army has this suicidal tendency to automatically revert to "us and them" mentality.
Ironic, since "Gung Ho" actually means "unity of effort", NOT "blade buddy before he blades you" ...
 
I will soon be sworn in as an Officer Cadet (reserve) this Thursday.  I have no previous military experience, only a little management experience, and I would have happily joined as an NCM before being CFR  (I'm actually a little disappointed that I won't).  I'd like to make a point, and please don't take offense and please keep in mind my gross inexperience.  Also, this post expands the topic a bit.  If I'm highjacking the thread, I'm sorry.  If I've wasted your time repeating what you distinguished people have already said, I'm sorry.

I don't doubt that there are many empires in NDHQ (and elsewhere) that should be eliminated and the staff used to a better purpose elsewhere.  This solves the 'officer glut' nicely, but it does not solve the HR problems of the CF as a whole.  Requiring all junior officers to be CFR is not a bad idea at all, it may (or may not) solve the problems of the Reg. Army, but I see how it could make it even harder for Reserve units to get the junior leaders they need.

There are two (arguably many more) recruiting systems in the CF, Regular and Reserve.  The "Regular" system selects people for the needs of each regular branch of the service.  The "Reserve" system selects people for the needs of particular units.  I decided to go the officer rather than the NCM route because the regiment's recruiting  Sgt. asked me to.  He was looking towards the needs of the regiment only - the odds that I might 'go regular' or become a desk jockey at some point in the far future were irrelevant - he needs qualified junior officers a year from now more than he needs qulaified NCMs.

The different solutions to the 'officer glut' presented in this thread are:
-All officers in the CF (Army?) must be CFR.
-Make the CDS a Lt. General
Both are legitimate proposals that have their merits and flaws.  Either could solve the tooth-to-tail ratio on paper, but when you look at the HR system used by the forces, the first will decrease the viability of Reserve units (which was the subject of the first post) by making it even harder to find the junior officers they need.  I have no idea what the effects of the second proposal will be, but a reorganization of the senior CF staff does not go far enough.

Please pardon my noobiness (both to army.ca, the Army, and the CF), and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the problem is with the lack of an HR plan.  We have an incredibly diverse array of recruiting needs, not just Army/Navy/Air or reg/reserve.  To use the example of Charlottetown, PEI:  There are three reserve units competing for recruits, one Navy, two Army.  Each of these have a recruiting office, to specifically meet the needs of that one unit.  There is also a CF recruiting office that handles the needs of the regular Army/Navy/Air Force, but also handles every recruit from the three reserve units.  So: there are four different recruiting offices in a city of less than 60 000 people, each with a different goal.  This is arguably not an efficent use of resources, and it is repeated in nearly every Canadian city.

I understand why the HR system works the way it does:  because there is a huge diversity of needs within the CF.  These people need to supply the immediate needs of three wildly different forces, in both their regular and reserve incarnations, AND ensure that the people they take in today fill the slots (NCM and officer) needed to manage the CF a decade from now.  The decisions that the CF has made with regards to integrating the reserves more with the regulars are made on the basis of operational need: a reserve soldier should be held to the same training standards as regular soldiers, the only difference is readiness.  This decision is operationally necessary, but costs more money.

Money isn't everything.

Saving money by demoting the CDS position or requiring all officers to be CFR may save money, but will cause other problems.  There are considerations besides money to think about.  There are much better reasons to make these decisions, like " . . . ensure they [officers] have some real world experience to guide them." (a_majoor)

I'm going to be an officer because of the needs of my (future) regiment, not because of my ambitions to carve out an empire.
 
Since this thread is basically a return to a topic that was discussed in great detail vigorously a few months ago, I've merged the two together to allow other members view's on the issue to be brought into the fore.
 
what requirements are needed to switch from an NCM to a commissioned officer if you dont have a university education. any input would be great
 
You cant   :blotto:

[Edited because it is possible to transition from NCM to officer]
 
If you're going to university, I believe there is some way to switch. Talk to an officer at your unit or something, they would know better than me.
 
If you are a senor NCO, are an outstanding performer and get noticed by the higher-ups........you may be OFFERED to CFR ( comissioning from the ranks).  No degree required.  I do beleive that the MOC you are going to must be realted to your NCM MOC ( i.e. infantry to infantry officer, aesop to ANAV .........)

But like i said...you dont apply for this....you get offered !
 
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