- Reaction score
- 6
- Points
- 430
TomGledhill, please read the entire thread before commenting on the subject line.
- Reaction score
- 10,346
- Points
- 1,260
You are correct Michael. University, like most endeavours, can only give people what they put into it. Unfortunately, the standards have slid to the point where one can put next to nothing into it and can gain the same degree as someone who busts their butt and moves onto Graduate work.
Essentials to a military education would be small class sizes, various forms of evaluation (tactical exercises, written work, proposals and debates), and a rigorous comprehensive exam at the end. The bar would be set high so as to ensure that only the best succeed.
Essentials to a military education would be small class sizes, various forms of evaluation (tactical exercises, written work, proposals and debates), and a rigorous comprehensive exam at the end. The bar would be set high so as to ensure that only the best succeed.
- Reaction score
- 10,346
- Points
- 1,260
Well, I've been contemplating over this discussion for a bit and I've thought of a fresh approach to looking at both topics (service in the ranks/PSE). In a recent article I read, there contained the following quote with regards to Officer training.
"A French officer, writing immediately after France's defeat in 1940, lamented that in French military schools, "The teaching was more concerned with developing knowledge than exercising judgement."
I think this may offer a key to helping to ensure that our Officer Corps occupies the right side of the bell curve and leads to a higher degree of professionalism within the Forces as a whole.
In essence, when we are trying to determine who the best leaders are, we are trying to find one key thing; Character. It is fundamental to the abilities of all leaders, from the veteran section commander to the green Lieutenant to the brilliant General. As Michael O'Leary's sigline explains
Leadership is the practical application of character. - R.E. Meinertzhagen
I would consider all the aspects that we would consider essential to a good leader as elements of strong character (sound judgement, as the French Officer above referred to, would be one of those elements).
The Canadian Forces policy that all Officer's will have a Post-Secondary Degree to make it to senior ranks, although seemingly guided by good intentions, is fundamentally unsound because it assumes that all people who have went through university possess the good character and sound judgement required of a professional Officer. This is unfair to degree-less Officers who have shown to be excellent commanders but commissioned prior to the policy and it is unfair for soldiers who are given junior leaders whos sole claim to their rank is through their education. In essence, the policy of attempting to enforce a PSE on all officers may increase the level of knowledge possessed by the Officer Corps, but it does nothing to look at the development of the level of professionalism and the strengthening of the character of our leadership (which I believe the purpose of the policy is intended to do). To state it bluntly, education does not necessarily equal intelligence or sound character and judgement.
Although a fair portion of young officer's possess the requisite character abilities to turn them into competent leaders, many fail to reach the bar, but manage to bumble on due to the fact that they are "intellectually qualified". In essence, our Officer Selection is a crap shoot. We've seen historical examples of what happens when we utilize "crap-shoot" techniques (educational, political, social standing) to determine where the officers should come from; both the Canadian and American Armies had to "clean house" within their Officer Corps in WWII to clear the cobwebs of amateurism. Prussia had to do the same after being humiliated at Jena and Auerstedt by Napoleon while the British were late to recognize that selling commissions didn't earn you the best of leaders.
How is our selection system a crap shoot? In my opinion, the two key programs of Direct Entry Officer (DEO) and Regular Officer Training Program (ROTP) do not look at anything concrete to determine if the candidate is suitable as a military leader (or suitable for military service at all). Both DEO candidates sent directly to Officer Training and ROTP candidates sent to the RMC are assessed on civilian aspects which may not be the best determinants of the character required of a combat leader. Their educational background (highschool or university) is looked at, as well as volunteer or community programs, work history. These are largely irrelevant to the profession of arms; any flake can get his Post Secondary Education if he applies himself and most aspects of civilian achievement, although possibly illuminating certain character traits of the applicant, do nothing to show us how these people handle themselves under the intense stress of combat.
There are "character references", but these are very subjective; I can find many people who would say "Gee, Infanteer is a great guy". As well, I highly doubt that the "character references" for most applicants indicate that "Mr Bloggins was an outstanding employee, as such, I am sure that he will prove to be an excellent leader of troops in battle."
There is an interview, but I believe this can only go skin deep. Applicants can simply lie or bluff, but what for. They aren't expected to display to their interviewer that they are a Rommel or a Montgomery in waiting, they just need to show that they know what they are getting into and have rudimentary understandings of responsibility. As well, applicants undergo such a change in personality when they are indoctrinated into a military institution that what they say to please the recruiter may be totally irrelevant after a civilian has been transformed into a soldier.
Finally, our Officer's must make it through their "Phase training". I think this is probably the "best" determinant of character we currently us in the fact that cadets who cannot hack the rigors field conditions simply don't make it. However, this can be a slippery form of character evaluation as well. Standards change, and when the military is really hurting for troops, standards may decline. As well, Phase Training, conducted in the traditional military environment, is largely a "monkey see, monkey do" format. Students are taught doctrine and go into the field and are evaluated (by checking off the boxes) on whether they can adhere to doctrine. This is of limited value in a character evaluation (William Caley eventually made it through this sort of training) and it is largely a set of tactics and techniques; as we've discussed before, being able to conduct a right flanking attack does not make an officer.
All in all, I think the method we use is a crap shoot. Sure, you're going to get excellent leaders, but your also going to have unsuitable candidates squeak through and move up the chain. Young Lieutenants arrive at their units essentially as "unknown quantities" ; an aspect that can be contained in peacetime through effective management by SNCO's and senior Officers, but can be disastrous prior to or during deployment (look at the problems with US Officer's in Vietnam). The efforts of all your excellent leaders can be for nothing if unsuitable, unprofessional officers are able to occupy positions within the C-of-C during peacetime. The level of professionalism, the level that it is prepared to fight and win battles, begins to decline.
The solution? I would argue that we need to have better, objective tests of the character traits of the men and women that will be commissioned as Officers in the profession of arms. The character of our NCO's is largely determined by years of good service as a soldier; essentially, they are a "known quantity". The goal of utilizing multiple, objective means of analysing the character of our potential officers is to ensure that on a whole, the quality of the "clay" with which the training establishment is provided with is of a much finer grade; with the result being a higher degree of professionalism within the Officer Corps as a whole.
My initial proposal of how we do this takes much from what we've discussed in this thread.
Potential Officer's will be selected from the ranks determined on two things; exemplary service as a soldier and the passing of a selection board that further analyses the abilities of the solider in question.
The requirement of exemplary service in the ranks allows us to ensure that the soldier is a "known quantity". He is respected by his peers and has the recommendation of his leaders. He has shown himself to be a competant soldier and eager to show initiative and accept responsibility. Essentially, the Officer's and SNCO's are saying that "yes, we want this soldier to be one of our leaders." This has the added benefit that suitability for leadership is determined by leaders who have dealt with the soldier and are willing to lead with him as opposed to leaders being selected by Personal Officers and Recruiters who have their own priorities which may or may not be related to superior combat performance. Leaders will not elect one who has shirked from duties, shown himself to be lazy, or acted as a selfish individual to be one of their own (I've seen Officer's get through the system with all these traits). Service in the ranks can act as an essential "filter" in the Officer Selection Process.
The requirement of a selection board that further analyses the abilities of the potential officer is the second step. Once the soldier has been put forth by his commanders as a good candidate, a process that seeks to determine the character of the potential officer is initiated. From what I've read, the Israeli Kaba system is one method used to do so. The selection board would use a battery of tests and interviews in an attempt to develop an objective, qualitative assessment of the solder. If he meets the standards here, he is accepted as a Officer Cadet and is sent to the RMC. Here is the article previously linked that has a good overview of the Israeli and German methods of Officer selection which focus on character.
http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc30/exnh/datchko.htm
The RMC serves to develop the new Cadet into a thinking fighter. It grounds the Cadet with a solid military education. As the quote by the French Officer above indicates, the purpose of the military education is not to load the Cadet up with detailed knowledge (as a more conventional PSE might), but to provide him with a "funnel" with which to apply sound judgement that it grounded in a professional education. In a sense, the sound character of the cadet is tended to with a military education so as to produce a thoughtful and proficient professional Officer, one who equally at home with staff duties, training and educating, or command in battle.
Throughout this process, we cannot compromise standards. We must ensure that selection of officers is based on external needs (the need for only the best candidates who can lead our soldiers into battle) as opposed to internal needs (the need for more officers to fill out TO&E). When a number of required Officer's is fielded to regiments, they can only put forward those who have met the standards described above. There can be no tolerance for admitting an unacceptable product for the sake of filling up "empty hats"; these positions can be filled by NCO's (requiring a development of our NCO Corps, a topic I know PBI has thoughts on) and by "double hatting" existing officers if required. We must do as Martin Van Crevald points out and possess a "readiness to accept a shortage of officers rather than to compromise in regard to their quality."
I think a good analogy would be comparing a potential officer to a seed. You sort through the seeds to determine which will be the strongest one, which will contain the characteristics you are looking for (evaluation of character). After you have planted it (service in ranks), you tend to it with water in order to allow it to grow into a sapling (military education). The water (education) is required to release the talents of the seed and to develop and infuse it with the essence of the art of war. When it is a sapling, it is tended to by capable gardeners (the young Lt's watchful SNCO's and Officers) who ensure it develops into fully grown tree.
Well, that's about all this Corporal has to say for now
. I'd be interested to hear some criticism or thoughts on this as well as other opinions on the matter of character and its relation to leadership.
Cheers,
Infanteer
"A French officer, writing immediately after France's defeat in 1940, lamented that in French military schools, "The teaching was more concerned with developing knowledge than exercising judgement."
I think this may offer a key to helping to ensure that our Officer Corps occupies the right side of the bell curve and leads to a higher degree of professionalism within the Forces as a whole.
In essence, when we are trying to determine who the best leaders are, we are trying to find one key thing; Character. It is fundamental to the abilities of all leaders, from the veteran section commander to the green Lieutenant to the brilliant General. As Michael O'Leary's sigline explains
Leadership is the practical application of character. - R.E. Meinertzhagen
I would consider all the aspects that we would consider essential to a good leader as elements of strong character (sound judgement, as the French Officer above referred to, would be one of those elements).
The Canadian Forces policy that all Officer's will have a Post-Secondary Degree to make it to senior ranks, although seemingly guided by good intentions, is fundamentally unsound because it assumes that all people who have went through university possess the good character and sound judgement required of a professional Officer. This is unfair to degree-less Officers who have shown to be excellent commanders but commissioned prior to the policy and it is unfair for soldiers who are given junior leaders whos sole claim to their rank is through their education. In essence, the policy of attempting to enforce a PSE on all officers may increase the level of knowledge possessed by the Officer Corps, but it does nothing to look at the development of the level of professionalism and the strengthening of the character of our leadership (which I believe the purpose of the policy is intended to do). To state it bluntly, education does not necessarily equal intelligence or sound character and judgement.
Although a fair portion of young officer's possess the requisite character abilities to turn them into competent leaders, many fail to reach the bar, but manage to bumble on due to the fact that they are "intellectually qualified". In essence, our Officer Selection is a crap shoot. We've seen historical examples of what happens when we utilize "crap-shoot" techniques (educational, political, social standing) to determine where the officers should come from; both the Canadian and American Armies had to "clean house" within their Officer Corps in WWII to clear the cobwebs of amateurism. Prussia had to do the same after being humiliated at Jena and Auerstedt by Napoleon while the British were late to recognize that selling commissions didn't earn you the best of leaders.
How is our selection system a crap shoot? In my opinion, the two key programs of Direct Entry Officer (DEO) and Regular Officer Training Program (ROTP) do not look at anything concrete to determine if the candidate is suitable as a military leader (or suitable for military service at all). Both DEO candidates sent directly to Officer Training and ROTP candidates sent to the RMC are assessed on civilian aspects which may not be the best determinants of the character required of a combat leader. Their educational background (highschool or university) is looked at, as well as volunteer or community programs, work history. These are largely irrelevant to the profession of arms; any flake can get his Post Secondary Education if he applies himself and most aspects of civilian achievement, although possibly illuminating certain character traits of the applicant, do nothing to show us how these people handle themselves under the intense stress of combat.
There are "character references", but these are very subjective; I can find many people who would say "Gee, Infanteer is a great guy". As well, I highly doubt that the "character references" for most applicants indicate that "Mr Bloggins was an outstanding employee, as such, I am sure that he will prove to be an excellent leader of troops in battle."
There is an interview, but I believe this can only go skin deep. Applicants can simply lie or bluff, but what for. They aren't expected to display to their interviewer that they are a Rommel or a Montgomery in waiting, they just need to show that they know what they are getting into and have rudimentary understandings of responsibility. As well, applicants undergo such a change in personality when they are indoctrinated into a military institution that what they say to please the recruiter may be totally irrelevant after a civilian has been transformed into a soldier.
Finally, our Officer's must make it through their "Phase training". I think this is probably the "best" determinant of character we currently us in the fact that cadets who cannot hack the rigors field conditions simply don't make it. However, this can be a slippery form of character evaluation as well. Standards change, and when the military is really hurting for troops, standards may decline. As well, Phase Training, conducted in the traditional military environment, is largely a "monkey see, monkey do" format. Students are taught doctrine and go into the field and are evaluated (by checking off the boxes) on whether they can adhere to doctrine. This is of limited value in a character evaluation (William Caley eventually made it through this sort of training) and it is largely a set of tactics and techniques; as we've discussed before, being able to conduct a right flanking attack does not make an officer.
All in all, I think the method we use is a crap shoot. Sure, you're going to get excellent leaders, but your also going to have unsuitable candidates squeak through and move up the chain. Young Lieutenants arrive at their units essentially as "unknown quantities" ; an aspect that can be contained in peacetime through effective management by SNCO's and senior Officers, but can be disastrous prior to or during deployment (look at the problems with US Officer's in Vietnam). The efforts of all your excellent leaders can be for nothing if unsuitable, unprofessional officers are able to occupy positions within the C-of-C during peacetime. The level of professionalism, the level that it is prepared to fight and win battles, begins to decline.
The solution? I would argue that we need to have better, objective tests of the character traits of the men and women that will be commissioned as Officers in the profession of arms. The character of our NCO's is largely determined by years of good service as a soldier; essentially, they are a "known quantity". The goal of utilizing multiple, objective means of analysing the character of our potential officers is to ensure that on a whole, the quality of the "clay" with which the training establishment is provided with is of a much finer grade; with the result being a higher degree of professionalism within the Officer Corps as a whole.
My initial proposal of how we do this takes much from what we've discussed in this thread.
Potential Officer's will be selected from the ranks determined on two things; exemplary service as a soldier and the passing of a selection board that further analyses the abilities of the solider in question.
The requirement of exemplary service in the ranks allows us to ensure that the soldier is a "known quantity". He is respected by his peers and has the recommendation of his leaders. He has shown himself to be a competant soldier and eager to show initiative and accept responsibility. Essentially, the Officer's and SNCO's are saying that "yes, we want this soldier to be one of our leaders." This has the added benefit that suitability for leadership is determined by leaders who have dealt with the soldier and are willing to lead with him as opposed to leaders being selected by Personal Officers and Recruiters who have their own priorities which may or may not be related to superior combat performance. Leaders will not elect one who has shirked from duties, shown himself to be lazy, or acted as a selfish individual to be one of their own (I've seen Officer's get through the system with all these traits). Service in the ranks can act as an essential "filter" in the Officer Selection Process.
The requirement of a selection board that further analyses the abilities of the potential officer is the second step. Once the soldier has been put forth by his commanders as a good candidate, a process that seeks to determine the character of the potential officer is initiated. From what I've read, the Israeli Kaba system is one method used to do so. The selection board would use a battery of tests and interviews in an attempt to develop an objective, qualitative assessment of the solder. If he meets the standards here, he is accepted as a Officer Cadet and is sent to the RMC. Here is the article previously linked that has a good overview of the Israeli and German methods of Officer selection which focus on character.
http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc30/exnh/datchko.htm
The RMC serves to develop the new Cadet into a thinking fighter. It grounds the Cadet with a solid military education. As the quote by the French Officer above indicates, the purpose of the military education is not to load the Cadet up with detailed knowledge (as a more conventional PSE might), but to provide him with a "funnel" with which to apply sound judgement that it grounded in a professional education. In a sense, the sound character of the cadet is tended to with a military education so as to produce a thoughtful and proficient professional Officer, one who equally at home with staff duties, training and educating, or command in battle.
Throughout this process, we cannot compromise standards. We must ensure that selection of officers is based on external needs (the need for only the best candidates who can lead our soldiers into battle) as opposed to internal needs (the need for more officers to fill out TO&E). When a number of required Officer's is fielded to regiments, they can only put forward those who have met the standards described above. There can be no tolerance for admitting an unacceptable product for the sake of filling up "empty hats"; these positions can be filled by NCO's (requiring a development of our NCO Corps, a topic I know PBI has thoughts on) and by "double hatting" existing officers if required. We must do as Martin Van Crevald points out and possess a "readiness to accept a shortage of officers rather than to compromise in regard to their quality."
I think a good analogy would be comparing a potential officer to a seed. You sort through the seeds to determine which will be the strongest one, which will contain the characteristics you are looking for (evaluation of character). After you have planted it (service in ranks), you tend to it with water in order to allow it to grow into a sapling (military education). The water (education) is required to release the talents of the seed and to develop and infuse it with the essence of the art of war. When it is a sapling, it is tended to by capable gardeners (the young Lt's watchful SNCO's and Officers) who ensure it develops into fully grown tree.
Well, that's about all this Corporal has to say for now
. I'd be interested to hear some criticism or thoughts on this as well as other opinions on the matter of character and its relation to leadership.Cheers,
Infanteer
- Reaction score
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- Points
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After some thought, I'll now cease fire and unload. I agree with this concept, not least because through much intellectual discourse, it has arrived back at something I originally suggested and which I believe in.
As the originator of this thread, I'd like to thank all who put so much thought and passion into what they had to say. The qualities of army.ca have been exemplified here. Cheers.
As the originator of this thread, I'd like to thank all who put so much thought and passion into what they had to say. The qualities of army.ca have been exemplified here. Cheers.
- Reaction score
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zerhash said:
I'm an officer and I hate admin(although I see its importance). Truth be told, most "admin" work in the Army is done by WOs/NCOs. Officers do staff work, which is not the same as "admin". Also, not all officers go through RMC-many get their degrees in civilian universities under ROTP or as officers in the Reserve, and a smaller number either Commission From The Ranks (CFR) or do UTPNCM.
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zerhash said:
Yes: CFR is normally applied to those at the rank of Sgt and above who are deemed suitable. They will be commissioned at a rank ranging from Lt to Capt, depending on a case-by-case assessment of their rank, etc. CFR (as originally conceived) did not envision sending the officer to get a degree, primarily because the NCO/WO was being commissioned for their technical knowledge (although I have seen it done "just to keep 'em around" IMHO the wrong reason to commission somebody).
Do not confuse CFR with UTPNCM (University Training Plan for Non Commissioned Members): UTPNCM is directed at MCpl and below who are selected as showing potential to become commissioned leaders in their MOC. It is not a way to get a free degree: the degree is a secondary effect to the production of an officer.
Cheers.
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man im right now in that situation i just finnished highschool and will be joining up in january im goin in as a bumb recruit, i also love the field work and all that stuff, i cant stand the thiought of paperwork. but my situation is a little different im gonna go to university after my three years are up and ive got a family business waiting for me. look at your situation and remember youve got to one day support a wife and kids.
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so when going CFR does it limit your officer trades? i know one officer who went from MWO infanteer to Capt. Log
Ninja, u gotta do what you gotta do... if you are considering going officer after 3 years your NCO's that you previously worked with will most likely have a problem with that.
As for going in as a bumb recruit there is nothing wrong with that. if it werent for us bums there would be no army... someones gotta do the ass kicking
Spr. Richmond
Ninja, u gotta do what you gotta do... if you are considering going officer after 3 years your NCO's that you previously worked with will most likely have a problem with that.
As for going in as a bumb recruit there is nothing wrong with that. if it werent for us bums there would be no army... someones gotta do the ass kicking
Spr. Richmond
- Reaction score
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What limits your suitability for specific officer MOCs is not the fact you are a CFR, but rather your actual qualifications for that MOC. I am not aware of any Offr MOC that will not take CFRs, but a number of Officer MOCs will not take applicants who lack the technical or academic qualifications.
Cheers.
Cheers.
R
RDA
Guest
pbi said:
pbi: What is considered "staff work"? I realise that there is probably no single all-encompassing answer, but could you give a brief example or two of tasks or roles that fall under the "staff work" umbrella? Thank you in advance for sharing your wisdom!
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I'll try to distinguish the two, as I see them:
Admin, to me, includes things such as basic personnel transactions, maintaining personnel records, ordering, handling and issuing supplies; ordering and coordinating transport, arranging for rations and quarters, handling mail and documents and all other routine support functions at unit and sub-unit level. To the greater extent, this is the work of NCOs and WOs.
Staff work, on the other hand, concerns itself mainly with the development, issue and coordination of operational plans and orders and instructions for major exercises, (as well as all the support issues that go with these), the development of policy and direction, the preparation of briefs and other decision support documents for higher commanders, as well as the review and preparation of major documents for signature by commanders. This type of work is most commonly done by officers although more senior grades of WO are frequently involved at the initial level.
There is of course some overlap between the two, especially at unit HQ level, but that is the division that I am familiar with.
Cheers.
Admin, to me, includes things such as basic personnel transactions, maintaining personnel records, ordering, handling and issuing supplies; ordering and coordinating transport, arranging for rations and quarters, handling mail and documents and all other routine support functions at unit and sub-unit level. To the greater extent, this is the work of NCOs and WOs.
Staff work, on the other hand, concerns itself mainly with the development, issue and coordination of operational plans and orders and instructions for major exercises, (as well as all the support issues that go with these), the development of policy and direction, the preparation of briefs and other decision support documents for higher commanders, as well as the review and preparation of major documents for signature by commanders. This type of work is most commonly done by officers although more senior grades of WO are frequently involved at the initial level.
There is of course some overlap between the two, especially at unit HQ level, but that is the division that I am familiar with.
Cheers.
A
aesop081
Guest
McG said:
That is correct. I have taught a few of those. They take some classes with reserve ICT courses ( if they are QL6B if not they have to do a complete PH IV)
C
CrimsonSeil
Guest
Does anyone have the feeling of being a NCM for your whole career. Do you ever feel you want to be a worker and not a planner. I know being a officer is very desireable and is also beneficial but I feel like i dont really want to be an officer. What do you guys think.
Edit: Forgot to say I'm not in the CF yet so I probably wont know how it feels =P
Edit: Forgot to say I'm not in the CF yet so I probably wont know how it feels =P
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All depends on what you want to do.
At this point in time, I do not wish to be an officer, however, I may want to sometime in the future. Starting off as an NCM gives you invaluable experience and you still have the option to become in officer in the future (as long as you have the education requirements met). If you want to be a worker to start (like most jobs), then go for NCM.
At this point in time, I do not wish to be an officer, however, I may want to sometime in the future. Starting off as an NCM gives you invaluable experience and you still have the option to become in officer in the future (as long as you have the education requirements met). If you want to be a worker to start (like most jobs), then go for NCM.
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[Heresay (at least you admitted it as such). Please locate the answer instead of offering conjecture. Here is the link for NCM requirements]
http://www.recruiting.forces.gc.ca/engraph/army/jobs_e.aspx
as for the reserves you dont need any quals
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Sound familiar?
The Scotsman, 27 November 2004
THE British Army is employing hundreds of officers that it does not need at a time when the military's top brass insists that Scotland's infantry regiments need to be amalgamated to save money, The Scotsman can reveal.
The case for the loss of one Scottish battalion has been argued by the Ministry of Defence on the grounds of recruiting shortfalls. But new government figures show that the MoD argument is fatally flawed.
The cost of the 370 surplus officers in the army is estimated to be more than £10 million a year, and could top £20 million. The cost of maintaining a regiment for 12 months is approximately £17 million.
Last night, a spokesman for the Save the Scottish Regiments campaign said there were "too many chiefs and not enough indians" and promised to fight on to the bitter end to reverse the decisions.
"The gloves are off now - if this Labour government think they have seen the campaign at it's maximum strength they are mistaken," he said. "Stabbing Scotland's soldiers in the back while they carry out work on behalf of the government and country is what is really happening here."
The Scotsman has also learned that under the Ministry of Defence plans, the Black Watch and the other threatened Scottish regiments will lose their individual identities as early as November next year. From that point on, unless political pressure forces the government into an unlikely climbdown, they will be known as the Royal Regiment of Scotland.
As of 1 October this year, the army had 370 more officers than its own stated requirements - 14,080 instead of the 13,710 it should have on its books. Meanwhile, the Scottish Division [made up of the Scottish infantry regiments] is short of 328 men and the army as a whole is short of 3,320 other ranks - 89,700 instead of the 93,020 it should have.
The British Army has five generals on its books, 12 lieutenant-generals, 46 major generals, 170 brigadiers, 590 colonels and 1,740 lieutenant-colonels. Lt-Col James Cowan, the commanding officer of the Black Watch, is one of only a handful of lieutenant-colonels in front line postings; many of the others, and the majority of the more senior officers, are employed in MoD desk jobs.
The MoD claimed that its recruitment and staffing figures did not tell the whole story. A spokesman said: "All of these officers have important roles to play within the armed forces. It is not the case that they are sitting around twiddling their thumbs."
But restricted army papers reveal even more puzzling anomalies. General Sir Mike Jackson, Britain's most senior soldier, has argued that Scotland cannot recruit enough soldiers to man its existing six regiments. "If these regiments are so precious, why are not more young Scotsmen signing up? Why are the Royal Scots having to recruit Fijians?" he said in a recent interview.
Gen Jackson has argued that larger regiments - the so-called super-regiments - suffer fewer recruiting problems, but the army's own figures tell a different story.
His own Parachute Regiment - a model for the new army structure - is at present more reliant on foreign and Commonwealth soldiers than the combined Scottish regiments, using on average 37 such soldiers in a battalion compared to 35 in the Scottish regiments.
The Paras are not over-recruited either: 3 Para is short of 30, the same shortfall as the Black Watch.
However, it is when the figures for foreign and Commonwealth soldiers are stripped out of the existing super-regiments that the full scale of their problems is revealed. The Royal Green Jackets, with two battalions, use a total of 191 such soldiers. The Princess of Wales Royal Regiment, also with two battalions, uses 207. The entire Scottish Division, with six regiments, uses just 208.
But senior army officers, and the MoD, are refusing to contemplate backing down on their plans to restructure the army in Scotland and to get rid of one entire Scottish battalion.
Yesterday an MoD spokesman said: "The issue of foreign and Commonwealth soldiers is neither here nor there as to the future of the battalions."
He said it was up to the individual soldiers which regiments they joined: "They are not being artificially boosted by foreign and Commonwealth soldiers," he said.
Soldiers serving with the Black Watch at Camp Dogwood in Iraq yesterday described the decision as a kick in the teeth. "I feel terrible that the regiment is coming to an end," said 23-year-old Lee Beaton, from Dundee. "We are all working hard and this is how we are rewarded."
Geoff Hoon will announce the cuts on 16 December, ten days after the Army Board meets to finalise its recommendations. Colonel commandants of the Scottish regiments have been invited to the meeting to argue their individual cases, but there appears to be little chance of a change of heart.
The first three of four infantry battalions to disappear completely from the army will go by April 2007, with the final disbandment or amalgamation pencilled in for the following April. The Royal Scots and King's Own Scottish Borderers - which are to be merged into a single battalion - will have to wait until Mr Hoon's announcement to discover when the axe will fall on them.
The Scotsman, 27 November 2004
THE British Army is employing hundreds of officers that it does not need at a time when the military's top brass insists that Scotland's infantry regiments need to be amalgamated to save money, The Scotsman can reveal.
The case for the loss of one Scottish battalion has been argued by the Ministry of Defence on the grounds of recruiting shortfalls. But new government figures show that the MoD argument is fatally flawed.
The cost of the 370 surplus officers in the army is estimated to be more than £10 million a year, and could top £20 million. The cost of maintaining a regiment for 12 months is approximately £17 million.
Last night, a spokesman for the Save the Scottish Regiments campaign said there were "too many chiefs and not enough indians" and promised to fight on to the bitter end to reverse the decisions.
"The gloves are off now - if this Labour government think they have seen the campaign at it's maximum strength they are mistaken," he said. "Stabbing Scotland's soldiers in the back while they carry out work on behalf of the government and country is what is really happening here."
The Scotsman has also learned that under the Ministry of Defence plans, the Black Watch and the other threatened Scottish regiments will lose their individual identities as early as November next year. From that point on, unless political pressure forces the government into an unlikely climbdown, they will be known as the Royal Regiment of Scotland.
As of 1 October this year, the army had 370 more officers than its own stated requirements - 14,080 instead of the 13,710 it should have on its books. Meanwhile, the Scottish Division [made up of the Scottish infantry regiments] is short of 328 men and the army as a whole is short of 3,320 other ranks - 89,700 instead of the 93,020 it should have.
The British Army has five generals on its books, 12 lieutenant-generals, 46 major generals, 170 brigadiers, 590 colonels and 1,740 lieutenant-colonels. Lt-Col James Cowan, the commanding officer of the Black Watch, is one of only a handful of lieutenant-colonels in front line postings; many of the others, and the majority of the more senior officers, are employed in MoD desk jobs.
The MoD claimed that its recruitment and staffing figures did not tell the whole story. A spokesman said: "All of these officers have important roles to play within the armed forces. It is not the case that they are sitting around twiddling their thumbs."
But restricted army papers reveal even more puzzling anomalies. General Sir Mike Jackson, Britain's most senior soldier, has argued that Scotland cannot recruit enough soldiers to man its existing six regiments. "If these regiments are so precious, why are not more young Scotsmen signing up? Why are the Royal Scots having to recruit Fijians?" he said in a recent interview.
Gen Jackson has argued that larger regiments - the so-called super-regiments - suffer fewer recruiting problems, but the army's own figures tell a different story.
His own Parachute Regiment - a model for the new army structure - is at present more reliant on foreign and Commonwealth soldiers than the combined Scottish regiments, using on average 37 such soldiers in a battalion compared to 35 in the Scottish regiments.
The Paras are not over-recruited either: 3 Para is short of 30, the same shortfall as the Black Watch.
However, it is when the figures for foreign and Commonwealth soldiers are stripped out of the existing super-regiments that the full scale of their problems is revealed. The Royal Green Jackets, with two battalions, use a total of 191 such soldiers. The Princess of Wales Royal Regiment, also with two battalions, uses 207. The entire Scottish Division, with six regiments, uses just 208.
But senior army officers, and the MoD, are refusing to contemplate backing down on their plans to restructure the army in Scotland and to get rid of one entire Scottish battalion.
Yesterday an MoD spokesman said: "The issue of foreign and Commonwealth soldiers is neither here nor there as to the future of the battalions."
He said it was up to the individual soldiers which regiments they joined: "They are not being artificially boosted by foreign and Commonwealth soldiers," he said.
Soldiers serving with the Black Watch at Camp Dogwood in Iraq yesterday described the decision as a kick in the teeth. "I feel terrible that the regiment is coming to an end," said 23-year-old Lee Beaton, from Dundee. "We are all working hard and this is how we are rewarded."
Geoff Hoon will announce the cuts on 16 December, ten days after the Army Board meets to finalise its recommendations. Colonel commandants of the Scottish regiments have been invited to the meeting to argue their individual cases, but there appears to be little chance of a change of heart.
The first three of four infantry battalions to disappear completely from the army will go by April 2007, with the final disbandment or amalgamation pencilled in for the following April. The Royal Scots and King's Own Scottish Borderers - which are to be merged into a single battalion - will have to wait until Mr Hoon's announcement to discover when the axe will fall on them.
