Rick's Napkin Forces Challenge

[Kirkhill]

First, the CP-140 flies more in support of the RCN than for NORAD/NORTHCOM. It's an ASW platform that also does ISR, and realistically that ISR mission only started in Afghanistan. Depending on nation, those types of aircraft are either operated by their air forces or navies.

Second, the RCAF RPAS will be armed.

Finally, RCAF is in charge of the space domain. It doesn't launch anything (yet) but it's definitely critical for operations.

Re: The dividing line between RCAF and arty - I don't see a split. Cruise missiles/HIMARS/etc can be arty. Similarly, the RCN CSC is supposed to carry Tomahawks. I don't think any of those conflict with the RCAF's roles.

Edit to add: I personally see the RCAF dealing with things that fly (and are supposed to return). Of course, with the CA/RCN/SOF flying small-ish UAS, that vision is a bit skewed, but I don't think that every ship or troop needs an RCAF SUAS operator detachment.

Yebbut - according to Rick I get to be CDS for a day .

So I want to use the CP-140, and its replacements, the same way it was used over the Middle East. I want it to support both the RCN at sea and the Ground Forces, especially the CANSOFCOM Fusiliers, when operating against Little Green Men.

The RPAS will be armed. But do all of them have to be armed all the time?

And you are dead right. I completely forgot the Space Domain.

As for the RCA/RCAF split

If a flying vehicle launches from a canister or rail on the ground and sprouts wings, then flies autonomously to a designated target (either pre-programmed, programmed in flight or laser designated), with wings or rotors, under the influence of a prop, a jet, a rocket or gravity, large or small, at 30 km/h or Mach 9 is that a plane, a uav or a missile?

 

[KevinB]

Law isn't always black and white

It would be if first we killed all the lawyers

The point here is that when he is running away you are no longer in a self defence mode and there were (and still can be) ROEs that only allow engagement when the individual is actually committing a hostile act like shooting at you. Once the act ceases the permission to engage under the ROE also ceases. (its a bit similar to cops not being allowed to shoot a fleeing suspect/perpetrator in the back)

The trouble that many soldiers have is understanding where in the full war scenario killing any enemy who is not actually surrendering is perfectly permissible while with a lower than full war scenario where deliberate limitations are put in place for whatever reason the CoC sees fit.

Actually you couldn't once the individual disengages and is running away. I'll let a LEO answer that one.

Since you asked Down here we can shoot fleeing felons in the back, they don't even need to be armed

I had this argument with the then JAG - I ended up "winning" when I sent the transcript of the discussion higher for review.
The individual doesn't need to be still firing to be a deadly threat - as they still have the weapon, and have already shown they are willing to use it. Thus they are still able to be engaged with lethal force.


The issue as I later found out was that the JAG in question had the view that the hostile was disengaging - while I saw a hostile using fire and movement to a more advantageous position. It was about how I could articulate the action on the ground from my perspective -

Now if they didn't visibly still have a weapon, under some ROE one would need to wait to see what they where doing, and under nearly all ROE if they threw down their weapon they also could not be engaged.

Part of the problem I found later was there often is no "right" answer in a scenario like that - because it is very hard to frame the scenario for a "correct response" without making it absurd.

All Leg Os are people who interpret things with their own bias. I know some timid Leg Os and I know a whole bunch who are very pragmatic when it comes to balancing competing interests in their advice.

The ROE are your left and right of arcs.

Sometimes perfectly reasonable things make no sense to some people.

I'm not familiar with this opinion even though I was in Ottawa at that time. I can see where the term "Open Tip Match" can get confused with "hollow point". I've seen it considered legal and non legal for both military and hunting purposes in different circumstances. The Hague Convention prohibits "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions." Personally I wouldn't form any opinion on it until I've seen terminal impact effects studies on it (which I haven't) in order to determine if it falls inside or outside the prohibition. I can see where its high level of accuracy would make it a very desirable round for snipers.

Whether a round is acceptable to coalition forces is informative but not determinative. If it had previously been approved within DND, that's another thing although its not unknown that requests can come from separate sources and be handled by two different Leg Os. Differing opinions shouldn't happen but I can see it happening especially if there has been a time interval and the usual posting shuffle has moved folks around.

The CF had issued the OTM approval for a while on 7.62mm (pre 911 IIRC) - but the 5.56mm approval didn't come until during OEF.
My own personal opinion is the rule against expanding bullets is insane this day and age - as C77 ball will yaw and fragment at impact velocities over 2400fps - and leave much worst wound channels that a Soft Point Hunting Bullet would

I'd like that. I prefer a good Pilsner. You could probably help me out a lot with some of the novels I write. With luck I'll get back down to the States when this plague is more under control.

I will eventually be up to Ottawa and Petawawa some time as well.

 

[dimsum]

If a flying vehicle launches from a canister or rail on the ground and sprouts wings, then flies autonomously to a designated target (either pre-programmed, programmed in flight or laser designated), with wings or rotors, under the influence of a prop, a jet, a rocket or gravity, large or small, at 30 km/h or Mach 9 is that a plane, a uav or a missile?

Why not all? Technically they're all subsets of each other.

I'm not being facetious - this Joint Air Power Competence Centre article says this regarding UAS and aircraft:

Currently, NATO defines UA as an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and which is operated remotely using various levels of automated functions...

The ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) defines an aircraft as any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.

And it says this regarding cruise missiles vs UAS:

In general, making the distinction between ordnance and UA is not useful, due to tremendous technical progress. These two categories are not exclusive anymore, while not every ordnance is a UA, a UA can be used as ordnance.

 

[Kirkhill]

These too then.

So, again I say, I have difficulty differentiating between an uninhabited Air Force and the Artillery.

 

[FJAG]

These too then.

View attachment 67193

So, again I say, I have difficulty differentiating between an uninhabited Air Force and the Artillery.

The simple differentiation is if the terminal weapon is ground launched the delivery system is artillery if its air launched the delivery system is Air Force. Please don't try to confuse me with having an ground launched system that delivers air launched sub munitions.

There are probably a herd of colonels sitting around conference tables in Ottawa getting absolutely nothing accomplished while they argue these points. I know they did over Sperwer which didn't even launch a weapon.

 

[Kirkhill]

So this 1400 NM drone on a one-way mission is Artillery?

And pretty sure the Yanks have got 4 stars sweating the same questions.

 

[FJAG]

So this 1400 NM drone on a one-way mission is Artillery?

And pretty sure the Yanks have got 4 stars sweating the same questions.

Not just sweating but getting downright ignorant about it.

Air Force general says of Army’s long range precision fires goal: ‘It’s stupid’

The head of Air Force Global Strike Command had some harsh words about the Army's plan to base long-range missiles in the Pacific.

www.defensenews.com

The Army responds:

Army Chief Defends Long-Range Missile Effort After Air Force General's Public Attack

Gen. Timothy Ray, head of Air Force Global Strike Command, took a very public jab at the Army's top modernization priority.

www.military.com

 

[dimsum]

So this 1400 NM drone on a one-way mission is Artillery?

Yes. The key point being "one way".

If it was designed to do its job, return, and land, then you can argue it's Air Force. This isn't that different (aside from flight profile) of a cruise missile, and no one is saying that cruise missiles should be Air Force assets.

The simple differentiation is if the terminal weapon is ground launched the delivery system is artillery if its air launched the delivery system is Air Force. Please don't try to confuse me with having an ground launched system that delivers air launched sub munitions.

I'd still argue that it would be artillery. Like what I said above, if it's one way then it's a guided munition.

I mean really, with Class 1 UAS being operated by CA/RCN/SOF, the precedent is set for the RCAF not controlling everything that flies.

 

[Kirkhill]

So a recoverable loitering munition, like the Hero-120, that would be a Class 1 UAS?

UVision unveils new HERO developments

UVision has disclosed a series of new developments within its HERO family of precision loitering systems, including a new-generation variant of the Hero-120 and a...

www.janes.com

 

[dimsum]

So a recoverable loitering munition, like the Hero-120, that would be a Class 1 UAS?

UVision unveils new HERO developments

UVision has disclosed a series of new developments within its HERO family of precision loitering systems, including a new-generation variant of the Hero-120 and a...

www.janes.com

This is the (slightly dated) chart I'm referring to when I talk about classes.

So if the Hero is designed to potentially come back and land, and be reused, it counts as a Class 1. If it's not supposed to come back (the site doesn't mention a recovery system) then it's a guided munition in my books.

Incidentally, the USMC just selected that for its indirect fires program.

 

[Kirkhill]

Stepping back from the discussion of the technicalities of the flying machines I am beginning to see the point being made by those of you that have been beating the drum about Airspace Co-Ordination.

In Canadian, and North American, airspace I have come to understand that the responsibility lies with the civil authorities, like NAVCAN, with NORAD having a watching brief until requested to act by the civil authority.

In the event of expeditionary warfare (which our new administration doesn't want) then airspace co-ordination becomes a major issue.

Is it under the national authority of the government being assisted? The authority of the coalition doing the assisting (likely led by the US)? The RCAF or the RCA? In particular 2 Expeditionary Wing or 4 RCA (GS)?

With damnear everything being used in warfare these days "flying" to contact the enemy, and even low cost "40 mm grenades" following complex flight paths with extended durations, that deconfliction and co-ordination role is, indeed both complex and critical.

And I know I have told that before. Just put me down as being slow on the uptake.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is the (slightly dated) chart I'm referring to when I talk about classes.

So if the Hero is designed to potentially come back and land, and be reused, it counts as a Class 1. If it's not supposed to come back (the site doesn't mention a recovery system) then it's a guided munition in my books.

Incidentally, the USMC just selected that for its indirect fires program.

Thanks for that Dimsum. I always appreciate clarification. As noted I can be slow on the uptake.

 

[Kirkhill]

The New Hero-120 .....

The lightweight, compact, highly maneuverable man-pack configuration, with extended endurance of over an hour and a loitering range of40 km and more, can be independently operated by frontline forces, precisely striking time-sensitive targets from a wide variety of angles. Featuring low acoustic and low visual and thermal
signatures and fully gimbaled, stabilized day/night tracking, the Hero-120 delivers critical situational awareness with its advanced data link and real-time intelligence. Providing cutting-edge abort and target re-engagement capabilities, it provides a whole new range of operational possibilities. Despite being a highly sophisticated weapon system, the Hero-120 is affordable and cost-effective due to its recoverable option, using a parachute, while securing the warhead.

UVision Announces Successful Demo of its New Hero-120 Loitering Munitions System for Strategic NATO Customer - EDR Magazine

February 18, 2020 – UVision Air Ltd. – a global leader in Loitering Munitions Systems of all sizes for a

www.edrmagazine.eu

So it seems, like the UTAP-22 Mako "drone", to fall into the space of a re-usable aircraft that is cheap enough to be used as a disposable munition.

 

[FJAG]

...

In the event of expeditionary warfare (which our new administration doesn't want) then airspace co-ordination becomes a major issue.

Is it under the national authority of the government being assisted? The authority of the coalition doing the assisting (likely led by the US)? The RCAF or the RCA? In particular 2 Expeditionary Wing or 4 RCA (GS)?

With damnear everything being used in warfare these days "flying" to contact the enemy, and even low cost "40 mm grenades" following complex flight paths with extended durations, that deconfliction and co-ordination role is, indeed both complex and critical.

And I know I have told that before. Just put me down as being slow on the uptake.

I'm probably speaking out of my hat here since what I do know about air space coordination goes back to the early years in this century but -- it all depends on who is involved.

For example around 2004 when we went into Kabul, Afghanistan's ability to control air space was limited (and poorly at that) to Kabul airport. For that matter NATO/ISAF had very little capability except some very minor air defence folks. The US has a major capability to do the job and basically controlled all the air space over Afghanistan but with virtually no coordination with Kabul airport or ISAF.

When Canada sent its ASCC team there from 4 AD regiment, its primary purpose was to ensure that another Tarnak Farms wouldn't happen and one of the first things they did was ensure that the US knew where all ISAF weapon ranges and installations were so that restricted fly zones could be placed around them. That was harder to accomplish than one would think. SOF folks in particular did not like to coord anything with anyone. Canada then also worked on setting up coordination for all UAVs and artillery with Kabul airport. Again harder than you would think. When Canada took its brigade HQ home after 2004 air support coordination around Kabul suffered again as most NATO countries do not have deployable expeditionary air support coordination systems. Canada's ASCC's are pretty robust but we were a bit light on all the radars etc needed to do the job properly and down south required good linkages with the American's system to do so.

I'm not sure to what extent things have improved in NATO. While they do have systems within Europe, I think their expeditionary capabilities are still light years behind the US's and quite frankly when it comes to who's in charge I would think that for the US, their military interests/needs far outweigh any other consideration.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just going to try and summarize my Napkin Force thoughts in one table.



OIC (Office of the Intelligence Commissioner - Civilian)



CBSA
RCMP
Canadian Rangers
Militia (DART)



Coast Guard
2 Cdn Air Div (Transport & Rescue, Base Support, Training)
RCN
Arctic Fleet (AOPS/SSK/XLUUV)
Atlantic Fleet (CSC/SSK/XLUUV)
Pacific Fleet (CSC/SSK/XLUUV)
12 Wing (Op Con from 1 Cdn Air Div)



NAVCAN
1 Cdn Air Div (NORAD-NorthCom)
22 Wing (Control)
3 Wing (Fighter)
4 Wing (Fighter)
14 Wing (LRPA)
19 Wing (LRPA)
RCA/RCE (GBAD – Coastal Def)



CANSOFCOM
427 SOAS (Op Con from 1 Wing, 1 Cdn Air Div)
1 Wing (GS by 1 Cdn Air Div)
8 Wing (GS by 1 Cdn Air Div)


I believe that that meets The Woke Parties requirements and can be accomplished within the 15,000 PY Framework





Now if I had more PYs available I would supplement the CANSOFCOM force with

3 RCR, 3 PPCLI, 3 R22R, (RCA, RCE)

That combined structure would be the Immediate Reaction Force with a responsibility to support the RCMP with small unit actions, primarily focused on Ranger territory in the North but also available to back up the RCMP in the urban territory of the Militia. They would focus on the War in the Spaces and emphasize tactics similar to those employed in Phase I Afghanistan - rapid and violent disruption of identified threats so as to return matters to RCMP control as quickly as possible.





With more PYs I would establish the Carabineers as a force for operating along the highways in the southern, Militia domain, in support of the RCMP. Their primary focus would be the War in the Places and emphasise tactics similar to their Italian namesakes - the tricky job of managing threats in a crowded and generally friendly environment. This would be the LAV/ACSV force.

CARABINEERS

RCD, LdSH(RC), 12 RBC

1,2 RCR, 1,2 PPCLI, 1,2 R22R,

RCHA

RCE


And finally


Canadian Expeditionary Force


This would be based on the Carabineer Framework but would be thickened by RCA/RCAF/RCN assets to supply greater fire support, surveillance and transport assets.

 

[dimsum]

In the event of expeditionary warfare (which our new administration doesn't want) then airspace co-ordination becomes a major issue.

Is it under the national authority of the government being assisted? The authority of the coalition doing the assisting (likely led by the US)? The RCAF or the RCA? In particular 2 Expeditionary Wing or 4 RCA (GS)?

To try and simplify it - if it's multinational, then it's basically under the coalition Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC).

There are a whole bunch of other coordination centres under that.

 

[lenaitch]

In Canadian, and North American, airspace I have come to understand that the responsibility lies with the civil authorities, like NAVCAN, with NORAD having a watching brief until requested to act by the civil authority.

I'm not sure that's correct. The decision to act would flow from NORAD's bi-national chain of command. NAVCAN is managing traffic in our airspace, but I am not aware they are surveilling it. As far as I know NORAD sees what NAVCAN sees via primary and secondary radar, as well as the NWS, coastal radar and possibly satellite, which NAVCAN would not have access to.

 

[FJAG]

To try and simplify it - if it's multinational, then it's basically under the coalition Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC).

There are a whole bunch of other coordination centres under that.

Kirkhill

You should note that there are several CAOCs in existence - incidentally the operative term for the function is AOC or Air Control Center. the C for "Combined" simply indicates that it is a multinational organization and, through the absence of the indicator "Joint", means that it is essentially a single service operation which in this case means Air Force.

There is a brief overview of what a CAOC is and does in this wiki article:

Air Operations Center - Wikipedia

To muddy the waters even more, Air Space control is also an Army function albeit that it integrates into overarching Air Force structures - note as well that the terms "Control" "Operations" and "Coordination" are not synonymous but instead define separate yet integrated functions. Here's the US Army Field Manual on Airspace Control.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/FM 3-52 FINAL WEB.pdf

It's interesting sometimes to think of how this field developed. I joined the artillery during the height f the Vietnam War when we started getting heavily involved in airmobile missions and fast air support so we started using systems to deconflict artillery, air defence and all those things that flew. As Vietnam faded from history we largely tended to ignore the issue in favour of the "big sky: little bullet" doctrine of airspace non coordination. I can't put my finger on when we started getting serious about the issue again but we certainly had the main elements in place in the late 90s (Bosnia was probably a big factor) although it was one of those backwater fields that only the folks in it really cared about. Tarnak definitely energized the issue and it has stayed that way ever since. When the Army wrote off air defence, it managed to be smart enough to keep the ASCCs as operational entities.

Air space management is a complex field which is getting more complex by the minute. It not only requires a core of personnel well trained in the craft but a suite of specialized hardware and software from radars down to survivable and secure networks to specialized software such as FalconView.

One of the problems with any field like this is having a critical mass of trained people to ensure that there is an adequate career development capability. This is becoming difficult for the artillery which has been so deprived of numbers that stovepipes such as guns, observation and fire support coordination, surveillance and target acquisition and the soon to return air defence are hard to maintain. The artillery is fortunate that it has a specialized instructor in gunnery and master gunner capability for both officers and NCOs that maintains core knowledge alive in faltering fields.

All that to say that we need to be very careful with any exercise like this reduction to 15,000 folks in what capabilities we try to hive off to civilian agencies and which ones we need to hang on to as a military capability at any cost.

To get back to my hobby horse, the reserves, the ONLY way that I can see a reduction of the full-time force to such a low number is if we have a larger part-time force of military "doers" that can be called up in the event of an emergency and focus the full-timers as being instructors and keepers of the knowledge (the "knowers") and the equipment and whose time in units as "doers" is only long enough to gain the practical experience to give their theoretical knowledge a foundation. Divestment of key capabilities to civilian agencies (even related ones) will very quickly have the essential military skills fade away; day-to-day peacetime pressures will very quickly relegate essential in-an-emergency military skills to such a low priority that the skills will disappear.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not sure that's correct. The decision to act would flow from NORAD's bi-national chain of command. NAVCAN is managing traffic in our airspace, but I am not aware they are surveilling it. As far as I know NORAD sees what NAVCAN sees via primary and secondary radar, as well as the NWS, coastal radar and possibly satellite, which NAVCAN would not have access to.

And yet...

As part of NAV CANADA’s ongoing readiness training, the company organised the drill with NORAD. During the exercise, NAV CANADA cleared the airspace over parts of Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area and coordinated with the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and military command and control units from the Royal Canadian Air Force and United States Air Force

Erik Doucet, Manager of Military Coordination and Special Events at NAV CANADA, says these types of international training exercises are necessary to ensure seamlessly coordinated responses in the event of real aerospace threats.

“Employees at NAV CANADA are a key component of all NORAD missions in Canada,” says Doucet. “As we are often the first to identify irregular aircraft movements, NAV CANADA plays an important role in these types of training missions.”

The exercise, known as AMALGAM HAWK 20-01, was part of Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Developed by NORAD after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NOBLE EAGLE is an extensive air defence effort to protect against similar types of attacks within North American airspace.

Operations requiring decisions​

During your first 180 days in office, you will be asked to renew several key operations. You have the authority to extend some of these, but others will require Cabinet approval or concurrence from other Ministers.

• You may be required to make decision on ongoing operations such as Operation NOBLE EAGLE, which seeks to address asymmetric aerial threats within Canadian and US airspace. You are identified as the designated Engagement Authority/decision-maker if the Prime Minister is unavailable. Given the reactive nature of this operation, it is unlikely but possible that it could be triggered at any time.

Operation Noble Eagle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) preparedness[edit]​

Background[edit]​

In January 1982, the FAA unveiled the National Airspace System (NAS) Plan.

... There is no overlap of responsibility between DoD and FAA within the NAS: this is why within FAA-controlled airspace the FAA is in charge of controlling and vectoring hijack intercept aircraft.[1]

The US and Canadian militaries, particularly NORAD and the US Air National Guard, have been tasked with interception duties concerning hijacked aircraft. Their primary duty was assistance to law enforcement. Quoting Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold: "We always viewed an attack from within our borders as a law enforcement issue, ...".[49] Military aircraft were to be used to assure positive flight following, report unusual observances, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.[1]

General Arnold also stated "In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 we had to hook up to FAA radars throughout the country, install compatible radios for nationwide coverage between our command and control agencies and our airborne assets, and purchase a new command and control computer system to integrate radar and communications. The initial investment was for $75 million, and this number has grown to nearly $200 million."[26]

The Airspace is opened and controlled by the civilian corporation NAVCAN, in conjunction with the civilian aiport authorities. The training is organized by the civil authorities. Engagement authorization is supplied by the civil authorities (and I would argue that the President of the United States is as much the civil authority as he is the Commander-in-Chief).

Although NAVCAN may not have access to all available intelligence I think it is reasonable to assert that the Minister of National Defence does, as does the Prime Minister and POTUS.

As to NAVCAN not surveilling the airspace, I hope that is not true. I would find it disconcerting if they were only aware of the things they expected to see in their airspace and unaware to the unexpected.

Canada's NAVCAN radars don't cover the all of Canada's land area, that is true. NORAD's NWS extends that coverage somewhat, but still leaves blind areas in the North. At the same time Canada is reponsible for controlling all traffic civil and military throughout the Canadian zone which extends half-way across the Atlantic, up to the North Pole and well into the Gulf of Alaska. To my understanding that airspace is managed by civilian traffic controllers and not NORAD.


My sense is that NORAD is actually a quite small organization focused on looking for military threats and warning the civil authorities then taking operational control of the airspace when that control is ceded by the civil authorities.

March 2020 - North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)​

Mandate​

• Deter, detect and defeat air threats to Canada and the United States
  • NORAD is a bi-national command that provides:
  • Aerospace control through surveillance and exercising operational control of airspace over Canada and the United States
  • Aerospace warning of attack by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles
  • Maritime warning
• Air defence operations including:
  • Coordinating with Canadian, US, and International partners
  • Coordinating cyber and info ops
  • Developing recommendations on future requirements

Key facts​

Total Employees:​

• 4,842 (Canada 1,091, USA 3,751)

Budget:​

• Unique bi-national combatant command leveraging Canadian and US Services as a Force Employer

 

[Kirkhill]

Kirkhill

You should note that there are several CAOCs in existence - incidentally the operative term for the function is AOC or Air Control Center. the C for "Combined" simply indicates that it is a multinational organization and, through the absence of the indicator "Joint", means that it is essentially a single service operation which in this case means Air Force.

There is a brief overview of what a CAOC is and does in this wiki article:

Air Operations Center - Wikipedia

To muddy the waters even more, Air Space control is also an Army function albeit that it integrates into overarching Air Force structures - note as well that the terms "Control" "Operations" and "Coordination" are not synonymous but instead define separate yet integrated functions. Here's the US Army Field Manual on Airspace Control.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/FM 3-52 FINAL WEB.pdf

It's interesting sometimes to think of how this field developed. I joined the artillery during the height f the Vietnam War when we started getting heavily involved in airmobile missions and fast air support so we started using systems to deconflict artillery, air defence and all those things that flew. As Vietnam faded from history we largely tended to ignore the issue in favour of the "big sky: little bullet" doctrine of airspace non coordination. I can't put my finger on when we started getting serious about the issue again but we certainly had the main elements in place in the late 90s (Bosnia was probably a big factor) although it was one of those backwater fields that only the folks in it really cared about. Tarnak definitely energized the issue and it has stayed that way ever since. When the Army wrote off air defence, it managed to be smart enough to keep the ASCCs as operational entities.

Air space management is a complex field which is getting more complex by the minute. It not only requires a core of personnel well trained in the craft but a suite of specialized hardware and software from radars down to survivable and secure networks to specialized software such as FalconView.

One of the problems with any field like this is having a critical mass of trained people to ensure that there is an adequate career development capability. This is becoming difficult for the artillery which has been so deprived of numbers that stovepipes such as guns, observation and fire support coordination, surveillance and target acquisition and the soon to return air defence are hard to maintain. The artillery is fortunate that it has a specialized instructor in gunnery and master gunner capability for both officers and NCOs that maintains core knowledge alive in faltering fields.

All that to say that we need to be very careful with any exercise like this reduction to 15,000 folks in what capabilities we try to hive off to civilian agencies and which ones we need to hang on to as a military capability at any cost.

To get back to my hobby horse, the reserves, the ONLY way that I can see a reduction of the full-time force to such a low number is if we have a larger part-time force of military "doers" that can be called up in the event of an emergency and focus the full-timers as being instructors and keepers of the knowledge (the "knowers") and the equipment and whose time in units as "doers" is only long enough to gain the practical experience to give their theoretical knowledge a foundation. Divestment of key capabilities to civilian agencies (even related ones) will very quickly have the essential military skills fade away; day-to-day peacetime pressures will very quickly relegate essential in-an-emergency military skills to such a low priority that the skills will disappear.

I agree with you FJAG. However I was working in the terms of reference supplied by the Woke Party.

Having said that I am taking a couple of points from this exercise.

1 We don't have a good Civil Defence plan in place
2 That defence plan should rest on the Militia

(and I remember all the moans about ropes and ladders but even your National Guard Brigades are primarily an emergency management force for their State - they also train for war-fighting - but I would argue that is their secondary job)

3 Ground Based Air (and Coastal) Defence needs to be moved up the spectrum of needs

(and while that may be under the operational control of the RCAF and NORAD it is patently an artillery function and needs to involve the RCE and the RCA in the planning and implementation and requires the RCA/RCE to permanently shadow the civilian organization in much the same way that I perceive NORAD doing. The RCA does indeed need the skills development. Where better to find it than in the Control Towers across Canada and the NAVCAN training centre in Cornwall.

My recipe for the RCA is still commissioned Gunner at each airport, assisted by a Warrant Office and a pair of Bombardier Ammo Techs.

4 The RCN and the RCAF don't have much in the way of spare PYs with which to accomplish their primary missions

(having said that I do think that the RCAF seems to spend a lot of effort doing things that I believe the Coast Guard should be doing and I would be inclined to split the RCAF along the yellow fleet fault line and pass it, along with the maintenance of bases and training to 2 CAD leaving 1 CAD with the military side of the house).

(they are also the forces most likely to exploit technology and artificial intelligence - although the RCA GBAD should not be far behind them).

5 The ground forces necessary to secure the 90% of Canada that isn't arable and not served by roads don't need to be large in number. But they do need to be intimately tied to their air support.

(we don't need to be looking at brigade and even battalion attacks - we need to be looking at FOO/FAC teams with small security elements - say a 4 man FOO/FAC team working with a 16 man rifle squad and a 4 man logistics support team, all transportable by VTOL/STOL aircraft and relying on 1 Cdn Air Div for fire support).

6 The 10% of Canada that is arable, and the 1% that is urban, is a great fit for the LAV based army acting in a para-military Carabineer/Carabinieri role. Transfer the TAPVs to the RCMP and the Militia. The RCA/RCHA would be focused on spotting and targeting and the occasion precision fires, together GBAD. The key tools would be, I suggest, SUAS, LAMs and MSHORAD. Not guns.

7 We can export some of the Carabineer and Northern Force expertise on an ongoing basis (sustaining a battle group) in a permissive environment with a similar set of tools.

8 If we want to send a force over seas and sustain it in the face of opposition then it will require a heavy force based on Cannons and Tanks. And so I think that the Cannons and Tanks should be grouped into one heavy support Brigade that has a high reserve component in it.