Rick's Napkin Forces Challenge
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Oh. And large cargo aircraft for distributing skim milk powder and dehydrated potatoes for famine relief and Obelix and a bunch of sisters for Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.
All bought for inventory and manned by Civil Defence Force Volunteers.
All bought for inventory and manned by Civil Defence Force Volunteers.
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
By the way! Not a bad idea.
ArmyRick
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 2,329
- Points
- 1,010
Why transfer RCN and RCAF and CANSOFCOM to civil defence force? In this case, the political party masters most likely say use them or lose them, no transfer out.OK, I'm jumping early (And no MLRS or RC cheats!)
Step 1 - Take all issued kit into inventory. Add inventory and toys at whim. Apparently Wokers don't mind spending money.
Step 2 - Transfer the RCAF and the RCN to the Civil Defence Force.
Step 3 - Paint all Aircraft Yellow and all ships white (with a jaunty dazzle stripe in red) They're our skies and waters. We don't need to hide.
Step 4 - Buy GBAD kit for inventory with lots of 35mm projectors and NASAMs MMLs, Munitions to include lots of birdshot, frangibles, PFHE (for larger foreign objects) and High Speed Loitering Drones (for reconnaissance of course). Must keep the skies open and airports operating, free of drones, to permit emergency services to operate, families to visit and take vacations, receive their expedited plastic stuff from China. One downside is businessmen would be free to travel.
Step 5 - Buy F35s for inventory and for SAR / SovPat purposes (NORAD to supply missiles if they absolutely insist we have to shoot something down).
Step 6 - Buy for inventory RPAS, High Altitude Pseudo Satellites and a constellation of navigation, comms, radar and observation satellites to keep track of the fields, the fires. the floods and all the other global warming catastrophes
Step 7 - Transfer the civilians to the Civil Defence Force
Step 8 - Transfer CANSOFCOM to the Civil Defence Force (they can come in hand domestically too - and if they end up taking a vacation in Ukraine who's to know?)
Step 9 - Buy for inventory multiple sets of small arms modelled on the New USMC pattern. Enough to equip all 217 Ranger Patrols of the Civil Defence Force, the entirety of the 10 DART brigades of the CDF, and all support personnel. As well as enough for the Canadian Peace Keepers Expeditionary Force. Issued for personal defence and local security. Grenade launchers and Carl Gustavs issued to the Civil Defence Force Armouries with non-lethal ammunition. Mortars and Machine Guns for managing disgruntled rednecks stored locally.
Step 10 - Buy Canadian ATVs, Snowmobiles and weird looking vehicles that will go anywhere. For Inventory.
Step 11 - Distribute all log vehicles in inventory equally across the 13 Provinces and Territories to depots.
Step 12 - Store all F Echelon Vehicles in 4 depots - Edmonton, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown.
Now that lot is sorted out - What to do with the 15,000 Peace Keepers.
Step 13 - Retain CJOC
Step 14 - Combine all elements under 1 Cdn Div.
Step 15 - Establish a Sigs Regt under 1 Div with a Div HQ and 3 or 4 Bde HQs and a bunch of Unit HQs.
Step 16 - Fall in the remainder in light order
Step 17 - Draw from inventory kit necessary for training and for missions
Step 18 - Buy necessary stuff that isn't available.
Step 19 - Ask for volunteers from the Civil Defence Force and the RCMP.
Step 20 - Wait for a change of government.
Beyond that? I got nuffink!
ArmyRick
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 2,329
- Points
- 1,010
Who said this party wants the new CAF to tackle humanitarian relief missions? Go back to the situation please and design accordingly.
Haggis
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 3,138
- Points
- 1,140
No need to maintain a CAF SOF component.
Most large LEAs now have a nucleus of former CANSOF in their ETF/ERT/TRU/GTI. These units would be employed domestically anywhere within Canada under contract to the Minister of Public Safety with equipment transferred from CANSOF. The remainder of the sharp end of CANSOF could be bridged to LEAs for employment as special constables in a limited role, with an option for full bridging to regular constables if they so desire. The GoC could also enter into an international PLAR program allowing those who decided against or were found unsuitable for LEA employment to apply for a transfer (fully funded with a cost move, of course) transfer to another NATO nation's SOF component.
Each Team could be mandated to maintain a deployable sub-unit for VERY SPECIFIC international ops (CANCIT HR, NEO etc.) but NOT for direct action missions which would not be supported by a GoC policy of non intervention in international affairs. Those missions would be left to our allies. This capability would be funded centrally by the GoC.
LEAs in coastal communities (e.g. Halifax, Vancouver) would be funded and mandated to develop and maintain a maritime ERT capability with equipment transferred from CANSOF.
CFJIRU would be transferred to CNSC or Health Canada.
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Like that idea!
- Reaction score
- 21,840
- Points
- 1,360
I think Kirkhill was adding in the contemporary factor of an organization ignoring its directed GR&A (ground rules and assumptions…the latest DND planning space buzzword).
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Getting serious now.
Boss has straightened me out.
No foreign excursions and expeditions
Focus on domestic threats.
Domestic threat response is led by the Civil Power. The lead agency will be the RCMP.
RCMP will be assisted by CSIS, CBSA, Coast Guard and Parks Canada.
RCMP has internal capability to manage a limited number of armed events - occasional incidences of small groups of individuals (section size and smaller) equipped with small arms ((AK, RPK, Old FNs, RPGs). They are not equipped for managing a malign environment (a Canadian version of Afghanistan).
Domestic threats are not expected to include heavy weapons (tanks or artillery). However the grey zone ranges downwards from a full blown, organized armed insurrection with the insurgents creating "technicals" (including armed helicopters and Twin Otters and RC conversion of Cessnas) to Hell's Angels exploiting instability for criminal advantage and adding to the instability, to well meaning protesters disrupting daily life by any and all means, to corporations deciding to test the limits of government by hiring their own security forces and deviating from government policy. All of which will be encouraged, financed and equipped by foreign interests - governmental, commercial and criminal.
The Domestic Threat, I would anticipate would have access to anything that can be bought on the civilian market in Canada as well as anything that can be smuggled into the country in an Amazon shipment by air or in a Seacan.
Foreign Advisors on Canadian soil are likely to be a real threat. Those could range from individuals working independently as saboteurs, to provocateurs, to facilitators, to groups of advisors/trainers/operators acting coverty all the way up to overt support of separatist entities that are recognized by foreign governments.
Quebec and Alberta/Saskatchewan are at risk. So is Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. So is BC outside of the Douglas treaty area of Victoria. The Inuit controlled coasts of Northern Quebec and Labrador. The entire boreal forest zone held by the indigenous community and defended by the Rangers. All of these groups could be exploited by foreign governments, legitimately, by foreign commercial investment interests and their privately engaged security companies. Additional foreign assistance could be anticipated in the form of on-site plant management and technicians working in Canada on visas.
Summary.
If we stipulate an active threat, stress on active, then the threat is diverse, distributed and low grade but possibly orchestrated.
Threat Capabilities
Industrial Sabotage - from not conducting proper maintenance intentionally (or intentionally conducting maintenance improperly)
Splashy events - bombings, destruction of dams, HAZMAT/CBRN/Environmental attacks (to include intentional floods, wildfires and exploitation of minor natural events such as ice-storms to cover the sabotage of power grids, pipelines, railways, roads, ports and airports).
Open aggression - targeting of government personnel, forces and facilities by missile bombardment launched from separatist territory by foreign advisors whose government recognizes the separatist element. The recognition would be paid for by commercial advantage.
In fact the exact terms under which the US agrees to defend Canada in exchange for oil access.
Perhaps somebody is willing to make the locals a better offer than Ottawa is willing to make.
Threat Equipment
Smart Phones
Commercial EO and RF equipment, binoculars, telescopes, sights, NVGs, radar, laser range finders, laser pens, RC kits, actuators, solenoids, motors, wires, batteries....
Tools
Motorcycles, Quads, Snowmobiles, Cars, Trucks, Helicopters, Planes, Boats, Bv206s.
Explosives and blasting devices and equipment
Matches and Lighters
Acids and caustics (and exothermic reactions)
Knives and Hammers
Bows and Arrows, Crossbows, Airguns,
Rifles and Shotguns (with wooden stocks and no pistol grips)
And, of course smuggled AKs, FNs and pistols.
Lots of ammunition available
Machine guns and mortars and missiles (dumb ballistic as well as smart guided) also readily available on the international market with or without foreign government support. These would include bombardment missiles as well as anti-tank and anti-air missiles that can be either man-portable or compatible with light vehicles and helicopters. Off route, remote controlled, automatically triggered and confined space versions are also available or can be rigged.
Another summary.
The worst case scenario is very bad.
The government will be well advised to keep the lid on things, and not let them escalate. Otherwise, to use another Canadian analogy, they are looking at going into wildfire season with a bone dry forest, in a drought and lots of smouldering subterranean fires left over from previous years. They do not want people intentionally starting fires.
They also don't want to upset the population any more than it is and cause it to consider starting new fires.
They government needs to act with a firm, but light, touch. Keeping old friends, making new friends where it can and not making new enemies.
Boss has straightened me out.
No foreign excursions and expeditions
Focus on domestic threats.
Domestic threat response is led by the Civil Power. The lead agency will be the RCMP.
RCMP will be assisted by CSIS, CBSA, Coast Guard and Parks Canada.
RCMP has internal capability to manage a limited number of armed events - occasional incidences of small groups of individuals (section size and smaller) equipped with small arms ((AK, RPK, Old FNs, RPGs). They are not equipped for managing a malign environment (a Canadian version of Afghanistan).
Domestic threats are not expected to include heavy weapons (tanks or artillery). However the grey zone ranges downwards from a full blown, organized armed insurrection with the insurgents creating "technicals" (including armed helicopters and Twin Otters and RC conversion of Cessnas) to Hell's Angels exploiting instability for criminal advantage and adding to the instability, to well meaning protesters disrupting daily life by any and all means, to corporations deciding to test the limits of government by hiring their own security forces and deviating from government policy. All of which will be encouraged, financed and equipped by foreign interests - governmental, commercial and criminal.
The Domestic Threat, I would anticipate would have access to anything that can be bought on the civilian market in Canada as well as anything that can be smuggled into the country in an Amazon shipment by air or in a Seacan.
Foreign Advisors on Canadian soil are likely to be a real threat. Those could range from individuals working independently as saboteurs, to provocateurs, to facilitators, to groups of advisors/trainers/operators acting coverty all the way up to overt support of separatist entities that are recognized by foreign governments.
Quebec and Alberta/Saskatchewan are at risk. So is Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. So is BC outside of the Douglas treaty area of Victoria. The Inuit controlled coasts of Northern Quebec and Labrador. The entire boreal forest zone held by the indigenous community and defended by the Rangers. All of these groups could be exploited by foreign governments, legitimately, by foreign commercial investment interests and their privately engaged security companies. Additional foreign assistance could be anticipated in the form of on-site plant management and technicians working in Canada on visas.
Summary.
If we stipulate an active threat, stress on active, then the threat is diverse, distributed and low grade but possibly orchestrated.
Threat Capabilities
Industrial Sabotage - from not conducting proper maintenance intentionally (or intentionally conducting maintenance improperly)
Splashy events - bombings, destruction of dams, HAZMAT/CBRN/Environmental attacks (to include intentional floods, wildfires and exploitation of minor natural events such as ice-storms to cover the sabotage of power grids, pipelines, railways, roads, ports and airports).
Open aggression - targeting of government personnel, forces and facilities by missile bombardment launched from separatist territory by foreign advisors whose government recognizes the separatist element. The recognition would be paid for by commercial advantage.
In fact the exact terms under which the US agrees to defend Canada in exchange for oil access.
Perhaps somebody is willing to make the locals a better offer than Ottawa is willing to make.
Threat Equipment
Smart Phones
Commercial EO and RF equipment, binoculars, telescopes, sights, NVGs, radar, laser range finders, laser pens, RC kits, actuators, solenoids, motors, wires, batteries....
Tools
Motorcycles, Quads, Snowmobiles, Cars, Trucks, Helicopters, Planes, Boats, Bv206s.
Explosives and blasting devices and equipment
Matches and Lighters
Acids and caustics (and exothermic reactions)
Knives and Hammers
Bows and Arrows, Crossbows, Airguns,
Rifles and Shotguns (with wooden stocks and no pistol grips)
And, of course smuggled AKs, FNs and pistols.
Lots of ammunition available
Machine guns and mortars and missiles (dumb ballistic as well as smart guided) also readily available on the international market with or without foreign government support. These would include bombardment missiles as well as anti-tank and anti-air missiles that can be either man-portable or compatible with light vehicles and helicopters. Off route, remote controlled, automatically triggered and confined space versions are also available or can be rigged.
Another summary.
The worst case scenario is very bad.
The government will be well advised to keep the lid on things, and not let them escalate. Otherwise, to use another Canadian analogy, they are looking at going into wildfire season with a bone dry forest, in a drought and lots of smouldering subterranean fires left over from previous years. They do not want people intentionally starting fires.
They also don't want to upset the population any more than it is and cause it to consider starting new fires.
They government needs to act with a firm, but light, touch. Keeping old friends, making new friends where it can and not making new enemies.
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Government Capabilities
Beyond those of the Civil Power and its agencies
The Federal Government has at its disposal, as a result of its policy decisions, an inventory of equipment that is held in depots across Canada. That equipment is Government equipment and it is employed to meet civil emergencies, security and military requirements. It is used for training, maintaining situational awareness and crisis management as well as offensive action.
The available fleet is heavily skewed towards logistics
7500 wheeled vehicles (not including Quads, Snowmobiles and Motorcycles)
141 helicopters (CH-148 without their roll-on surveillance kit)
51 transport aircraft
2 JSS ships planned - one interim analog in service.
Beyond those of the Civil Power and its agencies
The Federal Government has at its disposal, as a result of its policy decisions, an inventory of equipment that is held in depots across Canada. That equipment is Government equipment and it is employed to meet civil emergencies, security and military requirements. It is used for training, maintaining situational awareness and crisis management as well as offensive action.
The available fleet is heavily skewed towards logistics
7500 wheeled vehicles (not including Quads, Snowmobiles and Motorcycles)
141 helicopters (CH-148 without their roll-on surveillance kit)
51 transport aircraft
2 JSS ships planned - one interim analog in service.
| RCN JSS | 2 |
| CC-144 | 4 |
| CC-150 | 5 |
| CC-177 | 5 |
| CC-130J | 17 |
| CC-295 | 16 |
| CC-138 | 4 |
| CH-146 | 85 |
| CH-147 | 15 |
| CH-148 | 27 |
| CH-149 | 14 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary -Ttl | 340-520 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-TCV-16.5T | 50-75 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-MHC | 10-18 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-MRT | 50-82 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-LHS | 200-300 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Tractor | 30-45 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Fuel | 100-120 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Water | 10-15 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Flatracks | 200-300 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Pods | 2-8 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-Fuel | 30-70 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-HET | 30-45 |
| LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-LHS | 50-100 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - Ttl | 1300 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - TCV | 895 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - Cage | 128 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - Flatbed | 100 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - Arty | 94 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - Eng | 51 |
| MSVS-MilCOTS - MHC | 32 |
| MSVS-SMP-Ttl | 1587 |
| MSVS-SMP-LHS | 750 |
| MSVS-SMP-TCV | 600 |
| MSVS-SMP-MRT | 150 |
| MSVS-SMP-MHC | 50 |
| MSVS-SMP-Arty | 37 |
| MSVS-APS | 161 |
| MSVS-Trlrs | 322 |
| MSVS-ISO | 995 |
| MSVS-SEV Kits | 868 |
| LVM-Lt Domestic | 400-600 |
| LVM-Lt Expedtionary - Ttl | 1000-1500 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary -TCV-3T | 290-425 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Cage | 80-100 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary-MRT | 255-395 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Adm | 410-640 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Ftr | 55-70 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Amb | 110-130 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary -Trlr-Cgo | 100-150 |
| LVM-Lt Expeditionary -Trlr-Water | 100-150 |
| LUV-MilCOTS-2T | 1061 |
| LUV-C&R | |
| LUV-UV | 858 |
| LUV-MP | 143 |
| LUV-Cable | 60 |
| LUV-SMP-2T | 1159 |
| LUV-C&R | 466 |
| LUV-UV | 647 |
| LUV-MP | 46 |
| LUV-Cable | |
| LUV-APK | |
| LUV-Trlr-1T | |
| LFE-TMP-1T/3T (PL/GVW) | 330 |
| LFE-TMP-Personnel (4+1) | 230 |
| LFE-TMP-Cgo (2+1) | 100 |
| LFE-TMP-Trlr-0.5T | 330 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp | 207 |
| CHER-HSA-Exp-Backhoes | 12 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp-Dozers | 30 |
| CHER-HCE-Amd-Dozers | 6 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp-Loaders | 24 |
| CHER-HCE-Amd-Loaders | 6 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp-Graders | 19 |
| CHER-HCE-Amd-Graders | 6 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp-Excavators | 19 |
| CHER-HCE-Amd-Excavators | 6 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp Compactors | 13 |
| CHER-HCE-Amd- Compactors | 4 |
| CHER-HCE-Exp-Crane-Med | 10 |
| CHER-HCE-Amd-Crane-Med | 4 |
| CHER-HCE-Trlr-Lowbed | 8 |
| CHER-HCE-Modules-Dump | 40 |
| CHER-HCE-COTS | 131 |
| CHER-HCE-COTS-Backhoes | 31 |
| CHER-HCE-COTS-Dumptrucks | 31 |
| CHER-HCE-COTS-Trlr-Tilt | 69 |
| CHER-MHE | 292 |
| CHER-MHE-RTCH | 12 |
| CHER-MHE-RTFL-Hvy | 20 |
| CHER-MHE-RTFL-Med | 66 |
| CHER-MHE-RTFL-Lt | 81 |
| CHER-MHE-RTFL-Zoom | 113 |
| ERC | 104 |
| ERC-A | 78 |
| ERC-B | 26 |
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Additional fleets include an internal security fleet including
1477 Armoured Security Vehicles (653 LAVs, 324 ACSVs, 500 TAPVs)
Additional vehicles included are those responsible for IEDD management.
12 MCDVs
8 AOPS (including future builds planned)
14 CP-140s
36 CF-188s (equipped with LANTIRN/Sniper Pods)
The Air Force assets are included for their Situational Awareness / ISR capabilities more than their abilities to launch bullets, bombs and missiles.
Likewise the AOPS and MCDVs are primarily SA vehicles, but they also have the ability to act as launch platforms for people and weapons. Exactly after the fashion of the Armoured Security Vehicles. A roving home for heavily armed coppers.
1477 Armoured Security Vehicles (653 LAVs, 324 ACSVs, 500 TAPVs)
Additional vehicles included are those responsible for IEDD management.
12 MCDVs
8 AOPS (including future builds planned)
14 CP-140s
36 CF-188s (equipped with LANTIRN/Sniper Pods)
The Air Force assets are included for their Situational Awareness / ISR capabilities more than their abilities to launch bullets, bombs and missiles.
Likewise the AOPS and MCDVs are primarily SA vehicles, but they also have the ability to act as launch platforms for people and weapons. Exactly after the fashion of the Armoured Security Vehicles. A roving home for heavily armed coppers.
| RCN AOPS | 6+2 |
| RCN MCDV | 12 |
| RCAF CP140 Recap | 14 |
| RCAF Ftrs | 88 |
| LAV-Ttl | 977 |
| LAV-ISC | 278 |
| LAV-Cmd | 181 |
| LAV-LRSS | 66 |
| LAV-OPV | 47 |
| LAV*-EW | 18 |
| LAV-Eng | 44 |
| LAV*-Eng | 19 |
| ACSV-CPV | 97 |
| ACSV-Amb | 49 |
| ACSV-MRT | 70 |
| ACSV-MRV | 54 |
| ASCV-FCV | 13 |
| ACSV-TCV | 41 |
| TAPV - Ttl | 500 |
| TAPV-Recce RWS | 138 |
| TAPV-GU RWS | 226 |
| TAPV-Recce | 55 |
| TAPV-GU | 81 |
| IEDD |
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Canada's military fleet comprises
12 Patrol Frigates
4 Diesel Submarines
52 CF-188s (Assumes a total fleet of 88 flying machines with 36 tasked to ISR support of internal security)
37 Towed howitzers.
112 Leopard Tanks with 82 gun tanks in 4 configurations.
The CF-188s are assumed to be required to Continue Mission in support of NORAD under the terms of the new Oil Treaty.
The Patrol Frigates and the Diesel Submarines can be just as easily be assigned to internal security duties as ISR assets and roving launch platforms. In the CPF case the platforms can launch small dets of people, boats, helicopters, and anti-aircraft missiles (SBAD - Sea Based Air Defence) before going offensive and starting to launch SSMs, torpedoes and bullets.
12 Patrol Frigates
4 Diesel Submarines
52 CF-188s (Assumes a total fleet of 88 flying machines with 36 tasked to ISR support of internal security)
37 Towed howitzers.
112 Leopard Tanks with 82 gun tanks in 4 configurations.
The CF-188s are assumed to be required to Continue Mission in support of NORAD under the terms of the new Oil Treaty.
The Patrol Frigates and the Diesel Submarines can be just as easily be assigned to internal security duties as ISR assets and roving launch platforms. In the CPF case the platforms can launch small dets of people, boats, helicopters, and anti-aircraft missiles (SBAD - Sea Based Air Defence) before going offensive and starting to launch SSMs, torpedoes and bullets.
|
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
So, in sum, in my opinion, Canada is well equipped to meet its Civil Defence needs and has reasonable cover on its internal security needs. It also has adequate assets in inventory to meet its obligations to the USN and the USAF.
What it is lacking is any ability to fight a conventional war on land. 82 tanks (in 3 different configurations) and 37 towed howitzers are not a firm basis on which to engage Latvia, let alone the Russians.
So the Government of the Day's decision to focus on domestic, rather than expeditionary needs, is not unwise. Even if it is unwelcome.
Enuff for just now.
Given this situation I will be looking at organizing 15,000 available bodies into:
A Maritime Force (RCN) of 4000
An Air Force (RCAF) of 4000
A Land Force (CA) of 4000
A Command and Support Force of 3000.
More to follow.
What it is lacking is any ability to fight a conventional war on land. 82 tanks (in 3 different configurations) and 37 towed howitzers are not a firm basis on which to engage Latvia, let alone the Russians.
So the Government of the Day's decision to focus on domestic, rather than expeditionary needs, is not unwise. Even if it is unwelcome.
Enuff for just now.
Given this situation I will be looking at organizing 15,000 available bodies into:
A Maritime Force (RCN) of 4000
An Air Force (RCAF) of 4000
A Land Force (CA) of 4000
A Command and Support Force of 3000.
More to follow.
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
Glad for the approbation.
More good background (I trust)
From a recent archived publication
The existing structure:
It is worth noting that, in my opinion, Canada's defence requirements start and finish with the RCAF. The shear size of the land mass, the lack of roads, the inaccessible terrain, the changing seasons, the amount of fresh water, the ginormous littoral - if we had no international obligations we would be required to maintain a sizeable air capability. Add to that our strategic position in the arctic, our position on the attack path to the US (both the Continental US AND Alaska) and the resultant NORAD obligation, as well as our responsibility for a total airspace of 15,000,000 km2 when we consider as well our responsibilities to supply SAR coverage and maintain law and order over the high seas fishing fleets, then there is no other mechanism available to us that will permit us to police that area.
Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Fisheries Zones - Canadian interest in Zones 18, 21 and 67
More good background (I trust)
From a recent archived publication
March 2020 - Defence 101 – Transition binder 2020
Defence 101 – Transition binder 2020 - Canada.ca
March 2020 - Essential information to familiarize the Minister with the Department.www.canada.ca
The existing structure:
It is worth noting that, in my opinion, Canada's defence requirements start and finish with the RCAF. The shear size of the land mass, the lack of roads, the inaccessible terrain, the changing seasons, the amount of fresh water, the ginormous littoral - if we had no international obligations we would be required to maintain a sizeable air capability. Add to that our strategic position in the arctic, our position on the attack path to the US (both the Continental US AND Alaska) and the resultant NORAD obligation, as well as our responsibility for a total airspace of 15,000,000 km2 when we consider as well our responsibilities to supply SAR coverage and maintain law and order over the high seas fishing fleets, then there is no other mechanism available to us that will permit us to police that area.
Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Fisheries Zones - Canadian interest in Zones 18, 21 and 67
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
But before I do
4 vessels.
2 Halifax Patrol Frigates in the Blue Waters of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific operating at the rough edges of our policing responsibility
2 AOPS in the Hudson's Bay littoral and the arctic ice of the North West Passage
White Pins - AOPS
Yellow Pins - CPF
Red Rings - 24 hr sprint distance of the vessels, 30 knots (CPF open water), 17 knots (AOPS open water), 3 knots (AOPS breaking ice).
Light Blue Rings - CH-148 range if recovered on board (740 km)
Light Green Rings - CH-146 range if recovered on board (300 km - Kirkhill Estimate half of 90% of published range)
4 vessels.
2 Halifax Patrol Frigates in the Blue Waters of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific operating at the rough edges of our policing responsibility
2 AOPS in the Hudson's Bay littoral and the arctic ice of the North West Passage
White Pins - AOPS
Yellow Pins - CPF
Red Rings - 24 hr sprint distance of the vessels, 30 knots (CPF open water), 17 knots (AOPS open water), 3 knots (AOPS breaking ice).
Light Blue Rings - CH-148 range if recovered on board (740 km)
Light Green Rings - CH-146 range if recovered on board (300 km - Kirkhill Estimate half of 90% of published range)
Blackadder1916
Army.ca Fixture
- Reaction score
- 2,747
- Points
- 1,160
No expeditionary capability. Extremely limited requirement for any overseas operations. Are there any NATO/UN commitments beyond an Icelandic symbolic type? NORAD continues. Coastal, territorial, economic zone sea and air surveillance and armed response must continue.
If the 4000 cap is not met for a component can remainder be used in another service (e.g. if don't need 4000 Army can I have a larger Navy/Air Force)?
Good. No SAR or Assistance to Civil Authorities. Aid to Civil Power remains. No standing reserve units - a supplementary category of reservist should remain to have capability to use "individuals" with special skills for temporary/part-time uniformed service.
Let's begin with some obvious cuts.
a. Most of NDHQ - replace with a CFHQ (a military HQ); DND will still need a civilian HQ but those pers are civvies, not the CDS' worry.
b. Military colleges go - if (and it's a very big if) subsidized university education is deemed necessary send them to a civilian university. One obvious approach is contract with CCG College for education of hard Navy officers.
c. If there is no expeditionary capability beyond rare, short-term limited manpower activities, then there is no requirement for a large (uniformed) tail to maintain the teeth. So a lot of the supporters can be civilianized (preferred) or contracted.
d. Most CF schools can be reduced, amalgamated or closed - particularly for technical/service support trades; most technical training done at civilian colleges. Try to make agreement with allies (if any remaining except USA) for some contracted military related training, particularly pilot and other aircrew trades.
e. Any SAR specific units (or elements thereof) and equipment. Those airframes would go to whatever organization takes on the SAR mission.
f. Anything that is Cadet related (the CF manpower is Reservist).
What must remain.
a. Existing Naval capability though it would be mostly restricted to operating in our vast sea area.
b. Existing Air Force capability including fighters (NORAD), maritime surveillance, tactical aviation, and transport (includes refueling)
c. A ground force capability primarily for "Aid to the Civil Power" operations, some limited OUTCAN ops (NEO, etc). Assumption - NO CEREMONIAL function.
A first look:
CFHQ
CDS - Major General (or naval equivalent)
VCDS - BGen
One other GOFO as operations chief
400 military pers (all ranks)
Navy
Commodore
4000 pers (5000 preferred)
Air Force
BGen
4000 pers (5000 preferred)
Army
BGen
2300 pers
Intelligence and Security
Colonel
450 pers
Service Support/Training/Misc (a mixed bag of separate orgs)
1850 pers
Other specifics will require some more thinking
- Reaction score
- 8,210
- Points
- 1,160
As I perambulate slowly to catch up with Blackadder
And I know that SAR is no longer the CF's job but I presume that the job will still have to be done somehow to comply with existing agreements. Sell it off to Provincial Air Lines?
The CC-295s and the CC-130Hs go with the Cormorants? Or the way of the Buffalo?
And I know that SAR is no longer the CF's job but I presume that the job will still have to be done somehow to comply with existing agreements. Sell it off to Provincial Air Lines?
The CC-295s and the CC-130Hs go with the Cormorants? Or the way of the Buffalo?
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