The second video about the experimentation at Bovington is, I think, the most relevant.
Watch: What is the Future Commando Force?
The Royal Marines modernisation programme has seen the creation of a new unit, a new uniform, and new technology being tested.www.forces.net
But isn't that how you get to implement change? With minimal disruption to the order of things?Sounds like a pretty bog standard company level patrolling exercise to me, roaming around in 4 man teams, but 'whatev Royal'
www.army.mod.uk
Both Hereford and Poole have bumped those numbers up (along with their international equivalents), 4-man dets / patrols went away long ago once FIBUA became a mainstay operating environment and a required increase in the number of specialist qualifications within each det / patrol; the contemporary UKSF tp is more like ~24-30 pers (not accounting for actual manning).Sticking with my thesis on the value of the "large section or small platoon as a single element" in the ground combat role with a size of 12 to 20 I was also going to add the Troops of the SAS Squadrons.
Special Air Service - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Another example of 16 soldiers organized to work together is the Leo2 Troop.
When I look at videos from Ukraine what I am seeing is groups larger than 8 and smaller than 40. 12 to 16 seems to a fairly common element size for an element conducting autonomous, dispersed missions.
One needs to be careful in making conclusions about arty structures. They have dramatically transitioned over the years and continue to do so.
One needs to be careful in making conclusions about arty structures. They have dramatically transitioned over the years and continue to do so.
Traditionally battery commanders and FOOs in the British structure have come from the close support battery. That was one of the key distinctions of a close support battery/regiment in that it provided liaison and observers to the manoeuvre units it supported as well as dedicated fire support. All other arty units (general support) merely provided fire support.
The Americans have been different for quite some time with close support regiments providing liaison and observers from the arty battalion rather than the battery by way of fire support coordinators and fire support teams. A FIST generally provides company level support with a FIST officer (FSO) and sergeant with the company HQ and an observer (FO) and RTO at each platoon. FACs are generally attached specialists.
The Brits and Canadians have changed their structure as well and have removed all FSCC and FOO functions from the gun batteries. They are now in their own batteries which in Canada are called OP batteries and with the Brit Army are called Tactical or Tactical Group batteries. In each case the battery provides all FSCC and observers to supported manoeuvre battalions. Canadians still call their observers FOOs while Brits are now gravitating to the Fire Support Team (FST) label. They are very similar, however, with a Capt as the FOO, a sergeant team commander, a sergeant FAC/JTAC (this role may also be in the FOO or his tech or both) and several drivers/signallers. There is no provision for observers to go with platoons although the team has the ability to split into a base and mobile parties which could (and in Afghanistan) frequently accompanied the lead elements. The basic concept however is that the observers basically chose their own location(s) within the company based on the tactical situation rather than a permanent affiliation. They do communicate intimately with the FOO/FST/FSCC, however, so that near and deep observation is seamless.
STA is not part of the FOO/FST structure. Their tactical and technical requirements differ completely from FOOs/FSTs. Radars, acoustic devices and drones are deployed based on where they can best support the force. Drones are frequently assigned to companies, radars and acoustics rarely - they are more "in location". Generally STA resources are coordinated by an STACC at the brigade level although during Afghanistan we pushed that down to the battlegroup. IMHO it overloaded the BG CPs and should have stayed with brigade.
All that to say that neither the Brits nor Canadians assign observer resources to a platoon. They are assigned solely to the company but may operate within a platoon's formation or position depending on the tactical situation. Platoons receive fire support through an all-arms call for fire which is picked up and technically managed by the FOO/FST. Personally I see no need for a specific fire support resource to a platoon. It would be idle for the vast majority of the time. In those rare circumstances where a platoon is separated far enough from the company to merit an accompanying observer, the FOO/FST can split to allocate one or two members for that role.
I can see that if the Marines do revert to a smaller team role that there may very well be FSTs or FST members assigned to those teams. One thing that gunners do is adapt to the tactical realities. As an example Canada's peacetime establishment called for two FOOs with an additional one for wartime. In Afghanistan, because of the dispersed companies, we ended up deploying four on occasion and changed the underlying structure of the regiments to provide the requisite number of FSCCs and observers and STA resources at the cost of cutting our deployable guns in half.
Just about zero. We're not important enough to merit that. As an example, during the early years of Kandahar the gun troops (that's two M777s and around 35 bodies) operated mostly from austere desert gun positions up to a hundred or more kilometres apart (some were within the FOB at Sperwan Ghar but most weren't) At times they were located with an echelon or sometimes a US SOF Det Alpha or two but just as often they sat on a flat piece of ground with a TLAV at each corner of a 100 metre square.
Actually not so much. Canada has an STA battery within each of its three field regiments and additional resources with 4 GS. In the UK most of the STA is concentrated in 5 RA and 32 RA. There are certain sensors that sit with the FOOs/FSTs such as GPS and orientation systems, lasers, thermal imagery and ground radars, but not at the level of UAVs or counterfire radars. They're really more of a divisional resource tied to things like GS MLRSs. The US, like us, does have some counterfire radars and UAVs at the manoeuvre brigade level as well as in GS arty brigades.
I don't think so for two main reasons.
You're right there. When we formed the OP batteries we gave it one BC and FSCC staff and all the OP dets. We left a BC and his FSCC with each of the two gun batteries. IMHO this had more to do with the administrative nature of having a major as a battery commander and that we couldn't simply shove three majors into the OP battery and leave the gun batteries under the command of senior captains. Its a Frankensteinian structure at the best of times.
