Report of the SC on National Defence: "Canada and the Defence of North America"

[MarkOttawa]

Prof. Andrea Charron of U. of Manitoba featured in this piece at “HIgh North News” from Norway–note US Army and NORAD exercise:

NORAD, NORTHCOM Strategy Highlights Changing Strategic Environment in the Arctic

“In today’s changing geopolitical environment not to mention environmentally changing world, Canada and the US need to rethink continental defence,” Dr. Andrea Charron, Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies says…

Dr. Andrea Charron, Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) at the University of Manitoba in Canada, explains that the strategy builds on the thinking of successive NORAD and USNORTHCOM commanders who recognized that continental defence is often overlooked in favour of deployments away.

“In today’s changing geopolitical environment not to mention environmentally changing world, Canada and the US need to rethink continental defence,” Charron writes in an e-mail to High North News…

The launch of the strategy comes just a few days early of the new US Army Arctic strategy, which lays out how the Army can better position itself to operate in the region.

The strategy emphasizes developing and strengthening Arctic partnerships, stating that “we will defend the United States and Canada in and through the Arctic, with allies and partners, including Indigenous peoples and governments, by building Arctic awareness, enhancing Arctic operations, capabilities, infrastructure, and ensuring a credible defense presence. Improving our DA, polar communications capability, and ability to conduct sustained multi-domain operations are priorities.”

“It is encouraging to see that the strategy thinks about the necessary and important partnerships with indigengous peoples in the Arctic. Canada has been ahead of the US in this respect,” Charron adds.
Arctic Air Defence Exercise

On Wednesday, NORAD announced it will be conducting the Arctic air defence exercise, AMALGAM DART From March 20 to 26, 2021. The exercise which will include a variety of military aircraft from the Royal Canadian Air Force and United States Air Force.

The aircrafts will be operating out of northern locations including Whitehorse, Y.T., Yellowknife, N.W.T, Edmonton, Alta., Goose Bay, N.L, Iqaluit, Nun, and Thule, Greenland [emphasis added],” the NORAD press statement says.

According to the statement, the exercise will provide the opportunity to improve skills as Canadian and U.S. forces operate together with allies and partners in the Arctic.

NORAD routinely conducts exercises using a variety of scenarios including airspace restriction violations, hijackings, and responses to unknown aircraft.’
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/no...hlights-changing-strategic-environment-arctic

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

RCAF/USAF turning Thule into fighter base for NORAD Ex AMALGAMDART--with portable arresting gear--at the invaluable "War Zone" (Canadian media beaten yet again what CAF are doing)--with video:

NORAD Fighters Are Using Arresting Gear For Year-Round Ops At Greenland’s Thule Air Base​

The Arctic airbase hasn’t had a permanent fighter presence since the 1950s but is once again ready to accommodate fighters all year round.​

Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 Hornet fighter jets have been operating in Arctic winter conditions at Thule, in Greenland, home of the northernmost U.S. airbase, an immensely strategic facility just 947 miles from the North Pole. The jets are helping prove the concept of year-round operations at the base in the High North, using the Mobile Aircraft Arresting System, which adds an important additional margin of safety for landing planes.

The U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) announced recently that the U.S. Air Force’s 823rd RED HORSE Squadron — the acronym standing for Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers — had installed the Mobile Aircraft Arresting System (MAAS) at Thule Air Base for use during the Amalgam Dart 21-2 air defense exercise. The U.S. Department of Defense confirmed that the MAAS was certified on March 21 via high-speed taxiing involving a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CF-18.

“The system slowed a CF-18 from 128 knots to a full stop in 1,000 feet,” NORAD added. “The MAAS ensures we can support fighter aircraft ops in high Arctic environments.”

The MAAS is intended to be installed anywhere in the world where fighter operations may be required from short or icy runways or even those that have been damaged by enemy airstrikes. Similar equipment is also used to bring a fighter to a halt in an emergency situation. In the High Arctic environment, the MAAS gear reduces flight safety risks when recovering on runways that may be subject to snow, wind, and ice. At Thule, for example, winter temperatures can plummet to -47 degrees Fahrenheit, while winds reach as high as 100 knots...

Amalgam Dart 21-2, which is running from March 20 to 26, is a wider Arctic air defense exercise involving the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and USAF at various northern locations, including Whitehorse in Yukon, Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, Edmonton in Alberta, Goose Bay in Newfoundland and Labrador, plus Iqaluit, Nun, and Thule in Greenland.


Small investments deliver big capabilities for #NORAD ops. Concrete pads installed at Thule AB enable the rapid deployment of Mobile Aircraft Arresting System (MAAS), which reduces flight safety risks during #Arctic winter conditions and enables year-round fighter aircraft ops pic.twitter.com/P7LMnzdGNH
— North American Aerospace Defense Command (@NORADCommand) September 21, 2020


Aside from the CF-18s from 3 Wing Bagotville, types taking part in the maneuvers include NATO E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), RCAF CP-140 long-range patrol aircraft, CC-130 search and rescue and tactical airlift aircraft, CC-150T tankers, and CH-149 Cormorant search and rescue helicopters; plus USAF F-16 fighter jets, KC-10 Extender, KC-46 Pegasus and KC-135 Stratotanker tankers, and C-130 and C-17 transport aircraft.

The area of the exercise extends from the Beaufort Sea off the north of Alaska, to Greenland and then south down the Eastern Atlantic to the coast of Maine.

The availability of the MAAS to provide year-round operations at Thule is significant. As we have discussed in the past, this airbase already serves as a vital outpost for early warning of a potential nuclear as well as providing a major logistical hub in a remote but strategically important region. MAAS-enabled fighter operations from Thule, within the context of Amalgam Dart, provides an additional operational node that helps expand the defensive bubble around the United States and Canada from aerial threats, even in the winter.

NORAD officials have spoken of wanting greater situational awareness against various potential threats, including cruise missiles, and extending defensive coverage further out into the Arctic supports that aim. “We don’t want to be in a situation … where end game defeat is our only option,” Air Force General Glen D. VanHerck, commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month, referring to the growing cruise missile threat from Russia...

NORAD Fighters Are Using Arresting Gear For Year-Round Ops At Greenland’s Thule Air Base

The Arctic airbase hasn’t had a permanent fighter presence since the 1950s but is once again ready to accommodate fighters all year round.

www.thedrive.com

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Fishbone Jones]

RCAF/USAF turning Thule into fighter base for NORAD Ex AMALGAMDART--with portable arresting gear--at the invaluable "War Zone" (Canadian media beaten yet again what CAF are doing)--with video:


View attachment 64784

Mark
Ottawa

Does the arresting hook retract mechanically on our aircraft. I ask because the last time I worked on an aircraft with an arresting hook (Voodoo) we had to reload it manually with a lever, which was a bit of a pain as well as taking time to do.

 

[MarkOttawa]

2) But US commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD looks to much more active, indeed pre-emptive, role for NORTHCOM--would seem to leave NORAD as rather an afterthought if cruise missiles are launched, US clearly thinks simply improving radars of North Warning System nowhere near enough for improving over-all defence:

Hmm–JADC2 so one COCOM or another, can act in some form or another (not necessarily kinetically, maybe NORTHCOM itself), vs Russkies “left of launch” against North America? Some coded language here it seems to me:

COCOMs Want JADC2 Now, Not Later, VanHerck Says

A successful wargame last week left the 11 combatant commanders wondering why the network and artificial intelligence technology it featured can’t be put to work right away, said U.S. Northern Command and NORAD commander Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck.

“All 11 commands endorsed every capability that we looked at, and many asked, ‘Why are we waiting? Why don’t we field these right now?’” Herck reported in a March 31 outbrief to reporters forllowing the March 22-23 “Global Information Dominance 2” wargame.

VanHerck has no acquisition authority in his role, but said he wanted to “bring all the Combatant Commanders together to place a demand signal on the Department, to move quicker down the path of domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority.”

The exercise showed off the capabilities of software, sensors, and artificial intelligence.

“All … my objectives were achieved,” he said. His goal was to “show the incredible value of information … and how it can be used today.” The exercise demonstrated real-time value of data from the tactical to strategic levels, he said.

“If you put a bow around this, [it] would be referred to as Joint All-Domain Command and Control,” he said. The problem is that “legacy [acquisition] processes take years” while “these capabilities exist today.”

VanHerck used the exercise to demonstrate his four-pronged vision for STRATCOM: “domain awareness, information dominance … decision superiority … and global integration.” To be effective, all combatant commands must be able to cooperate in near-real time, he said.

“I need … capabilities that can help me with anything from small [unmanned aerial systems] to ballistic missiles and everything in between, from bombers to cruise missiles [emphasis added--left of launch?].”

Combatant commanders don’t want to wait for JADC2, they want to “build … and use” new JADC2 systems and make them available to allies and partners now.

Ironically, the media session was delayed by 14 minutes because the audio wasn’t working on the video conferencing system.

The experiment also sought to better connect the combatant commands with each other, especially where their areas of responsibility come together. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Air Force Gen. John Hyten has called fixing this a top priority.

Today, COCOMs overcome these gaps by means of their relationships with fellow COCOMs or among themselves, and the “operations and intel folks that work for us,” VanHerck said.

Recent exercises “exposed the absolute requirement” to overcome this problem. The U.S. command authority needs “options to respond in competition,” and not necessarily in the same domain where a competitor may have already taken action. That means a rival’s move on land could be met with a response “in sea, or space,” VanHerck said, or even in a different AOR [emphasis added].

VanHerck acknowledged a strong uptick in Russian military activity, requiring NORAD to fly intercept missions in the air, at sea, and undersea. The episodes are “strategic messaging,” he said, asserting that Russia wants to be seen as a player in the Arctic region, where some 25 percent of its gross domestic product is earned.

F-22s fly many of those intercept missions, but VanHerck said that’s not his call. “I can see other alternatives to an F-22 that could absolutely accomplish our mission,” he said. He needs an aircraft “able to share information, with a highly capable radar to detect low radar cross section kinds of platforms, such as cruise missiles, and with long-endurance capabilities. You can let your imagination run wild; that does not have to be an F-22.”

NORTHCOM trains with other interceptors, he said, because F-22s aren’t always available. They will “be in high demand in a crisis or conflict,” VanHerck said. They “would likely forward-deploy from the Alaska AOR.”’
COCOMs Want JADC2 Now, Not Later, VanHerck Says - Air Force Magazine

And last year from CDA Institute:

NORAD Modernization: Report Three: JADC2/JADO​

NORAD Modernization: Report Three: JADC2/JADO | CDA Institute

cdainstitute.ca

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

What does Canadian government think of the US move towards "left of launch" for defence of North American?
From a piece by Prof. Nancy Steeples at RMC:

The Impact of the Post-Arms Control Context and Great Power Competition in the Arctic

…
What is the impact of new missile technology and the post-strategic arms control context in the Arctic?

…USNORTHCOM and NORAD have released a new strategic guidance for developing all domain awareness capability and information dominance, under a deterrence by denial doctrine that shifts responses to Russian and Chinese aggression to the left (i.e., early, or prior-to the launch phase) to prevent or disarm threats before they are deployed… [see “NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy“]
The Impact of the Post-Arms Control Context and Great Power Competition in the Arctic | The Arctic Institute

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Weinie]

What does Canadian government think of the US move towards "left of launch" for defence of North American?
From a piece by Prof. Nancy Steeples at RMC:



Mark
Ottawa

Is Russia only posturing in the Arctic? Or are they anticipating a Russian "Northwest Passage" that they can exploit for economic gain? There is some credible science that suggests that Russia will either have, or be able to create, a sea lane soon that would be economically viable for a significant part of the world's shipping.

 

[Good2Golf]

Is Russia only posturing in the Arctic? Or are they anticipating a Russian "Northwest Passage" that they can exploit for economic gain? There is some credible science that suggests that Russia will either have, or be able to create, a sea lane soon that would be economically viable for a significant part of the world's shipping.

Northern Sea Route is already a thing, is less obstructed than the NW Passage, and has several coastal replenishment points along the route.

 

[Underway]

Northern Sea Route is already a thing, is less obstructed than the NW Passage, and has several coastal replenishment points along the route.

Agreed. Personally I think the NWP will never be a real thing. By the time it properly opens up the NSR may be ice-free most of the year-round.

 

[Good2Golf]

By the time it properly opens up the NSR may be ice-free most of the year-round.

And it seems the Chinese are helping the Russians by burning coal like all get out.

 

[MarkOttawa]

What does Canadian government think of the US move towards "left of launch" for defence of North American?
From a piece by Prof. Nancy Steeples at RMC:

Very interesting podcast below, well worth the listen, by CGAI with USAF BGEN at NORAD and USAF official on US thinking about future defence of North America ("the speed of relevance").

US thinking is all aimed “left of launch”, deterring or preventing (how?) Russian attacks, kinetic or otherwise, before they start, using combined actions by various US COCOMS (and NORAD) to achieve those goals, with all-domain info/data awareness/coordination/integration to achieve that “Global Information Dominance” (note this post: NORAD (and NORTHCOM) Thinking Offense of some sort vs Russian Threats–what does Canadian Government Think?).

To my mind that potentially gets NORAD and Canada involved in all sorts of things to which our government has not given formal, open consideration, much less any official agreement. Events seem to be racing way ahead of our thinking/commitments–we’re not in the North Warning System anymore, Toto.

They’re talking about a fundamentally different defence “environment” than almost anyone considers publicly in this country:

The CGAI Podcast Network
Defence Deconstructed: U.S. Perspectives on Continental Defence

https://soundcloud.com/user-609485369%2Fdefence-deconstructed-us-perspectives-on-continental-defence

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

No mention of NORAD or NATO in this story on USAF's developing its Arctic strategy--Norway noted, not Canada:

Air Force Plans Wargames, Tech Experiments To Flesh Out Arctic Strategy ​

The Air Force is wargaming with allies on how to counter Russia and China in the Arctic, looking to "understand the nature of the competition, as well as the range of capabilities that each of us bring to the problem," said Lt. Gen. Clinton Hinote, the service's lead strategist.​

Wargames have become one of the Air Force’s key tools for implementing its year-old Arctic Strategy, with four separate series — each “with a different flavor” — being used to test new concepts and technology, says Lt. Gen. Clinton Hinote, deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements.

“We had been spending a lot of wargaming bandwidth on countering Great Powers, specifically in Europe and in the Asia Pacific. And one of the things that we felt like we did not understand as well [was] how that competition would spill over into the Arctic; how our competitors could use the Arctic in a way of doing something strategically bad for the United States and for our allies and partners,” Hinote explained during a panel sponsored by the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute.

“I believe that wargaming is one of the great focusing events that we can bring to the craft of strategy and concept development,” he added. “It really focuses everybody’s attention … because everybody wants to win.”

The Air Force — like the Navy — has been doubling down on DoD concerns that the warming environment is upping the ante in competition for Arctic resources, including oil. Congress, too, has raised red flags about increased Russian military activity in the Arctic region, as well as China’s attempts to position itself as an Arctic nation despite the facts of geography.

The service thus has been mulling its future needs in the region, eyeing new equipment buys such as more ski-equipped C-130s; prototyping new capabilities such as using commercial broadband communications satellites orbiting the poles; planning to improve bases in region; and expanding cooperation with regional allies and partners such as Norway [emphasis added].

Hinote said the Air Force currently is in the midst of two of the Arctic-related game series, “Arctic Engagement” and “Plan Blue,” that involve allies and partners.

“What we’re trying to do is understand the nature of the competition, as well as the range of capabilities that each of us bring to the problem,” he said. “And if the first problem is understanding what is going on in the Arctic and what others are doing, then shared awareness becomes something that is a very interesting, both objective and technological, challenge for us.”

Next up, he said is the annual “Global Engagement” game and the “Futures Game.” Both, although to a greater extent the Futures Game, are normally used by the service to “try different technologies and concepts,” he added.

“What we are trying to do with this series of four games is understand what … the dynamics are in the Arctic region, and also bring an innovative approach to what it looks like to have awareness and defense in the Arctic,” Hinote explained.

Being able to improve awareness and deterrence in the region “will probably involve a significant amount of data analytics of new technologies that allow for shared awareness and common command and control — sometimes we call that Joint All Domain Command and Control, or JADC2,” he elaborated. “And then, of course, the air and space capabilities that you need to be able to defend. So all of those are going to come into play [emphasis added].”

Air Force Plans Wargames, Tech Experiments To Flesh Out Arctic Strategy - Breaking Defense

The Air Force is wargaming with allies on how to counter Russia and China in the Arctic, looking to "understand the nature of the competition, as well as the range of capabilities that each of us bring to the problem," said Lt. Gen. Clinton Hinote, the service's lead strategist.

breakingdefense.com

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Hmm--Joint Statement released just before fall of Kabul and call of Canadian election--no real specifics or firm commitments:

Canada, U.S. vow stronger protection against ‘greater and more complex’ missile threat​

The Canadian and U.S. governments say they intend to proceed with “co-ordinated investments” that bolster their ability to protect North America from “a greater and more complex conventional missile threat” including gear that watches for incoming threats from “the sea floor to outer space.”

The joint announcement [text here: Joint Statement on Norad Modernization - Canada.ca] from Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and his American counterpart U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin was published Saturday night, on the eve of Sunday’s federal election call in Canada. There were no spending commitments.

The risk that Canada and the U.S. have in mind is missile technology advancements in Russia and China that can send non-nuclear warheads far greater distances with far more accuracy, said Dave Perry, vice-president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. These include hypersonic missiles, which travel extremely fast and can dodge and weave during flight to avoid interception, as well as next-generation cruise missiles. This evolution in conventional missiles’ power have made them an increasingly important tool to deter threats or project power without resorting to nuclear weapons.

“It’s the Chinese and Russians that are building really cutting-edge new stuff with three characteristics: very accurate, long range and maneuverable,” Mr. Perry said.

The Sajjan-Lloyd statement would appear to represent a deepening of Canada-U.S. collaboration in protecting North America from missile threats. Titled “Joint Statement on NORAD modernization,” it sets out priorities for the future of North American Aerospace Defense Command, the heart of the Canada-U.S. continental defence pact, saying the two countries must be able to “detect, identify [airborne] threats earlier and respond to them faster and more decisively.”

However the Liberal government insisted Sunday this does not represent a deviation from its policy to avoid participation in U.S. ballistic missile defence, announced in 2005. “[The] joint statement does not reflect any change in the Government of Canada’s position,” Daniel Minden, press secretary for Mr. Sajjan, said. “The statement will help guide our collaborative approach to security and NORAD renewal with our closest neighbour in the coming years.”

One of the most imminent spending decisions for Canada is rebuilding the soon-to-be obsolete North Warning System, a joint United States and Canadian radar system that includes dozens of radar sites from Yukon to Labrador. Its job is to detect airborne threats. The price tag has been estimated at more than $11-billion.

The statement said the North Warning System will be replaced with technology including “next-generation over-the-horizon radar systems,” which have the ability to detect targets at very long ranges. It’s technology that is being developed by Canada’s Department of National Defence. It also talks of building a network of American and Canadian sensors installed everywhere from the seabed to satellites in space.

Andrea Charron, director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, said modernization of NORAD will comprise far more than North Warning System renewal and the statement helps prioritize where Canada can focus its efforts while the United States engages in a “wider rethink of homeland defence [emphasis added, e.g. 'left of launch' action of some sort].”

“Certainly what you can read into this is the United States needs Canada to make certain commitments – and sooner than later – and so ‘Here we are prioritizing them for you’,” she said.

Prof. Charron said in her opinion the statement also underlines the need for Canada to proceed with buying new fighter jets. In 2010 Canada announced its intent to buy Lockheed Martin F-35s in 2010 but backed off amid controversy over the lack of a competitive bidding process. The government is now expected to announce later this year which fighter jet will replace Canada’s aging CF-18 aircraft.

She speculated one reason for the timing of this joint NORAD announcement with the United States, hours before Prime Minister Justin Trudeau triggered a federal election campaign, could have been political. “I am guessing but the Liberals are always accused, especially by the Conservatives, as being soft on defence, so here is something that they can point to and say ‘Look at what we are doing with the U.S. Here are the priorities,’” Prof. Charron said.

She also said the United States has been very eager to move forward on NORAD modernization.

Mr. Perry said that it’s considered likely now that if Russia were to launch conventional-warhead missiles at North America they would come straight over the North Pole through the Canadian Arctic or from the North Atlantic. Thirty years ago, the range of conventional missiles was so much shorter that the Russians would have had to fly relatively close to the U.S. mainland to strike a target there. “So there’s more pressure from the United States for us to make a big contribution here, as well a much more direct Canadian defence concern, given the geography is ours.”

Canada, U.S. vow stronger protection against ‘greater and more complex’ missile threat

Statement from Defence Minister and U.S. Secretary of Defence appears to represent a deepening of Canada-U.S. collaboration in protecting North America from missile threats

www.theglobeandmail.com

Mark
Ottawa

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well, this is comforting. We've got people up there who can spot a tiny little boat and call the cops!

Canada disputes Chinese news report that famous sailor was turned back from Northwest Passage​

Zhai would be the second sailor to attempt to circumvent Canada's interim order. In the summer of 2020, a sailor from New Zealand named Peter Smith tried to cross the Northwest Passage on a solo journey in a custom yacht, but was spotted by Nunavut land guardians and reported to Canadian authorities.

Transport Canada told CBC News it fined Smith for violating the ban, though it did not specify the amount.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/northwest-passage-canada-china-1.6178521?ref=mobilerss&cmp=newsletter_CBC%20News%20Top%20Headlines%20%20%E2%80%93%20Morning_1613_313673

 

[MarkOttawa]

More on US NORAD thinking in context of recent Joint Statement with Canada--one wonders what PM Trudeau’s government thinks of it all–if they even are paying any notice, what with the imminent federal election they have have been planning, and have now called, taking up almost all their mental bandwidth:

1) "Left of launch"

US and Canada want to collaborate on NORAD modernization​

...
At an Aug. 17 Center for Strategic and International Studies event, VanHerck outlined some modernization initiatives that would enable teams to see threats sooner and react faster.

“Homeland defense doesn’t start in the homeland. It starts abroad. I don’t want to be shooting down cruise missiles over the national capital region. I think that’s a little bit late in the process. So I’d like to be engaging or deterring, well, what I call left of launch,” said VanHerck.

That means moving even earlier than the instant detection of a launch provided by overhead persistent infrared sensors on orbit. Using signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence and other data sources, VanHerck wants to establish a pattern of behavior on the ground around potential threats. That way, when NORAD or other observers see a deviation in behavior, they can begin preparing responses. That sort of capability could give commanders hours, or even days notice of a threat — well before an actual launch.

VanHerck also wants to see modernization that aligns with the Department of Defense’s overarching concept of Joint All-Domain Command and Control, which envisions a series of technology upgrades that enables data from any sensor to be processed and fed to appropriate weapon systems in real time. That process would be largely autonomic, fast and effective...

US and Canada want to collaborate on NORAD modernization

In a joint statement, the nations pledged to upgrade NORAD's sensors and modernize the data infrastructure needed to detect more threats faster.

www.c4isrnet.com

2) Cruise missiles from Russian territory:

Russia is Top Military Threat to U.S. Homeland, Air Force General Says

Russia, with its array of hard-to-detect cruise missiles and advanced submarines, poses the primary military threat to the American homeland today, the commander of U.S. Northern Command said Tuesday.
“They’ve developed capabilities that didn’t exist 20 years ago …very low radar cross-section cruise missiles [and] submarines on par with our submarines,” Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck said.
Speaking at a Center for Strategic and International Studies online forum, he described the crucial difference between cruise and ballistic missile threats. Cruise missiles “can be launched from multiple platforms, from air-launch capabilities to sea-launch capabilities to submarine-launch capabilities to a container on a commercial vessel. There are multiple ways to do that.”
He added that the advanced cruise missiles in Russia’s arsenal have the range to strike the United States when launched from inside Russian territory [emphasis added, so much for air defence vs the launching bombers (archers) anywhere offshore the North American Arctic–it also seems clear to me that the Americans are placing much less focus on destroying those missiles well away from the continental United States, certainly in the Arctic area itself]…

 

[MarkOttawa]

Now a report from CDAI:

NORAD Modernization Forum:
Information Dominance

Introduction

The CDA Institute, in partnership with NDIA and NORAD/USNORTHCOM, hosted a virtual industry roundtable focused on the topic of achieving Information Dominance and the means with which NORAD and USNORTHCOM can achieve it in the digital age. The aim of this session was to allow experts from industry, academia, and government to break down silos and engage in direct conversations. More specifically, the goal of this event was to examine the architecture, infrastructure, data framework and policies needed for the integration of systems, as well as for deeper integration with allied partners.

This report, focused on Information Dominance, will outline the major points of consensus and contention reached by participants during the webinar, answers provided in the question-and-answer session, a synopsis of introductory remarks, updates on the Pathfinder Initiative, and a synopsis of the scene setter. This report was commissioned by the CDA Institute and is intended to read as an overview of the key points made by our invited experts.
NORAD Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier gave introductory remarks. An update on the Pathfinder Initiative at NORAD was given by Canadian team lead Colonel Robyn Hulan (OMM, CD, COO, COO for N2X/Pathfinder). Colonel Matt Eberhart, Special Assistant to Commander of NORAD/USNORTHCOM, provided the scene setter. Gordon Venner (CDA Institute), Former Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence and Canadian Diplomat and Ambassador, acted as Master of Ceremonies and moderated a panel discussion that included:

• Tom Karako, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Director, Missile Defence Project, CSIS
• Julia Scouten, Senior Manager, Cyber Security Team, KPMG
• Chris Pogue, CEO, Thales Canada

Executive Summary

North American continental defence is undergoing a transformational modernization amidst the digital age. Emerging technologies and emboldened adversaries are creating the environment necessary for NORAD and USNORTHCOM to achieve information dominance. The Commander needs more information from an updated sensor network that includes data from all domains. This will allow for a fuller understanding of possible threats from adversaries and create more time for decision-making, with informed and trusted data needed to broaden the possible choices and options to achieve Decision Superiority.

NORAD is responsible for the aerial defence of the continent and warns of maritime threats approaching North America. The binational command has evolved from deterring Soviet long-range bombers during the Cold War, to countering Violent-Extremist Organizations in the wake of 9/11, to addressing new threats associated with the reemergence of great power politics. This has created a new reliance on Information Dominance and cloud computing to protect the continent. These new modernization capabilities will ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM can move “farther left of bang” (i.e., before there is an attack) by preemptively deterring and detecting threats in competition and crisis. Experts from across industry, academia and the command discussed a wide range of issues related to achieving Information Dominance. This included the Pathfinder Initiative, the military’s ability to leverage and maximize commercial and private input, the possibility of working beyond traditional binational NORAD structure, and the challenge of keeping pace with evolving and emerging technologies with new actors in new domains. NORAD Modernization is a large-scale moving target, and decision-makers are scrambling to meet existing challenges and those yet to emerge. The allocation of resources amid these rapid advancements means that achieving Information Dominance is necessary to protect the homeland, as it is no longer a sanctuary.

All-Domain awareness should enable Information Dominance, which creates Decision Superiority, the ultimate objective for the Commander. For NORAD to Deter in Competition, Deescalate in Crisis and Deny and Defeat in Conflict, the binational command requires Global Integration, Domain Awareness, Information Dominance, and Decision Superiority. Ultimately, Information Dominance will allow NORAD and USNORTHCOM to meet three goals: 1) Improved decisions in competition, crisis, and conflict; 2) Proactive options to deter, deny, and if required, defeat 3) Global Integration across tactical, operational, and strategic levels [emphasis added, sure would like some clarity about that "proactive" which could include some sort of preemptive action "left of launch"].

Publications

cdainstitute.ca

Read on. The report indicates a serious US intent effectively to re-invent NORAD–or perhaps relegate NORAD to some sort of backwater, with serious defence of the US in almost all, er, domains allocated to US NORTHCOM, if the Canadian government does not start getting its defence of North America ass in a much higher gear to cope with what’s happening now and coming down the road.

But I’d bet dollars to Timbits that almost none of the Liberal pols, and no-one at senior bureaucratic levels in National Defence or, help, Global Affairs Canada, is paying the least attention to the substance of these matters that are of increasing public attention and concern in certain important American quarters (quarters, including in Congress, that have no real equivalents here). Our federal policy capacity for defence is pushing up daisies at higher levels (and the forces are rather pre-occupied with reported scandals amongst GoFos).

Americans will make decisions on what they judge necessary to defend their homeland; there will be a real price to pay, either in dollars or sovereignty, for Canada depending on when our government finally wakes up and on what it decides to do–or not, And smells more than the Tim Hortons Double Double coffee.

A Pentagon video and news release on GIDE (Global Information Dominance Experiments] are here.:
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command lead the third Global Information Dominance Experiment (GI.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[TCM621]

Now a report from CDAI:





Read on. The report indicates a serious US intent effectively to re-invent NORAD–or perhaps relegate NORAD to some sort of backwater, with serious defence of the US in almost all, er, domains allocated to US NORTHCOM, if the Canadian government does not start getting its defence of North America ass in a much higher gear to cope with what’s happening now and coming down the road.

But I’d bet dollars to Timbits that almost none of the Liberal pols, and no-one at senior bureaucratic levels in National Defence or, help, Global Affairs Canada, is paying the least attention to the substance of these matters that are of increasing public attention and concern in certain important American quarters (quarters, including in Congress, that have no real equivalents here). Our federal policy capacity for defence is pushing up daisies at higher levels (and the forces are rather pre-occupied with reported scandals amongst GoFos).

Americans will make decisions on what they judge necessary to defend their homeland; there will be a real price to pay, either in dollars or sovereignty, for Canada depending on when our government finally wakes up and on what it decides to do–or not, And smells more than the Tim Hortons Double Double coffee.

A Pentagon video and news release on GIDE (Global Information Dominance Experiments] are here.:
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command lead the third Global Information Dominance Experiment (GI.

Mark
Ottawa

The US Military will definitely appreciate our commitment to reconciliation and gender equality. That should be enough. Right?

I'm partially joking but our capabilities are (relatively speaking) way worse than the decade of darkness at a time when China is rising, Russia is trying to regain its place and the US is falling apart internally. We haven't pulled our weight in years and the US knows it.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Major article by Profs Andrea Charron and James Fergusson of U. of Manitoba:

NORAD’s Maritime Warning Role:
Origins and Future

https://navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol17num2/cnr_vol17_2_Charron_and_Fergusson.pdf

Mark
Ottawa

 

[suffolkowner]

Rethinking Canada’s Security Strategy: How Canada Can Graduate from the Kids’ Table - Canadian Global Affairs Institute

wasn't sure where to put this, but fat chance on our growing up as we've been more than happy to shirk our share for way too long now. The public has no great interest in national defence and security and therefore is no political value in it. Unless the US starts explicitly tying some of these defence issues to economic ones I don't foresee a change

 

[Kirkhill]

Necessary background - Note the references to Canada and the US expectations thereof.

Strategy

Our Strategy​

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) are separate commands. Both leverage the (US) commander's singular vision and guidance; develop plans to meet challenges in the same strategic and operational environments; build complementary mission approaches; and share a common goal of defense of the United States and Canada. This NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy is a combined strategy that aligns with objectives identified in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, National Defense Strategy, and Canada’s Strong, Secure, Engaged policy.

Problem Statement​

Over the last three decades, our nations’ competitors and potential adversaries have watched Canada and the United States and our way of deterring, competing, and conducting war. They have adapted and developed advanced capabilities in all domains challenging us at home and across the competition continuum, and holding at risk our people, our critical infrastructure, and our power projection capabilities.

Strategic Environment​

For decades, our nations enjoyed the benefits of dominant military capabilities in all domains and we relied on our geography to serve as a barrier to keep our nations beyond the reach of most conventional threats. Our ability to project power forward along with our technological overmatch has allowed us to fight forward and focus our energy on conducting operations overseas. However, our competitors have analyzed our ability to operate overseas and have invested in capabilities such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, small unmanned aircraft systems, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and delivery platforms to offset our strengths while exploiting our perceived weaknesses. These advancing capabilities embolden competitors and adversaries to challenge us at home, looking to threaten our people, our critical infrastructure and our power projection capabilities. As a result, the stakes are higher than they have been in decades and, for NORAD and USNORTHCOM, successful continental defense is the only option.

Whether the threats come from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, violent extremist organizations, or transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), significant challenges persist. This environment requires a culture change that factors in homeland defense, from a global perspective, into every aspect of operational plans and strategies, decisions, and budgeting choices resulting in the sustained successful defense of our two nations.

The Arctic provides a good example of the changing physical and strategic environment and is a zone of international competition. Both Russia and China are increasing their activity in the Arctic. Russia’s fielding of advanced, long-range cruise missiles capable of being launched from Russian territory and flying through the northern approaches and seeking to strike targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the dominant military threat in the Arctic. Additionally, diminished sea ice and competition over resources present overlapping challenges in this strategically significant region. China is not content to remain a mere observer in the growing competition, declaring itself a “near-Arctic state,” and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial presence in the region to increase its access to lucrative resources and shipping routes.

Missions & Vision​

NORAD conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America.


USNORTHCOM defends our homeland - deters, detects, denies, and defeats threats to the United States, conducts security cooperation activities with allies and partners, and supports civil authorities.

(I would note that this is an USAF/USN/USCG/US Army/USSOCOM/Space and Cyber Command - it would seem reasonable that the US would expect Canada do contribute in all domains - and support the civil authorities).


OUR VISION is to outpace global competitors, deter adversaries, deny and defeat threats through all-domain awareness, information dominance, decision superiority, and global integration.

Strategic Principles​

1. Global Integration in order to achieve a Globally Integrated Layered Defense​

2. All-Domain Awareness (Observe)​

3. Information Dominance (Orient)​

4. Decision Superiority (Decide and Act)​

The four strategic principles used to achieve our priorities are building blocks under an umbrella of Global Integration (GI). All-Domain Awareness (DA) is the first step in pursuit of Information Dominance (ID), which is used to reach Decision Superiority (DS) in competition and crisis. Applying these strategic principles positions the commands further “left of launch” not just in crisis, but also during competition in order to get inside the adversaries Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop and complicate their calculus.

1. Global Integration in order to achieve a Globally Integrated Layered Defense​

Our adversaries operate globally, across all domains and organizational boundaries. Use of a global framework, rather than regional, to synchronize global all-domain operations is paramount to success. A globally integrated layered defense consists of layers in terms of geography (forward regions, approaches, and the homeland layers), domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and cognitive), and whole-of-governments/nations.

• The forward layer consists of forward-deployed Canadian and U.S. forces integrated with allies and partners;
• The approaches layer consists of joint force capabilities integrated with capabilities from Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas;
• The homeland layer consists of joint force capabilities integrated with the whole-of-government/interagency and strategic private sector partner capabilities.

GI must guide force allocation, future acquisition, and budgeting choices. Additionally, we must coordinate globally focused planning with other combatant commands (CCMDs) and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) to create a layered defense approach to protect our nations.

Enduring Conditions​

NORAD and USNORTHCOM’s strategic approach focuses on achieving four enduring conditions (ECs) through the lens of the strategic principles. Because the nature of continental defense is not conducive to achieving a traditional "end state," the ECs drive us to continually evaluate the efficacy of operational planning and execution. This ensures our efforts, priorities, and resources are driving towards NORAD and USNORTHCOM's top priority - defending our nations. The four ECs serve as guideposts to drive efforts throughout both commands:

Enduring Condition #1

Homelands defended from threats and adversary influence countered.​

• NORAD's and USNORTHCOM's primary missions are to defend the United States and Canada against aggression. To be successful, we continue to globally integrate our defense with supporting CCMDs, CJOC, allies, and mission partners across all domains throughout competition and into crisis. A central aspect of our capable defense is a ready, credible deterrence to dissuade adversaries from threatening North America. NORAD's and USNORTHCOM's combined deterrence posture is part of a globally integrated approach, incorporating deterrence by denial at home, deterrence by punishment coordinated with our partners, and strategic application of all instruments of multi-national power through our governments.

Compete and deter aggression.​

• Our primary role in the globally integrated layered defense is deterrence by denial. Our competitors know that we are always prepared to defend our nations. The central effect in our deterrence by denial strategy is to make our potential adversaries understand that the advancing capabilities of the United States and Canada will deny their ability to achieve their objectives.

If deterrence fails, detect, then deny and defeat threats.​

• We must defend our nations should deterrence fail and our adversaries attack. Our surest path is through a globally integrated and resilient all-domain awareness infrastructure that is processed, synchronized, and presented to create information dominance, resulting in decision superiority over adversaries. Embracing these strategic principles requires a fundamental change of culture for NORAD and USNORTHCOM and our mission partners.

Enhance National resiliency.​

• Equally as important as defeating threats is the hardening of critical infrastructure and promoting domestic resilience in order to mitigate the consequences of attacks, both kinetic and non-kinetic. Our demonstrated ability to respond to diverse attacks with a whole-of-government response is a strong deterrent to our adversaries. Protecting our nations is a prerequisite to projecting power abroad.

Enduring Condition #2​

United States and Canada outpace competitors to ensure our military advantage is expanded and not eroded.​

• In order to maintain and increase our lead, we need to identify areas of competitive advantage, invest in them, and continually assess their effectiveness to ensure we are outpacing our adversaries.

Outpace our competitors through innovative concepts and technology.​

• In order to achieve decision superiority, we must move past relying on complex, unique, and unaffordable defeat mechanisms. We will continue to modernize by working with industry partners to develop innovative approaches/systems and improve infrastructure in support of our strategic principles.

Outpace our competitors through global integration of strategies, plans, and operations between CCMDs, allies, and interagency organizations.​

• We need to shift away from a regional planning process, because today’s competition and any future conflict with peer adversaries will be global in scope. We are pursuing a global framework to synchronize activities across CCMDs prior to conflict, while working closely with allies and partners.

Enduring Condition #3​

U.S. and Canada's national security enhanced and regional stability maintained through strengthened partnerships.​

• Aligned with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and Strong, Secure, Engaged, we will revitalize our unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. In this era of great power competition, robust relationships with our international and interagency mission partners, the Services, other CCMDs, industry, the private sector, and academia are key to expanding the competitive space and enabling a layered defense of North America across the competition continuum.

Develop and strengthen mission partnerships.​

• NORAD and USNORTHCOM promote and actively engage with value-added mission partners such as NATO and FiveEye partners (Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States), both Canadian and U.S. Services, Canadian and U.S. interagency partners, private industry, and academia to accept, promote, refine, and expand upon the strategic principles. Adoption of the strategic principles by our partners will foster greater innovation and synergy and will promote interoperability.

(USNORTHCOM) Develop and strengthen mission partnerships with allies and partner nations, interagency organizations, other CCMDs, Services, CJOC, and the private sector.​

• Canada is a critical mission partner and ally in the defense of North America and a strategic partner with the United States in meeting broader regional and global security challenges. USNORTHCOM will continue to seek opportunities with Canada to enhance our ability to act in a timely fashion to defend both countries.
• Within its area of responsibility (AOR), USNORTHCOM continues to advance and strengthen relationships with Mexico and The Bahamas. Mexico’s leadership throughout Central America serves as a bulwark against the corrosive effects of revisionist powers and ultimately improves the collective defense of North America. Cooperating with The Royal Bahamian Defence Force will result in better domain awareness in the region and thus strengthen North American defense in that critical portion of the AOR. Security cooperation with Mexico and The Bahamas, while focused on traditional military roles and missions, also enhances their ability to disrupt, degrade, and defeat TCOs. TCOs create opportunities for exploitation by our competitors who employ unrestricted warfare.
• The U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable (BMCR) and the U.S.-Bahamas Bilateral Security Cooperation Framework (BSCF) are the key mechanisms through which USNORTHCOM will continue to collaborate with our partners in the areas of domain awareness, domain control, and institutional strengthening in support of bilateral strategic objectives that contribute to globally-integrated cooperative defense.

(NORAD and USNORTHCOM) Develop and strengthen Arctic partnerships.​

• We will defend the United States and Canada in and through the Arctic, with allies and partners, including Indigenous peoples and governments, by building Arctic awareness, enhancing Arctic operations, capabilities, infrastructure, and ensuring a credible defense presence. Improving our DA, polar communications capability, and ability to conduct sustained multi-domain operations are priorities.

Enduring Condition #4​

(USNORTHCOM) Civil authorities provided rapid flexible response options to improve collective resiliency.​

• We will continue supporting when requested, both in response to natural or manmade disasters and in countering TCOs. Our ability to support our civil authority partners for large-scale incidents and national special security events (NSSEs) requires detailed integrated planning.

As the supported command for the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission and the DSCA synchronizer within the USNORTHCOM AOR, we proactively plan and respond with key enabling capabilities to requests for assistance from interagency partners during incidents.​

• Catastrophic disasters require an extraordinary level of synchronization among Federal, State, Tribal, local, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. COVID-19 has reinforced the importance of our Pandemics and Infectious Diseases (P&ID) responsibility for the planning of DoD efforts and the need to coordinate across the whole-of-government.

In support of civil authorities, manage the catastrophic consequences of kinetic and non-kinetic attacks by peer competitors.​

• Our commands will leverage all elements of national power and partner with other Federal departments, Indigenous governments, agencies, and the private sector, to plan for an integrated response to national security emergencies, including peer adversary attacks. This integrated planning will identify more effective uses of our capabilities to provide the greatest effect with the smallest number of forces, which will be critical in a resource-constrained environment

 

[Kirkhill]

Enhance National resiliency.​

• Equally as important as defeating threats is the hardening of critical infrastructure and promoting domestic resilience in order to mitigate the consequences of attacks, both kinetic and non-kinetic. Our demonstrated ability to respond to diverse attacks with a whole-of-government response is a strong deterrent to our adversaries. Protecting our nations is a prerequisite to projecting power abroad.

It is difficult to think of many enemies having the ability to attack the fabric of North America with more devastation than some recent events.

2001 terrorist attacks and financial crisis
2008 financial crisis
2020 biological crisis
2021 supply chain crisis
2021 BC transportation crisis
2021 US Hurricane and Tornado crises.

And yet both the US and Canada are still here and there was no requirement to declare martial law. We are resilient.

Forgot to add in ice storms and cyber attacks on energy and food supplies.