Replacing the Subs

[Good2Golf]

Thanks. I think we agree on this.

So here is the test: when an air force general orders planes to fly and is told they can't due to air worthiness issues, what is his/her response?

If an admiral orders a ship to sea and is told they can't because of seaworthiness (something like the red/purple button above), what is his/her response?

A. Procedural compliance is the mechanism by which we assure the safety of our sailors / airmen (air women?) and please expedite remediation of this situation as quickly as possible.

B. In order to meet operational commitments, get operational and deploy NOW.

The RCAF has a specifically codified set of regulations that very strictly control when an aircraft can be flown in what would be considered an unserviceable state. It has minimum levels to which flight authorization can be delegated, usually formation or division auth required. So the answer isn’t ‘never’ but it is very well understood by all, what the regulations are and procedure to follow.

 

[dapaterson]

Much as it pains me to admit it and say anything nice about the Light Blue folks, the RCAF flight safety program is well designed and inculcates a genuine safety culture that the RCN and CA would be smart to emulate.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Much as it pains me to admit it and say anything nice about the Light Blue folks, the RCAF flight safety program is well designed and inculcates a genuine safety culture that the RCN and CA would be smart to emulate.

So, like, throwing a grenade to (hopefully) detonate another (blind) grenade, or the equivalent, wouldn't make it into the RCAF safety manual?

 

[dapaterson]

RCAF would actually investigate to figure out why there was the blind - is there an issue with the batch of detonators? Were personnel properly trained? Were the conditions of the training area appropriate?

You know, all those factors which may contribute to the problem would be assessed, and the results would be widely promulgated so others will not make the same errors again.

 

[OldSolduer]

So, like, throwing a grenade to (hopefully) detonate another (blind) grenade, or the equivalent, wouldn't make it into the RCAF safety manual?

Well that seems to work - why wouldn't we do that?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Well that seems to work - why wouldn't we do that?

There is no reason that both the Army and Navy cannot adopt/adapt their versions of flight safety to each environment. It is not rocket surgery.

 

[childs56]

There is no reason that both the Army and Navy cannot adopt/adapt their versions of flight safety to each environment. It is not rocket surgery.

Except the army would never do anything if they had to investigate every mishap like the Airforce does. No body moves, no body gets hurt.

 

[MilEME09]

Except the army would never do anything if they had to investigate every mishap like the Airforce does. No body moves, no body gets hurt.

Isn't that why RCEME gets 6 coffee breaks a day plus lunch?

 

[CBH99]

That's a good question Stoker, and one that you are probably more qualified to answer than most on here. (Although there are a few of you who are quite the experienced Navy folks.)

I'd be curious to hear your answer about the admiral ordering a ship to sea -- and an answer from an Air Force type about the air force general

 

[dapaterson]

Except the army would never do anything if they had to investigate every mishap like the Airforce does. No body moves, no body gets hurt.

The Army approach: A vehicle rolls. Passengers in back are injured - some sent to hospital. Investigation: The driver - staff on a course - fell asleep. Stupid corporal, unavoidable accident.

But why did the driver fall asleep? Because he wasn't given adequate time to rest. Why wasn't he given the time to rest that CAF directives require? Because leadership (Sgt and Lt) of the course didn't think they had to follow the rules.

So it was in fact avoidable, there was in fact misconduct, and it wasn't a Stupid Corporal situation - it was a bad leadership situation.

But the Army would never admit to that, so the official MSE accident report blames it all on the Corporal.

 

[Good2Golf]

The difference between a blame-based vs cause-based investigatory mind-set. One actually does seek to learn lessons often learned in blood, vice just talking about lessons learned (aka recorded)...

 

[OldSolduer]

The Army approach: A vehicle rolls. Passengers in back are injured - some sent to hospital. Investigation: The driver - staff on a course - fell asleep. Stupid corporal, unavoidable accident.

But why did the driver fall asleep? Because he wasn't given adequate time to rest. Why wasn't he given the time to rest that CAF directives require? Because leadership (Sgt and Lt) of the course didn't think they had to follow the rules.

So it was in fact avoidable, there was in fact misconduct, and it wasn't a Stupid Corporal situation - it was a bad leadership situation.

But the Army would never admit to that, so the official MSE accident report blames it all on the Corporal.

You're absolutely correct - the Army always had to find someone to blame vice fix the problem.

August 1993 Croatia: one of our corporals was crushed between two MLVWs. The parking brake failed, the marshalling area was on a hill, the front ML rolled back and pinned the corporal. He did not survive.

The tech - a corporal - that inspected the vehicle determined that "someone's gonna hang over this one".

 

[YZT580]

This points out the main reason why TC went to a no fault system for reporting incidents in aviation. It allowed those involved to report system errors and their own incidentally without fear of repercussion. Probably, no definitely, prevented a lot of fatal flaws from actually becoming lethal.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Also MTU engine rebuild facility in Richmond has a policy of not punishing mistakes that are admitted right away, so if a tech forgets a part of the very strict procedure and process, they are safe to report it. However lying, covering up the mistake or not reporting a known mistake is instant dismissal.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Also MTU engine rebuild facility in Richmond has a policy of not punishing mistakes that are admitted right away, so if a tech forgets a part of the very strict procedure and process, they are safe to report it. However lying, covering up the mistake or not reporting a known mistake is instant dismissal.

"Research shows that the climate of an organization influences an individual's contribution far more than the individual himself.

"Wherever there is fear you will get wrong figures."

W. Edwards Deming

 

[SeaKingTacco]

You're absolutely correct - the Army always had to find someone to blame vice fix the problem.

August 1993 Croatia: one of our corporals was crushed between two MLVWs. The parking brake failed, the marshalling area was on a hill, the front ML rolled back and pinned the corporal. He did not survive.

The tech - a corporal - that inspected the vehicle determined that "someone's gonna hang over this one".

That is exactly what we don’t do in the RCAF- hang people. You are personally accountable for your actions in aviation and are expected to own up to your own mistakes. As long as you have not deliberately and willfully broken regulations, no harm will come to you. Any conversation you have in a flight safety investigation is protected by law and that has been upheld at the Supreme Court level.

 

[YZT580]

That is exactly what we don’t do in the RCAF- hang people. You are personally accountable for your actions in aviation and are expected to own up to your own mistakes. As long as you have not deliberately and willfully broken regulations, no harm will come to you. Any conversation you have in a flight safety investigation is protected by law and that has been upheld at the Supreme Court level.

Very true. Co-chaired a number of fact finding boards: only discipline ever handed out was a suspension for lying to the board.

 

[JMCanada]

Let me bring in an article about nuclear boats from the aussies.

Nuclear submarines could lead to nuclear power for Australia | The Strategist

In Adelaide’s The Advertiser newspaper on 7 March, former defence minister Christopher Pyne said, ‘Then there is the nonsensical argument that the Attack Class submarines are no good because they aren’t nuclear. Almost all of ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

While it seems clear the purpose to "make a call" for the conference (at the very end of the article), it's also true that, as said in there "Diesel submarines have been around for about 120 years and nuclear submarines have been around for about 65 years, so neither form represents new technology."

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Meanwhile in Europe

France cuts two nuclear-powered submarines in half to make one new one | CNN

A French nuclear-powered submarine severely damaged by fire last year has been saved from the scrapyard -- by cutting it in two and welding the salvageable half to part of another decommissioned sub.

www.cnn.com

 

[Dale Denton]

I wonder how the damage to Corner Brook has moved up the high-level meeting to discuss the future of RCNs sub service. I'm sure it's an easy $20Bish bill to avoid while deciding about the $120B+ Fighter and CSC bills too.

Should be reaching out to the US for reduced-VLS/strike capability and refurbished LA Class SNNs. Could leverage the new $2T US New Deal economic plan to boost programs that would better Canadian Industry or transport infrastructure too. That would equate to IRBs from US contractors. Leverage existing global US LA/Virginia Class infrastructure, industrial capacity and 49 years of exp on the platform. "New page in post-trump US-Canada relations..."

Hard to imagine trying to guestimate the cost of a build-in-Canada capability for just 4-6 expensive ships. Can't be easy for other nations to promote an OTS SSK or SNN design that would return $$$ to Canadian companies, or compete with a US proposal.