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Replacing the Subs

Colin P said:
But maybe if we gave the crew and captain funky looking socks they can pose with, they might change their mind?  ;D

Tell them it will come with a UNSC seat
 
suffolkowner said:
It will be interesting to see what gets offered for the Dutch replacement. If they didn't like the Navantia/S-80 offering its hard to see Naval Group making the cut.
Why?
Navantia failed to make the cut on the industrial-cooperation front, according to Visser’s missive to lawmakers, known as a B-Letter in local military-acquisition speak. In other words, the Netherlands is “uncertain” cooperation with Spain would work out and that it would offer fewer touchpoints compared with the governments of the other three bidders — France, Germany and Sweden.
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/12/17/dutch-walrus-submarine-program-shuffles-forward-but-not-by-much/
 
I should have been more specific as to the type of UK sub- nuclear.
 
tomahawk6 said:
I should have been more specific as to the type of UK sub- nuclear.

UK nuclear subs use US technology, and therefore require US approval to transfer to a third nation (such as Canada).
 
dapaterson said:
UK nuclear subs use US technology, and therefore require US approval to transfer to a third nation (such as Canada).

Given the cost of the Astute at over 1.6 billion pounds per ship, I doubt we would jump on that boat, but compared to our ship programs that is a good price. Buying the Trafalgar's used would be a bad deal given they are just as old or older then the Vic's. The only new ish subs due to be replaced soon are the Vanguards but I doubt the Canadian public would approve of buying SSBN's even if we converted them to SSGN's.
 
Buying just 4-6 Astutes or Suffrens, would be nice especially to patrol the Arctic. The time for such deal is now, for UK/ France to put them in their production line. In one decade they both will end their SSN building program and start with their next generation of SSBNs.
Purchase should be "off- the-shelf" as much as possible, otherwise the cost would double and delivery would be delayed.

As for the dutch programme... my opinion is that they will finally buy german, not to forget Germany has recently signed a contract with Damen for the MKS 180 frigates.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/06/damen-leading-role-for-german-frigate-project-mks-180/

Finally, ... VLS look attractive, but in the end cruise missiles (as well as anti-ship ones) can also be fired from torpedo tubes. I don't see that as a great capability increase.
 
JMCanada said:
...

Finally, ... VLS look attractive, but in the end cruise missiles (as well as anti-ship ones) can also be fired from torpedo tubes. I don't see that as a great capability increase.

The best weapon of a submarine is its stealth.  A sub with 18 x VLS tubes could launch a significant attack while only exposing its position for a relatively short period of time.  Launching a significant missile strike from tubes would require you to be exposed for longer period of time (and how many missiles could you store for use from the torpedo tubes?).  And also, each missile you load into the torpedo tubes is one less torpedo available to defend yourself against any enemy subs that are in the area.
 
Uzlu said:
Why?https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/12/17/dutch-walrus-submarine-program-shuffles-forward-but-not-by-much/

It's just my opinion but I don't think they're going to find Naval Group easy to work with. There's also the little problem that they don't have a sub to offer. I think (and again it's just my opinion) that the Swedish and German sub designs are at a much more advanced stage
 
Chief Engineer said:
There is a difference, when you think of sub launched missiles you thing of nukes or conventional cruise missiles and a sub can silently approach the coast and launch, offensive in nature. When you think of a VLS for a CSC Anti Aircraft/defensive comes to mind. Canada will never have cruise missiles.

The Navy needs to get out of this mindset that they are some sort of pseudo-constabulary force.  I hear this line of thinking often from Naval Officers regarding "offensive" weapons.  A Harpoon Block II Missile is an offensive weapon that is also capable of land attack.  Our Frigates are already equipped with those. 

Our CSC should seek to build on that capability and Naval Leadership should be aggressively pursuing a Naval Strike capability.  The Balkans, Libya, Iraq/Syria all provide ample CAF examples of where this capability would be incredibly useful and would allow the Navy to make a far greater contribution to CAF Ops.

It's time the Navy get some skin in the game and start contributing to joint ops.  Navy leadership should be saying they want a Naval Strike Capability, they should also be saying they want submarines.

It's very unhelpful when Flag Officers tell a room full of Naval personnel that things like Submarines isn't something the Canadian Navy should be doing.
 
Humphrey Bogart said:
The Navy needs to get out of this mindset that they are some sort of pseudo-constabulary force.  I hear this line of thinking often from Naval Officers regarding "offensive" weapons.  A Harpoon Block II Missile is an offensive weapon that is also capable of land attack.  Our Frigates are already equipped with those. 

Our CSC should seek to build on that capability and Naval Leadership should be aggressively pursuing a Naval Strike capability.  The Balkans, Libya, Iraq/Syria all provide ample CAF examples of where this capability would be incredibly useful and would allow the Navy to make a far greater contribution to CAF Ops.

It's time the Navy get some skin in the game and start contributing to joint ops.  Navy leadership should be saying they want a Naval Strike Capability, they should also be saying they want submarines.

It's very unhelpful when Flag Officers tell a room full of Naval personnel that things like Submarines isn't something the Canadian Navy should be doing.

Its not the Navy, its the government where over the years the idea of offensive power or any type of power projecting is seen as Uncanadian. To be honest I was surprised to see the offensive capabilities of the CSC.
 
Sadly there will be useful idiots at the top telling said government what it wants to hear to further themselves at the expense of the Service. The government will latch onto them as proof they are right.
 
JMCanada said:
Finally, ... VLS look attractive, but in the end cruise missiles (as well as anti-ship ones) can also be fired from torpedo tubes. I don't see that as a great capability increase.

BLUF;  IMO, your observation in yellow above is misguided, but that is (likely) from not being aware of, and appreciating, some important factors.

To that end, here's some information to consider that will (hopefully) provide you with some 'tactical/operational level' points to consider;  how limiting it is to sub, skipper and crew in a combat situation to have to 'pick/chose' what things to fire out torpedo tubes, if other than torpedos, "weapons make noise, making noise can kill you"...realities of sub-surface warfare.

This is somewhat dated, and open source but still very relevant points to consider.  I've taken some of the discussion from Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship and put it into a PDF file (highlights mine for emphasis) attached below.


Additionally;  when deciding on what 'caps and lims' you're willing to accept, it's often prudent to look at your potential/likely adversaries in the near/middle/distant future...

RFN Yasen Class submarine

RFN Borei Class submarine

People's Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force (PLANSF)
 

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dapaterson said:
UK nuclear subs use US technology, and therefore require US approval to transfer to a third nation (such as Canada).

Are they now, though?  I'd certainly agree more with that with the Swiftsure and Trafalgar class boats but...Astute?  I think even more of the "nuclear" system are more "home grown" (I'm not able to recall the open source info on that I'd refer to...).  I'll sleep on it and see if morning coffee helps the mental cob-webs...

I'd agree that 'some' of the tech would be "US"...or "based on".

Regardless, having flown on a few A-boats, I'll say "I wish we had a few of 'em"...
 
The S5W proved extremely successful.  The British tried to develop their own submarine reactor but lacked sufficient technical manpower; the Magnox civilian power reactors had higher priority.  In negotiations with the U.S. Navy in 1958, Britain was offered the Skate reactor but ended up with the more powerful S5W.  HMS Dreadnought, the prototype British SSN, had, in effect, a Skipjack tail welded onto her slightly larger-diameter British front end.  The British believed that they returned the favor by providing the U.S. Navy with the rafting (silencing) technology that proved crucial at just about the same time.  All later British submarine reactors incorporate some S5W technology, although just how much is a matter of dispute.
Source: U.S. Submarines Since 1945: An Illustrated Design History, page 127.
 
dapaterson said:
Wikipedia reports that it's the Rolls-Royce PWR ticking away inside the Astute class.

Coffee-aided, I think I found the quick discussion on the RN nuc "beginnings", also from Submarine:  A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Submarine.  Excerpt attached in a PDF.

FWIW, this is the foreword to that book.

Foreword

The transformation of Tom Clancy’s wonderful fictional account of submarining in The Hunt for Red October to the reality of actual modern nuclear submarine capabilities and operations is long overdue. Now he brings a unique account of the nuclear-powered submarine, a vital component of naval power, to the public for the first time. This book explains the world of undersea warfare, from how people live within a steel tube for months at a time, to the many arrows a submarine puts in the quiver of national military power.

Twice in this century submarine warfare has threatened the existence of major powers. Submarines have always been a flexible and adaptable national asset, capable of many roles and missions. The submarines of World War I and II had some inherent stealth and could submerge to conduct attacks, but this property was limited by a lack of sustained power while under the sea’s surface. The advent of nuclear propulsion made the submarine a truly stealthy platform. A so-called stealth aircraft can still be seen by the naked eye. A nuclear powered submarine is truly invisible and not readily detectable. It is the original stealth machine and can remain undetected indefinitely. From this enduring covertness springs the awesome power of the modern submarine. Through the advances of ballistic and cruise missile technology the strategic nuclear deterrence mission and land attack capability have become an integral part of this military power. For decades the principal mission of a submarine has been to sink ships and submarines. Today, the nuclear-powered submarine’s ability to affect events on land is one of its dominant features.

With Tom Clancy as our tour guide, let us view the submarine’s history, its missions, the people and their families, the training, the boat itself with all its compartments and systems, and consider what these can do. If you spend years on the bridge of a submarine, as I have, you will notice how the dolphins that “ride” the crest of the exhilaratingly beautiful bow wave along the tear-shaped submarine hull do so at different positions for different classes or shapes of submarines. Why? I have always wondered. This tour you are about to take will come close to answering such questions, which are inherent to the mystique of a submarine.

I may not agree with all of the points present herein, but I do believe that upon completion of your tour you will understand why the submarine is the only naval platform that combines stealth, surprise, survivability, mobility, and endurance in a single unit. The employment of these characteristics provides a nation with a formidable maritime power, which should be understood by the public.

—Vice Admiral Roger Bacon, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare
January 1993
 

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