Replacing the Subs

[blacktriangle]

I'm obviously no expert on this topic but is Canada always looking to buy from someone else?  We have smart people in this country that I'm sure can come up with designs and tech.

Did you build your own car or truck? Or did you go somewhere like Toyota or Ford and try to get the best vehicle you could for the best price possible?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Why not just straight up by something from Germany or similar on a current production run with common parts of a larger fleet? It would be a lot easier to get some IP arrangement to do the maintenance, and cheaper to maintain then an obsolete one off fleet of a few boats.

The German boats (U212-214)are about a 1,000 tons smaller, the U-214 class claims an endurance of 84 days, not sure if anyone has been able to do that. The 214 have had their own technical issues, although their AIP systems appears to be impressive. At the same time the German navy had all 6 subs out of service at the same time, mainly due to lack of spare parts. That must be really frustrating for their crews.

 

[stellarpanther]

Did you build your own car or truck? Or did you go somewhere like Toyota or Ford and try to get the best vehicle you could for the best price possible?

Obviously I went to a company with strong reputation in Canada.

 

[MilEME09]

Obviously I went to a company with strong reputation in Canada.

As I pointed out above submarines require very specialized yards to be built at, if we wanted to build subs we would need to build a yard from scratch first. We would then have no technical expertise to build them and have to contract in those who do.

This would add billions to the price tag, after we were done the yard would like sit idle and loose the skills just learned.

Submarines, along with really big ships like assault ships we can't build and shouldn't try.

 

[Uzlu]

The German boats (U212-214)are about a 1,000 tons smaller, the U-214 class claims an endurance of 84 days, not sure if anyone has been able to do that.

The Type 212, Type 214, and Invincible-class submarines are about 1 830 to 2 200 tonnes submerged displacement—probably too small for world-wide deployments preferred by the Royal Canadian Navy.  Does the Type 212CD also have a submerged displacement of about 2 200 tonnes?

 

[NavyShooter]

The contract can state that the chief executive officer and president of Irving Shipbuilding Incorporated must both be in the submarine for every submarine’s initial sea trials.

That would simply prove that all levels of their employees are expendable to them.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Meanwhile Netherlands' "expeditionary" subs:

Dutch Navy confirms three corner fight for future sub program
https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/maritime-antisub/5404-dutch-navy-confirms-three-corner-fight-for-future-sub-program

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Dutch also realize the current designs from the German yards are to small for oceanic deployments, not that is bad, just they are designed for other waters and you can't have a boat that is perfect for large ocean and also for shallow waters littoral fight.

 

[Swampbuggy]

Hindsight and all, but it's a bit too bad that they didn't lump a bunch of stuff together, when they put out RFI's. Something like, we need a design for AOR, AAW vessels and SSK's. Whoever put together the best bid, by whatever metric you weigh most important, gets all three pieces. For example, Navantia would build you 6 new subs, give you whatever you need for maintenance, and you also buy a couple CANTABRIA class and F-100 class to build at home. I'm certain there would be some discounts on such a bulk buy.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Hindsight and all, but it's a bit too bad that they didn't lump a bunch of stuff together, when they put out RFI's. Something like, we need a design for AOR, AAW vessels and SSK's. Whoever put together the best bid, by whatever metric you weigh most important, gets all three pieces. For example, Navantia would build you 6 new subs, give you whatever you need for maintenance, and you also buy a couple CANTABRIA class and F-100 class to build at home. I'm certain there would be some discounts on such a bulk buy.

Subs are really specialized, while AORs are basically commercial ships, and AAWs are common surface warships.  They would be built at separate yards anyway, and would each have their own particular skillsets needed for the design and engineering.

Why try and get a single shipbuilder that can build all three? Each would effectively be it's own project anyway, and you would rule out all kinds of yards that specialized in one or the other to try and get a one-size-fits-all project manager.  That seems like it would just add on extra overhead, contract complexity, and also give the super contractor a tonne of bargaining leverage.

 

[Swampbuggy]

Point taken. I just was thinking that since sub building isn't something that Canada should really get into, then there may be a benefit to rolling a couple of projects into one, with whoever you get to build your subs. So, maybe something smaller scale, then. Like we buy your subs, but then we get a better price on an OPV/Corvette design etc. I can see where it may be problematic, in some ways, though.

 

[Dale Denton]

The problem with the entire Victoria Class replacement is that we have put ourselves in this corner, and have chosen to go into the fetal-position instead of pushing out.


The 2004 Chicoutimi incident is too far into the public psyche, we have forever ruled-out buying used subs. No matter if the US offered up 10 used SSNs for a loonie, a decision-maker would never be able to escape the comparison to the bad Upholder purchase.

- It's too expensive to build MOTS in Canada, and our yards are too busy (the large yards) and inexperienced (haven't built large naval/CCG ships in decades).

- It goes against our history to spend billions aboard with little chance of comparable CDN IRBs.

- Safe Secured Engaged even left out buying a sub altogether, when replacement project should be at the point of selecting a design or cutting steel.

My bets are on a divestment of this capability.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

My bets are on a divestment of this capability.

Sadly, at this point I find myself agreeing with you.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

LoboCanada I sincerely hope your wrong, but your logic is quite solid.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The problem with the entire Victoria Class replacement is that we have put ourselves in this corner, and have chosen to go into the fetal-position instead of pushing out.


The 2004 Chicoutimi incident is too far into the public psyche, we have forever ruled-out buying used subs. No matter if the US offered up 10 used SSNs for a loonie, a decision-maker would never be able to escape the comparison to the bad Upholder purchase.

- It's too expensive to build MOTS in Canada, and our yards are too busy (the large yards) and inexperienced (haven't built large naval/CCG ships in decades).

- It goes against our history to spend billions aboard with little chance of comparable CDN IRBs.

- Safe Secured Engaged even left out buying a sub altogether, when replacement project should be at the point of selecting a design or cutting steel.

My bets are on a divestment of this capability.

Give our massive, national COVID 19 deficit you might also see the sub program sacrificed upon the altar of 'fiscal prudence'.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I find the history of the submarine program interesting.  The Oberons were originally procured as training platforms to replace the British 6th Submarine Squadron, aka OPFOR, as the RCN focus at the time was ASW in the NA.

They were then upgraded in the 1970s and 1980s to make them capable of frontline combat and were used quite successfully, proving their worth particularly in the Turbot War and on other covert operations in the Atlantic.

By the 1990s, they were in need of replacement and we got the Upholder Class for a steal from the UK.  Since then though, the Submarine Program and it's raison d'etre, have stagnated and lost focus.

We've foolishly split a micro-fleet between two coasts and have two different FMF looking after what is an orphan fleet.  On top of this, 75% of the Subs are on the West Coast while all the trainers and school are on the East Coast.

The Sub Program doesn't need to be destroyed, it needs to be refocused.  I've already made a case elsewhere why the Subs should all be on the East Coast.  Lets get it done.

 

[FSTO]

I find the history of the submarine program interesting.  The Oberons were originally procured as training platforms to replace the British 6th Submarine Squadron, aka OPFOR, as the RCN focus at the time was ASW in the NA.

They were then upgraded in the 1970s and 1980s to make them capable of frontline combat and were used quite successfully, proving their worth particularly in the Turbot War and on other covert operations in the Atlantic.

By the 1990s, they were in need of replacement and we got the Upholder Class for a steal from the UK.  Since then though, the Submarine Program and it's raison d'etre, have stagnated and lost focus.

We've foolishly split a micro-fleet between two coasts and have two different FMF looking after what is an orphan fleet.  On top of this, 75% of the Subs are on the West Coast while all the trainers and school are on the East Coast.

The Sub Program doesn't need to be destroyed, it needs to be refocused.  I've already made a case elsewhere why the Subs should all be on the East Coast.  Lets get it done.

The reason why 75% are on the West Coast is that the refit program and facilities are in Esquimalt. The goal was always to have one boat operational on each coast, one going in to major refit and one coming out of a major refit. FMF's Cape Scott and Cape Breton are tasked to keep the operational boats supported. The contractor (currently Babcock Marine) is responsible, in conjunction with ADM(MAT) to carry out the Extended Docking Work Period work.

The Subs are a critical strategic asset for Canada and they must be replaced. 6 are the minimum we should shoot for.

 

[Dale Denton]

We are a 3 Ocean navy with enough ships for 1, maybe 2 Oceans.

Why do we need to base any submarines in the Atlantic in the first place? I get ASW, which we're historically good at, keep on at it - but - isn't that thinking too NATO-centric? Do we not care about our two 'besties' ANZACs?

Are we basing ships based on what NATO cares about (Europe) or what we care about? Our NATO commitment really only covers our one East-Ocean and is only starting to train near the arctic circle, yet we focus alot on the East-Coast. If Russia aggression is a concern then why isn't there a NATO Air Policing mission or a SNMG3 to support 2 of its members (US/CAN) with a direct border to Russia?

Plenty of wealthy countries in Europe with newer subs to patrol the Atlantic. Our SSKs can't operate under ice, so why not just base the sub fleet wholly in the Pacific? Start working with some Pacific friends and make a "PATO" to cover our Western flank? Throw a sack of change at the RN or USN in one of their XLUUV projects and use those on the East/North Coast instead. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Plus Russia has an effect on us both in the Atlantic and Pacific. So Pacific wise we have two potentiel threats, three if you count NK.

 

[CBH99]

I would have to agree...

While a resurgent Russian submarine force may be a formidable opponent in the Atlantic, we have the advantage of having a large number of allies in Europe, most of which have substantial naval infrastructure to control the waters around Europe. 

Lots of warships of all kinds, lots of ports, naval harbours, naval bases, substantial MPA capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic, plenty of AOR capabilities, etc etc.  The Atlantic, with all of the contributing naval forces of EU and NATO countries, has a robust naval presence and infrastructure, and can saturate the Atlantic with naval assets if need be.


We tend to forget how big the Pacific really is.  There is nowhere near the amount of naval infrastructure, or allied countries with professional 'western' military quality military forces.  When you get across the Pacific, yes - there is Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Guam, etc.  But even then, it isn't anywhere near the density of assets that the Atlantic offers.



Why not consolidate the sub fleet to the west coast, along with the training, simulators, support folks?  If our training & support for the fleet is out East, yet half the fleet is West, I'd have to agree that a 'refocus' of our submarine capability might have a real noticeable affect on the fleet's capabilities.  :2c: