Question on Russians training Germans, WW2

[Jarnhamar]

Maybe not so much of a Canadian miltary history question (wasnen't sure the best form to post this).

I've been trying to research links and articles on the Russians having trained the German military just prior to ww2 but I can't find anything.

Does anyone know any links or references to this offhand?

Am I not right in saying that the russians did infact train german pilots, artillery, armored and other elements prior to ww2?

Any help would be very appreciated thank you very much.

 

[HistoryFreak]

I don't know any links at the moment, but your correct the Russians did train German troops prior to WW2. The Germans and the Russians actually ahd an alliance before the war, and worked together in the invasion of Poland if I'm not mistaken. but because of the Treaty of Versailles, the German's where not allowed to train there own troops, so they just sent them to Russia to be trained. Also, bit of a side note, I heard the Britsh Pretroleum and Shell sold Hitler, prior to WW2, the technology to make synthetic oil, and since Germany had almost no way of getting oil other then from Russia, this helped them immensely later on in the war.

 

[3rd Herd]

Not so much as being trained by as the considerable use of Russian territory in order to curcumvent the terms of the Versaillies. It started in 1922 or so.

"The first tangible Soviet-German co-operation was, as far as I know, an agreement on 15 March 1922, which foreshadowed the open political statement of the Treaty of Rapallo. This agreement, to build an aeroplane factory in the Soviet Union, was between Junkers and the Soviet government. Junkers put up the expertise and the Soviet put up the money. In 1922 German troops were sent to train in the Soviet Union, the quid pro quo being the Soviets got the advantage of observing and participating in German military training methods.

The parties also co-operated in the manufacture of poison gas and munitions in the Soviet Union, for the Germans to train with and equip their army. I believe that a lot more promises than actual gas or munitions would have been forthcoming if the Soviets followed their usual practices in such circumstances. About 1929 a tank training ground was operational in the Soviet Union for German personnel and limited co-operation was established between the army staffs for participating in Soviet war games.

With the growth of air power the ability for Germans to train as pilots in the Soviet Union was also welcomed, a forerunner of the training grounds that the Spanish civil war would provide the same parties, albeit in a somewhat more realistic setting. Germans such as General Hans von Seeckt dreamed of an alliance with the Soviets that would at least last long enough to finish off the state of Poland, as a precursor to the rise of a new Germany.  ''(http://www.geocities.com/athens/troy/1791/rapallo.html )

"German Bases in the Soviet Union 1922-1933: In 1926, the Germans established a Panzerschule named Kama in Kazan. It was to teach both the practical and the theoretical. By 1929, the basic infrastructure had been built at the base and the first Panzers started arriving; six 23-ton tanks (BMW engines; 75mm main gun) and three 12-ton tanks armed with 37mm guns. The Soviet Army gave the Reichswehr a number of British Carden-Lloyd light tanks. In return for those, Germany provided the Soviet Union with a number of industrial and manufacturing tools the Soviets were not yet capable of fabricating. General Lutz of the Reichswehr was the Commanding Officer of the Motor Transport Inspection Nr. 6. One of the schools most famous teachers was Heinz Guderian. No German uniforms were worn; only civilian clothing was permitted, though on occasion, the Soviets who trained there as well let the Germans borrow their uniforms for a while.

In terms of aviation matters, the following approximate timetable applied: In 1921 Germans worked on establishing aviation manufacturing capabilities in the Soviet Union. In 1924, German personnel and German material support built the Lipetsk facility. From 1925 to 1927, German pilots (old and new) received refresher courses based on the existing flight school curriculum. Both pilots and instructors were familiarized with equipment and with flight strategies/tactics. In 1926, Reichswehr officers were trained to become pilots and flight leaders. In 1928, Jungmärke (young pilots) were now accepted into the training program. This lasted until 1933. The aerial observation program was started, but dropped in 1930. Numerous technical innovations in military aviation were also tested and evaluated while battle strategies and tactics evolved. In 1933 the Lipetsk school was closed.

Germany's first efforts in working with Moscow resulted in the construction of the Junkers factory in Fili (near Moscow). Negotiations dragged on for nearly a year before the Germans and the Soviets could agree on a signed document (October 1921 to December 1922). 300 metal-skinned a/c were supposed to be built at the plant per year; never reached. Politics interceded (on both sides), though the Soviets also stole many items from the plant a nd that did not make the Germans happy campers. In the end, the Junkers concession in Fili was liquidated.

In terms of giving the Germans a military aviation base, the Soviet Union at first proposed a military aerodrome in Odessa. These facilities were not only practical from a meteorological point of view; they also satisfied a number of requirements levied by the Reichsmarine (naval aviation issues).= But then the Reichsmarine withdrew itself from working with the Soviets. Because this eliminated the need for a naval aviation base, the Soviets now offered Lipetsk (north of Voronezh) to the Germans, which they accepted with no problems......................." (http://www.feldgrau.com/ger-sov.html )

Try using Google with the search terms: German Russian Military Cooperation 1920. If you have university or college computer access there are  several good articles through JSTOR. Also you can try the Journal of Slavic Military studies.

Good Luck.
 

 

[Jarnhamar]

Thats a perfect start!

Thank you very much!

 

[Flanker]

"German Bases in the Soviet Union 1922-1933: In 1926, the Germans established a Panzerschule named Kama in Kazan. It was to teach both the practical and the theoretical. By 1929, the basic infrastructure had been built at the base and the first Panzers started arriving; six 23-ton tanks (BMW engines; 75mm main gun) and three 12-ton tanks armed with 37mm guns. The Soviet Army gave the Reichswehr a number of British Carden-Lloyd light tanks. In return for those, Germany provided the Soviet Union with a number of industrial and manufacturing tools the Soviets were not yet capable of fabricating. General Lutz of the Reichswehr was the Commanding Officer of the Motor Transport Inspection Nr. 6. One of the schools most famous teachers was Heinz Guderian. No German uniforms were worn; only civilian clothing was permitted, though on occasion, the Soviets who trained there as well let the Germans borrow their uniforms for a while.

First, let's precise that the German military visits to USSR stopped mostly by the beginning of 1930s when Nazi came to the government.
So it is incorrect to say that Soviets trained Nazi before WW2.

Second, to give you a scale of the trainings, let's take an example of the aforementioned tank school.
All in all this school  produced ... 30 officiers for 3 years. That's all.

Third, there are some inexact information about Guderian being teaching in there and so on. That is not right, Guderian had never studied nor teached there.
He just came there for limited time with regular inspections.

 

[geo]

From my perspective, the training that happened in it USSR in the 20s was applied in Spain in the 30s.
Once the Nazi's came to power, the great depression was going full force, the allies had other problems to deal with nad Versailles was pert much dead.  At that point, the germans did not need the USSR as a front man anymore.

 

[3rd Herd]

First, let's precise that the German military visits to USSR stopped mostly by the beginning of 1930s when Nazi came to the government.
So it is incorrect to say that Soviets trained Nazi before WW2.

Second, to give you a scale of the trainings, let's take an example of the aforementioned tank school.
All in all this school  produced ... 30 officiers for 3 years. That's all.

Third, there are some inexact information about Guderian being teaching in there and so on. That is not right, Guderian had never studied nor teached there.
He just came there for limited time with regular inspections.

Flanker,
try adding your source information. For example the military collaboration which had began in the 1921 with the setting up Sonder-Gruppe R. was still peaking in the early 1930s. As direct Soviet German Military exchanges 1932 "saw multiple educational exchanges and large scale participation in joint exercises" according to Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 by Habeck. Germany on September 15th of 1933 discontinued the operation of the three secret Reichswar bases as "collaboration was terminated not because it was no longer mutually beneficial, but because collaboration was no longer able to maintain itself as a purely military operation independent of current Russo-German relations".(Stein) As for your minimizing of the training efforts, according to Vercamer and Pipes " by 1933, over 1,200 Luftwaffe pilots had been trained at Lipetsk." In the realm of armoured warfare from "1926 till 1929, at least 146 officers finished the training school at Kama. The most famous "cadet" was Von Kleist."(Parada) The end result of this training saw "forty - three air force officer s "graduating" from the Lipeck camp in 1928, twenty became Luftwaffe generals, while a good dozen of the forty army officers from the Kama school also made it to generals rank."(Zeidler)


Source:
Keyserlingk, Robert H, Reichswehr und Rote Armee 1920-1933: Wege und Stationen einer ungewuhn lichen Zusammenarbeit by Manfred Zeidler http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3686/is_199404/ai_n8720477

Parada, George. http://www.achtungpanzer.com/neu.htm

Vercamer and Pipes "German Military in the Soviet Union 1918-1933 http://www.feldgrau.com/ger-sov.html

Stein,G.H., "Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933" Political Science Quarterly, 1962

 

[Flanker]

Flanker,
try adding your source information. For example the military collaboration which had began in the 1921 with the setting up Sonder-Gruppe R. was still peaking in the early 1930s.As direct Soviet German Military exchanges 1932 "saw multiple educational exchanges and large scale participation in joint exercises" according to Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 by Habeck. Germany on September 15th of 1933 discontinued the operation of the three secret Reichswar bases as "collaboration was terminated not because it was no longer mutually beneficial, but because collaboration was no longer able to maintain itself as a purely military operation independent of current Russo-German relations".(Stein)

The last quote seems to repeat exactly what I said before but in a very-very sophisticated way.
The school trainings ended by 1933 for political reasons.

What are these political reasons?
Nazi's coup d'etat in Germany.

Many people make a big error trying to mix Germany of 20s, which was called Weimar Republic and was a democratic socialist state, and Nazi's Germany of 30s which was a quite opposite thing.

USSR and Weimar Republic had a lot of common political and economics interests, so it is not surprising that they collaborated and this was beficial for both of them.
More particularly, these common interests arose from non collaborative attitude of Western states.

As for sources, there is a bunch of declassified Soviet documents as well as many german sources. Like the one I mention below.

As for your minimizing of the training efforts, according to Vercamer and Pipes " by 1933, over 1,200 Luftwaffe pilots had been trained at Lipetsk."

That is simply not true. A pure speculation.
The Lipetsk school trained about 120 pilots and 100 pilots-observers.
I would recommend to use more reliable sources.
Here is first-hand information from of a high-ranking Luftwaffe officer involved in the trainings:

Helm Speidel
http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/1953_1.pdf
page 29, 30

In the realm of armoured warfare from "1926 till 1929, at least 146 officers finished the training school at Kama. The most famous "cadet" was Von Kleist."(Parada) The end result of this training saw "forty - three air force officer s "graduating" from the Lipeck camp in 1928, twenty became Luftwaffe generals, while a good dozen of the forty army officers from the Kama school also made it to generals rank."(Zeidler)

Your sources seems to be contradictory. So 40 or 146 officers?

To avoid any further speculations, here is a quite complete list of the staff trained at the Kama tank school:

http://www.meissler.de/militaer/wuensdorf_lehrgang.shtml

As you can see, there is no 146 officers, no Guderian in there, and even no Kleist.

The last one is particularly ridiculous.

You can check the official biography of Kleist to make sure that :
1. He had never studied in USSR
2. By that time he had already got a high officer grade, high enough to keep his nose out of thank schools

There are many sources, here is a link:

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERkliest.htm

After the war Kleist was Staff Officer with the 13th Cavalry Regiment (1920-23), Instructor of Tactics at the Cavalry School at Hanover (1923-26) and Chief of Staff of the 2nd Cavalry Division (1927-28) where he replaced Gerd von Rundstedt. He then served as Chief of Staff of Wehrkreis III (1928-31) and in 1932 was promoted to the rank of major general.

A couple of hundred of pilots and tank officers trained in USSR is nothing comparing to at least 2000 officers trained secretely in Germany itself by the beginning of 30s.

The overall impact of these trainings was absolutely insignificant for the whole German army.

 

[3rd Herd]

"Manfred Zeidler has investigated the truth behind this sensational chapter of Weimar history. His Reichswehr und Rote Armee, . is based on a doctoral dissertation which won the Moritz-von-Bethmann prize. It makes extensive use of Russian sources which only became available during the 1990s."(GERMANY'S FIRST REPUBLIC)

"In the late 1980s, Manfred Zeidler wrote on the relations between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Unfortunately, his application to do research at the Soviet military archives (then TsGASA, now RGVA) was rejected. However, Zeidler could use German archives and memoir data combined with those Soviet archival documents that appeared in the early 1990s in such periodicals as Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, Istoriia SSSR/Otechestvennaia istoria, and Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. Zeidler's monograph remains a standard work on the Reichswehr's Russian story. He carefully evaluated the role of the secret plants and training stations in the USSR for German military capability and the evolution of new German doctrines. However, it was only access to Russian archives that made it possible to thoroughly examine the other side of the coin, the significance of secret contacts in Germany for the Red Army and Soviet industry."(Samuelson)


So

"The Germans may have trained just 200 pilots and observers at Lipeck, plus maybe 30 tank men at Kama, but in the context of the limitations of Versailles, the aim was always qualitative not quantitative. In due course, the 43 Lipeck trainees of 1928 produced at least 20 generals of the Luftwaffe; the Kama tankers gave rise to at least a dozen generals of their own. Zeidel's conclusion is fair: through its secret military co-operation with Russia, the Weimar Republic provided vital prerequisites for the military expansion of the Third Reich." (GERMANY'S FIRST REPUBLIC)

"On several occasions in 1928-32, exchanges of general staff-level delegations took place. In fall 1932, a high-level Soviet delegation headed by Tukhachevskii visited Germany, attending the Wehrmacht's maneuvers in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder and armaments plants in the Ruhr. Naturally, official visits like this one were anxiously followed by other states, notably France and Poland."(Samuelson)

"The framework and presentation of Gorlov's research corresponds nicely with that of Zeidler, and a parallel reading is recommended. Henceforth, historians can delve into specific aspects of the interaction between the German and Soviet military elites in the 1920s and early 1930s. For example, one might study the evolution of modern maneuver warfare by comparing the Blitzkrieg doctrine (Guderian) with the Soviet concept for deep offensive operations (Vladimir Triandafillov, Tukhachevskii). There is a need for in-depth studies of what [End Page 354] Soviet officers learned at the German general staff academy. 11 In turn, one might ask what was taught, and even learned, by German generals like Friedrich Paulus (the future field marshal) during their long guest lectureships in Moscow. What exactly did the Soviets take from their experiences in Germany from staff courses, maneuvers, and visits to industries, and how did they implement what they learned at home? (Samuelson )

You could also add in the German training mission to China after the Soviets were expelled in 1927. Or the German/Swedish tank development or the Finnish German relationship vis via military training.

Sources:

GERMANY'S FIRST REPUBLIC The Historical Journal, 44, 2 (2001), pp. 579-585 Printed in the United Kingdom
# 2001 Cambridge University Press http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=78349

Samuelson, Lennart. Review Sovershenno sekretno: Moskva - Berlin 1920 - 1933. Voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia mezhdu SSSR i Germaniei; Sergei Alekseevich Gorlov, Sovershenno sekretno: Al´ians Moskva - Berlin 1920-1933 gg. (Voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia SSSR-Germaniia) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kritika/v003/3.2samuelson.html

 

[pbi]

Wow-great debate on a little-known subject. Kudos to both Flanker and 3rdHerd for good arguments well supported. While not a scholar of the period, I have researched and prepared a professional study program that examines the Reichsheer and Von Seeckt's role in ithttp://www.army.forces.gc.ca/38cbg_hq/Headquarters/Command/professional_development/course_outline.htm.

In doing the work, I formed the opinion that while the absolute numbers of Reichsheer officers going through Kazan and other places may have been small, the professional effect was disproportionate. At a time when Germany was still being watched by the Allies for treaty violations, the USSR arrangement gave them a place to experiment, develop, learn and think with a much greater degree of professional freedom than what they would have had in Germany. Even when the Versailles inspection regime lapsed in the 1920's and then finally ceased altogether, there was still value in having access to what the Soviets could offer, if only because of left-wing political party resistance to military spending in Germany. Don't forget that Von Seeckt's demise as COS of the RH happened because a Socialist defence minister resented the invitation of the Crown Prince to attend RH manoeuvres involving a former Imperial Guard regiment. It wasn't just the Allies who were opposed to a resurgent RH.

I encourage everybody who is interested in the development of the WH of WWII to spend some time digging into the history of the RH in the years 1919-1932.

Cheers

 

[3rd Herd]

pbi,
thanks for joining in. It would be interesting to see what Flawed Design came up with as a result of his opening this thread.

As to the issues at hand another perspective is found with Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941 by Aleksandr M. Nekrich [ a review of this book can be found at http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.cgi?path=2604894487609]. In regard to the Kama, German tank school, Nekrich states "In 1928 the RH(Reichswher) dispatched to the school a young officer named Heinz Guderian...............According to German sources , Guderian, significantly improved conditions at Kama."(pg.61) Nekrich goes onto quote the deputy chief of Mechanization and Motorization Directorate of the Red Army in a "rather high assessment" as stating "up to now represent great interest fro the Red army from both the technical and tactical point of view. Sixty five Soviet tank commanders completed the school on a three year period."(pg.61) This author concludes the reason for the closing of this school was due more in part to "after 1933 German tank building at home increased sharply making the complex near Kazan redundant".

As for the Junkers plant at Fili, "One of the more fantastic OGPU reports claimed in 1925 that the German aircraft firm Junkers, then operating a concession outside Moscow, was engaging in criminal activities ranging from promoting religion to trying to take over the Soviet aviation industry. The report concluded that Junkers was working with the British to promote a monarchist coup d’etat in the Soviet Union." (Keys) Highlights from Nekrich on this venture contain such information as the intrigues of Petr I Baranov [head of the Soviet airforce] proposing to "terminate dependence on Junkers and to organize the domestic production of all metal airplanes." To do so the head of the Soviet airforce stooped to "simple larceny", "recomending that all necessary blueprints, materials, etc be secretly removed from the plant" and that a "group of Russian engineers, presently employed at the Junkers plant , had already been systematically stealing materials."(48) The financial picture in Germany for Junkers was no better with a bail out by the German government in 1925 resulting in both sides seeking an "amicable settlement of affairs". The Soviets paid 3 million rubles "which constituted compensation for the plant, its equipment, and fourteen planes with motors and spare parts".(50)

Lipetsk, the German Pilot training school was formally founded in 1925 and opened the following year [Soviet acronym VIVIPOL] according to Nekrich. Describing the period of 1926 to 1932, Nekrich states "some 220 military pilots participated in each of the half year training courses."(51). From the Soviet side in 1926 there were sixteen fighter pilots trained, along with forty five mechanics. Continuing, there were two primary focuses of the school; air combat and recognise and in conjunction "tests of all new weapons and equipment."( 51) A German senior engineer sent to report on the school concluded "...that the tests as concluded in Lipetsk, simply could not be carried out in Germany."(51) The training program entailed "everything that concerns the construction of airplanes, their outfitting, weaponry and bombing(including testing of poison gas bombs)". Nekrich states this school was closed and handed over to the Soviets in July of 1933, although the "Reichswar command proposed to maintain reciprocal visits of officers and specialists and to continue the exchange of experience in the areas of tactics and technology".(52) Several years into the future the successful results of "testing" at Lipetsk would be felt by both eastern and western allied armies as the Junker's JU-87 dived from the sky.

Flanker
your quotes

"First, let's precise that the German military visits to USSR stopped mostly by the beginning of 1930s when Nazi came to the government.
So it is incorrect to say that Soviets trained Nazi before WW2."

And along comes Hitler into power and all cessation of military collaboration halts, wrong. Although the army and airforce endeavours do gradually wind down the German Soviet naval participation begins. Ending with the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Hitler it seems according to Philibin overrode the German naval staff's objections to dealing with the Soviets. From a review of his book The Lure of Neptune. German-Soviet Naval Collaboration, 1919-1941. One example from a review by Steven Main states "once Germany had committed itself to an aggressive war in Europe, the possibility of operating a German naval base in the Kola Peninsula, free from British military activity, compelled the German Navy's High Command to rethink: 'Basis Nord', located in the Soviet Arctic north of Murmansk, was created. From the German point of view, the base was to have three functions: 'as a logistics base, as a safe harbour, and as a repair base,' (p. 88). No less a figure than Admiral Donitz was made the base's 'action officer' (p. 91). As such, he was less than concerned about the USSR's desire to maintain its neutrality in the war between Germany and Britain."

To be Continued......................

Source:

Keys, Barbara. Review: Aleksandr M. Nekrich. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.cgi?path=2604894487609

Main, Steven. Review: Philibin, Tobias R.  III, The Lure of Neptune. German-Sorviet Naval Collaboration, 1919-1941.
http://www.jstor.org/view/09668136/ap010004/01a00220/0

Nekrich, Aleksandr M. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. Edited and
translated by Gregory L. Freeze. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Philibin, Tobias R.  III, The Lure of Neptune. German-Sorviet Naval Collaboration, 1919-1941. University of South Carolina, 1994