Our 'maybe' new recce vehicle

[Britney Spears]

Well, see, in most other armies, "Armoured" means TANKS, you know, the one with the tracks, and the big gun and that kind of thing, not Iltises. So you'll forgive us for being a little confused at recruiting.

 

[Infanteer]

I only ask because of this:

Theme 4: Commanders require human intelligence more than imagery
Many key leaders commented on the importance of human intelligence.  The special operations forcesteams who worked in support of both the 3d Infantry and 101st Airborne divisions were absolutely vital in this capacity.  Often the most useful information came from captured Iraqi prisoners or from Iraqi citizens.  Colonel William Grimsley, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division described the difficulty he and his S2 were having in templating the Medina and Adnan divisions until they captured a large contingent of enemy prisoners of war from those units.  What they discovered was that both divisions had spread out their forces from Baghdad to An Najaf rather then deploying them in any strict doctrinal manner.  The reasons behind this bizarre defensive strategy did not become apparent until soldiers were captured and interrogated.  No amount of satellite imagery or UAV feed could have provided the critical insights offered by a handful of captured soldiers.  Because the enemy was not adhering to any doctrine, it was virtually impossible to assess his intent and predict his future actions based on where his forces were arrayed.  This type of predictive intelligence could be obtained only by meeting the enemy face to face

Theme 6: Lightly armored scouts cannot support high-tempo operations.
The three brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division were each equipped with brigade reconnaissance troops consisting of 10 HMMWV-mounted scouts equipped with the long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRASS) and a combination of Mark-19 grenade launchers and .50-caliber machine guns. Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first test of the new brigade reconnaissance assets in combat since their creation following the1996 Goldsmith reconnaissance study. Likewise, each battalion task force included a similarly equipped scout platoon of six HMMWVs.  Perhaps the greatest success of this new design was the LRASS optical system.  Numerous interviews spoke of the incredible capability of the new sight to acquire and classify enemy targets at extreme distances.  The greatest praise came from Colonel Daniel Allyn, commander of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, who related an incident near Karbala where his brigade reconnaissance troop was able to acquire precise 10-digit grids of enemy vehicles and dismounts with their LRASS at a range of 3,600 meters and then pass that information directly to his artillery battalion for a first-round hit.  Despite the successes of the LRASS optical system, the vulnerability of the lightly armored scouts proved to be a significant limitation.  Shortly after crossing into Iraq, most of the brigade reconnaissance troops transitioned from their traditional role of forward reconnaissance to conducting route security or convoy escort for the unit trains. The same thing happened with the task force scout platoons. In a few cases, units attempted to equip their scouts with M113s from their maintenance sections to afford them some measure of survivability. In the majority of cases, commanders simply stopped using their reconnaissance troops for reconnaissance.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Sanderson, commander of 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, could not employ his HMMWV scouts because he saw that they were incapable of screening infront of a moving force.  Lieutenant Colonel Scott Rutter, commander of 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, chose to keep his scouts only two to three kilometers from his lead forces to provide them some degree of protection.  Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Twitty, commander of 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, used his scout platoon as convoy escort and employed M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles from his line companies to conduct reconnaissance for the battalion.  He strongly recommended, based on his inability to employ the HMMWVs correctly, that scout platoons in the future should be equipped with M3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles rather than HMMWVs.  COL Perkins pulled his brigade reconnaissance troop from the reconnaissance mission when the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) threat became too intense.  The only unit in 3d Infantry Division that had scouts operating in armored vehicles was the division cavalry squadron, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry.  However, during a tough fight against incessant RPG attacks, LTC Ferrell found the situation too dangerous to reconnoiter even with the medium armor on his M3 cavalry fighting vehicles.  To solve this dilemma, he placed his tanks forward of the M3s and then ordered his scouts to ride on the tanks in place of the tank loaders.

Both from here, which as we all know is being discussed in the armoured forum.

Is this experience an anomoly or is it a portent of what is to come?  The presenter has real experience in combat and the data seems pretty sound, so I felt compelled to pose these questions to the forum.

Slim states "stand off electronic surveillance and "old fashioned 'Recce By Stealth".  These quotes highlight the opposite - HUMINT and Advance to Contact.  How do we address these disparities?  Do they need to be addressed before we purchase a vehicle?

 

[couchcommander]

Just a quick note, the authour does make note of how useful the survellience systems were, just that vehicles (being light and unable to properly defend themselves), were not suited to the task. The disparity, to me, seems to be the idea of "recce by stealth" by light, small, vehicles.... namely that some of us seem to feel that this is idea is not quite working how how it was supposed to.

So to rephrase Infanteers question, how do we address this disparity, and should we address this disparity before we purchase new vehicles?

 

[George Wallace]

Slim states "stand off electronic surveillance and "old fashioned 'Recce By Stealth".  These quotes highlight the opposite - HUMINT and Advance to Contact.  How do we address these disparities?   Do they need to be addressed before we purchase a vehicle?

Actually No.  We do not need to address these disparities.  

We have always relied on numerous sources to gather info (Intelligence).  Recce is but one of them.  Humint is another.  SIGINT, IMINT (TUAVs, UAVs, Satellite, etc.), TECHINT, ELINT, COMMINT, INTSUMS and INTREPS from flanking Allied Formations, input from National Sources (NDHQ, etc.), Open Source materials (Newspapers, magazines, TV, Radio, Internet), and numerous other sources all contribute to a Commander's planning.  

What we are concentrating on in this thread is Recce, nothing else.  Leave HUMINT to the HUMINT discussions.  Who cares what kind of photos we can get from a satellite when we are trying to decide on a Recce vehicle for the Recce Troops.  Theme 4 is a 'Red Herring" in this case.  Theme 6 is more in line with what we do and how we have done it.

 

[DG-41]

And for Theme 6, what I can't help but see is crews not experienced in the use of light recce, commanders not sure of how to employ them, and decisions made to protect those troops that perhaps need not have been made were they more experienced in the role.

We've been doing this stuff since WW2, and it works. But it also takes time and training to get right. I don't think that the Yanks having trouble during their first real employment of lght recce really qualifies as a failure of the entire concept.

DG

 

[Bomber]

Mowag makes a 4x4 piranah, lets get that.  Or maybe chop some of the MTVL's into a super Lynx.

 

[Slim]

Mowag makes a 4x4 piranah, lets get that.   Or maybe chop some of the MTVL's into a super Lynx.

Has anyone thought about motorcycles? Have a couple of heavy cars in the recce troop and then a few bikes, which canbe taken just about anyplace you need to go, are inexpensive and can dissapear right into the landscape along with the guys riding them...Say in an OP for instance...

 

[a_majoor]

WRT theme six, I think it pretty much sums up the case for larger and more powerful recce vehicles than the "Ferret scout car" model. The Stryker recce vehicle has many of the virtues that I see being needed in a modern recce vehicle, the only down side in the current configuration is that it places the LRASS unit on the OWS where the standard Stryker Infantry carrier has the defensive weapons. Examples I have seen are protected by a pintle mounted GPMG. A better developed version should address the self defence issue, and the LRASS (if required) can either be moved or co located with the weapon (perhaps an outsized OWS?).

And for Theme 6, what I can't help but see is crews not experienced in the use of light recce, commanders not sure of how to employ them, and decisions made to protect those troops that perhaps need not have been made were they more experienced in the role.

We've been doing this stuff since WW2, and it works. But it also takes time and training to get right. I don't think that the Yanks having trouble during their first real employment of light recce really qualifies as a failure of the entire concept.

As Major Taylor points out in his paper, even in WW II, light Jeep mounted recce was unable to perform the task and only the introduction of "Stuart" light tanks allowed the recce to carry our their tasks. (Not mentioned was the parallel introduction of the "Greyhound" armoured car)

WRT theme four, here I will respectfully disagree with you, George. Since the enemy can and will hide out in the civil population, the ability to dismount and walk and talk with the locals is of paramount importance. Armoured Recce has its place in this scenario, the vehicles can do presence patrols, spot VCPs and other tasks over a very wide area, the dismounted patrolmen increase the flexibility and versatility. Pulling up to the side of the road and having someone walk over and talk to a farmer in his field is a valid recce task in humanitarian and SASO OPS. After all, it will often be a friendly local who will point out the location of the IED or weapons cache, which would be otherwise invisible to any other system. Generating information by "face to face" contact also covers shooting at people who are shooting at you, a very clear indication of their intent.

The Armoured recce casts the wide net (the dismounted patrolmen are simply another tool in the kitbag), and if they develop enough information, more forces can be introduced into the AOR to deal with whatever has been discovered.

(edited to clarify the "theme four" discussion)

 

[KevinB]

We've been doing this stuff since WW2, and it works. But it also takes time and training to get right. I don't think that the Yanks having trouble during their first real employment of lght recce really qualifies as a failure of the entire concept.

DG

DONT EVER MISTAKE OUR TRAINING FOR US MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN A SHOOTING WAR.

 

[DG-41]

Right, because we have zero experience with shooting wars ourselves.

:

I would expect, were we to buy an aircraft carrier, that we might experience some teething problems developing carrier ops doctrine. It is reasonable to expect that the Yanks might have some teething problems too when they try something new.

DG

 

[Infanteer]

Actually No.  We do not need to address these disparities.  

We have always relied on numerous sources to gather info (Intelligence).  Recce is but one of them.

Sorry George, maybe I was a bit unclear in why I put up "theme 4".  In the context that it was written, it was meant to point out that passive surveillence means (the article specifically mentions UAV's and Sat. Imagery) were unable to deliver practicle information to the guys on the ground.  I was sort of aiming at surveillence with this example.  We have a great surveillence asset with the Mast, but if taken in the same context as the article it would be spotting out a goatherder or a inactive town.  What is needed is more active recconaissance measures, such as cruising up in your mud recce dune-buggy/car and asking somebody what's going on - the locals can be depended on for information of what lies ahead without us having to get shot at; especially when one considers a populace breakdown that LtCol Eyre refers to here.

I don't think reconaissance needs to be seperated into what it can achieve (in the sense of a specific form of intelligence; [X]INT).  As long as the guys on the ground are finding stuff out, whether it is with a fancy sensor (the article mentions the LRASS), the naked eye, or by talking to somebody who is pissed off because insurgents turned his basement into a bomb-making factory, then recce is doing its job.  Does this seem to make sense?

I'm sure Matt Fisher can tell us plenty of differing ways he "recced" stuff during his 7 months in the Sandbox.  As well, our own experience in Afghanistan should highlight the multifaceted ways in which recce forces gather intelligence that is relevent and very usable by low level commanders.

 

[Infanteer]

And for Theme 6, what I can't help but see is crews not experienced in the use of light recce, commanders not sure of how to employ them, and decisions made to protect those troops that perhaps need not have been made were they more experienced in the role.

We've been doing this stuff since WW2, and it works. But it also takes time and training to get right. I don't think that the Yanks having trouble during their first real employment of lght recce really qualifies as a failure of the entire concept.

DG

Pretty lame cop-out to assume that it is a cultural problem in that the Americans simply didn't know what they were doing; especially when the author points out that it was tried in Gulf War I.

Do you have any proof from your own vast operational experience to back up your statement that the Americans "fumbled something that we've been doing for years"?

Right, because we have zero experience with shooting wars ourselves.

Last time I checked, the most recent battle honour was "Korea 1950-1953".   Sure, we've been shot at plenty of times, we've had a fill gunfights in the Balkans and we had some limited experience in conducting operations in Kandahar, but other than that I'm at a loss to find out the last time we've conducted sustained combat operations against a foe who is ready to fight.

 

[George Wallace]

WRT theme six, I think it pretty much sums up the case for larger and more powerful recce vehicles than the "Ferret scout car" model. The Stryker recce vehicle has many of the virtues that I see being needed in a modern recce vehicle, the only down side in the current configuration is that it places the LRASS unit on the OWS where the standard Stryker Infantry carrier has the defensive weapons. Examples I have seen are protected by a pintle mounted GPMG. A better developed version should address the self defence issue, and the LRASS (if required) can either be moved or co located with the weapon (perhaps an outsized OWS?).

Actually, I disagree with your analysis.   To me, it looks more like the most common problem faced by Armd Recce; thier commanders don't know how to properly employ them.   When employed incorrectly, any unit may be found to be lacking in equipment.

As Major Taylor points out in his paper, even in WW II, light Jeep mounted recce was unable to perform the task and only the introduction of "Stuart" light tanks allowed the recce to carry our their tasks. (Not mentioned was the parallel introduction of the "Greyhound" armoured car)

Sorry, but again crap.   He has pull a stunt that many of our poorer journalist friends have pulled.   He has limited his inputed data to what verifies his opinion.   What about the units that used the Lynx II, the Dingo, Otters, Humbers, all light armoured cars used through to the end of the war in Germany?  

WRT theme four, here I will respectfully disagree with you, George. Since the enemy can and will hide out in the civil population, the ability to dismount and walk and talk with the locals is of paramount importance. Armoured Recce has its place in this scenario, the vehicles can do presence patrols, spot VCPs and other tasks over a very wide area, the dismounted patrolmen increase the flexibility and versatility. Pulling up to the side of the road and having someone walk over and talk to a farmer in his field is a valid recce task in humanitarian and SASO OPS. After all, it will often be a friendly local who will point out the location of the IED or weapons cache, which would be otherwise invisible to any other system. Generating information by "face to face" contact also covers shooting at people who are shooting at you, a very clear indication of their intent.

And I will disagree with you.   Armd Recce should not be in built up areas.   They should bypass them.   This is a job for the Infantry and their Recce, who operate more along the lines that you describe.   Even today, we find that the Armour guys are out in some remote location, hidden, putting surveillance on some location, not walking in and talking to the people in that house.   HUMINT is doing things like: having a coffee with the locals, not Armd Recce.

Let's not get the different roles played by the various players confused with each other.   That is a problem here, and it is a problem faced 'in country' by Recce forces whose Commanders don't fully comprehend their role and capabilities.   One does not bring a knife to a gunfight type of philosophy.   Armd Recce is the surgical knife that finds and uses other means to fight the enemy.   SF troops do their thing.   Infantry bring in the guns.   HUMINT does the talking.

 

[George Wallace]

......... especially when one considers a populace breakdown that LtCol Eyre refers to here.

  We are talking Apples and Oranges here.  LCol Eyre is looking at the "Changing Role of the Infantry", not our new Recce veh for the Armour Recce role.  As I said earlier, two different jobs.  If you want Dismounted Infantry on the ground, you can use any form of "Armoured Bus".  You could use a vehicle similar to the British Saxon, if you wish: http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/current_equipment/the_infantry_armoured_fighting_vehicle.htm
For Armd Recce you need something else.

 

[George Wallace]

Last time I checked, the most recent battle honour was "Korea 1950-1953".  Sure, we've been shot at plenty of times, we've had a fill gunfights in the Balkans and we had some limited experience in conducting operations in Kandahar, but other than that I'm at a loss to find out the last time we've conducted sustained combat operations against a foe who is ready to fight.

Can we hold up your comments on the PPCLI at Medak Pocket?

 

[DG-41]

Pretty lame cop-out to assume that it is a cultural problem in that the Americans simply didn't know what they were doing;

I'm not assuming anything at all; it is right there in black and white in the article. And furthermore, I'm not just handwaving away their experience as a "stupid american problem" - I see teething problems with troops adopting new doctrine and new techniques upon which they don't have a lot of experience, and commanders nervous about committing troops to actual shooting engagements under those conditons. Hey, fair enough. I've been involved with a unit that re-roled from sabre to recce (aside from some senior NCOs who had done recce time in Germany - and who were a huge help - I was the only recce-trained leader inthe unit at the time) and hell yeah there were teething problems.

And as George has pointed out, commanders not knowing how to employ recce is an endemic problem even in the Canadian army. Sadly, I have lots of experiance here too. Sometimes you work with a commander who makes good use of you, and sometimes you get employed with a commander where you have to explain to him who it is you are and what you can do for him.

And one area that I happen to agree with the Yanks is that on the spectrum of possible recce vehicles, the mission is better served if the vehicle is more towards the armoured car or light tank end of the spectrum than the Hummer/Jeep end of the spectrum. Yes, recce can be done successfully in jeeps, but (in my opinion at least) only when nothing better is availible. The current crop of SUV-alike fishbowls has me very concerned. At least with Iltis, you got a very small, very light, and very open vehicle that could be super-stealthy and fit into all sorts of weird places - meaning that Iltis offered capability that (say) M113 or Bison did not. The SUV-alikes give up the size and openess of the Iltis, but aside from not being rusted out relics with proper radio installations, don't seem to offer any new capabilities.

Even today, we find that the Armour guys are out in some remote location, hidden, putting surveillance on some location, not walking in and talking to the people in that house.  HUMINT is doing things like: having a coffee with the locals, not Armd Recce.

Well.... this is becoming less true. Armoured recce is doing more dismounted stuff these days (based on what happened in Germany, perhaps we are to some extent *restoring* the dismounted stuff) and with dismounts (or with open vehicles) you open up the potential for more HUMINT-style intelligence. Certainly I'm not above asking a local if they saw a bunch of green trucks go by....

But I do agree that compared to Infantry recce or dedicated HUMINT pers, we do a lot less of it.

There's not a clean division between the various recce missions; they are more like areas along a continuous spectrum. We do dismounted patrolling, but far less than the Infantry and when we do, our patrols are smaller - so the ability to carry dismounts is a nice to have, but not an absolute requirement, and not worth giving up vehicle speed/size/protection/noise in order to get (because that interferes with the primary mission) In many cases, we are supposed to hand over our OPs and patrol bases to the Infantry recce as they move forward, and I would expect the size and frequency of dismounted patrols to increase once they show up. So that skills overlap between the Armour and Infantry recce is a good thing, because when it comes to patrol bases and OPs, we're (supposed to be at least) singing off the same songsheet. The OP and patrol base I hand off to the pongoes should serve their purposes as well as it did mine, so that my counterpart inherits a good, solid, at least partially prepared position and isn't forced to start from scratch.

That's something I wish we practiced more.

But anyway, I don't think the American experience with light armoured recce invalidates the concept, especially given our long and successful history with it. But by the same token, there are clues in the American experience that warn against relying on SUV-alikes as recce vehicles, instead of something more along the lines of Lynx. If we are going to rely on the experience we have doing this sort of operation, we have to use ALL of it and employ the proper vehicle for the job.

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

I asked the question on another thread whether there isn't a problem with confusing task and platform, patrolling and recce and advance to contact.

As George has pointed out everybody does recce, likewise everybody does advance to contact and everybody patrols.  The question seems to me to be the environment in which the force operates and the intention of the operation.

George's light armoured recce, is designed, it seems to me, for working in wide-open spaces where large areas of ground need to be covered, the threat (though heavily armed) is dispersed even if locally concentrated and the recce force (whether patrolling, conducting route recce or surveying enemy positions) has time, space and cover/concealment allowing the use of long range sensors (binoculars even).  The primary weapons of such a force are its radios linked to arty or to assault groups (own troop, or one of the brigade's battalions).

Kevin's Long Range Recce types (minus vehicles of any sort) do the same thing but at a slower pace in complex terrain  with very low population density where vehicles can't go and likewise where the threat of encountering a tank is very low as well.

Once either of these forces run into a concentration of enemy troops it isn't up to them to launch an assault, even to gain information.  They can observe and lead in assault forces or spot an arty raid.

If the enemy moves then recce keeps pace with the enemy to keep them under observation.

However the business of "fighting for information" becomes an "advance to contact" and it seems that with heavy recce force the battalion commanders were in the habit of using that platoon as a fourth manoeuver element, as a substitute for a fourth "troop" (American style), so that they still kept their other "troops" free from the battle and available for manoeuver.  The alternatives then seem to be to accept a reduction in their fighting strength by allocating one of their manoeuvre troops to the advance to contact role, keeping only two troops in reserve.  Or else prevail upon command to allocate them a fourth manoeuvre element.  In any event, once the bullets start flying contact has been made.  What is required now is for contact to be maintained and for those in contact to keep reporting what they are seeing so that the commander can shape the field accordingly.  If you can see the enemy and the enemy can see you what need is there to find the enemy and I always thought of recce's role, regardless of platform, as finding the enemy.

Standing patrols, fighting patrols, presence patrols are something else again and if the environment in which they are conducted is a hostile environment with a risk of engagement by heavy weapons then the force needs to be equipped accordingly.  If heavily armoured vehicles are available, the roads will support them, the streets are wide enough etc... then they may be a suitable patrol platform.  Other wise something else will have to be done.

Now whether you want to teach tank crews to be able to conduct recce in light vehicles or whether you need a separately trained and equipped force ......... Which is more important and easier to train?  The task or the platform?

 

[a_majoor]

As Major Taylor points out in his paper, even in WW II, light Jeep mounted recce was unable to perform the task and only the introduction of "Stuart" light tanks allowed the recce to carry our their tasks. (Not mentioned was the parallel introduction of the "Greyhound" armoured car)

Sorry, but again crap.  He has pull a stunt that many of our poorer journalist friends have pulled.  He has limited his inputed data to what verifies his opinion.  What about the units that used the Lynx II, the Dingo, Otters, Humbers, all light armoured cars used through to the end of the war in Germany?

Since Major Taylor was commenting on the American experience, we will need to go by analogy here (treading very carefully). The initial recce in Operation Torch and other early US actions were based on "Jeeps", which were found to be unsuitable, and eventually withdrawn/supplimented with "Stuart" light tanks and armoured cars like the Greyhound. In terms of performance, protection and firepower, these vehicles are much more comparable to the Dingo, Otter, Humber and other armoured cars used by Commonwealth forces than Jeeps. Since we all seem to be in agreement that SUVs (modern jeep analogues) are not suitable recce vehicles, then we can look at this experience and see what sort of armoured car works best for recce.

In terms of other examining Armoured Recce deployments, Major Taylor also uses Gulf War One and OIF, as well as the experiences in the NTC throughout the 1980s  (where certain assumptions became ingrained in US thinking), so I am not sure if we can really think of this as "cherry picking" data; Korea, Viet Nam and the various small wars between 1945-1991 really did not see much use of armoured recce so there was little data to find there.

Armd Recce should not be in built up areas. They should bypass them. This is a job for the Infantry and their Recce, who operate more along the lines that you describe. Even today, we find that the Armour guys are out in some remote location, hidden, putting surveillance on some location, not walking in and talking to the people in that house. HUMINT is doing things like: having a coffee with the locals, not Armd Recce.

The issue of recce avoiding BUAs will be very difficult to get around, since the bad guys will be prefferentially in BUAs and other complex terrain. Even using the Armoured Recce to throw a sort of cordon around these areas and attempting to monitor the traffic in and out will be pretty time and manpower intensive. Maybe we should be using the various experiences in Gulf War One, OIF, Afghanistan, the Balkens etc. to start thinking more in terms of "Recce +". The terrain and human environments are becoming much more complex than ever before, and the increase in speed also changes the way we do business (the amount of time available is compressed, so you need to go faster and do more things and do them faster). The increasing speed and range also means the Recce elements will be transitioning between environments wether they want to or not, so they must be adaptable.

George's light armoured recce, is designed, it seems to me, for working in wide-open spaces where large areas of ground need to be covered, the threat (though heavily armed) is dispersed even if locally concentrated and the recce force (whether patrolling, conducting route recce or surveying enemy positions) has time, space and cover/concealment allowing the use of long range sensors (binoculars even).   The primary weapons of such a force are its radios linked to arty or to assault groups (own troop, or one of the brigade's battalions).

Kevin's Long Range Recce types (minus vehicles of any sort) do the same thing but at a slower pace in complex terrain   with very low population density where vehicles can't go and likewise where the threat of encountering a tank is very low as well.

Once either of these forces run into a concentration of enemy troops it isn't up to them to launch an assault, even to gain information.   They can observe and lead in assault forces or spot an arty raid.

If the enemy moves then recce keeps pace with the enemy to keep them under observation.

Small vehicles can do the job, but the ability to have more "eyes on" and sensor aids seems to be the biggest multiplier the recce patrol can have with them. Pulling in more data from Afghanistan, LCol Bank's article in the CAJ ("Three Block Warriors" http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_08/iss_1/CAJ_vol8.1_05_e.pdf) indicates that Infantry sections and platoons are operating with separations of 5-30 Km, so Armoured Recce patrols could potentially have even greater separation, so being self sufficient in terms of protection, firepower and on board capabilities becomes even more pressing.

I am not knocking the knowledge and experience in Recce that George and other Black Hatters are bringing to this debate, but rather thinking of putting together a bigger and better toolbox, consistent with the various "self imposed" limitations the CF is labouring under as well.

 

[George Wallace]

Armour Recce and Infantry Recce do two different jobs.  They share some similarities, but are completely different in their employment.

Armour Recce does use its' radios as its primary weapon.  Saying that, they are equipped with weapons for self-defence and use in emergency situations.  Those weapons are not meant to fight for information.  Speed, stealth and silence are their best defences.

A Recce Troop will find the Enemy and will do one of several things.  It can call in Arty on the Target.  It can 'mark' and bypass the Enemy and leave it to 'follow on' forces to take out, or it may 'Picket' the Enemy Positions and guide larger forces in to destroy the Enemy.  In an Advance to Contact, Recce uses its eyes and ears, not its weapons.  It passes all its information back so that the Commander can develop his plan to attack or move around.  Recce will probably be told to continue on with their Recce Task, or they may sent out to perform Flank Security, which is more of an early warning device in case of counter attacks than a Blocking Force.  Yes, I suppose they can be used as a Cut Off Force also, if the situation was desperate.  When not in front of a Bde, they may be tasked with Rear Area Security, and become a QRF for any Enemy Heliborne or Airborne landings in the Rear Areas of the Bde.  One of their roles is Convoy Escort.  They are not expected to take on any Armour formations. 

In recent years, Armd Recce has been operating more clandestine in the Surv role.  In some cases EW, SIGINT, or other Intelligence agencies travel with them.  That means they want to keep their presence secret from any locals.  No HUMINT involved there.

I am not experience with Infantry style Recce, so I will leave that to A-majoor, KevinB, and Paracowboy.  As I said, both operate differently, and in different areas of the Bde/BG AOR.  Armd more further out, Infantry closer in.

Canada does Recce differently most other countries.  We rely on stealth more than they do.  The Americans, Germans and French have an attitude of fighting for their information.  The Soviets incorporated Tanks into their Recce forces. 

Since Vimy Ridge, Canada has been the leader in planning from intelligence gathered from numerous sources.  ISTAR, the new buzz word for what we have always done, is the updated version of taking the Armd Recce, Inf Recce, Humint, Imagery, Cloak and Dagger stuff, INTSUMS and INTREPS from all Canadian units and Allied flanking formations, Canada, the Net, etc. to come up with a Plan.  There are dozens of 'organizations' involved with this collection.  Our different Recce organizations are only part of ISTAR.

 

[Infanteer]

We are talking Apples and Oranges here.   LCol Eyre is looking at the "Changing Role of the Infantry", not our new Recce veh for the Armour Recce role.

I made specific mention to the part of the Paper which refers to the aspects of a population that the Army as a whole will be operating amidst - it is applicable to all branches.

Can we hold up your comments on the PPCLI at Medak Pocket?

It was a hasty defence under contact for a day.  As I said, we've had gunfights in the Balkans and other not-so-friendly places, but we haven't conducted sustained combat operations for over half a decade.