Our 'maybe' new recce vehicle

[Lost_Warrior]

Being big, boxy, and sealed off seems to fit the job description perfectly.

Isn't the point of a light recce vehicle to be small and open (remove doors, roof, windshield)?  This would be the total opposite of it's intended "job description"...

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/future/

Panther Command and Liaison Vehicle

4.7m x 2.0m x 1.95m - 6.5 tonne GVW - 2.9 tonne payload - (2/EH-101?) - 28.6 hp/tonne

Crew of 2(+3)

It is designed primarily for strategic and tactical mobility with a high level of protection against anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, modular and with tuneable armour protection and stealthy design. In peacekeeping operations, currently undertaken by heavy armour and infantry fighting vehicles, the MLV provides a lower profile while still providing a high level of crew protection. In high intensity conflicts, the MLV can be configured as a scout, command or liaison vehicle or as a weapons platform.

GDLS/MoWag Duro/Eagle IV   (Eagle I was based on the Hummer)

5.0m x 2.2m x 2.0m   - 7.6 tonne GVW - 2.4 tonne payload - 33 hp/tonne

Crew of 2(+2)

The Panther was selected by the Brits. The Yanks are using uparmoured Hummers and looking for something heavier.   The Eagle vehicles are being used by the Danes (in Iraq) and the Swiss and the Eagle IV (Duro) is essentially the same concept as the uparmoured Hummers and early Eagles but on a heavier chassis.

It looks like a lot of other armies are making similar choices.

 

[Infanteer]

The "Armoured Corps" may be "the arm of decision" or "arme blanche",   inheritors of the tradition of tin suits and clydesdales, but all those other guys on horses and ponies have always been about patrolling and information. Long before even the stirrup was invented.   That's what they did when they weren't fighting, in other words that's what they most of the time.

I'll disagree with this - ever since the Egyptians routed the Canaanite army at Megiddo with war chariots, mounted forces have been an maneuver arm, an arm of decision.   Alexander's victories relied on heavy Macedonian cavalry destroying an enemy fixed by the phalanx.   The Huns smashed the Romans with horsemen, and Tariq ibn Ziyad brought Islam to Europe with his mounted warriors crossing at Gibraltar.   The Mongols, the Europeans, the Japanese all relied on mounted soldiers to smash enemy resistance.   Spanish conquistador dominated the more numerous Aztec with steel from the back of the horse.   Islamic kingdoms relied on the Mameluk, Napoleon had his "battle cavalry" and the West (in both Canada and the US) was won by the dominance of mounted units in the field.   Today, when we watch US armoured units destroy the Republican Guard, we are seeing the continuance of battlefield dominance that the mounted Cav has shared with the dismounted Infantry.   Their relationship is symbiotic, not one of dichotomy.

Sure, mounted units served reconnaissance and/or skirmish functions (by nature of their fast mounts), but so did various dismounted Infantry units.   Roman auxilia, Prussian Jaeger, British Light Infantry, and US Army Rangers are examples of this.   Reconnaissance/information gathering isn't a primary task, it is a secondary function of any maneuver force that takes to the field, mounted or dismounted.  Predominance in time and place seems mostly to have been decided by cultural outlook, devision of labour, and geography, but the Huron warrior stalking through the North American woodlands and the Polish Uhlan scouting ahead of Napoleon's Grande Armee basically served the same function - skirmishing, scouting, raiding, and fighting as part of a larger combined arms force.

 

[Infanteer]

Command and Liason, light recce, close recce - I'm seeing alot of terms mentioned here; what is this vehicle supposed to do exactly?  ???

 

[Kirkhill]

Man on horse, chariot or elephant has more mass and greater speed, thus more energy than man on foot.  In a world where the only source of mobile energy was muscle power all of the examples cited were the only method of transmitting sufficient energy to the enemy's formed mass to break it up.  Even with the advent of gunpowder it took a few hundred years to be able to change that calculus from the 1300s to 1916.

I agree, in battle the cavalry was used to break mass.  I argue it was done in the absence of anything better.

However - and ultimately here is where we differ fundamentally I believe - I know you have seen the argument.
 
Armies are not just for fighting wars. They have jobs in peace-time beyond sitting in garrison training for the next war.  They are the primary means by which governments control their territory and their people. 

People concentrated in towns can be controlled by armed people on foot (infantry) at relatively low cost in manpower. As difficult as it is to control cities it is relatively easy compared to controlling wide open spaces.  If the people are on-side with the government and the government's forces enjoy the support of the people then the people will be largely self-policing and heavy-handed methods are not required.  Conversely if the people are not on-side then no amount of armed personnel can keep control of the people indefinitely.  In the open spaces there are many places where individuals and small bodies can hide to hatch mischief. 


Infanteers on foot can't control wide open spaces.  Only the mounted soldier (and here I will include heliborne, ATV-borne, airborne, boat-borne and any other form of transported soldier) can do that and that is done primarily by patrolling.  Patrolling those spaces is a function of peace-time soldiering.  Peace-time doesn't mean the absence of conflict, or the absence of exchanged shots.  Peace-time means the absence of a declared war between states.  When people don't recognize the authority of states then the states need to impose that authority vigorously.  That requires well armed, disciplined supporters of the government that are mounted.

In time of war cavalry may have been massed to provide "breaking power" but in time of "peace" they were the principle means of keeping control of the countryside. 

Policing, in the face of armed resistance, is an army job.

Policing the countryside is a cavalry job.  You can't police the countryside in an M1A2 TUSK.  They are nice to have on hand, even necessary, but not particularly practical when patrolling large areas.  The 10 to 15 MCAD invested in a tank might be better invested in patrol vehicles and a couple of utility helicopters.



Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

I know you have seen the argument.

Yes, Kirkhill; we are both very familiar with the terrain. 

Policing as you use the term is used to imply coercive force on an occupied people.  I remain suspicious of the dichotomy you have drawn up with "dismount policing urban areas/mounted policing rural areas".  I'll restate my claim that predominance of the "mount or dismount" in time and place seems mostly to have been decided by cultural outlook, division of labour, and geography.  There are plenty of examples in history that suggest that the dichotomy you raise isn't always the case - the Spartans policed their Messinian helots with the phalanx; most Native Americans (who didn't even have large mammals to mount) used political coercion backed by punitive raids on foot - the Aztecs raided for sacrifice, the Iroquois to decimate a village and take captives to adopt.  In many cases forces weren't either/or but both - the Samurai enforced the cultural mores of the Tokugawa Shogunate from the back of his mount and from foot - they were masters of combat on both levels.  Indeed, cavalry in the West adopted the "dragoon" as a force to accommodate the technological factors of the rifle - mechanization put them back on their mounts for the fight and mixed the "hussar" with the "dragoon" for a fully effective combined arms force.  The M1 is a perfect vehicle to police the countryside with - we've seen the Americans do it in the Balkans on more than one occasion.  We policed Kosovo with our Leopards.

The capacity of coercion is more a factor of social will than the platform available to execute it with.  The Romans pacified the Gauls with the infantry; sure, they hired/co-opted Gaulish horsemen, but in the end, it was the Legion that was forced the issue and subdued the tribes.  The Mongols relied on the mounted warrior to subdue both the vast Eurasian hinterland and the ancient civilization of China.  Often, the countryside was irrelevant; power flows from the cities and towns; it is the center of gravity for an established people and they policed their powerbase with whatever seemed to fit the bill; mounted on horse, camel, or sandal was merely an issue of what was around.

I guess this should get back to the thread at hand.  What are we building and equipping our Army for.  Coercive force obviously; you're correct in pointing out that the Army is built upon coercive force - the headman (in our case state) and the warrior (in our case, the Army) rely on eachother for legitimacy; with no warrior, the headman lacks the imperative to back its claim to authority; with no headman, the warrior lacks legitimacy and becomes a marauding parasite.  Ironic that the United States, which culturally abhorred an coercive, state-backed army (but not a navy) and codified this suspicion in its own Constitution built its strength on the coercive force of its (until recently) mistrusted military forces.

What sort of capability do we want to equip this coercive force with?  The Samurai didn't take a lame horse out of the stable when he was going to trot into an unfriendly village for some Bushido-style "peacekeeping/peace-enforcement"; he put on his best lacquered armour, his fearsome helmet and mounted his best charger.  Should we not adhere to the same principle?  What will this vehicle do for us?  I've argued that we should equip for the "top level" and can progressively gear down if so required.  Close recce?  Can someone explain it to me how we will close recce the enemy in a warfighting scenario?  Please take into account the link I provided that shows that the United States, when fighting in the Gulf (on two separate occasions) simply pulled all of its "close recce" vehicles off the front line due to the fact that they were too exposed.  Is this an effective "warfighting" vehicle?  If not; strike one.

Okay, so we ignore the concept of equipping for war and gearing down for anything else - how will this vehicle add to our capabilities in SASO or peacekeeping?  What can this do that the Coyote/LAVIII/G-Wagon can't?  The Iltis was deemed to be a very effective platform as it was open and offered 360 degree awareness - it was complemented by the Coyote/LAV which is big enough to cow down the more belligerent types.  Is a light jeep exposed?  Sure.  But what is this thing going to offer us; will it survive a stack of mines or a VBIED that we see HUMVEE's succumb to daily?  Will it do any better than a G-Wagon if an insurgent pulls an RPG?  Nope.  Does this really add capability to a SASO/Peace support-enforcement-keeping role that we often find ourselves in?  If not, than strike two.

Is the overarching rationale for this purchase the "Made in Canada" sticker?  If so, strike three.

I'm merely being skeptical here; if somebody can point out how this enhances our capability, then great - maybe we're better off.  But to date, I've seen nothing in the arguments to convince me that it is.  The decision to let our heavy armour capability lie dormant and die a natural death seems to be self-inflicted (we can't blame Trudeau this time); I'm all for making the best of what we have and ensuring that it is used in the most effective way possible, but I won't accept adding another small pony to our stable when what we really need is a fierce charger.  I see "close recce", "mud recce" and "command and liaison" - can we not do this with what we have now?

Anyways, rant off.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

Command and Liason, light recce, close recce - I'm seeing alot of terms mentioned here; what is this vehicle supposed to do exactly?

As much as possible so that the budget doesn't have to buy and support a multitude of specialty vehicles as I understand it.  This is true for the Brits, Aussies, Europeans and even the Yanks.

 

[Kirkhill]

Policing as you use the term is used to imply coercive force on an occupied people.

There you go, you libertarian you.   Always assuming the worst.   Yes policing can be employed as coercion of an occupied people.   That however is ultimately a self-defeating strategy IMHO.   No government can long stand against the will of its people, or words to that effect.   I rather see policiing as a necessary tactic in a troubled community where there are disruptive elements that prevent ordinary folks longing for the simple life (apologies to Paris and Nicole) from going about their daily commerce.  

Most folks will support a government if the government can give them security and prosperity, no matter how corrupt they are.........

Policing is part of giving them that security.

Policing by the army is necessary when the disruptive elements are well armed and organized though in the minority and not enjoying the support of the majority.   If they do enjoy the support of the majority then the army may as well return to barracks because the government has a lot more work to do on the suasion side of things.

You are right to be suspicious of the dichotomy between foot/urban-mounted/rural.   I use this only as a starting point based on historical realities and still true in "ancient" cities where cities are "pedestrian friendly" or not vehicle friendly.    Dispersed garrisons (police or army) of soldiers or police on foot are suitable there.   In modern cities that are vehicle friendly then small patrol vehicles (RCMP cruisers or CLVs) are appropriate as they are in environments like the prairies, or Europe or areas of countries like Iraq that are well served by networks of roads.   Just like the interface between country and city is broadening and the border has moved from the well-defined city wall to the ever decreasing density of the suburbs so the zone that wheeled cavalry can patrol and control is ever increasing.

But cavalry was also responsible for patrolling the areas that roads weren't.   The horse was particularly useful in those locales as well both for carrying small patrols as well as for large rapid intervention forces.  

By necessity the horse was a mult-functional platform. Moreso than the chariot.

Wheeled cavalry resembles the chariot in utility having both utility in patrol and the assault on suitable terrain. Tracked cavalry can be likened to any of the heavy assault forces of history.   So what is available to handle the patrolling abilities of the horse soldier in rugged terrain?   Anything else driven by horsepower? Trucks, ATVs, Helicopters, Aircraft, Boats, Ships, Hovercraft.....?   Any platform that allows the soldier to cover large distances rapidly, but also to endure for extended periods of time supplying presence?

From there is it much of a leap to seeing the entire modern army with its emphasis on mobility as a cavalry force?   As a manoeuvre force?

The M1 is a lousy vehicle to police the countryside.   It needs roads and railways to get it to the scene and over which to move its fuel, tracks and other spare parts even if it doesn't fire a shot and have to be re-ammoed.   The roads and bridges in the Balkans were often too weak, low or narrow to support the M1 constricting its range of movement.   Its need for fuel really limits its range. It is great assault vehicle.   It makes a marvellous relocatable pillbox.   It is a lousy patrol vehicle for the many spaces far removed from road networks.

I do think that we should equip for war.   Full stop.   Agreed.   I also think we should train for war.   Again agreed.   I think that the reason that the military needs to be employed in policing in intransigent or disputed areas is precisely because they are equipped and trained to employ violent means and lethal force in support of the government of the day.  As important they are disciplined and courageous enough (there's a funny word in this day and age) NOT to act violently and lethally until told to do so.   If the enemy is a large state with a large force than the army needs to be able to concentrate sufficient breaking power against that mass as to discourage the activity of the enemy combatants.   These days that does not necessarily require matching them soldier for soldier, tank for tank, aircraft for aircraft.   If the enemy is a mob of heavily armed insurrectionists then the army needs to be able to concentrate sufficient breaking power to eliminate that threat and convince or coerce them into seeing the error of their ways.   The issue is not one of disagreeing on the need for "concentration of forces".   It is the next one on the list "economy of effort".   That economy of effort not only includes manpower and ammunition, ultimately it includes dollars as well.

How about this for an option?   I will stipulate the need for the M1A2 TUSK - a marvellous piece of kit without doubt.   But how about, instead of buying two TUSKs with two crews we buy one TUSK and 4 Patrol Vehicles with 5 crews for the same dollars.   Keep the crews together and rotate them through the tasks.

That would put expenditures into the same range as your ancient Mongols, my border reivers or the French knights at Agincourt - all of whom tended to travel with not a single horse but a string of horses.   The armoured knights only had one or two warhorses capable of carrying them into battle. They generally rode lighter riding horses most of the time, the same type of horses used for patrolling.

Historical analogies aside.

The period we have entered into is one of declining risk of government to government clashes,   the costs for all parties is just too high. At the same time central authority is being challenged all over the place and the need is for authority to reexert itself.   The threat is not concentrated. It is dispersed.   It is not heavily armed, nor compared to a professional military, is it particularly well trained or equipped to slug it out with a professional military.     The dispersed threat demands a dispersed, or at least a highly mobile rapid-response capability.   The lack of concentration on the enemies' parts and the relative low weight of fire that they can produce allows for smaller units to be fielded to counter them.   You yourself, and others, have argued this very point, speaking approvingly of the US Marines move to a small unit unit philosophy dependent on lower rank competence.  

The army needs to prepare for war against a concentrated force, absolutely, but right now there is a demand for forces to exert control over smaller, less well equipped forces operating over vast distances.   Both requirements have to be met.

And by the way, I will also stipulate that in uncertain situations it might be appropriate to lead with an M1A2 TUSK to figure out what is going on. On the other hand a swarm of Micro UAVs with sound, heat, radar and optical sensors might also generate a useful picture.

Cheers.

PS - Made in Canada is a poor rationale for buying kit if that is the only rationale.   On the other hand if it is good kit and gets the job done, at a competitive price, I am all for it.

 

[KevinB]

I'm just shaking my head about this vehicle  -- I could accept it as a LSVW replacement.

I just get the feeling we are putting our heads in the sand though with the idea of this vehicle as a "recce" vehicle.


Something like the Chenowth DPV or ALSV fits my mind for a light close recce item (and damn they look cool too...)

http://www.chenowth.com/


Recce in PSO's and Lower to Mid Intensity battles/conflicts has to interact with the populace to gain info.  Recconaisance is NOT surviellance - nor is it driving down a road ignoring, and offending the locals...


I fail to see how this system does anything better than a GWagon or Coyote/LAV

 

[a_majoor]

I'm just shaking my head about this vehicle  -- I could accept it as a LSVW replacement.

If we are considering the "Duro" APV as a potential replacement for the LSVW, we are being rooked again, it has a very small area to put the payload. Might as well buy the Duro truck.

As Infanteer alluded to in the "Trading the Sabre for Stealth" thread, light vehicles like the HMMVW are too vulnerable in a high intensity conflict to be much use to the commander. Given the flavor of the day is Full Spectrum Ops, you could be driving your Illtis/G-wagon/Duro through the market, happily talking to the locals, then turn the corner and be hosed down with RPG and machine gun fire. Some soldiers might be able to exit the burning vehicle, but that patrol is now over, and the information developed (there is an ambush at GR123456) will get stale pretty fast as the Jihadis blend into the urban landscape.

The "LAV with Dismounts" model I advocate would have to be handled differently (park the LAV, let the dismounts walk through the market), and I recognize that after a certain level of attack even a LAV will not be able to protect the recce crew, but in terms of functionality, logistics and the ability for the CF to field and support it, I think this model will go a lot farther than using any warmed over light truck.

Small purpose built vehicles like the Fennik could partially answer the need instead (the masts can be substituted by an OWS with a machine gun or AGL), choosing this solution will place the emphasis more on the "sneak and peek" model since the Fennik and similar vehicles won't have a lot of fighting power. Big patrol vehicles like the ADI "Bushmaster" are not recce vehicles per se, but can also support aggressive recce by transporting Assault troops who can do dismounted patrols, perform close protection tasks and develop HUMINT as a compliment to recce AFVs and surveillance systems.

The real problem here (and I think someone has said this already) is we are considering the vehicle, then adjusting our doctrine and TTPs to match the capabilities, rather than having a well thought out Recce doctrine (much less an overarching doctrine) and making the buy based on the needs identified by the doctrine. This would also require a very flexible mindset, since the doctrine might identify we have too few recce assets, and need to re role other units or stand up new ones; or conversely we are overborn with recce assets, and need to re role the current crop of recce units to do something else.

In the mean time, the Duro APV is a great looking truck, and should be featured in the next "Mad Max" movie. For the CF, it might make an acceptable LO or Commander's runner, and this role would make sense if we buy the Duro truck as the light logistics vehicle for commonality of parts, training and supply. Otherwise, let's end the farce and put the Duro APV back on the shelf, where it belongs.

 

[Infanteer]

The real problem here (and I think someone has said this already) is we are considering the vehicle, then adjusting our doctrine and TTPs to match the capabilities, rather than having a well thought out Recce doctrine (much less an overarching doctrine) and making the buy based on the needs identified by the doctrine. This would also require a very flexible mindset, since the doctrine might identify we have too few recce assets, and need to re role other units or stand up new ones; or conversely we are overborn with recce assets, and need to re role the current crop of recce units to do something else.

That was the crux of my rant.

How about this for an option?  I will stipulate the need for the M1A2 TUSK - a marvellous piece of kit without doubt.  But how about, instead of buying two TUSKs with two crews we buy one TUSK and 4 Patrol Vehicles with 5 crews for the same dollars.  Keep the crews together and rotate them through the tasks.

That would put expenditures into the same range as your ancient Mongols, my border reivers or the French knights at Agincourt - all of whom tended to travel with not a single horse but a string of horses.  The armoured knights only had one or two warhorses capable of carrying them into battle. They generally rode lighter riding horses most of the time, the same type of horses used for patrolling.

I'd opt for the two M1A2s for the following reasons:

1)  1 Abrams will be a great force multiplier for a light/medium force in most situations.  2 Abrams would be a fantastic force multiplier (you need 2 incase one is disabled; the second can pull it off).

2)  Would rather have an M1 than 4 patrol vehicles - the M1 will survive a stand up fight; better than having 4 jeeps that our rendered useless (or dead) as the situation shifts from block 1 to block 3 in a snap.

3)  We already have a variety of patrol vehicles - GWagon, Coyote, LAV, black caddies; don't need anymore shaggy ponies as that is all that is in the stable now and we haven't really figured out why we're buying horses yet (no comprehensive doctrine).

 

[Recce41]

The G wagon is and was never intended to be the Recce Veh. It was an intern, it was there to replace the Ilitis. The Coyote is NOT a Recce Veh, it is a Survailance veh. There is two types of ARMOUR Recce. Recce by force and Recce by stelth. As one of the SMEs of Armour Recce at the school. We require a Armoured type cross country veh.
One role of Armour Recce is to get to a point and secure it IE Bridge, crossroads. You also require a veh that can get there. Ether as I stated, Force as in AAR role or by Stealth.
Our TTPs are out lined for this. I know I helped write them. This veh is better than a GW.

:evil: :tank:

 

[a_majoor]

The G wagon is and was never intended to be the Recce Veh. It was an intern, it was there to replace the Ilitis. The Coyote is NOT a Recce Veh, it is a Survailance veh. There is two types of ARMOUR Recce. Recce by force and Recce by stelth. As one of the SMEs of Armour Recce at the school. We require a Armoured type cross country veh.
One role of Armour Recce is to get to a point and secure it IE Bridge, crossroads. You also require a veh that can get there. Ether as I stated, Force as in AAR role or by Stealth.
Our TTPs are out lined for this. I know I helped write them. This veh is better than a GW.

I have no doubts the Duro APV is better than an Illtis or G-wagon, but that is mostly a matter of degree. The crux of the objections to the Duro is that it is not as capable as a Fennik or similar vehicle in "sneak and peek", and it is not at all capable in the Recce by force scenarios. In fact, given the rapidity that situations can change in a Full Spectrum Ops scenario, Recce by Stealth might turn into Recce by force in a big hurry, in which case you will really wish you were mounted in an AFV in the first place....

As for the G-wagon being an interim vehicle, it seems in the CF the interim lasts up to 20 years. Perhaps we could prevail on the powers that be to do it right the first time?

 

[Kirkhill]

Recce by Stealth might turn into Recce by force in a big hurry, in which case you will really wish you were mounted in an AFV in the first place....

I thought one of the reasons to do recce was to determine where scarce heavy assets could be concentrated?  The alternative is to disperse them widely.  If that is done, if they are deployed in penny packets, doesn't that reduce their availability for effective shock action?

Perhaps there is a case for an all AFV mounted army, although I got the impression that many here supported light forces.  It just doesn't seem reasonable that that will ever be feasible, even if it were desirable.

 

[Infanteer]

Hadji, sitting in the mosque or bazaar with an RPG, would just love for us to get to a point and secure it with a glorified technical.  He's smart, and wouldn't even leave himself open to fire - he'd just lay a VBIED out to vaporize whatever trucks we sent forward.

http://www.dtdude.com/cj_44179.wmv

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Whilst the Duro APV may be a capable patrol vehicle for constabulary type actions, when the proverbial heat gets turned up, its lack of armor and firepower seriously negate its usefulness in a high intensity conflict scenario.  

For those who argue that mounted recce. elements require a vehicle that gives them an element of stealth, I ask that they provide some concrete examples of the successful application of mounted/mechanized 'stealth'/'mud' recce. elements outside of canned training environments in semi-wilderness training areas where the commanders OODA loop allows for ability of recce. elements to report, bypass and piquet enemy positions.   As combat experiences have shown, http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/35526.0.html and based on my personal experience in Iraq, application of time-intensive stealth recce. through the use of light wheeled vehicles (ie. HMMWV) doesn't work in a environent where the optempo is high, a real credible enemy threat exists where they can pass information as easily as picking up a cellphone and saying "Hi Hasan, this is Ibrahim...there are some crusaders in jeeps parked in old man Muhammed's date grove...do you want me to set the IED string out and hit them with an RPG ambush when they move down towards Haditha?"

About the only real application of 'stealth' when it comes to recce. is the application of a dismounted scout/sniper team heavily camouflaged and moving extremely slowly.   To try and play sneaky beaky in a camouflaged lightly armored low-profile vehicle in somebody elses backyard is borderline foolhardy given that today and tomorrow's enemies have learned the value of using irregular forces in all phases of warfare.

I say to heck with the recce. by stealth model and go with a flexible medium armored platform.   In an ideal world a vehicle such as the Swedish CV90 would make an excellent recce. vehicle as would the LAV-25 with a 4 man dismount team.   I'm very interested to see what the Swedes do with the SEV program in that a tracked/wheeled plug and play hull system could provide the 'solution' for the search for an effective recce. platform.

 

[Kirkhill]

"Hi Hasan, this is Ibrahim...there are some crusaders in jeeps parked in old man Muhammed's date grove...do you want me to set the IED string out and hit them with an RPG ambush when they move down towards Haditha?"

Sorry Matt, but I'm going to be even more of an idiot than usual here and suggest that Ibrahim is doing a fine job of recce by stealth.  

The problem seems to be how do you conduct a stealthy operation when everything about you is designed to set you apart from the civilian population. You wear a uniform, hard hat and armour, drive a vehicle that doesn't blend in with the rest of the civilian traffic,   the gun overhead in particular advertising who you are.    All of that screams "presence", a necessary attribute, hopefully reassuring to some portion of the civilian population, but some might see a presence as a "target".   In that event, I can fully understand the desire to have as much armour plate between me and the incoming RPG.   I think that is why the guys in the Stryker Brigade are relatively pleased with their gear.

Driving any military vehicle on a road is likely to be noticed, therefore it seems that recce by stealth in any urban or suburban environment in a military vehicle is a pretty long shot at the best of times. On the other hand, coming over the fields into old man Muhammad's date grove in the middle of the night in an APV might qualify as a stealthy approach.   Recce may patrol, but not all patrols are recce patrols.    

I'll try to shut up now.   This is your fight.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Sorry Matt, but I'm going to be even more of an idiot than usual here and suggest that Ibrahim is doing a fine job of recce by stealth.  

The problem seems to be how do you conduct a stealthy operation when everything about you is designed to set you apart from the civilian population. You wear a uniform, hard hat and armour, drive a vehicle that doesn't blend in with the rest of the civilian traffic,   the gun overhead in particular advertising who you are.    All of that screams "presence", a necessary attribute, hopefully reassuring to some portion of the civilian population, but some might see a presence as a "target".   In that event, I can fully understand the desire to have as much armour plate between me and the incoming RPG.   I think that is why the guys in the Stryker Brigade are relatively pleased with their gear.

Driving any military vehicle on a road is likely to be noticed, therefore it seems that recce by stealth in any urban or suburban environment in a military vehicle is a pretty long shot at the best of times. On the other hand, coming over the fields into old man Muhammad's date grove in the middle of the night in an APV might qualify as a stealthy approach.   Recce may patrol, but not all patrols are recce patrols.    

I'll try to shut up now.   This is your fight.

lol...I think I was working on my response to this:   http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/35526.0.html (edited to show correct thread) as you typed this response.   See my opinion on 'True Stealth'.

Unfortunately, while coming into old man Muhammad's date grove in the middle of the night would be preferable, there is a greater likelihood that the optempo is going to dictate that you conduct your op during the height of the day...

If we want true 'stealth recce' then lets ditch our uniforms and military pattern vehicles and go with local garb and contract out a bunch of beat-up looking, but serviceable toyota pickup trucks and other local vehicles that will allow recce. forces to achieve 'stealth' in the local environment.

 

[Kirkhill]

If we want true 'stealth recce' then lets ditch our uniforms and military pattern vehicles and go with local garb and contract out a bunch of beat-up looking, but serviceable toyota pickup trucks and other local vehicles that will allow recce. forces to achieve 'stealth' in the local environment.

  I think the Brits were trying something of that sort in Basra. http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/34799.0.html

And thanks for taking my comment in the spirit it was meant.  Cheers

PS your link led me back to this thread.  I'd be interested in seeing your comments.

 

[Infanteer]

I thought one of the reasons to do recce was to determine where scarce heavy assets could be concentrated?   The alternative is to disperse them widely.   If that is done, if they are deployed in penny packets, doesn't that reduce their availability for effective shock action?

Perhaps there is a case for an all AFV mounted army, although I got the impression that many here supported light forces.   It just doesn't seem reasonable that that will ever be feasible, even if it were desirable.

Here's my idea on the whole thing.

I think recce (or anything for that matter) is going to be done in an environment that presents an interplay between complexity and diffusion.

Mechanization, armour, firepower, logistical sustainment, digitization - these are all force multipliers that act to give professional Western forces (yes - us included) a huge asymmetric advantage when dealing with others.   The enemy either realizes this or doesn't; the dumb ones don't and die pretty quick and the smart ones do and become very capable foes.   We must assume that the enemy will eventually pick up on this (read Biddle's Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare - one can see how Taliban and AQ forces figure out how to avoid US firepower).   Why all our fad military theories like "Information Dominance" assume that the enemy is going to sit around while we get a bead on him is beyond me....

Anyways, the enemy will avoid these asymmetric vulnerabilities by using complexity - dispersing amongst complex human environments, complex physical environments, and complex informational environments.   US surveillance and recce assets were spectacular in templating a Republican Guard Brigade - it was either shot to heck or (in most cases) gave up anyways.   What it couldn't template would be a group of Fedayeen sitting in a village that hold up a divisional advance for a day.

When the tempo drops and we fall into "Block 1-2" type operations (SASO, Peace support, etc) we must assume that the bad guy will have "information dominance" over us.   Matt's example is a good one.   I was fortunate to catch a bit of MGen Bailey's (British Army, Retd) presentation at AUSA - his corresponding paper published by the Institute of Land Warfare, "Over By Christmas": Campaigning, Delusions, and Force Requirements aptly sums up the situation:

The doctrinal premise of information superiority or even dominance, of speed, fire-superiority and the avoidance of attrition had itself become a party to creating the conditions which those forces had been designed to avoid or render irrelevant.   There is a need to challenge some of the fundamental tenets of our concepts and doctrine.   For example, the notion that we might enjoy information superiority in the decisive operations in which we are currently engaged in Iraq, or information dominance on some future "transparent battlefield" - a term still commonly bandied about - does seem rather unreflective and self-serving.

....For example, our opponents in Iraq today undoubtedly hold information superiority over us: They are better able to identify our personnel and what they are doing vice versa - after all, we wear especially procured distinctive dress, camouflaged military uniform.   Expensive high-tech camouflage paint ensures that our vehicles are conspicuous, and these move routinely in large groups between well-identified bases, along predictable and well-observed routes.   Our strategic and operational objectives and our tactical operations are probably better known to the enemy than are his to us.   Our opponents' identities, appearance, means of transport and movements are, by comparison, harder to ascertain and to understand.

I basically see two scenarios - the tempo is either high (warfighting), and thus nobody knows what the heck is going on and you rely on superior combined arms tactics to win the day, or it the tempo is low (SASO, insurgency, etc, etc), and the fact that we are the invaders in an expeditionary setting means that the enemy should be assumed to have information dominance.

In either case, I don't see this type of vehicle as desirable.   We call the LAV the Light Armoured Vehicle for a reason - it is light; it is probably the low end of the spectrum when it comes vehicles you'd want to be cruising around in.   We've seen LAV's survive mineblasts (Ethiopia), sniper fire, and IED's (Afghanistan).   The American's also seem to be having favourable performance with them throughout the spectrum of conflict.   The relative weight and speed of the wheeled platform gives it some inherent advantages over its medium (M3) and heavy (M1) brethren, but all seem to be worth sending out.   There is always RPGs, but as the Aussie Infantry Captain at AUSA said to me "Listen, these things have taken out M1's; realistically, unless your in a MBT, you have to find ways other than armour to protect against them" (I'd be interested to see how many RPG's have actually taken out M1s in Iraq).

Conversely, this thing comes in at a quarter to a third of the weight of a LAV/Coyote.   It's lighter than light.   From arguments made on this thread, it's no good for warfighting because the tempo is too high for such a platform to be at the spearhead.   It's no good for lower tempo ops because, as a vehicle with no intrinsic strengths, hadji (who is assumed to have info dominance remember) will see it for as nothing but a target of opportunity.   You are putting four bodies into a vehicle that is vulnerable to plenty of things at all different times.   We are not diffusing or hardening our assets with this.

How to survive contact in complex environments when trying to find information on the enemy (or show a presence) - diffuse or harden (essentially, get as forceful or stealthy as possible).   Harden by bringing in the big boys that can take some punishment (M1 TUSK) or diffuse it by spreading out the forces out amongst a complex environment.   Either do it with dismounts out of a LAV or send in you Light Infantry (who should excel at utilizing complex microterrain while on foot) to conduct you reconnaissance on foot (the Scout/Sniper team is a good example).   It's easier to take four guys out when they are in a jeep than when they are spread out in a street.   It seems that there is no way to harden our diffuse a technical.

Just a few ideas,
Infanteer